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This rational idea of a peaceful, even if not friendly, thoroughgoing com-
munity of all nations on the earth that can come into relations affect-
ing one another is not a philanthropic (ethical) principle but a principle 
 having to do with rights. Nature has enclosed them all together within 
determinate limits (by the spherical shape of the place they live in, a glo-
bus terraqueus) [Globe of earth and water]. And since possession of the 
land, on which an inhabitant of the earth can live, can be thought only as 
possession of a part of a determinate whole, and so as possession of that 
to which each of them originally has a right, it follows that all nations 
stand originally in a community of land, though not of rightful commu-
nity of possession (communio) and so of use of it, or of property in it; 
instead they stand in a community of possible physical interaction (com-
mercium), that is, in a thoroughgoing relation of each to all the others 
of offering to engage in commerce with any other, and each has a right to 
make this attempt without the other being authorized to behave toward 
it as an enemy because it has made this attempt. – This right, since it has 
to do with the possible union of all nations with a view to certain uni-
versal laws for their possible commerce, can be called cosmopolitan right 
(ius cosmopoliticum).1
immanuel kant, 1797
Just as in international law the land-appropriating state could treat the 
public property (imperium) of appropriated colonial territory as leader-
less, so it could treat private property (dominium) as leaderless. It could 
ignore native property rights and declare itself to be the sole owner of 
the land; it could appropriate indigenous chieftains’ rights and could do 
so whether or not that was a true legal succession; it could create private 
government property, while continuing to recognize certain native use 
rights; it could initiate public trustee-ownership of the state; and it also 
could allow native use rights to remain unchanged, and could rule over 
indigenous peoples through a kind of dominium eminens […].2
carl schmitt, 1950
1 I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (ed. and trans. by M. Gregor), Cambridge, 2011, 121.
2 C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum 
(translated and annotated by G.L. Ulmen), New York, 2006, 199. For the German, see C. 
Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Volkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum, 2nd ed.  Berlin, 1997. 
x Preface 
In 1796, the British poet, painter and printmaker William Blake (1757–1827) 
drew the famous allegory of colonialism named ‘Europe supported by Africa 
and America.’ The three continents are represented by women, symbolizing 
the femininity and, thus, the fertility of the soil forming, together with exten-
sive surfaces of water, the globe. Land was depicted as a vital element for hu-
man kind. Europe is in the centre of the painting and is decorated with pearls; 
she is white and beautiful, but indifferent. In contrast, Africa and America 
wear bracelets on the upper arm – a sign of subjection – and are coloured and 
servile, but intelligent and caring. Although the three continents are clearly 
separated and have different hierarchical places, they are all part of one and 
the same globe – as metaphorically showed by the rope which every continent 
holds in the hand. This painting together with the fragments from the works of 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) made me question 
the justification of colonialism and imperialism, and write this book.
Since the sixteenth century, colonialism and imperialism have led to a con-
frontation between European and non-European nations. The allegory drawn 
by Blake shows the liberal view on colonialism, which emphasizes the hierar-
chy between nations with the Europeans and their norms and values on top 
of the pyramid. European civilization was exemplary of how the world had 
to be conceived and organized and would bring order and wealth to every na-
tion. The Europeans were inclined to impose their norms and values and their 
interpretation of law and order on non-European nations. This resulted in a 
divided view of the world.
With regard to the constitution of cosmopolitan right in combination with 
colonialism, Kant addresses the rights which a civilian of the world, a cosmo-
politan, has. Under this cosmopolitan right, Kant distinguishes the right to 
visit and the right to hospitality. Everyone who arrives on foreign territory has 
 Schmitt contextualizes his argumentation in a preceding passage: ‘A completely  different 
problem from land-appropriation, which proceeded inside Europe in the form of changes in 
the political sphere regarding a state are with a common legal order of property and econo-
my, was land-appropriation of free colonial soil outside Europe. This soil was free to be oc-
cupied, as long as it did not belong to a state in the sense of internal European interstate law. 
The power of indigenous chieftains over completely uncivilized peoples was not considered 
to be in the public sphere; native use of the soil was not considered to be private property. 
One could not speak logically of a legal succession in an imperium, not even when a Euro-
pean land-appropriator had concluded treaties with indigenous princes or chieftains and, 
for whatever motives, considered them to be binding. […] The land-appropriating state did 
not need to respect any rights to the soil existing within the appropriated land, unless these 
rights somehow were connected with the private property of a member of a civilized state 
belonging to the order of interstate, international law.’ Ibid., 198–199.
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the right to visit and has a right to non-hostile behaviour: ‘He [the stranger] 
must not be treated with hostility, so long as he behaves in a peaceable man-
ner in the place he happens to be in.’3 In his later work of 1797, Kant elaborates 
on this right to hospitality, which has strong parallels to Vitoria’s conception of 
natural law.4 As a matter of fact, his right of hospitality can be considered as 
a right of communication, in which voluntary contact between peoples is the 
core instance. Cosmopolitan right5 rules the relation between States and other 
nations and between nations themselves and the principle of universal hospi-
tality6 motivates these relations, in the context of the spherical world with its 
limited surface. As a matter of fact, the right to hospitality forms the boundary 
of colonialism. But where does hospitality stop and does colonialism begin? 
What are the limits to respect and toleration and which rights and duties are 
involved in the confrontation between nations? Or, was, according to Schmitt, 
might right? Were colonialism and imperialism per definition (not) justified? 
These are the questions with which I was occupied before writing this book. 
Although I answered the justification question regarding the European civi-
lization mission only in legal terms, I had to involve the political, economic, 
social and cultural context of colonialism and imperialism – like a legal histo-
rian should.
This book is based on a Ph.D-dissertation in law, which was defended at 
Tilburg University in November 2014. I am grateful to my supervisors, Professor 
Randall Lesaffer and Professor Willem van Genugten, who guided me on the 
way to completion of my Ph.D-trajectory.
At this place, I would also like to express my profound gratitude to the direc-
tors of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International 
Law in Heidelberg, Professor Armin von Bogdandy and, in particular, Professor 
Anne Peters. Without the Institute’s financial support, the English editing of 
the book had not been possible. As regards my employment in  Heidelberg, 
 particular thanks must go to all staff members and visiting fellows of the 
3 I. Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,’ in: H.S. Reiss (ed.), Kant: Political Writings 
(trans. by H.B. Nisbet), Cambridge, 1991, p. 106.
4 F. de Vitoria, De Indis et de Iure Belli Relectiones (edited by Ernest Nys and translated by John 
Pawley Bate), Washington, 1917.
5 ‘This rational idea of a peaceful, even if not friendly, thoroughgoing community of all na-
tions on the earth that can come into relations affecting one another is not a philanthropic 
(ethical) principle but a principle having to do with rights.’ I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 
(ed. and trans. by M. Gregor), Cambridge, 2011, p. 121.
6 For a current account of the right to hospitality, see G. Cavallar, The Rights of Strangers. Theo-
ries of International Hospitality, Aldershot/Burlington, 2002.
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 Institute whose presence and friendship was invaluable throughout the pro-
cess of writing.
My sincere admiration goes to Dick Broeren for his meticulous linguistic 
revision of the draft manuscript.
I am particularly grateful to my sister, Janneke van der Linden, who carefully 
created the illustration on the cover, which incorporates the main message of 
the book.
Of course, all the errors and mistakes remain my own. I have attempted to 
render this study up to date as far as 29 February 2016. This inevitably implies 
that important later developments could not be covered.
Finally, I would like to thank the publishers for their confidence, patience 
and impressive spirit of cooperation. I am indebted to the anonymous readers 
who reviewed my draft manuscript for Brill/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; their 
valuable comments and suggestions, which I have largely followed, helped to 
improve the book. I am particularly grateful to Jennifer Obdam and her team for 
preparing this publication in their well-known efficient and professional way.
Heidelberg, March 2016
chapter 1
New Imperialism: Imperium, Dominium and 
Responsibility under International Law
1 Introduction
The responsibility of European powers for their past actions as colonizers has 
not wanted for scholarly attention. The present book contributes to this live-
ly debate by exploring that responsibility under international law. Assuming 
such responsibility presupposes the violation of international law as it stood 
at the time of colonization. In the ‘Scramble for Africa’1 (1870–1914) during the 
age of New Imperialism, European States and non-State actors mainly used 
cession and protectorate treaties to acquire territorial sovereignty (imperium) 
and property rights over land (dominium). A key question raised in this book 
is whether in doing so these European parties did or did not systematically 
violate these treaties. If they did, the question arises whether this violation 
offers a legal basis to hold former colonizing powers responsible under con-
temporary international law. To answer these questions, three case studies will 
be performed. These concern the colonization of Nigeria by Great Britain, of 
Equatorial Africa by France and of Cameroon by Germany. Performing these 
case studies essentially entails examining treaty-making practices of European 
colonial powers and African rulers, and the aim of this inquiry is twofold: to re-
veal the legal dimensions of colonialism and to explore grounds that could give 
rise to responsibility for violation of the law during the colonization of Africa.
1 ‘Historians called the period of sudden changes in the political map of Africa in the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century the period of “the scramble for African territory,” 
characterized, as it was, by a rapidity of transfer of power of dimensions unprecedented in 
the history of mankind.’ C.H. Alexandrowicz, ‘The Role of Treaties in the European-African 
Confrontation in the Nineteenth Century,’ in: A.K. Mensah-Brown (ed.), African International 
Legal History (New York: unitar, 1975), 28. The ‘Scramble for Africa’ is the popular word 
combination to describe the acquisition and partition of Africa. Thomas Pakenham wrote 
his notorious book The Scramble for Africa (1991), giving a historical description of the Eu-
ropean colonial venture in Africa. T. Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, new edn (London: 
Abacus, 2009). For a 19th-century account of the partition, see J.S. Keltie, The Partition of 
Africa (London: Edward Stanford, 1895). The French jurist Henri Brunschwig pointed at the 
difference in meaning between the English ‘scramble’ and the French ‘course au clocher.’ See 
H. Brunschwig, ‘Scramble’ et ‘Course au Clocher,’ Journal of African History, 12 (1971), 140–141.
© Mieke van der Linden, 2017 | doi 10.1163/9789004321199_002 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
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This introductory chapter sets the scene by covering preliminary matters. If 
first provides a brief overview of the temporal and spatial dimensions of New 
Imperialism (§2). Second, it positions this book in the existing international 
legal discourse (§3). Third, it explores the central role of the concepts of sov-
ereignty and property (§4). It then addresses the relevance of the book’s topic 
both to legal research and to a broader social context (§5).It then moves on to 
perform three cases studies and it describes the methodology used (§6). The 
final section offers an overview of the topics of the remaining chapters (§7).
2 New Imperialism
Imperialism, defined generally in the context of this book, concerns the rela-
tionship between certain European powers and the lands and peoples they 
subjugated. In the words of Benjamin Cohen, imperialism is ‘any relationship 
of effective domination or control, political or economic, direct or indirect, 
of one nation over another.’2 This relationship is often referred to in terms of 
centre-periphery dualism, or the dichotomy of two worlds, namely, the civ-
ilized against the uncivilized. It is here that the difference between the no-
tions of imperialism and colonialism appears. Imperialism as the relationship, 
whether direct or indirect, of superiority, domination or control of one nation 
over another is mainly driven by political and/or economic considerations. It 
represents the hierarchical relationship between two nations, encompassing 
the way one nation exercises power over another, whether through settlement, 
sovereignty, or indirect mechanisms of control. More abstractly, ‘imperialism 
is a system that splits up collectives and relates some of the parts to each other 
in relations of harmony of interest, and other parts in relations of disharmony 
of interest, or conflict of interest.’3 In the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the notion of imperialism came to be used in a more specific, economic sense, 
namely, the ‘spread and expansion of industrial and commercial capitalism.’4 
Another definition of imperialism, that of Jürgen Osterhammel, draws a clear 
line between imperialism and colonialism:
2 B. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence 
(London: Macmillan, 1974), 16.
3 J. Galtung, ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism,’ Journal of Peace Research, 8 (1971), 81.
4 J.T. Gathii, ‘Imperialism, Colonialism, and International Law,’ Buffalo Law Review, 54 (2007), 
1013–1014.
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Imperialism presupposes the will and the ability of an imperial center to 
define as imperial its own national interests and enforce them worldwide 
in the anarchy of the international system. Imperialism implies not only 
colonial politics but international politics for which colonies are not just 
ends in themselves, but also pawns in global power games.5
Under this definition, colonialism is merely one element of imperialism. Impe-
rialism involves the political and economic superiority, domination or control 
of one nation over another. Colonialism refers not so much to the relationship 
between two nations as it does to the relationship between a subjugating na-
tion and subjugated territory. A key feature of colonialism is the expatriation 
of citizens of the subjugating nation to the subjugated territory, where these 
expatriates live as permanent settlers while maintaining political allegiance to 
their country of origin. More narrowly, in the words of James Thuo Gathii, co-
lonialism signifies the ‘territorial annexation and occupation of non-European 
territories by European states.’6 At the end of the nineteenth century, the co-
lonial venture involved encounters between two sides: native individuals and 
tribes were pitched against representatives of European States, private indi-
viduals, missionaries and trading companies. Although the concepts of impe-
rialism and colonialism do somewhat diverge in meaning, they are sufficiently 
similar for the purposes of this book to be used synonymously as the direct or 
indirect domination or control of one nation over another and its territory, 
mainly motivated by political and/or economic considerations.
In the age of New Imperialism, Africa was one of the main arenas in which 
the European powers competed for colonial expansion. Even before 1870, Eu-
ropean merchants had traded on the coasts of Africa, and European presence 
in Sub-Saharan Africa goes back to the end of the fifteenth century, when the 
Portuguese had first set foot ashore. But until the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the Europeans had mainly settled on African coasts and the African 
interior had largely been spared European involvement. The British historian 
George Sanderson gives a clear picture of Africa before 1870: ‘Until the 1870s, 
“Africa as a whole” had been a purely geographical concept, of no practical 
relevance to the European politicians and merchants concerned with the con-
tinent. Much of Africa still remained what it had been to the first Europeans 
who circumnavigated it: a series of “coasts” […] surrounding a vast enigmatic 
5 J. Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, transl. S.L. Frisch (Princeton: Wiener, 
1997), 21.
6 Gathii, ‘Imperialism,’ 1014.
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blank.’7 In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, Europe turned 
its attention to the African interior.
In the scramble for Africa several European powers aspired and competed to 
seize territory. These included Italy and Spain, but the main actors in this com-
petition were Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain and Portugal. Their mo-
tives were manifold: economic exploitation, protection of European national 
interests and the imposition of what were considered to be superior Western 
values. One result of this frenzied rivalry was that in the age of New Imperial-
ism, European powers added almost thirty million square kilometres of Afri-
can land, approximately twenty percent of world’s land mass, to their overseas 
colonial empires.8 The European race for African territory gathered pace after 
the Conference of Berlin (1884–1885), which triggered a series of events that 
had a huge impact on the partition of Africa.9 Border lines were drawn, territo-
ry was divided and whole peoples were uprooted split up and assimilated into 
European civilization. Each European power had its own means and strategies 
to realize its targets on the African continent. In many cases, the arrival of the 
Europeans did not start off with conquest and subordination, but rather with 
commercial interactions with the native populations and their rulers, based on 
equality or even on a subordinate position of the Europeans.10 What ultimately 
distinguishes New Imperialism from the former period of European coloniza-
tion are the dominant sentiments of nationalism and protectionism and the 
ensuing atmosphere of competition in Europe. This amalgam resulted in the 
scramble for Africa, in which an entire continent was brought under the rule 
of the European colonizing powers: territorial occupation expanded from 
7 G.N. Sanderson, ‘The European partition of Africa: Origins and dynamics,’ in: J.D. Fage 
and R. Oliver (eds.), The Cambridge History of Africa, vol. vi (Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 99. See also R.A. Butlin, Geographies of Empire. European Empires and Colonies 
c. 1880–1960 (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
8 For a chronological overview of colonization between 1870 and 1912, see Pakenham, 
Scramble of Africa, 681–694. See also P.K. O’Brien, Atlas of World History (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1999).
9 See A.A. Boahen, ‘Colonialism in Africa: its impact and significance,’ in: A.A. Boahen (ed.), 
General History of Africa, vol. vii (London, Paris, Berkeley: Heinemann Educational Books, 
unesco, University of California Press, 1985), 789.
10 J. Fisch, ‘Law as a Means and as an End: Some Remarks on the Function of European 
and non-European Law in the Process of European Expansion,’ in: W.J. Mommsen and 
J.A. De Moor (eds.), European Expansion and Law (New York: Berg, 1992), 20. See also 
R.C.H. Lesaffer, ‘Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: Occupation 
and Acquisitive Prescription,’ European Journal of International Law, 16 (2005), 25–58 and 
H.M. Wright (ed.), The “New Imperialism”. Analysis of Late Nineteenth-Century Expansion 
(Boston: Heath and Co., 1961).
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settlements and trade posts on the coast to the hinterland, the interior of Af-
rica. From an international law perspective, this raises the question of how the 
legal entitlement to territory was acquired. As is well established in historical 
and international law literature, by far the most frequently used mode to ac-
quire title to African territory was through the conclusion of treaties.
Between 1880 and 1914 the whole of Africa was divided between rival Euro-
pean powers, leaving only Liberia and Ethiopia independent of foreign rule.11 
The speed of the process was unprecedented: most of Africa’s landmass and 
most of its peoples were parcelled out in about ten years after 1880. Although 
the contest for title to territory had been in full swing before the Conference 
of Berlin,12 the Conference is often considered to have acted as a catalyst 
for the fierce rivalry over African territory. As Malcolm Shaw observes, ‘[t]he 
Berlin Conference can be seen as a turning-point in European-African rela-
tions. Although the conference did not itself partition Africa, it did involve 
an institutionalisation of the process of acquiring territory in the African 
continent.’13 Among other legal scholars, Makau wa Mutua is not convinced 
of the constitutive value of the Conference in the sense of affecting the factual 
situation. He notes that the Berlin Conference ‘only retroactively “ratified” and 
allocated existing “spheres of influence,”’ and was ‘in effect an attempt to seek 
legal shelter for an illegality already committed.’14 For Matua then, the true sig-
nificance of the Conference is that it concealed the illegal nature of the Euro-
pean colonial venture in Africa. At its close, namely, the Conference accepted 
a Final Act which in Articles 34 and 3515 laid down the central provisions on 
acquisition of territory.
11 For an elaborate historical description of the ‘Scramble for Africa,’ see J.D. Fage and R. 
Oliver (eds.), The Cambridge History of Africa, vol. vi (Cambridge University Press, 1985) 
and A.D. Roberts (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa, vol. vii (Cambridge University 
Press, 1986).
12 For a detailed report on the Conference of Berlin, see S. Förster, W.J. Mommsen and 
R.E. Robinson (eds.), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa (Oxford University Press, 1988). For 
an assessment of the Berlin Conference, see M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Na-
tions: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
121–127.
13 M.N. Shaw, ‘The Acquisition of Title in Nineteenth Century Africa: Some Thoughts,’ in: 
P.-M. Dupuy, B. Fassbender, M.N. Shaw and K.-P. Sommermann (eds.), Common Values in 
International Law. Essays in Honour of Christian Tomuschat (Kehl: Engel, 2006), 1037.
14 M. wa Mutua, ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry,’ Michigan Jour-
nal of International Law, 16 (1994–1995), 1130.
15 Article 34 stated that ‘[a]ny power which henceforth takes possession of a tract of land on 
the coasts of the African Continent outside its present possessions, shall acquire them, as 
well as the Power which assumes a Protectorate there, shall accompany the respective act 
with a notification thereof addressed to the other Signatory Powers of the present Act, in 
chapter 16
Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), Chancellor of Germany between 1870 and 
1890, opened the Conference, in which fourteen States participated,16 on 
15 November 1884. The Conference had not been convened to discuss claims 
on the sovereignty of the African continent, nor to divide it. Rather, the os-
tensible primary purpose17 of the Conference was to find a solution for the 
brutal subjugation of the Congo and to open up Africa for free trade through 
European co-operation and harmony.18 The original conference agenda had 
not included the introduction of rules for new territorial acquisitions and the 
discussion of existing agreements and control of the African interior. However, 
the regulation of the acquisition of African territory turned out to be the criti-
cal issue, prompted, initially, by economic interests, because rules had to be 
formulated to secure and stabilize commercial activities. As none had been 
invited, no African rulers attended the Conference, but their absence did not 
prevent the participating States from specifying, in Article 6 of the Final Act, 
how European civilization would be to the Africans’ advantage.
The Final Act stipulated that a State occupying a new territory19 or estab-
lishing a protectorate had to give notice to the other contracting parties and 
had to make sure that the new territory or protectorate was under ‘effective oc-
cupation, authority, control, or rule.’20 Although the Final Act, which had been 
negotiated during the plenary conference sessions, seemed inconclusive and 
cautious, much had happened behind the scenes in the corridors of the confer-
ence. These informal talks outside the conference room heightened tensions 
between the European colonial powers and increased their sense of urgency 
order to enable them, if need be, to make good any claims of their own.’ Further, article 
35 stated that ‘[t]he Signatory Powers of the present Act recognize the obligation to en-
sure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of the 
African Continent sufficient to protect existing rights and, as the case may be, freedom of 
trade and of transit under the conditions agreed upon.’
16 The participating States were Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain and Sweden.
17 The Conference had three official claims: the organization of freedom of navigation in 
the Congo and Niger rivers, the guarantee of freedom of trade in the Congo basin and 
mouth, and agreeing over the rules concerning the acquisition of new territory. Koskenni-
emi, Gentle Civilizer, 123. See also S.E. Crowe, The Berlin West African Conference 1884–1885 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1942).
18 H.L. Wesseling, Verdeel en Heers. De Deling van Afrika, 1880–1914 (Amsterdam: Bert Bak-
ker, 2007), 152. For the English version, see H.L. Wesseling, The European Colonial Empires 
1815–1919 (Harlow: Pearson-Longman, 2004).
19 Strictly speaking, the Final Act only ruled the acquisition of new territories on the coast. 
See Article 34 of the Final Act.
20 Wesseling, Verdeel en Heers, 152.
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to gain territory. When State officials met at the Conference, the scramble for 
possession and title was already underway, although it had not yet reached the 
interior of Africa. But that would prove to be only a matter of time. The oc-
cupation and subjection of African territory by European States, based mainly 
on protectorate treaties with native rulers, was to be completed soon after the 
Berlin Conference ended.
3 New Imperialism in International Legal Discourse
The central theme of this book is the legality of New Imperialism, more specifi-
cally of the colonization of Africa under international law. Although there is a 
wealth of academic literature on the history of international law,21 little of it 
engages the legal dimensions and implications of colonialism in general, and of 
Africa’s colonization in particular. Moreover, when international legal scholars 
do address colonialism, their discussions mostly culminate in moral and po-
litical claims.22 There are, however, exceptions. In his Imperialism, Sovereignty 
and the Making of International Law (2005), Antony Anghie presents a com-
prehensive analysis of the legal nature of colonialism and its impact on inter-
national law.23 He argues that colonialism was central to the constitution of 
international law, because ‘many of the basic doctrines of international law – 
including, most importantly, sovereignty – were forged out of the attempt to 
create a legal system that could account for relations between the European 
and non-European worlds in their colonial confrontation.’24 Anghie appraises 
the relationship between international law and colonialism through the lens 
21 For an extensive overview of the academic debate, see Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer.
22 On this problem, see M. Koskenniemi, ‘Why History of International Law Today?’ 
Rechtsgeschichte, 4 (2004), 65.
23 He is considered to be one of the scholars within the school of Third World Approaches 
on International Law (twail). See M. wa Mutua, ‘What is twail?’ American Society of In-
ternational Law Proceedings, 94 (2000), 31. See also A. Anghie, ‘What is twail: Comment,’ 
American Society of International Law Proceedings, 94 (2000), 39–40; J.T. Gathii, ‘Africa,’ 
in: B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), 407–428 and O.C. Okafor, ‘Newness, Imperialism, and 
International Legal Reform in Our Time: A twail Perspective,’ Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 
43 (2005), 171–191.
24 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2005), 3. For a more recent version and application to a concrete situation 
of his argument, see A. Anghie, ‘On Critique and the Other,’ in: A. Orford (ed.), Interna-
tional Law and Its Others (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 389–400. See also A. Anghie, 
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of the civilizing mission, which he defines as ‘the grand project that has jus-
tified colonialism as a means of redeeming the backward, aberrant, violent, 
oppressed, undeveloped people of the non-European world by incorporating 
them into the universal civilization of Europe.’25 He continues his argument 
by stating that international law is based on this division between the civilized 
and uncivilized world, a division he terms ‘cultural difference.’26 According to 
Anghie, colonialism in the sense of this cultural difference was constitutive of 
the development of international law and still persists in current international 
legal discourse: ‘Colonialism, then, far from being peripheral to the discipline 
of international law, is central to its formation. It was only because of colonial-
ism that international law became universal; and the dynamic of difference, 
the civilising mission, that produced this result, continues into the present.’27 
Anghie is right in arguing that colonialism, more specifically New Imperial-
ism, had a constitutive influence on international law and its development in 
the twentieth century. The theoretical framework and fundamental concepts 
of international law – such as sovereignty, self-determination and humani-
tarian intervention – have indeed been shaped by this practice of territorial 
expansion.
Anghie offers a further argument. He asserts that universal international 
law did not just come into being because it was imposed by Europeans: it also 
sprang from the confrontation with nations living in the peripheral part of the 
world.28 According to Anghie, cultural difference was and is a catalyst in the 
development of doctrines of international law, in particular doctrinal views 
on sovereignty. Anghie argues that sovereignty in the European sense of the 
notion was developed and adapted in the course of the collision of European 
States with non-European political entities: ‘[S]overeignty was improvised out 
of the colonial encounter, and adopted unique forms which differed from and 
destabilized notions of European sovereignty. As a consequence, Third World 
‘Europe and International Law’s Colonial Present,’ Baltic Yearbook of International Law, 6 
(2006), 79–84.
25 Anghie, Imperialism, 3.
26 Ibid.
27 A. Anghie, ‘The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities,’ Third 
World Quarterly, 27 (2006), 742. See also A.G. Forji, ‘International Law, the Civilizing Mis-
sion and the Ambivalence of Development in Africa: Conceptual Underpinnings,’ Journal 
of African and International Law, 6 (2013), 191–225.
28 Anghie defines his ‘dynamic of difference’ as ‘the endless process of creating a gap be-
tween two cultures, demarcating one as ‘universal’ and civilized and the other as ‘particu-
lar’ and uncivilized, and seeking to bridge the gap by developing techniques to normalize 
the aberrant society.’ Anghie, Imperialism, 4.
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sovereignty is distinctive, and rendered uniquely vulnerable and dependent by 
international law.’29 The universalization of international law was indeed not 
a one-dimensional occurrence: the nature and features of international law 
were also influenced and shaped by the confrontation between the European 
and non-European worlds. In sum, the European colonial venture in the age of 
New Imperialism both imposed and created international law.30
However, this doctrinal approach to international law is only one side of the 
story. The complementary and constitutive role of international legal practice 
– i.e., international law on the ground or international law in action – is quite 
substantial too. In disregarding the practical use of international law, the work 
of many legal scholars remains Euro-centric and implicitly upholds a tradi-
tional concept of sovereignty. This Euro-centrism originated in nineteenth-
century international legal doctrine, was adopted by legal scholars writing on 
international law at the time, and echoes in present-day scholarship. Such con-
temporary international legal scholars as Matthew Craven,31 James Crawford,32 
Wilhelm Grewe,33 Marcelo Kohen,34 Martti Koskenniemi,35 and Malcolm N. 
Shaw36 base their arguments first and foremost on doctrine, and they do not 
pay much attention to international legal practice. As these and other authors 
mainly read nineteenth-century international legal doctrine, which is almost 
exclusively Western in orientation, they implicitly perpetuate the older dualist 
29 Ibid., 6.
30 Arnulf Becker Lorca argues that nineteenth-century international law has not been im-
posed on the non-European world, but has been appropriated and developed by jurists 
from these areas. A. Becker Lorca, ‘Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century 
Histories of Imposition and Appropriation,’ Harvard International Law Journal, 51 (2010), 
475–552.
31 M. Craven, ‘The Invention of a Tradition: Westlake, The Berlin Conference and the 
Historicisation of International Law,’ in: L. Nuzzo and M. Vec (eds.), Constructing Interna-
tional Law. The Birth of a Discipline (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2012), 363–402 and 
M. Craven, ‘Colonialism and Domination,’ in: B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds.), The Ox-
ford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), 862–889.
32 J. Crawford (ed.), The Rights of Peoples (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) and J. Crawford, 
The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2006).
33 W.G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 2000).
34 M.G. Kohen, Possession contestée et souveraineté territoriale (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1997).
35 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Co., 1989) and Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer.
36 M.N. Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); M.N. Shaw (ed.), 
Title to Territory (Aldershot: Ashgate Dartmouth, 2005) and M.N. Shaw, International Law, 
6th edn (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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understanding of the international legal order. Although they explicitly ad-
dress Euro-centrism and even suggest correctives to it, they do so in an un-
satisfactory manner. Moreover, its implied Euro-centrism goes hand in hand 
with ‘legal exotism,’37 which can be defined as construing a non-European 
legal world using European rhetoric. While discussing European colonization 
within the international legal framework, the authors referred to (and others) 
generally pay scant attention to a non-European perspective on colonization. 
They maintain a dualistic approach to international law in, for example, sepa-
rating the European from the non-European, the civilized from the uncivilized, 
and positivism from natural law. On the one hand, much modern-day litera-
ture on the history of international law implies or assumes that there was a 
civilized world in which the interactions between the members of the family 
of civilized nations were regulated by international law. In later nineteenth-
century doctrine this family was not only considered to comprise the nations 
of Europe and (Northern) America, but also the – by that time – civilized ter-
ritories of the Ottoman Empire, Japan, China, Siam and Persia. On the other 
hand, beyond these boundaries there was an uncivilized world where a legal 
order was thought to be lacking and where international law was allegedly not 
applied. As will be argued, this construed dichotomy of the civilized versus 
uncivilized world mainly existed in international legal doctrine and less so in 
legal practice.
The role of Euro-centrism in present-day international law has been rec-
ognized by the twentieth-century Dutch jurist Jan Verzijl: ‘Now there is one 
truth that is not open to denial or even to doubt, namely, that the actual body 
of international law, as it stands today, not only is the product of the conscious 
activity of the European mind, but has also drawn its vital essence from a com-
mon source of beliefs, and in both of these aspects it is mainly of Western 
European origin.’38 Koskenniemi defines this Euro-centric nature of interna-
tional law as follows: ‘European stories, myths and metaphors continue to set 
the conditions for understanding international law’s past as it does for outlin-
ing its futures. […] Europe served as the origin, engine and telos of historical 
knowledge.’39 International legal doctrine, then, is founded on the idea of a 
37 See T. Ruskola, Legal Orientalism. China, the United States, and Modern Law (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013).
38 J.H.W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1968), 435–436.
39 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Histories of International Law: Dealing with Eurocentrism,’ Rechtsge-
schichte, 19 (2011), 155 and 158. Wilhelm Grewe argued that the universalization of Eu-
ropean international law started already before the end of the nineteenth century: W.G. 
Grewe, ‘Vom europäischen zum universellen Völkerrecht. Zur Frage der Revision des 
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self-contained and superior Europe. To this very day, the scramble for Africa is 
commonly accepted as being in accordance with international law as it stood 
at the end of the nineteenth century. The common view is that the scramble 
was morally objectionable but legally sound.40
Similarly, international legal scholars have mostly not probed the historical 
context in which New Imperialism unfolded and in which international law 
was applied and developed, and this makes their theory vulnerable to anach-
ronisms. In the reality of nineteenth-century international law, the perceived 
division between civilized and uncivilized worlds was not a clear-cut one, and 
there is even firm evidence that it was entirely absent. The non-European world 
was not a legal vacuum and international law was applied there for pragmatic 
reasons. This is evident from treaties having been negotiated and concluded 
between European and non-European nations throughout many centuries of 
colonization, in particular during the last three decades of the 1800s. These 
mutual relationships, in which respect for the rights and properties of all con-
tracting parties was often explicitly expressed, were based on and governed by 
the same international law regime that was in force in the civilized, European 
world. These treaties mostly covered economic issues and they benefited all 
contracting parties. Moreover, the African populations, which were represent-
ed by their rulers during the negotiations, were considered political entities. 
In practice, the native rulers had the power to cede sovereign rights over their 
territories and that power conferred ‘sovereign’ rights on them, as, according 
to a general principle of law, ‘nemo plus iuris (ad alium) transferre potest quam 
“europazentrischen” Bildes des Völkerrechtsgeschichte,’ Zeitschrift für Ausländisches 
Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 42 (1982), 449–479. Some legal scholars state that this 
‘discursive process of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion’ was a phenomenon already 
present long before the seventeenth-century emergence of modern international law. See 
S.N. Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans. Race and Self-Determination in 
International Law (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 65. For a 
detailed reading on the Euro-centric character of international law, see R.P. Anand, New 
States and International Law (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1972), 8–11; A. Becker 
Lorca, ‘Eurocentrism in the History of International Law,’ in: B. Fassbender and A. Peters 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2012), 1034–1057; S.N. Grovogui, Beyond Eurocentrism and Anarchy. Memories of Interna-
tional Order and Institutions (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Y. Onuma, ‘Appendix: 
Eurocentrism in the History of International Law,’ in: Y. Onuma (ed.), A Normative 
Approach to War. Peace, War, and Justice in Hugo Grotius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 
371–386 and B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below (Cambridge University Press, 
2013), Chapters 1 and 2.
40 See Grovogui, Beyond Eurocentrism and Anarchy, 39.
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ipse habet’ (no one can transfer more rights (to another) than he himself has). 
This example shows that the historical context of New Imperialism is vital to 
evaluating the position and role of international law, but until recently, inter-
national legal doctrine hardly paid any attention to this factual background of 
international law.
Euro-centrism and only a moderate historical awareness characterize the 
academic debate on colonialism and international law. Moreover, as interna-
tional legal scholars tend to think within the framework of nineteenth-century 
legal doctrine, they are generally not given to assessing it. This is particularly 
clear in the conception and understanding of the territorial State. One of the 
constitutive requirements for statehood, the possession of territory, is a prod-
uct of nineteenth-century international legal doctrine. On the basis of this 
premise, African political entities were denied statehood. As a result, African 
polities not being considered territorial States, they did not possess sovereignty 
in the eyes of the colonizing States. And because political bodies in Africa were 
not recognized as sovereign States, they were excluded from membership of 
the family of civilized nations. International legal doctrine – past and present 
– accepts this as a given. However, treaty-making practices between Europeans 
and Africans show that these presumptions are tenuous. Until fairly recently, 
legal personality was denied to African political entities,41 even though this 
has been a key issue in international legal doctrine.42 However, this problem of 
legal personality was a non-issue in international legal practice, where interna-
tional law did apply to African political entities. By upholding traditional Euro-
pean conceptualizations of this type, international legal doctrine is bound to a 
Euro-centric perspective, uses a limited and arbitrary vocabulary, and is caught 
in a nineteenth-century paradigm.
The overall objection to be raised to the work of past and present interna-
tional legal scholarship is that in general its scope is too narrowly restricted to 
international legal doctrine. This means that its elaborate arguments are out 
of touch with reality. This scholarship tends to disregard the historical context 
in which international law played a determinative role in the day-to-day 
lives of people inhabiting colonized territories. The abstract43 and theoreti-
cal elements of late nineteenth-century international law are remarkably 
41 See C.H. Alexandrowicz, ‘Doctrinal Aspects of the Universality of the Law of Nations,’ 
British Yearbook of International Law, 37 (1961), 508. See also Onuma, ‘When was the Law 
of International Society Born? An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an 
Intercivilizational Perspective,’ Journal of the History of International Law, 2 (2000), 46.
42 See Anghie, Imperialism, 94.
43 See, for example, ibid., 64–65.
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sophisticated, but doctrinal argumentation lacks concreteness: international 
legal practice – i.e., treaties being concluded between Europeans and Africans – 
has little or no place in it. Positivists such as John Westlake (1828–1913) were 
blind for international law in its practical application. They adopted a theoreti-
cal and formal approach to international law by which the political argument 
gained the upper hand at the expense of law in action.44 International legal 
doctrine of especially the second half of the nineteenth century eventually 
comes down as ideological and neglected the reality.
In legal scholarship, the nineteenth century has often been described as 
the age of positivism. The term is not entirely accurate since but few lead-
ing international jurists – notwithstanding their manifest leaning towards 
positivism – culled all strands of natural law from their work. What does mark 
nineteenth-century mainstream positivists is their close association with the 
sovereign State and the limited scope of international law as the law govern-
ing relations between sovereign States. They based their claims on two funda-
mental assumptions: (1) valid international law consists only of rules that have 
been accepted by States (voluntarism); and (2) all rules to which a State has 
consented bind it (consensualism).45 By assuming consensualism, positivists 
evaded the question whether these rules were in accordance with natural or 
divine law. According to positivists, the sovereign State was the foundation of 
the entire legal system, and their aim was to build a systematic framework of 
international law based on this premise.46 Positivism maintained that law was 
the creation of sovereign will and that law was administered and enforced by 
sovereigns as the highest authorities. Sovereigns could only be bound by the 
terms to which they had agreed. For positivists the rules of international law 
were not vested in general ideas of morality and justice, but were discovered 
by studying the behaviour of states and of its institutions, and the laws states 
create.47 The central issue, on which natural law jurists and legal positivists 
44 See Craven, ‘Invention of a Tradition,’ 367. See also Craven, ‘Colonialism and Domination.’
45 R.C.H. Lesaffer, European Legal History (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 437.
46 A. Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century 
International Law,’ Harvard International Law Journal, 40 (1999), 13.
47 Anghie, Imperialism, 43. In this light, Alexandrowicz asks ‘whether the positivist Europe-
an reality was reconcilable with the idea of universalism of the law of nations which drew 
its legal source from the declining concept of natural law but had a reality of its own.’ He 
answers this question by arguing that the ‘family of nations could not have been reduced 
from universality to a regional framework by a change of doctrine [from naturalism to 
positivism]. Admission of new states was and is possible only in relation to entities which 
came newly into being. It cannot comprise those of them which existed long before 
and drew their legal status from a law of civilized nations in mutual intercourse whose 
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differed in thought most clearly, was the creation and enforcement of law on 
the international level.48 Could a sovereign State be subjected to legal norms?
The mainstream Euro-centric perspective of the later nineteenth century, 
which was developed by contemporary legal doctrine dominated by positiv-
ism, gives the political argument priority over the legal, and the civilizing 
mission initiated by politics became entrenched in legal doctrine. This Euro-
centrism, together with a deficiency in historical awareness and critical stance 
in current international legal doctrine, obfuscates the real nature of interna-
tional law as a legacy of the age of New Imperialism. In this particular era how-
ever, international law was applied and used n encounters between Europeans 
and Africans, that is, between political entities as well as between human be-
ings, and this implies that in practice there was no strict or absolute separation 
between a civilized and an uncivilized world. Positivists constructed a dualism 
in international law which resulted in a fiction that justified the European co-
lonial venture. Beyond that fiction, however, there was the real world in which 
international law did have a place. Nevertheless, this legal fiction was adopted 
by twentieth-century international legal scholars and it infuses international 
legal doctrine still.
In the scholarly discussion about the legacy of New Imperialism in internation-
al law an empirical perspective has emerged. Whereas many international legal 
scholars have concentrated on nineteenth-century legal doctrine and frame 
their ideas within the traditional dualist world view, the Austro-Hungarian, 
later British legal historian Charles Alexandrowicz (1902–1975)49 has taken a 
different perspective: he has taken international law in practice into consid-
eration and has researched the practice of negotiating and concluding trea-
ties between Europeans and Africans. In The European-African Confrontation 
(1973),50 he looks at international law from a bottom-up perspective instead 
of pursuing a top-down approach. Koskenniemi observes that ‘Alexandrowicz’ 
work constituted a first opening for the treatment of non-Europeans as inde-
pendent agents in international law, even as he, too, surveyed them through 
universality had been an undisputable reality.’ Alexandrowicz, ‘Doctrinal Aspects,’ 506 
and 515. For a 19th century perspective, see J. Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of Inter-
national Law (Cambridge University Press, 1894), 112.
48 See, for example, G.G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Foundations of the Authority of International 
Law and the Problem of Enforcement,’ Modern Law Review, 19 (1956), 1–18.
49 On Alexandrowicz, see W.A. Steiner, ‘Charles Henry Alexandrowicz 1902–1975,’ British 
Yearbook of International Law, 47 (1975), 269–271.
50 C.H. Alexandrowicz, The European-African Confrontation. A Study in Treaty Making 
(Leyden: Sijthoff, 1973).
15New Imperialism
the lens of European concepts of (universal) natural law.’51 Alexandrowicz is 
considered an authority on the encounter between Europeans and Africans 
and the treaty relations that were established before and during the nine-
teenth century. His European-African Confrontation is the first, and to date 
only, elaborative analysis of treaty practice between Europeans and Africans 
that examines Africa’s partition by and subjection to European States in terms 
of international law. Although Alexandrowicz highlights the practical use of 
international law in the age of New Imperialism, his work is mainly descrip-
tive. He gives many examples of treaties concluded between various European 
powers and African rulers, but he does not compare and evaluate these dif-
ferent treaties. Although Alexandrowicz has a profound understanding of the 
practice of concluding and wording treaties, his work lacks conceptualization, 
evaluation and theoretical underpinning. For example, he does not discuss the 
consequences of treaty practice between Europeans and Africans, nor does he 
make an impact assessment of the rights of the parties involved. In addition, 
Alexandrowicz refrains from drawing conclusions from what happened back 
then for present-day international law. Moreover, Alexandrowicz has a Euro-
centric idea of colonization and the conclusion of treaties between Europeans 
and Africans;52 for him too, European norms and values are the standard in 
and beyond European jurisdictions.53
By relying on opposite approaches to revealing the history of internation-
al law, this study seeks a middle ground between the views of Anghie and 
Alexandrowicz. Although Anghie is right in observing that the idea of cul-
tural difference as a product of imperialism was constitutive of international 
law and that international law was not just forced upon non-Europeans, he 
pays scant attention to international law in practice. Almost as if to restore 
the balance, Alexandrowicz primarily addresses the practicalities of interna-
tional law. He does not engage in serious reflection on treaty-making between 
Europeans and Africans. In this regard, however, it is not only the work of 
51 Koskenniemi, ‘Histories of International Law,’ 163–164. ‘C.H. Alexandrowicz had advanced 
the view that the relations between the Europeans and the Islamic and East Indian com-
munities had in fact, until the nineteenth century, been based on a widespread network 
of reciprocal treaty relations and that it had not been until the nineteenth century when, 
owing to the rise of “positivism”, Europeans had begun to impose their behavioural stan-
dards on others.’ Ibid.
52 See C.G. Roelofsen, ‘Treaties between European and Non-European Powers in Early Mod-
ern and Modern Times (16th-20th Centuries) – Some Remarks on their Perception and 
Interpretation,’ in: T. Marauhn and H. Steiger (eds.), Universality and Continuity in Inter-
national Law (The Hague: Eleven, 2011), 409–417.
53 See Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans, 46.
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Alexandrowicz and Anghie but international legal literature as a whole that 
falls short of the mark. In the discourse on the legacy and legality of the ac-
quisition and partition of African territory by European States at the end of 
the nineteenth century, authors emphasize either nineteenth-century interna-
tional legal doctrine or practice – there is no synthesis of the two.
It is one of the peculiarities of international law in the age of New Imperi-
alism that the dualist world view on which it was predicated did not exist in 
reality. Doctrine teemed with unnecessary categorizations, introduced com-
plex theories and was often in contradiction with what happened in reality. 
Historical reality is multifaceted and theory is just a partial reflection of factual 
developments.54 More fundamentally, New Imperialism evokes the question 
of what the nature of international law was in the nineteenth century: was it 
a man-made construct imposed through deduction, a product of the encoun-
ters between nations applied inductively, or perhaps both? Although the need 
for theoretical conceptualization is evident in that it can help explain what 
happens in reality, it should not be inflated beyond usefulness. Neither theory 
nor practice has a particularly valuable claim to balanced truthfulness without 
the other. Future challenges for both international legal scholars and practi-
tioners lie precisely here, in that they will have to move beyond this deadlock 
on how to reconstruct, interpret and assess international law and its history. In 
this respect, the Euro-centric nature of international law should not obscure 
the writing on the history of international law. This book offers a way out of 
the impasse on the nature of international law by arguing that the relations 
between European and African polities of the nineteenth-century fell within 
the domain of international law and that its basis was first and foremost cus-
tomary, namely the customary law of treaties. This claim will be based on the 
analysis and evaluation of the cession and protectorate treaties concluded be-
tween European States and African rulers in the age of New Imperialism. In 
the centuries before the scramble for Africa, an extensive practice of treaty-
making between Europeans and Africans developed, and neither side had rea-
son to doubt the binding force of the treaties thus concluded. As will become 
apparent, the implication of this extensive practice is that Lassa Oppenheim’s 
argument that the Europeans only had to treat African natives on the basis of 
‘discretion, and not International Law’ has to be rejected. The same is true for 
Westlake’s view that ‘[t]he moral rights of all outside the international society 
against the several members of that society remain intact, though they have 
54 M. Senn, ‘The Methodological Debates in German-Speaking Europe (1960–1990),’ in: 
A. Musson and C. Stebbings (eds.), Making Legal History. Approaches and Methodologies 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), 116.
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not and scarcely could have been converted into legal rights.’55 The European-
African confrontation did not happen in a legal vacuum.
Based on the civilization argument, the nineteenth-century positivist per-
spectives on the scramble for Africa and the justification of the colonial ven-
ture introduced and cultivated the discriminatory character of international 
law.56 European powers developed normative ideas which reflected their supe-
riority ‘with the clear purpose to provide themselves with a legal and humani-
tarian “cover” to pursue ruthlessly their own advantages outside the Western 
hemisphere.’57 This arbitrary nature of international law has to be revealed and 
recognized, because, to use the words of Andrew Fitzmaurice, ‘humanitarian 
sentiment too often collapsed back into an apology for empire.’58 This recogni-
tion is needed to give colonialism a place in the history of international law: in-
ternational law must be reconciled with its past. In order to progress, interna-
tional legal doctrine should become aware of its nineteenth-century burden.59
4 Dominium and Imperium
As Stuart Elden argues in his work The Birth of Territory (2013), Rousseau 
was one of the first to recognize the dual aspect of land property and State 
territory.60 ‘Individuals can lay claim to particular sites, which can be with-
in the larger territory of the polity.’61 Rousseau described the two-fold rela-
tion as follows: ‘the soil as both public territory and the patrimony of private 
55 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, 2nd edn (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co.,1912), 34–35 and J. Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (Cam-
bridge University Press, 1894), 140. Anghie referred to them both to support his argument: 
Anghie, Imperialism, 81.
56 See D. Kennedy, ‘International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion,’ 
Nordic Journal of International Law, 65 (1996), 388.
57 M. Schulz, ‘Defenders of the Right? Diplomatic Practice and International Law in the 19th 
Century: An Historian’s Perspective,’ in: L. Nuzzo and M. Vec (eds.), Constructing Interna-
tional Law. The Birth of a Discipline (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2012), 275.
58 A. Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500–2000 (Cambridge University Press, 
2014), 334. ‘The critiques of empire that were least prone to collapsing into imperial apol-
ogy were those based not so much on a sense of common humanity, but upon self-interest 
– that is, upon the problem of liberty at home.’ Ibid.
59 See Kennedy, ‘International Law and the Nineteenth Century,’ 416. Koskenniemi proposes 
four ways of doing away with Euro-centrism in international law: Koskenniemi, ‘Histories 
of International Law,’ 171–175.
60 S. Elden, The Birth of Territory (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 329.
61 Ibid.
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individuals.’62 Consequently, the sovereign and private individuals can have 
different claims and rights to the same land.63 Rousseau asserted that ‘[i]t is 
intelligible how individuals’ combined and contiguous pieces of ground be-
come the public territory, and how the right of sovereignty, extending from 
subjects to the land they occupy, becomes at once real and personal.’64 Elden 
summarizes Rousseau’s thoughts on territory and property as follows: ‘To be in 
the territory is to be subject to sovereignty; you are subject to sovereignty while 
in the territory, and not beyond; and territory is the space within which sov-
ereignty is exercised over territory: territory is that over which sovereignty is 
exercised.’65 These thoughts on the relation between property and sovereignty, 
more specifically dominium and imperium, form the conceptual foundation of 
this book.
As has already been mentioned, concluding cession treaties and establish-
ing protectorates by treaty were the most frequently used modes of acquisition 
in the European struggle for African territory. The contracting parties were Afri-
can rulers and European States, and the object of transfer of these treaties were 
full or partial sovereignty rights over the territories concerned. Under current 
international law, the acquisition of territory is mainly understood in terms 
of the establishment of public sovereignty over territory, which concerns the 
vertical relationship between a sovereign state and its subjects. These legisla-
tive, administrative and jurisdictional rights to territory were counterbalanced 
by claims to territory of another nature, namely, private rights to property of 
land. These rights originate in the horizontal relations between individuals 
and are recognized both nationally and internationally. The European acquisi-
tion and partition of Africa by treaty undermined this distinction and balance 
between rights related to sovereignty and property, more specifically imperium 
and dominium. For the purpose of this book – the assessment of the legality 
of Africa’s colonization – imperium, dominium and the relation between these 
two concepts constitute both the theoretical framework and the evaluation 
criteria. The concepts of sovereignty and property are fundamental regula-
tory principles in almost every human society, and their application depends 
on the spatial, temporal and human context in which they have to function. 
62 Rousseau in his ‘The State of War,’ published in J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and 
Other Later Political Writings, ed by Victor Gourevitch, 10th edn (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 176. See also C. Miéville, Between Equal Rights. A Marxist Theory of Interna-
tional Law (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2005), Chapter 6.
63 Ibid., 56.
64 Ibid., 55.
65 Elden, Birth of Territory, 329.
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The European construct of the State is just one way to apply and express sover-
eignty and property. As will be argued, the European-African confrontation at 
the end of the nineteenth-century showed the theoretical and practical limits 
of the concept of the State, and this confrontation marked the onset of the 
decline of the State. As the scramble for Africa cannot be understood on the 
basis of the State-centric model this study uses the concepts of property and 
sovereignty, which exist independently of the State, to interpret the acquisi-
tion and partition of Africa by European powers in the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century.
This interpretation takes the treaties between the Europeans and Africans 
as its point of departure. In studying colonial treaties, Paul Patton points to 
both the astonishing cross-cultural cooperation and the vast cultural and con-
ceptual differences that generally accompany such treaties:
On the one hand, the fact that agreements were made at all demon-
strated a capacity for extraordinary cross-cultural cooperation involving 
mutual recognition, reciprocity, and genuine agreement that served the 
different interests of the parties involved. On the other hand, the cross-
cultural dimension of early colonial treaty making raises questions about 
the conditions, meaning, and consequences of the various agreements. 
Vastly different conceptions of land made it difficult for native peoples to 
appreciate, at least initially, what was implied by European conceptions 
of property. Similar difference between the kinds of authority, rule, and 
sovereignty claimed by European powers and the conceptions of authori-
ty and government among native peoples. Negotiating agreements across 
vast cultural differences left considerable scope for mutual incompre-
hension with regard to precisely what was being agreed, as well as scope 
for unilateral imposition of meaning and consequences onto ceremonies 
that were in reality far more ambiguous.66
Instead of considering the validity of these treaties, the emphasis will be on 
what happened after they had been concluded, i.e., the extent to which they 
were observed. Both nineteenth-century international legal doctrine and prac-
tice will be discussed when considering the interpretation and execution of 
the treaties concluded between Europeans and Africans. Studies such as those 
66 P. Patton, ‘The “Lessons of History”. The Ideal of Treaty in Settler Colonial Societies,’ in: S. 
Belmessous (ed.), Empire by Treaty. Negotiating European Expansion, 1600–1900 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 245.
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of Alexandrowicz and Hermann Hesse67 show that in these treaties the dis-
tinction between public sovereignty (imperium) and private property (domini-
um) was strictly observed. Often, the treaties stipulated explicitly that transfer 
of sovereignty would not affect the private legal rights of natives in territory 
over which the sovereignty was transferred to a European power. However, this 
distinction between sovereignty and property was not strictly upheld in the 
interpretation and execution of the treaties.68 It is commonly accepted in lit-
erature that these delineations were not always respected by the colonizing 
powers and that the transfer of sovereignty often implied the apprehension of 
native property rights over land too. In other words, sovereignty transfer was 
used to usurp private property rights.
Nevertheless, there are but few in-depth studies on how such treaty were 
negotiated, concluded and implemented. What remains to be assessed is 
whether the extension of sovereignty rights to private property rights was spo-
radic or systematic, and whether that extension was or became part of a con-
scious strategy of colonization. What also must be assessed is to what extent 
the practice of acquiring territorial sovereignty including the appropriation 
of privately held land accorded with the treaties and with international law. 
The legality of the extension of sovereignty to include property needs to be as-
sessed in the light of the object and nature of the treaties and the signatories, 
and this will involve examining the status of native rulers in their relation to 
European States under international law. Were these rulers capable of transfer-
ring sovereignty rights over territory to European States? In other words, were 
these rulers sovereign?
The main questions with which this book is concerned are the following. 
Did the European colonial powers acquire private property rights to land along 
with territorial sovereignty by concluding cession and protectorate treaties 
with African rulers in the age of New Imperialism (1870–1914)? Did the Euro-
pean colonial powers comply with their treaty obligations and, more generally, 
their international legal obligations? And, if treaties and/or international law 
were violated, what legal consequences did these violations have and which 
remedies were and are available under the treaties concerned and under in-
ternational law? In attempting to answer these questions, this book makes an 
important distinction between the narrow interpretation of international law 
as it governs relations between the members of the family of civilized nations 
67 Alexandrowicz, European – African Confrontation and H. Hesse, Die Landfrage und die 
Frage der Rechtsgültigkeit der Konzessionen in Süd-West Afrika (Jena: Costenoble, 1906).
68 C. Salomon, L’Occupation des Territoires sans Maître. Etude de droit international (Paris: 
Giard, 1889), 199–200.
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and the broader understanding of international law, i.e., the law of nations, the 
law governing relations between nations irrespective of their perceived status 
as civilized nations.
5 Legal and Social Relevance
From 31 August to 8 September 2001, the World Conference Against Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (wcar) was held 
in Durban, South Africa under the auspices of the United Nations. The main 
theme of the conference was reparations for grave human rights violations 
committed in the past. Two issues were at stake, namely the legacy of slav-
ery and the exploitation and degradation of native populations in the colonial 
era.69 Although these wrongs reach far back into history, their impact endures. 
Most former colonies ‘remain severely disadvantaged in the current world 
order.’70 In other words, the issue of reparations is not just about compensat-
ing for past wrongs: it addresses current global inequalities as the effects of 
these past wrongs persist and directly affect the present. As Theo van Boven 
argues, ‘[t]he struggle against racism and racial discrimination is beset by di-
verging and competing interests of different groups, by deeply rooted histori-
cal wrongs and injustices, by denials of responsibility, by traditional patterns 
of domination ingrained in various cultures and religions.’71
The closing Declaration of the wcar contains statements expressing 
remorse, but it does not acknowledge responsibility of former colonial States 
or provide for remedies. During the discussions on reparations for coloniza-
tion, the participating nations formed into two opposing blocks: one consist-
ing of European States and the United States and the other of the African 
States, supported by Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Several African 
States called for reparations for having been colonized in the past and on the 
issue of slavery even accused the European States of crimes against humanity. 
Theo van Boven’s characterization of the conference is worth quoting in some 
detail:
69 G. Ulrich, ‘Introduction: Human Rights with a View to History,’ in: G. Ulrich and L. Krabbe 
Boserup (eds.), Human Rights in Development. Reparations: Redressing Past Wrongs (The 
Hague, London, New York: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 1.
70 Ibid.
71 T. van Boven, ‘World Conference Against Racism: An Historic Event?’ Netherlands Quar-
terly of Human Rights, 19 (2001), 379.
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Western countries, in particular those with well-known past records and 
roles in this [slavery, slave-trade and colonial rule, MvdL] regard, were 
most reluctant to acknowledge present-day responsibility for suffering 
and evils inflicted in the past. They feared financial claims and wished 
to avoid at any price that language be used that might legally substanti-
ate such claims. Thus, subtle and hair-splitting distinctions were made 
between ‘expressing remorse’ or ‘presenting apologies,’ it being felt by le-
galistic minds that the latter term might open the door for compensatory 
demands.72
Clearly, former colonial States persist in their reluctance to take responsibility 
for their past actions. These reservations come to the fore in a central provi-
sion of the concluding Declaration, Paragraph 14, which determines that the 
participating States
recognize that colonialism has led to racism, racial discrimination, xe-
nophobia and related intolerance, and that Africans and people of Afri-
can descent, and people of Asian descent and indigenous peoples were 
victims of colonialism and continue to be victims of its consequences. 
We acknowledge the suffering caused by colonialism and affirm that, 
wherever and whenever it occurred, it must be condemned and its reoc-
currence prevented. We further regret that the effects and persistence of 
these structures and practices have been among the factors contributing 
to lasting social and economic inequalities in many parts of the world 
today.
The conference participants recognize that colonialism has caused a great deal 
of distress to native populations and that it has to be prevented in future. The 
signatories also express regret at the enduring social and economic inequalities 
throughout the world as a consequence of colonization.73 However, no re-
sponsibility for colonization as a wrongful act was taken or apportioned, no 
remedies were considered, and although the conference was a step towards 
redressing historical wrongs,74 many questions were left unanswered. Had 
colonization in itself been illegal? Are there grounds in contemporary law to 
72 Ibid., 380.
73 See ibid.
74 Theo van Boven underwrites that the Conference realized its ‘underlying spirit’: ‘remem-
bering the crimes or wrongs of the past, wherever and whenever they occurred, unequiv-
ocally condemning its racist tragedies and telling the truth about history are essential 
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held former colonial powers responsible for their acts of colonization? Who 
is responsible for past wrongs and in what way? What forms of relationship 
can be attributed to subsequent generations of native populations which suf-
fered colonial wrongs, and what degree of responsibility can be attributed to 
present-day States? Do recognition of wrongs and expressions of regret suffice 
or are attribution of liability and reparations called for? This study addresses 
these unanswered questions and aims to invigorate the stalemated ‘Durban 
debate’ on colonization and responsibility.
This study seeks to fill a lacuna in previous research, that of the absence of 
a systematic study of the execution and interpretation of treaties concluded 
between European States and African political entities. In doing so, the study 
situates itself within the broader field of the place of colonialism in the history 
of international law. Following a survey of previous scholarly work on New Im-
perialism, it will be shown that while some authors, notably Antony Anghie,75 
explain that colonization and the idea of cultural difference (developed to de-
fend colonialism) were constitutive features of the international legal order 
and still exert their influence today, these works do not pay sufficient attention 
to nineteenth-century legal practice. What will also be identified is a paucity of 
critical reflection on the empirical material in previous studies on nineteenth-
century treaty-making. The study adopts a critical approach to the pervasive 
Euro-centrism76 of international legal scholarship,77 but it is also critical of 
exaggerated, post-structuralist scholarship on colonialism. It seeks to steer a 
course between the extremes of practice without theoretical embeddedness78 
and purely scholarly discourse.
The book considers the scholarly debate about both the place of colonial-
ism in the history of international law and the importance of international 
legal history in the analysis of today’s international legal order. Not only does 
it conduct a thorough analysis of primary historical sources, it also places its 
findings in the context of the most influential works on the history of inter-
national law. The place of history in international law, with an emphasis on 
elements for international reconciliation and the creation of societies based on justice, 
equality and solidarity.’ Ibid.
75 Anghie, Imperialism.
76 Becker Lorca, ‘Eurocentrism in the History of International Law’; Koskenniemi, ‘Histories 
of International Law,’; N. Onuf, ‘Eurocentrism and Civilization,’ Journal of the History of 
International Law, 6 (2004), 37–41 and Onuma, ‘Appendix.’
77 See, for example, Craven, ‘Invention of a Tradition’; Crawford, Creation of States; Grewe, 
Epochs of International Law; Kohen, Possession; Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer and Shaw, 
Title to Territory.
78 Alexandrowicz, European-African Confrontation.
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the relations between Europe and Africa, is analysed with reference to critical 
perspectives – according to which the European origins of international law 
make this law’s claim to universality unfounded – as well as other works which 
characterize international law as a ‘law of encounter.’ Rather than following 
one of these approaches, the study analyses both the imperial legal theories 
of the nineteenth century and customary law as it evolved from legal practice, 
and characterizes the latter as being more inclusive than the former.
While the analysis offered in this book does point out the African contri-
bution to international law that lies in treaties concluded between European 
States and African political entities, it does not stop there. It also and specifi-
cally explains that European courts misinterpreted these treaties in order to 
justify colonial expansion. This feature gives the study a unique angle: it moves 
beyond the negotiation and conclusion of these treaties to explore their inter-
pretation and implementation.
Whereas most authors zoom in on the intellectual history of international 
law in relation to colonization and imperialism and often show a fairly instru-
mental concern for the topic – as part of the wider debate on the Western 
origins of international law – the present study takes a genuinely historical 
approach and specifically explores legal practices. In doing so, it bridges the 
doctrinal divide between public and private law – the imperium versus domi-
nium dichotomy – to analyse realities on the ground in their entirety. As a re-
sult, the study pioneers research into the actual legal processes of colonization 
and the Euro-African encounters, a type of research that has not been pursued 
in any depth since that of Alexandrowicz in the 1950s to 1970s. Complement-
ing Alexandrowicz’ original contribution, the comparative approach offered in 
this book provides a deeper analysis of the use of international law in imperial 
policy. By studying practice to such an extent, the book delves deeper into the 
issue of the use of international law for the colonization of Africa than most 
earlier studies have done, and it aims to challenge some of the general claims 
which have been made on the basis of the study of doctrinal writings alone.
The topic of the book is central to present-day international law. Steering 
away from overly moralising and political appeals, the study approaches the 
topic in a contextualized if rather sober and juridical manner. In this, the study 
is quite unlike most contemporary scholarship on colonialism, which is pre-
dominantly critical and deconstructivist, generally paying less attention to the 
primary material and more to the overtones and subtext of the debates. This 
project offers a straightforward legal analysis against the yardstick of interna-
tional law as it stood in the age of New Imperialism.
The contribution of the book to the study of international law lies mainly 
in the detailed analysis of treaty practice of three main European powers and 
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of African rulers. Additionally, the study offers a creative solution to the prob-
lems which arise from the friction between its two main conclusions, namely 
(1) that the acquisition of African territory in the context of New Imperialism 
was illegal according to the law in force at the time, and (2) that international 
legal responsibility does not result from this illegality, because the passage of 
time makes it impossible to determine the injured and the responsible parties 
respectively. The solution which the study proposes lies in recognizing the ille-
gality of New Imperialism. Such recognition could be a step towards eliminat-
ing the continuing influence on international law of the dichotomies brought 
about by nineteenth-century international legal theory. The two suggestions 
put forward in this study are wholly feasible: the International Court of Justice 
should give an advisory opinion and the past illegality should be addressed in 
academic discussions and domestic and international case law.
Moreover, the book argues that the European powers’ strategy of confound-
ing informal with formal empire was illegal. It offers important empirical proof 
to refute the all too readily accepted orthodoxy of the institution of ‘colonial 
protectorate’ by placing the term against the background of its actual political 
use.
Finally, the study offers compelling arguments about the consequences of 
the illegality of European colonization, both from a doctrinal and from a prac-
tical perspective, and it makes a valuable contribution to the current debate 
on Western accountability for the colonization of Africa. It is an original and 
well-founded contribution to a topical debate that engages many historians 
of international law and international lawyers. Its sound historical approach 
yields a wealth of new empirical materials and persuasively challenges a num-
ber of leading opinions.
6 Methodology and Case Studies
From a methodological perspective, this study is divided into three parts. The 
first part addresses the theoretical framework of the study by discussing the 
concepts of dominium (Chapter 2) and imperium (Chapter 3) and the modes 
of acquisition of and titles to territory (Chapter 4). The identification and 
understanding of this theoretical framework is based on nineteenth-century 
international legal doctrine. This part, in other words, reconstructs the coloni-
zation of Africa and international law as they were conceived by contemporary 
legal doctrine. African points of view are added as much as possible. These 
perspectives are extracted from reports drawn up by colonial authorities, case 
law, writings of African legal scholars and correspondence between African 
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natives and the colonizing powers. It is hoped that including African perspec-
tives will help to avoid the Euro-centric viewpoint and to enable a balanced 
and non-biased debate on the responsibility of former colonial States for their 
historical wrongs.
The second part examines the question whether the colonization of Africa 
was legal by nineteenth-century legal standards, and this exploration will in-
volve reconstructing the law as it was applied in the age of New Imperialism.
The third part of the book addresses the implications of conclusion arrived 
at in the second part that the colonization of Africa was illegal. Once this il-
legality has been established, two issues arise, that of attributing responsibility 
and of providing remedies to redress these wrongs. This third part relies on an 
analysis and evaluation of current international legal doctrine and practice. 
It discusses what the relevance of the illegal nature of Africa’s colonization 
can be in the present-day international legal order. The responsibility issue is 
addressed on the basis of established international legal doctrine and the ap-
plication of international law by international tribunals. The issue of providing 
remedies is addressed by examining the provisions in the European-African 
treaties on remedies in case of non-compliance, available case law and the 
possibilities that current international legal instruments and institutions offer.
As mentioned, the second part of the study involves reconstructing a par-
ticular historical reality. Recording international legal history accurately, 
consistently and reliably is crucial, because it may reveal the biased nature 
of international law as it evolved in earlier times and help present-day and 
future researchers to sidestep this inclination. Imperialism hinges on social, 
economic, legal and cultural ideas about ‘non-civilized’ peoples, and the con-
cept of imperialism continues to be used in this sense. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the present-day understanding of territorial sovereignty. As a 
result of a biased definition, an ‘imperialist’ concept of territorial sovereignty 
still imposes itself on a wide array of topics, including humanitarian interven-
tion and the universal application of human rights.79 Imperialism operates in 
tandem with international law. Anghie argues that the use of international law 
to further imperial policies is one of New Imperialism’s persistent features: 
‘The civilizing mission, the dynamic of difference, continues now in this glo-
balized, terror-ridden world, as international law seeks to transform the inter-
nal characteristics of societies, a task which is endless, for each act of bridging 
generates resistance, reveals further differences that must in turn be addressed 
by new doctrines and institutions.’80 The imperialist nature of international 
79 Anghie, ‘Evolution of International Law,’ 739–753.
80 Ibid., 751.
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law is apparent in mainstream scholarly works on international law. As will 
be shown, international legal history finds itself on the edge of describing and 
assessing the past, which is to say that it is simultaneously objective and sub-
jective. The question on the use of anachronisms is where lawyer and historian 
oppose each other.
To answer the question whether international law was violated when 
European powers acquired and partitioned Africa at the end of the nineteenth 
century, international law in the age of New Imperialism must first be recon-
structed, and it must then be interpreted within its historical context. This 
process of reconstruction and interpretation involves both the internal and 
external history of international law: internal developments within interna-
tional law, its institutions and its profession will be examined, as will exter-
nal factors which exerted influence on these developments. This process of 
reconstruction and interpretation relies entirely on the availability of sources 
of the various time periods. The social, political and economic context of these 
sources plays an essential role in trying to properly understand both the law 
of nations and international law, because ‘any legal rule must, by its very na-
ture, have a reality beyond its theoretical domain.’81 In this study international 
law is used as broadly and objectively as possible in accordance with Randall 
Lesaffer’s definition of international law as a historical concept: international 
law is ‘the law regulating the relations between political entities that do not 
recognize a higher power.’82
Attempts to interpret nineteenth-century legal sources will lead to a dis-
cussion of anachronisms and the position of historians and legal scholars in 
their debate. Regarding anachronisms, history and international law are inex-
tricably and necessarily connected.83 Lapse of time confronts legal theorists 
and practitioners with two interrelated problems, that of providing evidence 
81 C. Stebbings, ‘Benefits and Barriers: The Making of Victorian Legal History,’ in: A. Musson 
and C. Stebbings (eds.), Making Legal History. Approaches and Methodologies (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 87.
82 R.C.H. Lesaffer, ‘International Law and Its History: The Story of an Unrequited Love,’ in: M. 
Craven, M. Fitzmaurice and M. Vogiatzi (eds.), Time, History and International Law (Leiden, 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 32. See also Miéville, Between Equal Rights, Chapter 6; H. 
Steiger, ‘From the International Law of Christianity to the International Law of the World 
Citizen: Reflections on the Formation of the Epochs of the History of International Law,’ 
Journal of the History of International Law, 3 (2001), 180–193 and H. Steiger, ‘Universality 
and Continuity in International Public Law?’ in: T. Marauhn and H. Steiger (eds.), Univer-
sality and Continuity in International Law (The Hague: Eleven, 2011), 13–43.
83 See R.C.H. Lesaffer, ‘The Grotian Tradition Revisited: Change and Continuity in the His-
tory of International Law,’ British Yearbook of International Law, 73 (2002), 103–139.
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of causal relations and that of the legitimacy of counterfactual reasoning in 
determining how the present might have looked like if that original illegal act 
had not taken place. Both causality and counterfactuals become increasingly 
indeterminate and complex in the course of time because of the changing cir-
cumstances under the influence of internal and external intervening factors. 
Increasing remoteness of historical wrongful acts runs parallel to an increasing 
complexity in establishing a claim for responsibility. When it comes to deter-
mining the factual situation, this remoteness and complexity make historical 
awareness a preliminary requirement for lawyers. Especially in the field of 
international law, a thorough knowledge of historical developments is indis-
pensable to understanding and handling problems and conflicts. Conflicts of-
ten smoulder for years and sometimes even decades or centuries before they 
erupt. These disputes often have remote origins and intensify over time before 
they become legal conflicts that are eventually brought before an international 
court or tribunal.84 In his study of the historical evolution of the theory and 
practice of occupation Fitzmaurice affirms the importance of a proper under-
standing of the history of international law. He asserts that ‘[u]nderstanding 
the history of occupation is […] central to the politics of empire and hegemony 
in the present. Rather than continuing in a state of imperial denial, the politics 
of empire today can be illuminated by paying closer attention to the legal and 
political vocabularies of the past.’85
Recognizing the significance and consequentiality of historical inquiry in 
international law is a fundamental issue. It should be noted, however, that 
jurists must always be aware of and avoid the fallacy of presentism:86 the 
anachronistic application of present-day norms and values to the interpreta-
tion and evaluation of past actions. Although anachronism should be avoided, 
interpretation and determination of facts in the past should not.87 Although 
the past may indeed be a source of present-day obligations for international 
legal historians, as Koskenniemi and Anne Orford argue,88 this does not mean 
84 See Kohen, Possession, 183–200.
85 Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 32.
86 See T. Govier and W. Verwoerd, ‘The Promise and Pitfalls of Apology,’ Journal of Social 
Philosophy, 33 (2002), 67. See also A. De Baets, ‘Historical Imprescriptibility,’ Storia della 
Storiografia, 59–60 (2011), 145; P. Burke, ‘Triumphs and Poverties of Anachronism,’ Scien-
tia Poetica, 10 (2006), 291–292 and 298; D.H. Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic 
of Historical Thought (New York: Harper, 1970), 132–142 and H. Ritter, ‘Anachronism,’ in: 
D. Woolf (ed.), A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing (New York: Garland, 1998), 30–31.
87 See De Baets, ‘Historical Imprescriptibility,’ 146.
88 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Vitoria and Us. Thoughts on Critical Histories of International Law,’ 
Rechtsgeschichte, 22 (2014), 119–138 and A. Orford, ‘The Past as Law or History? The 
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that anachronisms must inevitably or necessarily be evoked. Past actions have 
to be assessed by the standards as they stood at the time: historical wrongs 
can only be wrong because and if they were deemed to be wrong at the time. 
This is true for historians and legal scholars alike. Here, Lesaffer proposes a 
reflective evolutionary history solution, which offers a clear view of the his-
torical understanding of international law and its relevance for present-day 
international legal discourse: ‘Evolutional history is commendable, as long as 
the distinct phases of these evolutions are first studied in their own right and 
for their own sake. Only after having done that will it be possible to construct 
an evolutional theory that truly moves from past to present and to ensure that 
explanations are derived from the past and not dictated by the present.’89 
In other words, historical reality first has to be observed and understood in 
its own time and on the basis of contemporary texts and contexts. The next 
step – and it must be the next step, not the first – is to write an evolution-
ary history. Lesaffer, in other words, acknowledges the stance of Orford and 
Koskenniemi in the sense that the history of international law should be writ-
ten on the basis of detailed and demarcated temporal and spatial contexts in 
which the law came into being and evolved. It is only after these compartments 
have been established that the evolutionary history of international law can be 
told. The crucial difference in Lesaffer’s argument, however, is that he rejects 
the use of anachronisms and warns against a functional approach in writing 
international legal historiography.90
Are anachronisms indispensable to writing the history of international law? 
They are not and it is only proper that they are not. Those who support the idea 
that anachronisms are necessary in writing international legal historiography 
confuse the internal and external dimension of such an endeavor. The internal 
dimension concerns the Vorverständnis of the author: legal historians cannot 
abandon their own context. This underlines the fictitious nature of Rawl’s veil 
of ignorance. Writing the history of international law then is inherently sub-
jective and selective: legal historians living in their own time and space reflect 
on the history of international law and make personal choices in structuring 
and conducting their research. Legal historians need to be constantly alert 
to their own Vorverständnis and should always account for the choices they 
make in writing international legal history. This hazard of Vorverständnis also 
Relevance of Imperialism for Modern International Law,’ in: M. Toufayan, E. Tourme Jouan-
net and H. Ruiz Fabri (eds.), International Law and New Approaches to the Third World: Be-
tween Repetition and Renewal (Paris: Société de législation comparée, 2013), 97–118.
89 Lesaffer, ‘International Law and Its History,’ 40.
90 Ibid., 34–35.
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means that the interpretation of international law is always mediated. Legal 
historians do not have immediate access to facts: they can only know the facts 
through statements about them. These limits should not stop academics from 
writing the history of international law. As long as they are conscious of their 
inevitable personal bias and reflect on it, they can write an accountable history 
of international law.
The external dimension of writing international legal history concerns re-
constructing and evaluating international law. It is here that the problem of 
anachronisms comes manifest. Past actions have to be assessed by the stan-
dards that applied at the time: as observed earlier, historical wrongs can only 
be wrong because and if they were deemed to be wrong at the time. This does 
not mean, however, that the history of international law is a static given. In-
ternational law is indeed a product of its time, but it has changed and evolved 
with time. The history of international law is both nature and nurture. It is 
also a chain of events. Each of these events stands on its own and has to be 
interpreted as such, but these separate events are also inextricably connected 
to what happened before and after the event. These events can only be under-
stood and valued in relation to each other: past, present and future temporal 
and spatial contexts – demarcated by context-changing occurrences – form a 
chain. The distinctive compartments of the history of international law are, to 
use the words of Ian Hunter, ‘windows of communication.’91 Those who insist 
on the necessity of using anachronisms to write the history of international law 
build their argument on the first dimension, while the issue of anachronism 
only appears in the second dimension. Making a clear distinction between the 
internal and external dimensions of writing the history of international law 
shows that anachronisms are in fact not necessary to write an accurate, consis-
tent and reliable history of international law.
If the writing of history of international law is based on moderate 
contextualism – the history of international law is both static and dynamic and 
comprises continuity and disruption – and on self-reflection – authors should 
be aware of their determination in time and space and should account for the 
choices they make in writing about their subject – and if the separateness of 
the external and internal dimensions of international legal historiography is 
respected, there are no obstacles to a fruitful co-operation between histori-
ans and jurists in writing the history of international law. As long as a mod-
erate and anachronism-free contextualist approach is adopted and authors 
91 I. Hunter, ‘Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics. On the Critical History of the Law of 
Nature and Nations,’ in: S. Dorsett and I. Hunter (eds.), Law and Politics in British Colonial 
Thought. Transpositions of Empire (New York: Palgrave, 2010), 25.
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are aware of and define their personal situatedness, jurists and historians can 
join forces in a joint venture to write the history of international law.
Yet these general observations on how to write the history of international 
law have to be operationalized. This study examines and assesses the legal 
strategies of Britain, France, and Germany in their colonization of Africa in 
the age of New Imperialism in the light of the international law as it applied 
at the time. To establish the historical reality of the European colonization of 
Africa, three case studies will be performed. Colonial Nigeria, Equatorial Africa 
and Cameroon have been selected for a comparative study that offers an anal-
ysis of the cession and protectorate treaties concluded between the British, 
French and German colonial powers and the African rulers in this tropical part 
of the African continent between 1870 and 1914. These case studies will depict 
the historical context in which the treaties concerned were negotiated, con-
cluded and implemented. Put differently, the case studies address the question 
whether the intentions, the text, the interpretation and the implementation of 
these treaties were consistent.
The three African territories mentioned above have been chosen because 
Britain, France and Germany collided in central Africa in the last three de-
cades of the nineteenth century. This makes these case studies representative 
of European practices, as these major European powers, more than any oth-
ers, made their influence felt in the formation and interpretation of interna-
tional law at the time. Moreover, all three areas have a history of slave trade, 
because of their position along the West coast of the African continent. After 
the slave trade had been abolished in the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
the trading colonists were forced to seek alternative trade commodities, and 
this drove them into the Hinterland. Furthermore, the area’s fertile soil and 
population density make research even more relevant, because these features 
imply that trade played a central role in this part of Africa. And trade is closely 
tied up with the interests of people(s), companies and states, both nationally 
and internationally.
The primary sources are available in the national archives of the States in 
question, but also in private collections, which are often maintained by li-
braries. The actions of Britain in Nigeria, France in Equatorial Africa and Ger-
many in Cameroon are established on the basis of a variety of sources: case 
law produced by colonial courts, both in Africa and Europe, in the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century; the official treaties between European 
States and African rulers; private agreements concluded between Europe-
ans, often tradesmen, and Africans on trade and exploitation; legislative acts; 
governmental communications both between European statesmen through 
the Colonial and Foreign Offices and between the European authorities and 
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the authorities in the colonies; reports of the debates of European parliaments; 
journals; pamphlets; and reports of tradesmen, missionaries, adventurers. The 
centre of gravity of the three case studies to be presented in this book is the 
cession and protectorate treaties concluded between the European States and 
African rulers. The texts of these treaties together with the reconstruction of 
the nineteenth-century context of colonization form the foundation for the 
assessment of the legality of Africa’s acquisition and partition by European 
States. This assessment includes perspectives of nineteenth-century inter-
national legal scholarship. Combined, these sources and perspectives will be 
instrumental in addressing the questions central to this study: were African 
natives’ property rights respected, were native rulers’ sovereignty rights up-
held, were treaty obligations met and was international law observed?
7 Plan
These questions will be addressed as follows. Chapter 2 addresses the legal 
nature and dimensions of the concept of property, more specifically that of 
private landownership. The central question in this chapter is what the right to 
property of land (dominium) entailed from the European and African perspec-
tives within the spatial and temporal context of the age of New Imperialism. 
Chapter 3 addresses the significance of the legal concept of territorial sover-
eignty (imperium) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from 
the European, African and international perspectives. Chapter 4 deals with the 
acquisition of and entitlement to territory from a nineteenth-century perspec-
tive in order to assess the theoretical and practical aspects of the notion of ter-
ritory within the context of New Imperialism, more specifically the encounter 
between European States and African political entities. It will transpire that 
cession and protectorate treaties were vital to the efforts of European colonial 
powers to gain control over African territory.
The second part of the book addresses the application of international law by 
analysing the treaty practices between Britain, France and Germany on the one 
 hand and African rulers in Nigeria, Equatorial Africa and Cameroon on the 
other hand. Three separate chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) examine imperium 
and dominium and their relation in the context of the European colonization 
of Africa at the end of the nineteenth century. These chapters explore how 
the concepts of dominium and imperium appeared in the treaties between the 
European States and the African rulers, and whether the institutions of territo-
rial sovereignty and/or landownership were used accurately and consistently. 
In analysing cession and protectorate treaties, these chapters probe the treaty 
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provisions on the transfer of territorial sovereignty and private property of 
land as well as the contractual and non-contractual remedies which could be 
invoked if and when treaty obligations were breached.
Chapter 8 evaluates the findings of the treaty-making practices analysed in 
the three previous chapters. As sources of international law, these treaties had 
to be observed by the contracting parties. The chapter considers whether the 
cession and protectorate treaties, and by extension international law, were vio-
lated. In this light, the main issue is whether the European States were obliged 
to comply with the cession and protectorate treaties, or whether they were 
free to break their promises, based on the civilization argument and the un-
equal status between contracting parties. In short, did European State powers 
have to comply with the treaties they concluded with African rulers on legal 
grounds as well as on moral grounds?
The third part of the book is mainly concerned with the implications of 
the finding that Africa’s colonization was indeed illegal. As has been observed, 
this issue was of central importance in the Durban debate and the doctrine of 
inter-temporal rule plays an essential role in exploring it. Chapter 9 addresses 
the following questions. Can responsibility for a historical wrongful act, more 
specifically the colonization of Africa, be established? If so, which remedies 
do the cession and protectorate treaties, nineteenth-century international law 
and current international law recognize?
Chapter 10 summarizes the claims and main arguments presented in this 




Property rights, more specifically titles to land or land ownership, were an 
essential constituent of the European acquisition and partition of Africa in the 
late nineteenth century. Often they had a prominent place in the cession and 
protectorate treaties concluded between European States and African rulers, 
and transferring sovereign rights over territory impacted on existing property 
rights to the land. Before discussing the appearance of property rights in these 
treaties, the concept of land ownership – dominium – will be addressed, both 
from a European and from an African perspective. Section 1 describes the theo-
retical framework and the premises that support the evaluation of the mean-
ing of property rights to land. Next, property rights to land will be discussed 
more extensively from the European perspective and the African conception 
of property rights in the age of New Imperialism (§2). The chapter concludes 
with a summary of the main argument (§3).
1 Property Rights: Theoretical Premises
Proprietary rights come in a variety of types and forms, and those most rele-
vant to this book will be discussed here. Today, the right to property has lost its 
absolute character. Property is a complex, organizing concept, and it is found 
in most legal systems.1 Although the concept of property varies in content and 
form from one system to the other, depending on the given social, cultural, 
political and economic context, some of its features are universal. Trespassory 
rules and the ownership spectrum are considered fundamental in all world 
societies. Property is both a social2 and a legal institution. Here, however, the 
emphasis, however, will be on property as a legal institution and its position 
in the vertical relationship between sovereigns and their subjects. While in 
1 A right to property indicates a legal relationship and not a thing: ‘It is to be observed that in 
common speech in the phrase the object of a man’s property, the words the object of are com-
monly left out; and by an ellipsis, which, violent as it is, is now become more familiar than the 
phrase at length, they have made that part of it which consists of the words a man’s property 
perform the office of the whole.’ J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, ed. by E. Harrison (Oxford: Blackwell, 1948), 337 (Chapter xvi, Section 26).
2 J.W. Singer and J.M. Beermann, ‘The Social Origins of Property,’ Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence, 6 (1993), 218.
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the civil law tradition ownership as the most comprehensive property right is 
based on the Roman law notion of dominium, the parallel between dominium 
in Roman law and ownership in modern law must be put into perspective, be-
cause property is determined by the temporal and spatial context in which it 
functions.
Property does not coincide with and is therefore not equal to, nor the same 
as, ownership.3 Property is a broad concept, of which ownership is a subcat-
egory. Property comprises a wide range of forms of ownership and possession, 
also referred to as titles, irrespective of whether these titles are absolute or 
relative. The right of ownership is the most comprehensive right a person can 
have in an object and it only stops where the rights of another person begin: 
‘ownership rights can be limited only to prevent harm to other people.’4 Conse-
quently, ownership cannot be considered to be equal to possession. These no-
tions and their differences already existed in Roman law in the Late Republic 
(264–227 bc).5 The Roman lawyer Ulpian would later observe that ownership 
had nothing in common with possession.6 Possession is the factual or physical 
holding of an object complemented by the bona fides belief of the possessor 
that he is the owner.7 Ownership, in contrast, comprises the all-comprehensive 
power and right over a thing. Although the possessor holds an object materi-
ally and mentally,8 it is the owner who has the most extensive rights. Put differ-
ently, possession is a material institution, ownership an immaterial institution. 
Ownership concerns the question whether the relation between the individual 
and the object has been constituted in such a way that the law confers rights 
3 See J.W. Singer, Entitlement. The Paradox of Property (New Haven, London: Yale University 
Press, 2000), 6–9. Singer argues that property law establishes the minimum conditions for 
social interaction between individuals: ‘[P]roperty law both responds to and shapes social 
relations by norms and rules that take into account the systemic effects of alternative en-
titlement structures. Paradoxically, property is both an individual entitlement and a social 
system.’ Ibid., 14.
4 Ibid., 30.
5 See A. Watson, The Law of Property in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1968).
6 D.41.2.12.1 (Ulpian): ‘nihil commune habet proprietas cum possessione.’ See also R.A. Epstein, 
‘Possession as the Root of Title,’ Georgia Law Review, 13 (1978–1979), 1221–1243.
7 Possession served as an alternative praetorian protection for those who were not able to 
prove ownership.
8 In contrast to the holder, who only holds and object materially. See A. Borkowski and P. du 
Plessis, Textbook on Roman Law (Oxford University Press, 2005), 164; B. Nicholas, An Intro-
duction to Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 105ff; and T.G. Watkin, An Historical 
Introduction to Modern Civil Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 229ff.
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on the entitled person: ownership is pre-eminently a right. Often the owner of 
an object is also its possessor, but this need not always be the case. The owner 
of an object is the person whose determination of how to use the object is 
deemed to be decisive and final.
The fundamental presumption concerning property rights is that they can, 
and do, exist independently from the State.9 The State as a political organiza-
tion is not a constitutive condition for creating property rights; in every other 
political entity Mein und Dein also naturally emerges in mankind’s quest for 
self-preservation and inevitably leads to conflicts, and these conflicts must be 
either prevented or settled. Regulation of property claims between persons or 
groups of persons must be initiated and guaranteed by an institution that has 
been so authorized by the members of the political entity concerned, regard-
less of whether this entity is, for example, a State, a tribe, a clan or a caste.10 
Property rights precede the territorial State: rules on the allocation of scarce 
resources and the protection of property were already known in ancient times 
and varied from place to place and from society to society.11 In essence, prop-
erty and rights related to property are a reaction to scarcity and are necessary 
to avoid and settle conflicts. As observed above, the evolution of property as 
a legal institution is dependent on its temporal and spatial context.12 Property 
endows the owner with the rights of possession, use and disposition.13 Prop-
erty rights are formalized powers to rule over objects. In general, property law, 
as the controlling instrument of the State, grants and limits such powers.14 In 
the course of the evolution of property rights, many classifications and related 
concepts and definitions have emerged.
9 U. Mattei, Basic Principles of Property Law (Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 2000), 4.
10 Ibid., 3. In this respect, Mattei refers to the work of Paul Bohannan, We, the Alien: An 
Introduction to Cultural Anthropology (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1991), 16. See also 
B. McFarlane, N. Hopkins, and S. Nield, Land Law. Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2009), 32.
11 Singer, Entitlement, 174.
12 Boudewijn Bouckaert argues that the evolution of a legal tradition such as property is 
divided into three phases, namely, the customary phase, the casuistic phase and the con-
ceptual phase. B. Bouckaert, ‘What is Property?’ Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 
13 (1990), 778–789.
13 R.A. Epstein, ‘Property and Necessity,’ Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 13 
(1990), 3.
14 Mattei, Basic Principles of Property Law, 3. See J.H.M. van Erp and B. Akkermans (eds.), 
Cases, Materials and Text on Property Law (Oxford, Portland: Hart, 2012), 65 and 73; and 
Singer, Entitlement, 3.
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The right to property concerns the relation between a subject and an object, 
but it also regulates relationships between persons concerning items of prop-
erty relationships. Property rights involve and create relationships between 
people: ‘Ownership powers of control and transmission all involve capacity to 
create relations with others by virtue of a person’s ownership of something.’15 
This insight became stronger in the nineteenth century and ran parallel to the 
emerging popularity of the bundle theory of property.16 This definition also 
clarifies the distinction between the institution of ownership and ownership 
rights. For ownership to arise, conditions for creating title17 to an object must 
be formulated, as must property limitation rules, expropriation rules and ap-
propriation rules.18
The final concept that requires clarification is that of ‘title’ to objects. ‘Title’ 
refers to the conditions that must be met before a person can rely on trespas-
sory rules to effectuate the protection of (their right to) an object. Title too 
is a regulatory concept, devised by a public authority in order to streamline 
transactions between persons. ‘In the interest of determinacy and public or-
der, a property institution may designate as sufficient conditions of title long 
possession of something over which ownership interest is claimed or long 
use as to a non-ownership proprietary interest.’19 The concept of title is often 
used as a synonym for ownership, but these concepts are not always clearly 
distinguished, especially not in common law jurisdictions.20 Title conditions, 
however, as well as trespassory rules and ownership interests are necessarily 
inextricable features of any system regulating property law relationships. What 
15 J.W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 67.
16 The bundle theory implies that rights to a property can best be conceived of as a bundle 
of individual rights and legal interests which together constitute that property. According 
to the traditional understanding of the bundle theory, the rights accompanying owner-
ship were the right to use, the right to exclusion, the right to compensation, the rights to 
destroy, waste, or modify, the right to income, the absence of time limits, the liability to 
execution and the power to transfer. See A.M. Honoré, ‘Ownership,’ in: A.G. Guest (ed.), 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press, 1962), 107–147.
17 ‘On the one hand, it [entitlement] describes a strong claim to a particular legal rights; 
one who is entitles has a right to be granted title or given the benefit of a particular right. 
[…] On the other hand, the word suggests that such rights are defeasible by political ac-
tion in the public interest, that they may conflict with one another, and that the rules in 
force must adjust the meaning of particular entitlements in light of their effects on other 
entitlement holders.’ Singer, Entitlement, 92.
18 Harris, Property and Justice, 42.
19 Ibid., 39.
20 See, for example, Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law, 62.
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a person may do in relation to an object governed by rules on trespassory pro-
tection depends on the prevailing interpretation of the ownership concept.21
These fundamental conceptual interpretations and classifications support 
and clarify the theoretical framework of both the current chapter and the book 
as a whole. But what do these general theories and assumptions mean for land 
ownership in the context of the European acquisition of African territory in 
the late nineteenth century?
2 European and African Perspectives
2.1 Land Law from a European Point of View
In the European legal tradition private land ownership is a key notion. Land 
law governs the range of complex relationships that can exist between indi-
viduals and collectives with regard to land. These relationships are most com-
monly understood as a bundle of rights and obligations held by individuals 
and collectives with regard to the acquisition, exploitation, preservation, use 
and transfer of specific plots of land. ‘Because human beings are fated to live 
mostly on the surface of the earth, the pattern of entitlements to use land is a 
central issue in social organization.’22 This first sentence of Robert Ellickson’s 
famous article on property in land expresses the essence of land rights and 
land law: land is first and foremost the means of man’s subsistence and private 
property in land secures man’s maintenance.23 Land tenure systems represent 
relations among members of society with respect to land, which next to water 
is the most essential but scarce resource they have. Systems of land tenure all 
turn on the question ‘Who holds what interest in what land?’24
Private land ownership is generally claimed to promote individual liberty, 
political stability and economic prosperity. Private land ownership evolved in 
parallel to the four stages of subsistence.25 The underlying thought, and the 
reason why private land ownership has emerged, is that
21 Harris, Property and Justice, 39–40.
22 R.C. Ellickson, ‘Property in Land,’ Yale Law Journal, 102 (1992–1993), 1317.
23 See M.G. Yakubu, Land Law in Nigeria (London, Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1985), 2–3.
24 Bentsi-Enchill, ‘African Systems of Land Tenure,’ 116.
25 The four stages of development theory assumed that human being and his institutions 
were created progressively by the circumstances in which from time to time and from 
place to place human being happened to find himself: ‘[…] society “naturally” or “normal-
ly” progressed over time through four more or less distinct and consecutive stages, each 
corresponding to a different mode of subsistence, these stages being defined as hunting, 
pasturage, agriculture, and commerce.’ R.L. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage 
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when land is individually owned, a self-interested owner may be tempted 
to use it without regard to the costs and benefits conferred on neighbors 
or others. Individuals may be able to reduce deadweight losses by (1) en-
forcing existing property rights; (2) transferring property rights to better 
managers; or (3) redefining property rights so as to create better-tailored 
incentives for appropriate economic activity.26
In contrast to collective property, private land ownership minimizes dead-
weight losses and transaction costs. On the other hand, private land owner-
ship does require the policing of boundaries as well as techniques to fence 
off privately owned land. The shift from collective to individual land owner-
ship, or the distribution of land, gives rise to conflicts about the exact course 
of boundaries and about who owns a particular piece of land. And, because 
boundaries of privately owned land are established by people, communities 
of people must introduce rules as well as adequate and consistent means of 
delineating plots of land. Only then can ownership be proved and conflicts 
be prevented or, if need be, settled. If a civil society is founded on collective 
property rights to land, mechanisms controlling behaviour of both the group 
and its individual members must be established, because ‘When many people 
use the same piece of land, tragedies of shirking and grabbing lurk.’27 These 
mechanisms, however, varying from participatory to hierarchical governance, 
carry with them far higher costs than do systems that are used to monitor pri-
vate land ownership.
The classical Blackstonian28 account of private land ownership resonates 
in the current understanding of the phenomenon. Joseph Singer encapsulates 
the traditional interpretation of private land ownership as follows:
(Cambridge University Press, 1976), 2. The core of this theory lies in the idea that societies 
are subjected to progressive development through successive stages based on different 
modes of subsistence, which depend on the temporal and spatial context in which the 
particular society exists.
26 Ellickson, ‘Property in Land,’ 1326. ‘In the nature of the case, parcels of land are the ob-
jects most susceptible to proprietary rights other than ownership. There are three com-
mon types: rights to enjoy some extracted category of the use-privileges which prima facie 
are comprised within ownership; rights to deny to the owner the enjoyment of some of 
his ownership privileges; and rights to subtract some monetary value out of the wealth- 
potential of the land.’ Harris, Property and Justice, 56.
27 Ellickson, ‘Property in Land,’ 1348.
28 According to the English legal scholar Sir William Blackstone (1723–1780), private land 
ownership has to be understood as comprising a bundle of private entitlements regard-
ing land: ‘[O]wnership by a single individual (“that sole and despotic dominion which 
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The classical conception assumes (a) consolidated rights; (b) a single, 
identifiable ‘owner’ of that bundle of rights; (c) who is identifiable by 
formal title rather than informal relations or moral claims; (d) rigid, 
permanent rights (e) of absolute control (f) conceptualized in terms of 
boundaries which protect the owner from non-owners by granting the 
owner the absolute power to exclude; and (g) full power of the owner to 
transfer those rights completely or partially on such terms as the owner 
may choose.29
While this traditional understanding of private property rights is a common 
one, it is by no means unique. Regimes of private and collective property of 
land can be found all over the world, and they do not necessarily exclude each 
other: there is a wide range of land ownership systems between the extremes 
of purely collective and purely private property of land. The nature of land 
ownership depends on the specific circumstances in a particular civil soci-
ety, and the various institutionalized forms of land ownership reflect societal 
demand. In this respect, Ellickson is right to assert that ‘a close-knit group 
tends to create, through custom and law, a cost-minimizing land regime that 
adaptively responds to changes in risk, technology, demand, and other eco-
nomic conditions.’30
As observed above, there is a distinction between property rights and territo-
rial rights: ‘[T]he primary function of a property right is to give the right-holder 
one man claims …”); in perpetuity; of a territory demarcated horizontally by boundaries 
drawn upon the land, and extending from there vertically downward to the depths of 
the earth and upward to the heavens; with absolute rights to exclude would-be entrants; 
with absolute privileges to use and abuse the land; and with absolute powers to transfer 
the whole (or any part carved out by use, space, or time) by sale, gift, devise, descent, or 
otherwise.’ Blackstone paraphrased in Ellickson, ‘Property in Land,’ 1362–1363. See also 
C.K. Meek, Land, Law and Custom in the Colonies, 3rd edn (London: Frank Cass, 1968), 1.
29 J.W. Singer, ‘Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement,’ in: G.E. van Maanen 
and A.J. van der Walt, Property Law on the Threshold of the 21st Century (Antwerp, Apel-
doorn: Maklu, 1996), 70–71.
30 Ellickson, ‘Property in Land,’ 1397. Singer proposes that property should be understood 
as a social system, which ‘involves, not relations between people and things, but among 
people, both at the level of society as a whole (the macro level) and in the context of 
particular relationships (the micro level). Four features of this system deserve emphasis. 
First, multiple models exist for defining and controlling property relationships. Second, 
property rights must be understood as both contingent and contextually determined. 
Third, property law and property rights have an inescapable distributive component. 
Fourth, property law helps to structure and shape the contours of social relationships.’ 
Singer, ‘Property and Social Relations,’ 78.
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control over the use and benefit from a thing, and the primary function of a 
territorial right is to give the right-holder the power to establish justice within a 
particular region.’31 Interference in land rights by the governing authority is le-
gitimate when that authority seeks to perform its designated duty of regulating 
and distributing land rights. The governing authority, today most commonly 
associated with the State, regulates society and therefore also the use of land. 
Given the regulating role of the State, this authority ‘improves an enabling en-
vironment in which people can live and use land optimally,’32 which may make 
it incumbent on the State to interfere in land rights. The negative duty of the 
State to refrain from interfering in private property rights and to protect these 
rights the protection of these rights is among the basic principles underlying 
the regulating role of the State. The distributing role of the governing author-
ity concerns ‘the situations whereby the state intends to improve the living 
conditions of those who live from the land.’33 In other words, land and land 
policy are used by the governing authority to distribute wealth. It is here that 
the positive duty of the State to enable its citizens to enjoy property rights 
becomes manifest.
To conclude, land rights serve both the private and the public spheres. In the 
private arena, land forms a fundament of people’s material and psychological 
security, and the legal regimes that are in place to regulate land tenure directly 
affect a society’s entire population. In the public domain, the instrumental use 
of land rights often aims at achieving political, economic and social goals.
2.2 African Land Law
The 1921 Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary of the Southern Provinces of Nigeria 
case,34 which Chapter 6 addresses in more detail, offers an interesting glimpse 
of the European interpretation of African land ownership. In their judgment, 
31 C. Nine, Global Justice and Territory (Oxford University Press, 2012), 73–74.
32 T.R.G. van Banning, The Human Right to Property (Antwerp, Oxford, New York: Intersen-
tia, 2002), 326. ‘The state has had and always will have to interfere with land rights in order 
to fulfil its governance role. It has to build roads, construct public facilities and protect 
the environment. It also has to balance the interests of various groups in society; these 
balancing acts regularly and unavoidably affect land.’ Ibid.
33 Ibid. See also T.W. Bennett et al. (eds.), ‘Land Ownership: A Changing Concept,’ Acta 
Juridica (1985), p. v.
34 Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary, Southern Provinces of Nigeria, 1921, 2 a.c. 399 or 3 n.l.r. 21 
(Appeal from the Divisional Court of Southern Nigeria to the Privy Council). Reference to 
this case is also made by M.F. Lindley in his The Acquisition and Government of Backward 
Territory in International Law: Being a Treatise on the Law and Practice Relating to Colonial 
Expansion (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926), 347.
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their Lordships refer to the 1898 Report on Land Tenure in West Africa, which 
had been prepared and drawn up by Chief Justice Rayner. The report describes 
the character of the tenure of land among the native peoples in that part of 
Africa, and it is quoted extensively by the Court:
The next fact which it is important to bear in mind in order to under-
stand the native land law is that the notion of individual ownership is 
quite foreign to native ideas. Land belongs to the community, the village 
or the family, never to the individual. All the members of the community, 
village or family have an equal right to the land, but in every case the 
Chief or Headman of the community or village, or head of the family, 
has charge of the land, and in loose mode of speech is sometimes called 
the owner. He is to some extent in the position of a trustee, and as such 
holds the land for the use of the community or family. He has control of 
it, and any member who wants a piece of it to cultivate or build a house 
upon, goes to him for it. But the land so given still remains the property of 
the community or family. He cannot make any important disposition 
of the land without consulting the elders of the community or family, 
and their consent must in all cases be given before a grant can be made 
to a stranger. This is a pure native custom along the whole length of this 
coast, and wherever we find, as in Lagos, individual owners, this is again 
due to the introduction of English ideas. But the native idea still has a 
firm hold on the people, and in most cases, even in Lagos, land is held by 
the family. This is so even in cases of land purporting to be held under 
Crown grants and English conveyances. The original grantee may have 
held as an individual owner, but on his death all his family claim an inter-
est, which is always recognised, and thus the land becomes again fam-
ily land. My experience in Lagos leads me to the conclusion that except 
where land has been bought by the present owner there are very few na-
tives who are individual owners of land.
This passage is considered to be the first Western articulation of African under-
standing of property rights to land. This first attempt to understand the Afri-
can land tenure system contains three misconceptions, as Clement Ng’ong’ola 
clearly describes.35 First, it is erroneous to suggest that communal land tenure 
has to be understood in the sense that every member of a particular group or 
35 C. Ng’ong’ola, ‘Land Problems in Some Peri-Urban Villages in Botswana and Problems of 
Conception, Description and Transformation of “Tribal” Land Tenure,’ Journal of African 
Law, 36 (1992), 144–148. See also Bryant, Land, 16–29.
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community had an equal claim to a particular piece of land.36 Second, the in-
terpretation of the position and the role of the native ruler as it appears in the 
Amodu Tijani case is inaccurate: ‘While acknowledging the error of attempting 
to translate the chief ’s political position and his powers of land administration 
into the language of ownership, it should also be appreciated that equating his 
position to that of a trustee does not take the clarification of his rights, duties, 
powers and privileges very far.’37 Third, the Court’s suggestion that natives are 
not familiar with the notion of ownership of land is also troublesome.38
At this point it is important to note that nineteenth-century legal doc-
trine did acknowledge African natives’ property rights to land. Westlake, for 
example, asserted that ‘[s]ettled agricultural populations know property in 
land, either as belonging to individuals or to families, or, if as belonging in 
full measure only to the tribe, at ease with such rights of a proprietary nature 
vested in individuals or in families as are necessary for cultivation.’39 However, 
he pointed to the limits of this native ownership because of the natives’ way of 
life: ‘Hunting and nomad tribes may have so slight a connection with any land 
in particular as to share but little, if at all, the ideas which we connect with 
property in the soil.’40
Another attempt to understand the tenure systems of Africa was made by 
the British Governor-General of Nigeria, Frederick Lugard (1858–1945).41 Lu-
gard subscribed to the conventional European view that the African property 
regime was of a customary nature, and he emphasized the familial and com-
munal character of these property rights. From the European point of view, Af-
rican natives were unfamiliar with private land ownership, but that view may 
36 ‘Communal ownership, given its usual common-law denotation, might mean wither that 
a right is held by a group of people jointly, i.e. by a single inseparable title, or by a group 
in common, i.e. each person having own separate but same title. This ambiguity is not 
explained.’ T.W. Bennett, ‘Terminology and Land Tenure in Customary Law: An exercise 
in Linguistic Theory,’ Acta Juridica (1985), 176.
37 Ng’ong’ola, ‘Land Problems,’ 146.
38 ‘Colonial policy towards African tenure was informed by two tenacious beliefs: that in-
dividual ownership of property was the hallmark of civilization and that customary law 
knew only communal ownership. […] However, it does not follow that customary land 
tenure was (or is) communal.’ T.W. Bennett, ‘African Land – A History of Dispossession,’ 
in: R. Zimmermann and D. Visser (eds.), Southern Cross. Civil Law and Common Law in 
South Africa (Kenwyn: Juta, 1996), 72.
39 Westlake, Chapters, 144.
40 Ibid.
41 F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Edinburgh, London: William 
Blackwood, 1922), 280–281.
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not stand up to analysis Was native land ownership in Africa indeed based 
solely on custom and community, or, in other words, was private ownership of 
land non-existent? To address these questions, land ownership in Africa must 
be discussed from a sociological and anthropological perspective42 and from 
the view point of the natives themselves.43 In what follows the African sys-
tem of native land tenure will be described, and this description includes a 
comparison between the rules and institutions of the African and European 
systems.
Before the European voyages of discovery, there was a wide variety of politi-
cal entities in Africa. These entities endorsed rules which ‘existed to define the 
appropriate reciprocal behavior of individuals,’ and mechanisms which ‘ex-
isted to maintain the social order.’44 Mechanisms to maintain social order var-
ied greatly ‘between constituted authority and various forms of self-help, with 
religious and supernatural sanctions, and processes of reconciliation playing 
their parts.’45 In short, social order and the existence of law, more specifically 
customary law, were common features of these African political entities.46
Although describing African systems of landholding poses problems,47 tra-
ditionally the nature of African native systems of land tenure is characterized 
by three interdependent denominations. First, it is custom-based. Second, be-
cause of the communal nature of native land tenure, the political organization 
of African peoples is closely linked to tenure and proprietary notions. Third, 
African natives have a ‘spiritual’ relationship with the land they live on and 
that their ancestors lived on before them. These three elements, which can 
42 See, for example, A.N. Allott, ‘The Ashanti Law of Property,’ Zeitschrift für vergleichende 
Rechtswissenschaft, 68 (1965), 137ff; A.N. Allott, ‘Family Property in West Africa: Its Juristic 
Basis, Control and Enjoyment,’ in: J.N.D. Anderson (ed.), Family Laws in Asia and Africa 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1968), 122ff and M. Gluckman, The Ideas in Barotse Jurispru-
dence (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1965).
43 See E.D. Morel, Nigeria, Its Peoples and Problems (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1911).
44 C.M.N. White, ‘African Customary Law: The Problem of Concept and Definition,’ Journal 
of African Law, 9 (1965), 86.
45 Ibid.
46 See M. Gluckman (ed.), Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1969).
47 G. MacCormack, ‘Problems in the Description of African Systems of Landholding,’ Journal 
of Legal Pluralism, 21 (1983), 1–14. More generally on property rights in Africa South of the 
Sahara, see H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, ‘The Nature of Land Rights under Indigenous Law in 
Africa,’ in: A. Claassens and B. Cousins (eds.), Land, Power & Custom (University of Cape 
Town Press, 2008), 95–108 and J.P. Powelson, The Story of Land. A World History of Land 
Tenure and Agrarian Reform (Cambridge, Mass.: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1988), 
257–284.
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only be meaningfully considered together, form the main characteristics of Af-
rican native land tenure.
First, the essence of customary law, as Ng’ong’ola aptly formulates, is that it 
refers to norms, values, habits and other commitments of groups or commu-
nities which must be appreciated as law.48 Unlike statutory tenure,49 the cus-
tomary law basis of proprietary rights to land in African native legal systems 
is related to the needs of a subsistence system of hunting and fishing, pastur-
age and agriculture, which in in turn is closely connected to the natives’ com-
munal way of life. This subsistence depends on a sufficiency of land to allow 
for rotation, which includes allowing land to lie fallow. Native communities 
need rules to solve conflicts of distributive scarcity. Customary land tenure in 
Africa entails that land belongs to all the people, and the land may be used by 
individuals, families and communities. Family property has a particular place 
within customary land law.50 Membership of a certain family or community 
gives individuals privileges and rights with regard to the access to and dispos-
al of the land.51 The main features of customary land law are that the land 
belongs to the community, implying that all the individuals of that commu-
nity have equal rights of access and use regarding land. The native ruler, who 
has governing powers over the land, is ‘in the position of a trustee and holds 
the land for the use of the people.’52 The content of the rights and rules with 
48 C. Ng’ong’ola, ‘Customary Law, Land Tenure and Policy in some African Countries at the 
Threshold of the Twenty-first Century,’ in: G.E. van Maanen and A.J. van der Walt, Prop-
erty Law on the Threshold of the 21st Century (Antwerp, Apeldoorn: Maklu, 1996), 392. On 
the uncontroversial issue of the interpretation of customary law, see ibid., 393. See also 
K. Akuffo, ‘The Conception of Land Ownership in African Customary Law and Its Implica-
tions for Development,’ African Journal for International and Comparative Law, 17 (2009), 
57–78; M. Chanock, ‘The Law Market: The Legal Encounters in British East and Central Af-
rica,’ in W. Mommsen and J. de Moor (eds.), European expansion and the law (Oxford, New 
York: Berg, 1992), 279–305; P. Fitzpatrick, ‘Traditionalism and Traditional Law,’ Journal of 
African Law, 28 (1984), 20–27 and also H. Klug, ‘Defining the Property Rights of Others: 
Political Power, Indigenous Tenure and the Construction of Customary Land Law,’ Journal 
of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 35 (1995), 119–148.
49 On the distinction between customary and statutory land tenure, see F. Twaib, ‘The Di-
lemma of the Customary Landholder,’ in: Robert Debusmann and Stefan Arnold (eds.), 
Land Law and Land Ownership in Africa. Case Studies from Colonial and Contemporary 
Cameroon and Tanzania (Bayreuth: Bayreuth African Studies, 1996), 82–110.
50 C.O. Olawoye, Title to Land in Nigeria (London: Evans Brothers, 1981), 36–38.
51 Yakubu, Land Law in Nigeria, 6.
52 Ibid., 8. ‘The powers of a ruler over land are in respect of the following: a) General Admin-
istration: A ruler as a sociological and political authority is charged with the responsibil-
ity to see that the community land is administered well for the common benefit of the 
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regard to acquisition of property differ according to the object in question, the 
party on whom these right have been conferred, and against whom they can 
be upheld.53
Second, the communal nature of native African landholding has as a con-
sequence that the political organization of the native group and the system of 
land tenure are closely connected. The relationship between the community 
and the land they hold is hard to interpret, because ‘the rights of individuals 
and of the group with respect to the same piece of land often co-exist within 
the same social context.’54 Additionally, land is in most cases not owned or 
worked by any large unit: ‘Everywhere there are individual rights, that is to say 
that a single individual, or two or more close relatives, have definite rights to 
a particular plot of ground and to its produce.’55 These rights are connected 
to membership of a family, clan or local group. Often, these rights are limited to 
the period of effective occupation and restricted in respect of succession and 
transfer: sale of the land by an individual member of the group does not ap-
pear to be possible, or if it is, it can only be effectuated under strict conditions 
set by the native group.56 Generally, the inalienability of land and the equality 
of group members are assumed to be the cornerstone of communal land own-
ership.57 Although individual proprietary rights and the benefits connected to 
these kinds of rights are often not of current interest within the native concep-
tion of landholding, they are not absent.58 In this respect, the African natives’ 
relationship with the land has a more possessory nature than an absolute, pro-
prietary one. As the head of the village, the ruler fulfils a custodian function 
people; b) Trusteeship Position: A ruler is a trustee of the community land. He admin-
isters land for the use and common benefit of the people. He cannot sell or make an 
outright gift of community land. […] The consequence of the Ruler’s position as a trustee 
over land is that he represents his community in all land disputes. He sues and he can 
be sued for any matter connected with the community land.’ Ibid., 12–13. See also Bentsi-
Enchill, ‘African Systems of Land Tenure,’ 127. For an intriguing perspective on customary 
law, see White, ‘African Customary Law,’ 89.
53 Bouckaert, ‘What is Property,’ 780.
54 T.O. Elias, Nigerian Land Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1971), 73. Land which are com-
munally hold, ‘often embrace both those in which individual members of the group hold 
clearly recognized rights and those over which no claim of right is ever asserted whether 
by groups or by individuals.’ Ibid.
55 Meek, Land, 17.
56 Ibid. See Elias, Nigerian Land Law, 130–131.
57 See Ng’ong’ola, ‘Customary Law,’ 403. See also R. Roberts and K. Mann, ‘Law in Colonial 
Africa,’ in: K. Mann and R. Roberts (eds.), Law in Colonial Africa (Portsmouth, London: 
James Currey, 1991), 25.
58 Okoth-Ogendo, ‘Nature of Land Rights,’ 111.
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over the land, but he cannot be considered the owner of the land: ‘The normal 
unit of land ownership is the extended-family, or kindred. Land once granted 
to a family remains the property of that family, and the chief has no right to any 
say in its disposal.’59 The native rulers were regarded as holders of land who 
had assigned powers of administration and allocation. Paramountcy and land 
tenure do not come together in the person of the native ruler. In other words, 
the ruler is ‘in no sense the ultimus haeres to any land to which there is no 
succession, since in the Customary Law care is taken to continue the persona 
of the family.’60 The African ruler had a ‘political and social pre-eminence’61 
function with regard to the land on which his community lived. Consequently, 
the native land tenure system of land, based on kinship, ensures social and 
political stability.
Third, the relationship of African natives with their land has to be articu-
lated. In the majority of native communities, the authority of customary rules 
and institutions has religious, mythical and ancestral origins. With regard 
to the relationship between customary rules and their cultural foundation, 
Boudewijn Bouckaert argues that
Although tribal societies have had to develop rules and institutions to 
solve interpersonal conflicts about the use of scarce resources, these 
rules and institutions are not perceived as a separate legal order. They re-
main closely intertwined within the cultural background of the mythical-
conventional world view. […] Lacking a perception of law as a separate 
order and lacking a specialized class devoted to solving legal problems, it 
is not surprising that we are unable to find a general and abstract notion 
of property in tribal legal systems.62
Charles Meek observes four classes of land within an Ibo village in Nigeria. 
First, there are lands which are ‘sacred or taboo,’ implying the spiritual values 
of the land. Often this spiritual relationship with the land refers to the people’s 
relationship with their ancestors, whom they worship. Second, virgin forest on 
land is not used for farming, because forests offer protection and defence to 
59 Meek, Land, 27.
60 J.E. Casely Hayford, The Truth about the West African Land Question, 2nd edn (London: 
Frank Cass, 1971), 67.
61 Elias, Nigerian Land Law, 78. ‘This is not, however, to deny that a chief may enjoy a dual 
capacity; his position of control and administration of community land, as well as his 
position as a land-owning individual in his private capacity.’ Ibid.
62 Bouckaert, ‘What is Property,’ 779.
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the village, shade to people and cattle, and supplies of wood and fibre. Third, 
farm land is communally held by the entire village, which is composed of the 
rulers and several families. Last but not least, there is the land which is indi-
vidually held and cultivated, i.e., land that is held ‘by a single individual or by a 
small working group composed of a father and sons, or a man and his younger 
brothers or cousins.’63
The very brevity of this outline of the general characteristics of customary 
land tenure in Africa requires that it be qualified. First, these features express 
a general view on native land tenure in Africa – contextual details have been 
left out. Each African community had its own habits and rules, which resulted 
in a variety of differing customary land tenure systems on the African conti-
nent. Second, even this native African land tenure system based on custom-
ary law was not free from foreign influences. Since times immemorial, African 
natives have encountered and been in contact with non-African natives, and 
this has affected their customs, rules and ways of life. For example, the first 
European colonization wave of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had 
already confronted the African native populations with unfamiliar legal con-
cepts, rules and systems regarding land tenure. It was from that moment on 
that African land tenure systems were influenced by European legal thought. 
In other words, when the European colonists of the nineteenth century first 
arrived in Africa, European legal concepts, rules and systems had already be-
gun to make their mark.64 In addition, in the colonial period African natives 
actively participated in the development of customary law.
3 Concluding Remarks: New Imperialism and Natives’  
Property Rights
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, contractual thinkers, of whom 
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), John Locke (1632–1704) and Jean-Jacques 
63 Meek, Land, 21. Yakubu distinguishes five sorts of African land use: forest land, marsh land 
(found along river beds or water lodge areas), grassland, fallowland (has been cultivated 
and has now reverted to grassland with the previous cultivator retaining the intention of 
coming back to take it) and sacred and taboo land. Yakubu, Land Law in Nigeria, 4–5.
64 See, for example, L. Benton, ‘Possessing Empire: Iberian Claims and Interpolity Law,’ in: 
S. Belmessous (ed.), Native Claims. Indigenous Law against Empire, 1500–1920 (Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 19–40; A. Fitzmaurice, ‘Powhatan Legal Claims,’ in: S. Belmessous 
(ed.), Native Claims. Indigenous Law against Empire, 1500–1920 (Oxford University Press, 
2012), 85–106; K. Mann and R. Roberts, Law in Colonial Africa (Portsmouth, London: James 
Currey, 1991) and S. Pierce, Farmers and the State in Colonial Kano. Land Tenure and the 
Legal Imagination (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005).
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Rousseau (1712–1778) were the most prominent, placed the institution of prop-
erty within the political realm and emphasized the development of property 
from commonly to privately owned objects, from de facto to de iure possession. 
Private property, therefore, is the foundation on which rests the superstruc-
ture of public authority and power, i.e., sovereignty. Against this background, 
Fitzmaurice argues that ‘[t]he division over whether the state needed to ex-
ist before occupation could create property would be central to discussions 
of colonial property.’65 He shows that in these discussions both philosophical 
positions – property and rights are created prior to the state and vice versa – 
were used to argue either that native populations did not live in States and, 
for that reason, did not possess rights or that native political entities were le-
gitimate because each polity organized property: ‘Similarly, the argument that 
rights pre-exist the state was used to argue that indigenous peoples had not 
exploited nature and so did not possess property, but it was also employed to 
argue that even if indigenous peoples did not live in recognizably sovereign 
states, they still possessed property rights.’66
In nineteenth century Europe, the concepts of property and sovereignty 
were formally separated: they were classified as belonging to different areas 
of law (private law and public law respectively), and in many European States 
they were codified separately. Property rights were considered to have been 
created by the State on the basis of the State’s territorial sovereignty. Paradoxi-
cally, in order to give sovereignty an independent position vis-à-vis property, 
legal doctrine used the model of property and its determining characteristics 
to shape sovereignty as an institute. This circular dependency became particu-
larly apparent in the development of international law. Following the demise 
of feudality at the end of the eighteenth century, property, and more specifi-
cally ownership, became an absolute institution within the private law systems 
of the various continental Europe States. In Great Britain, the birthplace of the 
common law tradition, property law retained its feudal origin and with it a 
broad range of proprietary rights to land.
The nineteenth century was also the era of territorial expansion through 
colonialism. Economic and political considerations combined with the op-
portunities offered by the Industrial Revolution to encourage Europeans to 
venture out into the world and establish settlements abroad. Encounters with 
non-Europeans led to confrontations between private individuals as well as 
between political entities and legal systems. Especially with regard to property 
rights to land, more specifically land ownership, conceptual differences and 
conflicts were the order of the day. The Europeans regarded land ownership 
65 Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 123.
66 Ibid.
chapter 250
both as an absolute, formalized institution and as a key private interest that 
needed to be protected by the State. They were confronted with the African 
interpretation of property rights to land. African natives considered their lands 
as the primary living condition. Although their property rights to land were pre-
dominantly communal and customary in nature and based on religious convic-
tions and ancestral relations, the Europeans through their earlier contacts with 
African peoples had already exerted some influence on how property rights 
were regulated within African political communities. Private land ownership, 
for example, was not unknown to the African natives.
Although there are differences in the understanding of property in general 
and land ownership in particular, dominium played a central role in the Euro-
pean acquisition of African territory and in the relations between Europeans 
and African natives. New Imperialism for Africa implied the European acqui-
sition of sovereign rights over African territory. These rights were acquired 
by means of bilateral treaties between African rulers and European States. 
Cession and protectorate treaties were the instruments that transferred sov-
ereignty, either in whole or in part, from the African rulers to the European 
contracting parties. This raises the following questions What effects did this 
treaty-based transfer of sovereignty have on the natives’ property rights. Did 
the Europeans recognize and respect the existing native proprietary rights to 
land? By nineteenth-century legal standards, were the natives’ property rights 
to land infringed and obligations of international law violated? To answer these 
questions, the cession and protectorate treaties between European States and 
African rulers must first be analysed and assessed in terms of how they were 
negotiated and concluded. Subsequently, it must be established whether these 
treaties were observed and whether international law was violated. Only then 
can an attempt be made to ascertain whether the acquisition and partition of 




The sixteenth century scholastic Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) was one of the 
first to describe the fundamental distinction between property and sover-
eignty within the law of nations. Perhaps somewhat confusingly, for these two 
concepts he used the terms dominium proprietatis and dominium iurisdictionis 
respectively. According to Suárez, dominium proprietatis (proprietary power) 
indicates the right to private property that all persons enjoy and which they 
can enforce against any and all private and public interventions. Sovereign 
power, or dominium iurisdictionis, is the authority as exercised by the rules: it is 
based on the territorial realm and it is defined by its objective to guarantee the 
protection and prosperity of that realm.1 It is the latter concept, the exercise 
of sovereign rights over territory, with which this chapter is concerned. It will 
be referred to by its more customary name in academic discourse: imperium.
Capturing both territory and sovereignty, imperium is commonly rendered 
as territorial sovereignty. Imperium connects the spatial and subjective dimen-
sions of legal order. Imperium is primarily a right over persons and it is sec-
ondarily a right over things, that is, over land and parts of sea.2 This close and 
interdependent relationship between sovereignty and territory has been the 
subject of many academic works and debates. Daniel O’Connell formulates the 
close relationship between sovereignty and territory as follows: ‘Sovereignty 
connotes nothing more than the supreme legal competence within a defined 
region, a competence which is relative only.’3 And, arbitrator Max Huber’s defi-
nition of territorial sovereignty in the Island of Palmas case (1928) is in every 
international lawyer’s toolkit: ‘Territorial sovereignty […] involves the exclusive 
1 F. Suárez, On Laws and God the Lawgiver (De legibus, ac Deo legislatore), in: Selections from 
Three Works. Vol ii: The Translation, transl. G. Williams (Oxford University Press, 1944), Bk ii 
Ch. xix, § 9 (347).
2 Hugo Grotius in Yanagihara Masaharu, ‘Dominium and Imperium,’ in: Y. Onuma (ed.), A Nor-
mative Approach to War. Peace, War, and Justice in Hugo Grotius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993), 147–173.
3 D.P. O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, vol. i (Cambridge 
University Press, 1967), 26.
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right to display the activities of a State.’4 Shaw gives a more comprehensive 
definition of territorial sovereignty: ‘[T]erritorial sovereignty in fact marks a 
link between a particular people and a particular territory, so that within that 
area that people may exercise through the medium of the State its jurisdic-
tion while being distinguished from other peoples exercising jurisdiction over 
other areas. It consists of a coherent body of rights and duties imposed upon 
States in relation to specific pieces of territory.’5
The main purpose of this chapter is to analyse and interpret the concept of 
territorial sovereignty from an international legal perspective and within the 
timeframe of the nineteenth century. As a consequence, the central object of 
scrutiny is the external component of sovereignty, and to make this theoretical 
discussion tangible and relevant within the scope of this book, it will be put 
into the context of the European partition of and entitlement to African ter-
ritory in the late nineteenth century. The question to be answered, therefore, 
is what territorial sovereignty as a legal concept entailed, in particular in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from both a European and an 
African perspective.
Although the concepts of sovereignty and territory are separate concepts, 
they have become closely related, in particular in the context of the interna-
tional legal order, by their direct relation to the concept of the State. The first 
step is to state the theoretical and conceptual assumptions that underlie the 
discussion of sovereignty presented here (§2). Next, the chapter looks more 
closely at the nineteenth-century theory and practice of sovereignty within 
the context of European international law as it stood at the time (§3). Follow-
ing this overview, the chapter describes and analyses the African view on both 
international law and the position and role of the concept of sovereignty (§4). 
Subsequently, the relationship of African natives with their territory will be 
explored and compared to the European perspective on territorial sovereign-
ty. Finally, the Chapter offers some concluding remarks on sovereignty in the 
context of the European acquisition and partition of Africa at the end of the 
nineteenth century (§5).
2 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
In this chapter sovereignty is understood in a broad sense rather than in 
the narrow sense of international legal doctrine in the nineteenth century. 
Under this doctrine, still prevalent today, sovereignty is considered to be the 
4 Island of Palmas (Netherlands v. United States of America), 1928, 2 riaa 829, 839.
5 Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, 11–12.
53Imperium
backbone, a ‘fundamental axiom,’6 or an ‘essential dogma’7 of international 
law in theory and practice. Koskenniemi describes this traditional view on 
sovereignty, which presupposes the inseparable connection between sover-
eignty and the State, as follows: ‘It [sovereignty, MvdL] works as a description 
and a norm. It characterizes the critical property an entity must possess in 
order to qualify as a State. And it involves a set of rights and duties which are 
understood to constitute the normative basis of international relations.’8 This 
traditional conceptualization of international sovereignty is problematic, be-
cause it expresses a European understanding of sovereignty. Originally, sov-
ereignty was not connected to the State and the distinction between internal 
and external sovereignty only developed over time. Moreover, sovereignty in 
the traditional sense is a formal concept and has only a tenuous connection 
with international law in practice. To avoid using a fiction in interpreting the 
many faces of a real world phenomenon, sovereignty has to be understood, 
to use the words of Martin Loughlin, as ‘a representation of the autonomy of 
a political sphere.’9 Sovereignty is a dynamic concept and its meaning is rela-
tive to its specific spatial and temporal context. Sovereignty as the supreme 
power of a political entity, according to F.H. Hinsley, is ‘the idea that there is 
a final and absolute political authority in the political community […] and no 
final and absolute authority exists elsewhere […].’10 However, neither within a 
particular political entity nor in relation to other polities is sovereignty unlim-
ited. Law sets the boundaries of sovereign power to avoid abuse of authority. 
6 Shaw, International Law, 487.
7 R. Domingo, The New Global Law (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 73.
8 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 300. Another example of the traditional view – 
aligning sovereignty, territory and State – can be found in the definition of sovereignty 
given by Rafael Domingo: ‘Sovereignty is thus a property inherent to any state, which 
gives it supreme power in its territory, control of its legal system, and the right to recog-
nize external bodies or entities that establish contact with it.’ Domingo, New Global Law, 
65. See also Shaw, International Law, 487–488: ‘International law is based on the concept 
of the state. The state in its turn lies upon the foundation of sovereignty, which expresses 
internally the supremacy of the governmental institutions and externally the supremacy 
of the state as a legal person. […] Since such fundamental legal concepts as sovereignty 
and jurisdiction can only be comprehended in relation to territory, it follows that the 
legal nature of territory becomes a viral part in any study of international law. Indeed, the 
principle whereby a state is deemed to exercise exclusive power over its territory can be 
regarded as a fundamental axiom of classical international law.’
9 M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), 228. See also 
M. Loughlin, ‘Ten Tenets of Sovereignty,’ in: N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Ox-
ford: Hart, 2003), 56.
10 F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (New York: Basic Books, 1966), 26.
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Interestingly, the narrow understanding of sovereignty is not only problematic 
to recent legal scholarship. The American lawyer Robert Lansing (1864–1928) 
had already pointed to the non-constitutive nature of the territorial State for 
the existence of sovereignty in 1913: ‘In the consideration of sovereignty, the 
state as a qualification of occupation of territory is for the purpose of these 
notes non-essential; and its omission from the definition avoids controversy 
as to the correctness of the limitation which its adoption would impose.’11 And 
as early as the 1920s, doubts arose about the fundamental assumption in in-
ternational law that State, territory and sovereignty align. Even then, it was 
recognized that territorial statehood is one of a number of ways to organize a 
political entity.
As the concept of sovereignty evolved from the Middle Ages onwards, it 
developed both an internal and an external component. The former was af-
firmed by the French Revolution, the latter evolved in parallel to the law of 
nations. Sovereignty in its internal sense implies that the sovereign’s authority 
is original, absolute and indivisible vis-à-vis the citizens of the political entity 
concerned. Internal sovereignty entails the authority relationship within a po-
litical organization between the ruler and the ruled, a relationship that is often 
defined in the constitution of that particular entity. The French jurist Maurice 
Costes, whose most productive period was the first two decades of the twenti-
eth century, emphasizes the personal nature between sovereign and subjects 
by defining internal sovereignty as ‘une sorte de maîtrise sur les personnes et sur 
11 R. Lansing. ‘Notes on Sovereignty in a State,’ American Journal of International Law, 1 
(1907), 108. Lansing confirmed that ‘[w]hat certain publicists have tried to avoid and what 
they cannot avoid is that sovereignty and the sovereign existed before the state.’ Ibid., 
p. 112. Lansing provided an understanding of sovereignty in relation to law: ‘There is in 
a modern political state, as in a primitive community, an irresistible energy which can 
control all human conduct within the state. This irresistible energy is superior physical 
might which has no limitations other than those inherent in human nature. This superior 
physical might confer upon its possessor or possessors the power to compel obedience to 
his or their will. This dominant will is expressed by action or by command. The supreme 
coercive physical power I would define as sovereignty; the expression of the dominant 
will of its possessor or possessors I would define as law. Sovereignty so defined is a natural 
product of human association affected by the desire for its continuance. Law, in any but 
an artificial sense, is the mental product of the possessor of the sovereignty. Thus effective 
rules of human conduct (and they are the only ones worthy of consideration), whether 
they apply to individuals or to states, depend ultimately upon paramount human energy 
or sovereignty, which though founded in nature, seems to me, not only an appropriate, 
but an essential, term in international law as well as in constitutional law.’ R. Lansing, 
‘A Definition of Sovereignty,’ Proceedings of the American Political Science Association, 10 
(1913), 74.
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les choses, résultant d’un rapport intime entre, d’une part, le pouvoir qui l’exerce 
et, d’autre part, les populations et les territoires qui y sont soumis.’12 Often, inter-
nal sovereignty is associated with authority or supremacy, while external sov-
ereignty signifies the autonomy of the polity. Sovereignty in its external sense 
comprises the status of a political entity in relation to other political entities, 
and it regulates their interactions. In most cases it involves the control over 
foreign affairs and the defence of the territory. In present-day international 
relations, external sovereignty concerns the international legal order that de-
fines the mutual rights, duties, powers, competences and titles of States. Inde-
pendence equality are the two fundamental principles that govern interstate 
relations. In short, sovereignty presupposes or assumes the supremacy and 
independence of a State.
3 Nineteenth-century European International Law: Sovereignty, 
Territory and State
The constitutive principles of nineteenth-century international law – some-
times called the ‘Relative Golden Age of Modern International Law’13 – were 
12 M. Costes, Des Cessions de Territoires (Paris, Toulouse: Rivière and Co., 1914), 43.
13 J. Shen, ‘The Relativity and Historical Perspective of the Golden Age of International Law,’ 
International Legal Theory, 6 (2000), 21. ‘While secularised hallmarks of civilisation rep-
resent a significant break with the Christian international law tradition, non-Christian 
stadial theories of progress were easily adaptable to secularised imperialism. Throughout 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Europeans could and did claim prescription 
and/or first valid discovery or occupation against indigenous groups that were deemed 
to have a lower form of production (e.g. nomadic), culture (e.g. no writing), or political 
system (e.g. anarchy, or monarchy). Similarly, there are numerous cases when the early 
modern secularisation of international law made it possible to accord full recognition 
to non-Europeans’ right to property, territorially defined states, and sovereignty. It re-
mains to be seen whether the nineteenth-century doctrinal turn in international law […] 
continued at least in part the stages-based justification of imperialism […], or whether 
Victorian imperial evangelism constitutes a volte-face from almost three centuries of self-
consciously secularising imperialist legal discourse, resurrecting in effect sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century Catholic justifications of imperialism. Without drawing a compre-
hensive arc, one can begin a pointillist picture of this change by contrasting, for instance, 
Vattel’s (1758) criterion for being a member of the natural society of nations (namely a 
state’s own claim to govern itself by its own authority and laws) with post-Kant and post-
Bentham elaborations that the correct hallmark of civilisation is not self-determination 
but recognition by a club of nations, self-appointed as already civilised. If not Iberian 
Catholicism, then at least a common, minimalist Christianity then became a defining 
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non-intervention, equality of States, balance of power, legitimacy, internation-
al community and international reciprocity.14 Territorial expansion played a 
crucial role in shaping the international legal order in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Saskia Sassen has described the conditions that facilitated 
the creation of international law: ‘[T]he world scale at the time was largely 
constituted through the projection of national capitalisms onto foreign geo-
graphic areas,’ which led to an ‘emerging orientation toward interstate coor-
dination through both national legislation and international agreements.’15 
Imperialism, in other words, boosted the universalization of European inter-
national law.
Grewe has observed that this expansion of the European law of nations was 
favoured, and indeed made possible by, three mutually reinforcing factors: the 
transformation of a family of Christian European nations into a secular society 
of civilized nations; the globalization of the State system; and Britain’s superior 
position in this era through its control over the world’s oceans and its colonial 
possessions in overseas territories.16 European international law, however, was 
not only carried to overseas territories. Lawyers from all corners of the earth 
flocked to Europe to study and took home with them the concept and prin-
ciples of European international law.17 As a consequence of this expansion of 
European international law to places and peoples outside Europe, the appear-
ance of sovereignty changed: it became imperial. ‘Imperial sovereignty pres-
ents itself as the nemesis of modern sovereignty: imperial sovereignty reflects 
a fusion of economic and political power, the elimination of the distinction be-
tween public and private, the erosion of civil order which underpins the idea 
of official power, and the disintegration of a political relationship.’18 Imperial 
sovereignty inevitably eliminated the traditional dichotomy between the eco-
nomic and the political spheres and, by extension, between the private and the 
public spheres. A substantial corollary of this imperial sovereignty is that late 
nineteenth-century international legal doctrine overemphasized the external 
hallmark of civilisation in positive international law.’ M. Somos, ‘Selden’s Mare Clausum. 
The Secularisation of International Law and the Rise of Soft Imperialism,’ Journal of the 
History of International Law, 14 (2012), 329.
14 M. Vec, ‘Principles in 19th century International Law Doctrine,’ in: L. Nuzzo and M. Vec 
(eds.), Constructing International Law. The Birth of a Discipline (Frankfurt am Main: Klos-
termann, 2012), 215.
15 S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton 
University Press, 2006), 132 and 136.
16 Grewe, Epochs of International Law, 445.
17 See Becker Lorca, ‘Universal International Law,’ 475–552.
18 Loughlin, ‘Ten Tenets of Sovereignty,’ 84.
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dimension of sovereignty. The identification of States by their independence19 
in relation to other States and political entities took priority over the internal 
and vertical relationship they had with their subjects.20
On this interpretation of sovereignty, moral limitations of sovereign powers 
were not considered to fall within the legal realm; limits of this kind depend-
ed on the sovereign’s discretionary powers and were not seen as compulsory, 
as Lansing’s argumentation shows: ‘All such influences being followed only 
voluntarily by the possessor of the sovereignty and operating by permission 
rather than by positive power, obedience to them does not determine the pos-
session of the real sovereignty.’21
Traditionally, international legal scholars emphasize the antithesis between 
natural law and positivism. They read a strict dualism regarding the natural 
law approach and positivism between the writers of the pre-nineteenth and 
the nineteenth centuries. Positivists are often styled as opponents of natural 
lawyers because of their alleged rejection of natural law, justice, and morality, 
and their epistemological approach to sources. As was shown no such strict 
dualism existed.22 Koskenniemi argues that stating that the nineteenth centu-
ry was the ‘golden age of international legal positivism’ meant that ‘the profes-
sionals moved within a fully consensualist or otherwise ascending  argument’ 
is wrong.23 Two arguments support his view. First, most nineteenth-century 
19 ‘A group of men is fully sovereign when it has no constitutional relations making it in any 
degree dependent on any other group: if it has such relations, so much of sovereignty as 
they leave it is a kind or degree of semi-sovereignty, though the constitution may not call 
it by that name.’ Westlake, Chapters, 87.
20 Nevertheless, the understanding of sovereign rights as being unlimited and supreme 
within the State was deeply rooted in the legal doctrine of that time. Sovereignty was 
conceived as ‘the power to the extent of the natural capacity of the possessor to do all 
things in a state without accountability.’ Lansing, ‘Notes on Sovereignty in a State,’ 110. Ac-
cording to Lansing, this definition implies that, first, ‘[s]overeignty is real (or actual) only 
when the possessor can compel the obedience to the sovereign will of every individual 
composing the political state and within the territorial state,’ that, second, ‘[s]uch com-
plete power to compel obedience necessarily arises from the possession of physical force 
superior to any other such force in the state,’ and that, ‘[t]he exercise of sovereignty in a 
state does not involve reasonableness, justice, or morality, but is simply the application or 
the menace of brute force.’ Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 See Lesaffer, ‘Classical Law of Nations,’ 426 and Vec, ‘Principles,’ 226. See also Craven, ‘In-
vention of a Tradition,’ 363–402.
23 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 131. See also M. Koskenniemi, ‘Into Positivism: 
Georg Friedrich von Martens (1756–1821) and Modern International Law,’ Constellations, 
15 (2008), 189–207.
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legal scholars preserved some ideas of natural law, which offered arguments 
when positive ones were not available. Second, the alleged differences be-
tween positivism and natural law are not as marked as they seem to be.24  
A purely positivist approach proved impossible and the presence of natural 
law and other a priori concepts and principles necessary. Initially, the empha-
sis shift from the natural law to the positivist approach entailed a move from 
an ideological to a more pragmatic or realistic methodological approach. Law 
was no longer deductively derived from nature; law, as a man-made product, 
was inductively created. Law, more specifically international law, was created 
by and for States, and it became the task of international legal doctrine to ob-
serve and explain this empirical phenomenon. Accordingly, instead of char-
acterizing this shift as a revolution resulting in a fundamental distinction, the 
relation between natural law and positivism can best be described or charac-
terized as a minor adjustment of focus, a slight change of direction.
This methodological change in legal doctrine, however, turned out to be not 
such a change in perspectives after all. Eventually a contradiction in terms did 
arise: although the positivists claimed to be empirical by following ‘the facts 
of international life without any a priori discrimination,’25 they actually con-
structed theories based on the conduct of European States to justify European 
colonial practices in overseas territories. As will be argued in Chapter 8, these 
theories proved to be out of touch with reality. Positivists were not that realis-
tic and even developed ideological traits; the acclaimed empiricists turned out 
to be epistemologists after all. This ambiguity had a fundamental impact on 
international law in the age of New Imperialism, especially with regard to the 
legality of the partition of Africa.
Two different but interrelated and interdependent worlds came into 
existence in the nineteenth century, created by European legal doctrine. On 
the one hand, a civilized European world was constructed. This order, to which 
international law applied, was one in which it was incumbent on States to re-
spect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the other hand, as a 
world order in its own right Europe now faced a non-European and uncivilized 
world order. The central expansionist activity of European States was their 
civilizing mission, both in the positive sense of exporting European values 
and instituting good governance and in the negative sense of assimilating 
24 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 132.
25 C.H. Alexandrowicz, ‘Empirical and Doctrinal Positivism in International Law,’ British 
Yearbook of International Law, 47 (1974–1975), 289. See J. Pitts, ‘Boundaries of Victorian In-
ternational Law,’ in: D. Bell (ed.), Victorian Visions of Global Order (Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 81.
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non-European people. In fact, European international law came to ‘cover, 
though not apply to, the African continent as a quiet companion of imperi-
alistic diplomacy and colonialism.’26 This dichotomy is the common thread 
that runs throughout the entire theory on colonization and the justification of 
Africa’s partition by means of cession and protectorate treaties. Although posi-
tivist legal doctrine denied Africa’s sovereignty, territoriality and statehood, 
European States had to conclude treaties with African rulers to acquire sover-
eign rights over territory. In this light, Umozurike Oji Umozurike connects the 
arbitrary allocation of sovereign powers to African natives and the conclusion 
of these treaties: ‘Since Africans were denied international personality, their 
future was decided by bilateral treaties entered into by European States. The 
recognition by European states of the exclusive right of one of them over a ter-
ritory proved sufficient title in international law.’27 This observation raises the 
questions whether these treaties were valid according to international law and 
whether they were complied with. These questions will be addressed in the 
following chapters
Although, in theory, the positivist view created a harmonious world defined 
by international society, sovereignty and civilization, the reality of the scram-
ble for African territory was one of conflict and disorder, resulting in an even 
more divided world. Moreover, from a pragmatic point of view, the confronta-
tion between Europeans and African natives occurred mainly through written 
treaties. This practice marked the reciprocal relationships in which territo-
rial sovereignty was subject to transfer and, thus, asserted the applicability of 
international law to these relationships. In other words, while in nineteenth-
century international legal doctrine international law applied solely to rela-
tions between sovereign States that belonged to the civilized European world, 
the practice of New Imperialism shows that international law did regulate 
contacts and relations between this world and that of the uncivilized Afri-
can natives. Treaty practices between European and African parties bear out 
the fictitiousness of the world view informing and informed by nineteenth-
century international legal doctrine. Theoretically, a redeeming quality of New 
Imperialism might be its consistency. However, as will be argued later, both 
from a practical and an African perspective, its legality is highly questionable.
26 Onuma, ‘When was the Law of International Society Born,’ 50.
27 U.O. Umozurike, International Law and Colonialism in Africa (Enugu: Nwamife Publishers, 
1979), 24. See J.-A.C. Pemberton, ‘The So-Called Right of Civilisation in European Colo-
nial Ideology, 16th to 20th Centuries,’ Journal of the History of International Law, 15 (2013), 
37–50.
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Practice evidenced international law’s applicability to relations between 
States and other political entities, for example, treaty practices between Euro-
pean colonial powers and African rulers. Before the nineteenth century, trea-
ties between European States and native rulers and peoples were commonly 
regarded as treaties governed by international law, despite the native treaty 
party not being a State by contemporary standards.28 In the wake of positivist 
jurisprudence, international law became exclusionist: international law only 
applied to the relations between members of the ‘family of civilized nations.’ 
A few exceptions aside, non-European nations were excluded from interna-
tional legal discourse. This situation justifies the conclusion that in the course 
of the nineteenth century the scope of international law ‘shrank.’29 According 
to Alexandrowicz, the law of nations before the nineteenth century was not 
European but inherently universal.30 In the nineteenth century, positivism lost 
its empirical footing and became doctrinal. Positivism was doctrinally Euro-
centric and bound to falsify history: ‘The rejection of extra-European source 
material was instrumental in building up a new European (pseudo-universal) 
international law.’31 Nineteenth-century legal scholars had to establish theo-
ries in order to justify the excesses of territorial expansion.
In sum, from the historical and theoretical analysis of the concept of sover-
eignty presented above it follows that its manifestation is characterized by its 
contingent nature. The meaning and understanding of sovereignty depend on 
the political reality in which it serves. Sovereignty organizes political reality 
and is both internal and external to a specific political entity. Its context-bound 
character is shaped not only by the notions of absoluteness, supremacy, auton-
omy and independence, but also by the ideas of equality, non-intervention and 
recognition. The meaning and interpretation of sovereignty change with time 
and depend on the socio-political and economic circumstances and needs of 
different peoples.32
This observation traces back to the general definition of sovereignty 
given in the first section of the current chapter. Sovereignty is a regulative 
principle that has an internal dimension – maintaining societal order within 
28 See, for example, A.D. McNair, The Law of Treaties, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1961), 53–54; and I. Brownlie, Treaties and Indigenous Peoples (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992), 8–9.
29 Alexandrowicz, Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations.
30 Alexandrowicz, ‘Empirical and Doctrinal Positivism in International Law,’ 288.
31 Ibid., 289.
32 See J. Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 247.
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a political entity – and an external dimension – representing the autonomy 
and identity of a political entity in relation to others.33 As society and politi-
cal entities originate, alter and disappear, so do the meaning and purpose of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty is, therefore, not necessarily bound to territory, nor, 
by extension, to statehood. Consequently, the claim that ‘a State is sovereign 
is a tautology and the expression “sovereign state” is a pleonasm’34 has to be 
rejected. Sovereignty, to use the words of Robert Jackson, is ‘a constitutional ar-
rangement of political life and is thus artificial and historical; there is nothing 
about it that is natural or inevitable or immutable.’35
External sovereignty gained the upper hand in international law, and, 
as soon as independence became the main criterion for the recognition 
of statehood, the three concepts of territory, sovereignty and State became 
aligned. Imperium as the unifying notion of territory and sovereignty became 
the realm of the State, more precisely the civilized, European-style State; 
both in theory and practice international law governed relations between 
these States, members of the international society or the ‘family of civilized 
nations.’ Outside this realm, there were confrontations between European 
States and foreign, in particular African, political entities, and European 
legal doctrine declared international law inapplicable to relations with this 
‘other’ world consisting of uncivilized, non-sovereign entities. It was only 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, and as a result of the attempts 
of legal doctrine to legitimize the colonization of Africa, that territory coin-
cided with civilization and sovereignty, and together these notions became a 
constitutive condition for the recognition of statehood. In practice, however, 
African political entities were capable of transferring sovereignty, whether 
wholly or in part, over their territory by treaty. Although these entities did 
not fulfil the theoretical conditions of statehood as defined by contemporary 
legal doctrine – recognition of statehood by the members of the family of 
civilized nations – they were considered sufficiently sovereign to relinquish 
sovereignty.
33 ‘[A]s seen from inside a state, sovereignty is paramount authority, and as seen from out-
side it is self-governing authority.’ Jackson, ‘Sovereignty in World Politics,’ 433. See also 
S. Jodoin, ‘International Law and Alterity: The State and the Other,’ Leiden Journal of Inter-
national Law, 21 (2008), 1–28.
34 S. Lee, ‘A Puzzle of Sovereignty,’ California Western International Law Journal, 27 (1997), 
243.
35 Jackson, ‘Sovereignty in World Politics,’ 432.
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4 The African Perspective
In its Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara (1975), the International Court 
of Justice (icj) determined that the Western Sahara was not terra nullius at the 
time of the Spanish colonization of the area, because, for one thing, ‘Western 
Sahara was inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and politi-
cally organized in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them.’36 This 
interpretation by the Court suggests that a public sphere did exist at the time 
of the confrontation between Europeans and African natives. This confronta-
tion did not only occur between private individuals, but also between polities 
represented by a ruler, on both the European and the African side. Following 
the analysis of sovereignty from the nineteenth-century European perspective 
in the previous section, sovereignty will now be assessed from the African per-
spective. The African view on international law and order and the position and 
role of the concept of sovereignty will be taken into account, although there is 
not a wealth of literature on law and colonialism from the perspective of the 
subjugated peoples.37 The central issue is to what extent there was a public 
sphere in African polities, or, in other words, whether there was a hierarchical 
or vertical relationship between rulers and their subjects. Related issues that 
will be dealt with are the status of the ruler with regard to his people, which is 
mainly characterized by personal relationships, and the status of the political 
entity as a whole vis-à-vis the international community or family of States. Ad-
ditionally, the relationship of the African natives with their territory, their soil, 
will be explored and compared to the European perspective.
Before the scramble for African territory got underway at the end of the 
nineteenth century, eighty percent of the African population were ruled by her 
own kings, queens, rulers, chiefs, clan and lineage heads, in empires, kingdoms, 
communities, tribes, clans and other polities of various sizes and shapes.38  
Although the term ‘sovereignty’ does not appear either in the vocabulary of 
African political entities or in sources on this subject, sovereignty in the sense 
of supreme authority and representation of the autonomy of the polity is 
indeed observable in Africa. While African political entities which the Europeans 
36 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975, icj Reports 4, at §81.
37 S.E. Merry, ‘Law and Colonialism,’ Law and Society Review, 25 (1991), 889–922.
38 A.A. Boahen, ‘Africa and the Colonial Challenge,’ in: A.A. Boahen (ed.), General History of 
Africa, vol. vii (London, Paris, Berkeley: Heinemann Educational Books, unesco, Univer-
sity of California Press, 1985), 1. See also J.A. Andrews, ‘The Concept of Statehood and the 
Acquisition of Territory in the Nineteenth Century,’ in: M.N. Shaw (ed.), Title to Territory 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Dartmouth, 2005), 417.
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encountered in the nineteenth century did not meet the conditions of the tra-
ditional, European understanding of sovereignty, it did comply with the broad 
notion of sovereignty, that is, a representation of the autonomy of an orga-
nized political entity.
As to the native authority’s territorial power base, Taslim Elias explains 
that in the chieftaincy-based or monarchical African polities, political rights 
and obligations were territorially delimited and that the territorial areas were 
demarcated on the basis of local communities, which in their turn consisted 
of lineage ties and bonds of direct cooperation.39 This personal loyalty to the 
ruler combined with the property in land of the ruler’s subjects resembles 
the feudal system of medieval Europe. Although the African polities did not 
meet the nineteenth-century, European understanding of sovereignty, this 
did not mean that these polities were unfamiliar with the European notion of 
sovereignty. As observed earlier, from the sixteenth century onwards, African 
political entities had been confronted with and influenced by the European 
understanding of sovereignty.40 Interactions, whether economic, diplomatic 
or legal, between Africa and Europe long predated European colonial rule on 
the African continent. Before the competition for African territory began in 
earnest and changed the social and political organization of African polities, 
mutual benefits had linked people from the two continents for centuries.41
The question now is whether and if so, to what extent these sovereign 
African polities were territorially based. Here, the issue of the relationship 
between sovereignty and property, and by extension, between the public and 
the private domains comes to the fore. Admittedly, in African political enti-
ties there was no categorical distinction between the public and the private 
spheres. In Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary of the Southern Provinces of Nigeria 
(1921),42 the Court extensively cited the Report on Land Tenure in West Africa 
39 T.O. Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law, new edn (Dordrecht, Boston, 
London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 35. Here, Elias referred to his own work: T.O. Elias, Nature 
of African Customary Law (Manchester University Press, 1956), Chapter 2.
40 See Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law, 43. See also L. Benton and 
R.J. Ross (eds.), Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500–1850 (New York University Press, 2013) 
and L.A. Fallers, Law without Precedent. Legal Ideas in Action in the Courts of Colonial Buso-
ga (University of Chicago Press, 1969).
41 See E.A. Ayandele, ‘External Influence on African Society,’ in: J.C. Anene and G.N. Brown 
(eds.), Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. A Handbook for Teachers and Stu-
dents (Ibadan, London: Ibadan University Press, Nelson, 1966), 144–146.
42 Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary, Southern Provinces of Nigeria, 1921, 2 a.c. 399 or 3 n.l.r. 21 (Ap-
peal from the Divisional Court of Southern Nigeria to the Privy Council). Reference to this 
case is also made by Lindley in his Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory, 347.
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(1898), prepared and written by Chief Justice Rayner, in which native sover-
eignty and property were closely examined. The report shows that land was 
communally held and that all members of a community had equal rights to 
this communal land. The position of the ruler of the community was similar to 
that of a trustee in that he held the land for the beneficial use by the members 
of the community. He had authority over the people within the borders of the 
communal land, but proprietary rights remained in the hands of the commu-
nity. Moreover, the ruler did not have the power to dispose of the land without 
consulting the community elders. Meek, who has identified the main charac-
teristics of native systems of landholding, gives a comprehensive account of 
the entanglement of institutions of sovereignty and property by African stan-
dards. Meek states that these landholding systems
are devised to meet the needs of a subsistence system of agriculture and 
depend on a sufficiency of land to allow of a rotation which includes a 
long period of fallow. Land is held on (a) a kinship, and/or (b) a local 
group basis. Individuals have definite rights, but these are qualified by 
membership of a family, kindred and ward (or small village). Similarly, 
the individual claims of families exist currently with the wider claims of 
the clan or local group. Title, therefore, has a community character. It 
is also usufructuary rather than absolute. Land may only be sold under 
conditions which do not conflict with the rights of the kin or local group. 
The chief is the custodian of land, but not its owner. The normal unit of 
land ownership is the extended-family, or kindred. Land once granted to 
a family remains the property of that family, and the chief has no right to 
any say in its disposal. This constitutes a definite limitation on the con-
ception of land as the collective property of the tribe or local group. The 
kinship basis of land-holding ensures social stability, but the absence of 
individual proprietary rights prevents the raising of money on land and 
so is a hindrance to development. Land may be pledged and redeemed 
at any time. The principle of redeemability ensures that land shall not be 
permanently lost, but it may be an impediment to progress since no one 
will attempt to improve land of which he may be deprived at short notice. 
The restrictions on the sale of land, the limitation of the possession to the 
period of effective use, and the periodic re-allocation of land, all ensure 
that land shall not be uselessly withheld from cultivation or lost to the 
community.43
43 Meek, Land, 26–27. For an extended discussion of territorial sovereignty and landowner-
ship in Nigeria, see Yakubu, Land Law in Nigeria, 12–13 and 59.
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Although Rayner’s report and Meek’s observations are European interpreta-
tions of native sovereignty, several general features can be distilled from these 
passages. First, the relationship between the native ruler and the population 
was not a hierarchical but a personal one, and that relationship was governed 
by customary law.44 In general, African polities were communal or peasant 
societies and organized and governed through kinship ties – a strong central 
authority was mostly absent. This internal dimension of sovereignty and its 
relation to native polity land are described by Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill: ‘From 
outside, the state or polity has the appearance of a monolithic unit holding 
land; viewed from the inside, however, the polity or state has the primary as-
pect of a control mechanism, the group regulating through law and organiza-
tion its relation to its sub-groups and individual members and the relations 
between them.’45 The status of African political entities originated in the prop-
erty in land of their subjects.
Second, the African natives’ interpretation of supreme authority was closely 
connected to territory as well as to property and land tenure. It is in this light 
that Bentsi-Enchill states: ‘Depending in part on the degree of organization of 
state and governmental machinery there falls within its jurisdictional author-
ity responsibility for protecting the community and its territory from various 
evils, including foreign attack and domestic strife, and for maintaining law 
and custom and the interests recognized thereunder.’46 Sovereignty in politi-
cal entities in pre-colonial Africa was not understood in the absolutist sense 
of the word: ‘chiefs did not claim sovereign “ownership” of their demesnes.’47 
Nonetheless, these observations confirm that the African polities did possess 
both internal and external sovereignty. Internally, the relationship between the 
ruler and the people was defined by authority and jurisdiction. The external as-
pect of the sovereignty of African polities was characterized by independence, 
relations with other polities and protection against external dangers.
Third, territory and land formed the soil in which native African families 
were rooted: spiritual and ancestral relationships between the people and the 
land were central to the existence of the political entity. From anthropological 
44 See Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law, 43 and 45. See also T.W. 
Bennett, Customary Law in South Africa (Lansdowne: Juta, 2007), Chapter 4.
45 Bentsi-Enchill, ‘African Systems of Land Tenure,’ 122.
46 Ibid.
47 B.P. Frohnen, ‘A Problem of Power: The Impact of Modern Sovereignty on the Rule of Law 
in Comparative and Historical Perspective,’ Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, 
20 (2012), 620. Bruce Frohnen based his argument on the book chapter of P.P. Ekeh, ‘The 
Impact of Imperialism on Constitutional Thought in Africa,’ in: O. Akiba (ed.), Constitu-
tionalism and Society in Africa (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 25–42.
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literature on the political organization of African native polities it can be con-
cluded that the concepts of sovereignty and property were determinative of the 
identity and functioning of native groups.48 In the majority of cases these poli-
ties were organized hierarchically. The native ruler and a circle of senior com-
munity members stood at the top of the social pyramid. Kinship relationships 
and personal allegiance characterized the internal organization of the polity. 
The essential role of land is especially apparent J.F. Ade Ajayi’s observations. He 
has surveyed several cultural and political regions in early nineteenth-century 
Africa, particularly West-Africa and the Congo Basin.49 Joseph Anene has done 
the same for the nineteenth-century native populations of Benin, the Niger 
Delta, Congo and Angola.50 Their anthropological, cultural and historic studies 
show the resemblance between the organizational structures of African politi-
cal entities and the feudal structures of medieval Europe.
From the native African perspective on the external dimension of sover-
eignty, the independence and autonomy of the African political entity stand 
out clearly, and both are closely related to territory.51 Bentsi-Enchill points to 
the necessity of any polity, whether State or tribe, having a territorial basis: 
‘African societies, like human societies everywhere, have territorial structuring. 
Everywhere we look communities of varying magnitude make claims regard-
ing the land they occupy that it is “theirs” and distinguish their relationship 
thereto from that of “strangers” or “guests.”’52 As organized unities, African pol-
ities (tribes, clans, families, etc.) had consciously defined identities in their in-
ternal and local relations and in their relations with European individuals and 
States. From his analysis of studies of nineteenth-century pre-colonial Africa 
48 The most authoritative anthropological works are those of D. Biebuyck (ed.), African 
Agrarian Systems (Oxford University Press, 1963); P. Bohannan, Social Anthropology 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963); M. Chanock, Law, Custom, and Social Or-
der (Cambridge University Press, 1985); M. Chanock, The Making of South African Legal 
Culture 1902–1936 (Cambridge University Press, 2001) and Gluckman, Ideas in Barotse 
Jurisprudence.
49 J.F. Ade Ajayi, ‘A Survey of the Cultural and Political Regions of Africa at the Beginning 
of the Nineteenth Century,’ in: J.C. Anene and G.N. Brown (eds.), Africa in the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries. A Handbook for Teachers and Students (Ibadan, London: Ibadan 
University Press, Nelson, 1966), 75–91.
50 J.C. Anene, ‘The Peoples of Benin, the Niger Delta, Congo and Angola in the Nineteenth 
Century,’ in: J.C. Anene and G.N. Brown (eds.), Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Cen-
turies. A Handbook for Teachers and Students (Ibadan, London: Ibadan University Press, 
Nelson, 1966), 270–290.
51 Territory was constitutive for both sedentary and nomadic living political entities.
52 Bentsi-Enchill, ‘African Systems of Land Tenure,’ 117.
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Terence Ranger concludes that ‘far from there being a single “tribal” identity, 
most African moved in and out of multiple identities, defining themselves at 
one moment as subject to this chief, at another moment as a member of that 
cult, at another moment as part of this clan, and at yet another moment as 
an initiate in that professional guild.’53 He speaks of ‘overlapping networks of 
association and exchange’ which were spread over wide territorial areas. Ex-
ternal sovereignty in this sense then has a fairly flexible scope. In the same 
light, Sean Stilwell describes the African native polities as having ‘fluid ethnic 
identities.’54 This fluidity of African polities, however, does not alter the fact 
that these political unities existed autonomously and independently. Europe-
an States recognized this status by consenting to the possibility of concluding 
treaties that transferred, either wholly or in part, sovereignty over territory.55 
On the European acceptance of the existence of African polities, Ranger ob-
serves that ‘[r]eady connections between African and European systems of 
governance could only be made at the level of the monarchy; Africa possessed, 
so the colonizers thought, dozens of rudimentary kings.’56 European colonial 
powers were aware of the necessity to collaborate with native rulers, for with-
out such alliances the Europeans could not effectively control their newly 
acquired territories.
5 Concluding Remarks
In the nineteenth century, the foundations for current international law 
and order were laid; in international legal doctrine and politics the concepts 
of sovereignty, territory and State were aligned and considered to constitute 
53 T. Ranger, ‘The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,’ in: E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger 
(eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge University Press, 1983), 248. See also O.C. 
Okafor, ‘After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of 
Legitimate Statehood in Africa,’ Harvard International Law Journal, 41 (2000), 503–504.
54 S. Stilwell, ‘The Imposition of Colonial Rule,’ in: T. Falola (ed.), Africa. Colonial Africa, 
1885–1939, vol. iii (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 18.
55 ‘It should be pointed out, since this is often ignored, that the phase of actual conquest 
was preceded by years of negotiation and treaty-making between the imperial powers 
and African rulers. This phase of negotiation shows that the European powers originally 
accepted their African counterparts as their equals, and, secondly, that the former did 
recognize the sovereignty and independence of the African states and polities.’ Boahen, 
‘Africa and the Colonial Challenge,’ 9. On the status of African native polities and their 
place within international legal order, see Gathii, ‘Africa,’ 407–428.
56 Ranger, ‘Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,’ 212.
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international order. The State was considered an abstract political entity 
empowered with international legal personality – i.e., it possessed territorial 
sovereignty – and it was accompanied by three assumptions: all States are 
formally equal; no State is legally allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of 
another State; and territory and the control exercised over this territory co-
exist. Moreover, in legal theory and politics, positivism took precedence over 
natural law; realism rather than rationalism prevailed. In nineteenth-century 
international legal doctrine, the colonial encounter amounted to a confronta-
tion between European States and African political entities. The assumption 
that the non-European world lacked sovereignty enabled positivists to con-
struct this encounter as an arena in which the European sovereign made, in-
terpreted and enforced the law. In other words, the colonial encounter made 
it possible for positivists to construct a system of international law that was 
based on inclusion in or exclusion from the family of civilized nations by im-
posing European norms and values on non-European lands and peoples. The 
basic doctrinal and theoretical assumption was the dichotomy between civi-
lized Europe and uncivilized Africa. The concept of civilization was essential 
to the justification of European colonial practices on the African continent; it 
was used purposefully, if arbitrarily, to promote the interests of the European 
powers, thus disadvantaging the African natives.
Although, in theory, the positivist view created a harmonious world defined 
by international society, sovereignty, and civilization, the reality of the scram-
ble for African territory was one of conflict and disorder, creating a world that 
was even more divided than it had been before the age of New Imperialism. 
While in nineteenth-century international legal doctrine international law ap-
plied solely to relations between sovereign States that belonged to the civilized 
European world, the practice of New Imperialism shows that international 
law did regulate contacts and relations between this world and that of the 
uncivilized African natives. Treaty practices between European and African 
parties bear out the fictitiousness of the world view informing and informed 
by nineteenth-century international legal doctrine. Theoretically, a redeem-
ing quality of New Imperialism might be its consistency. However, as will be 
argued in the following chapters, from an African perspective, its legality is 
highly questionable.
External sovereignty gained the upper hand in international law, and as 
soon as independence became the criterion for the recognition of statehood 
the three concepts of territory, sovereignty and State became aligned. Imperi-
um as the unifying notion of territory and sovereignty became the realm of the 
State, more precisely the civilized, European State; both in theory and practice 
international law applied to the relations between these States, members of 
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the international society of nations. Outside this realm, there were confron-
tations between European States and foreign, in particular African, political 
entities, and European legal doctrine declared international law inapplicable 
to relations with this ‘other’ world consisting of uncivilized, non-sovereign en-
tities. It was only towards the end of the nineteenth century, and as a result of 
the attempts of legal doctrine to legitimize the colonization of Africa, that ter-
ritory coincided with civilization and sovereignty, and together these notions 
became a constitutive condition for the recognition of statehood. In practice, 
however, African political entities were capable of transferring sovereignty 
over their territories, whether wholly or in part, by treaty. Although they did 
not possess statehood, that is to say, they were not recognized as possessing 
statehood by the members of the family of civilized nations, they were con-
sidered to be sovereign entities. Here, the fictitious nature of the dualist and 
State-centric legal order first manifests itself, a nature that has since persisted 
into the Post Modern Age (1914-present), an era characterized by the plurality 
and diversification of legal subjects on the international level and the gradual 
detachment of sovereignty and territory by globalization.57
The next chapter will address how the interplay between sovereignty and 
territory – imperium – effected and justified the European acquisition of legal 
title to African territory.
57 See J.L. Brierly, The Basis of Obligation in International Law and Other Papers, ed. by 
J.L. Brierly, H. Lauterpacht and C.H.M. Waldock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), xv and 
xvi. For twentieth- and twenty-first-century perspectives on sovereignty and territory, see 
J.L. Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty (Cambridge University Press, 2012); T. Nardin, 
Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton University Press, 1983); B.R. Roth, 
‘State Sovereignty, International Legality and Moral Disagreement,’ in: T. Broude and 
Y. Shany (eds.), The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law (Oxford, Portland, 
2008), 123–161 and M.N. Shaw, ‘Territorial Administration by Non-territorial Sovereigns,’ 
in: T. Broude and Y. Shany (eds.), The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law 




The term property as a legal construct denotes the ownership claim, or title, one 
or more persons can have to a thing or interest. It is a private-law right which can 
accrue to every legal or natural person. When interests or things are claimed in 
property, disputes may (and often do) arise,1 and for that reason property claims 
require regulation and, by extension, the authority to impose such regulation. 
This is where sovereignty comes in. Sovereignty is the power, or right of control, 
over a specific group of persons and it can only be exercised by a person or entity 
that holds a dominant position – regardless of whether this person or entity ob-
tained this privileged position through election, appointment or appropriation. 
Sovereign rights ensure that a person’s property is respected by and protected 
against other persons. In addition, sovereignty transforms property into a legal 
claim, a right which can be enforced. It is this basic relationship2 between prop-
erty and sovereignty that underlies the concepts of dominium and imperium dis-
cussed in the previous chapters. Both concepts are specified conceptualizations 
of property and sovereignty and imply the claim to a demarcated piece of the 
earth’s surface. Dominium implies a person’s claim to a particular parcel of land 
vis-à-vis one or more other persons, and imperium concerns the right to control a 
group of people inhabiting a particular territory. Sovereignty enables persons to 
have private-law rights to a particular parcel of land within a particular territory.
Traditionally, territory is defined as the geographical space in which politi-
cally organized human inhabitation is realized. Territory in this narrow sense 
is highly relevant, because, as Shaw argues, ‘it constitutes the tangible frame-
work for the manifestation of power by the accepted authorities of the State 
in question.’3 In other words, territory is directly connected with the concept 
1 ‘The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying “This is 
mine,” and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society.’ 
J.-J. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality in The Social Contract and 
discourses, transl. G.D.H. Cole (London: Dent, 1973), 76.
2 On the historical discussion on the relationship between property and sovereignty – what 
was first: property or sovereignty, see Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, Chapters 
4 and 5.
3 M.N. Shaw, ‘Territory in International Law,’ Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 13 
(1982), 61. For an extended reading, see Shaw, Title to Territory; and Shaw, ‘Acquisition of Title 
in Nineteenth Century Africa.’
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of the State as a specific form of political organization. In the words of Enrico 
Milano, territory consists of ‘the spatial sphere within which a state’s sover-
eignty is normally manifested.’4 While it is true that the concept of territory 
is indeed a constitutive element for statehood, it does not, as will be argued 
in this chapter, necessarily coincide with the concept of the State. The notion 
of territory contains both an external and an internal element, namely, the 
expression of the power-balance between two coexisting or rivalling political 
entities, and the relationship between a group of people and the tangible space 
they inhabit. Shaw describes the internal and external components of territory 
as follows: ‘territory is the physical aspect of the life of the community as an 
entity and therefore reflects and conditions the identity of that community.’5 
The identity of a political entity, which makes it distinct from other polities, is 
based on the relationship the population has with its territory. In his book The 
Birth of Territory, Elden understands territory as
[…] a historical question: produced, mutable, and fluid. It is geographi-
cal, not simply because it is one of the ways of ordering the world, but 
also because it is profoundly uneven in its development. It is a word, a 
concept, and a practice, where the relation between these can only be 
grasped genealogically. It is a political question, but in a broad sense: eco-
nomic, strategic, legal, and technical.6
Inevitably, territory plays an important role in international law, because many 
of the fundamental principles of international law are based on the concepts 
of territorial exclusivity and sovereign equality7 and on such ensuing prin-
ciples as territorial integrity, political independence and non-intervention. In 
other words, when the modern conception of the State was introduced, sov-
ereignty and territoriality became intimately connected, and they were often 
considered equivalents. The origins of this relationship can be found in the 
Age of Empire.
The nineteenth century, more precisely its closing two to three decades, 
witnessed a speedy, vast and often violent territorial expansion of some 
European States beyond the European continent. This chapter will discuss the 
acquisition of and entitlement to African territory by European States from a 
nineteenth-century perspective. By doing so, it aims to identify the theoretical 
4 E. Milano, Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law. Reconciling Effectiveness, Legal-
ity and Legitimacy (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), 66.
5 Shaw, ‘Territory in International Law,’ 63.
6 Elden, Birth of Territory, 330. Italics are original.
7 See Shaw, ‘Territory in International Law,’ 67.
chapter 472
and practical relevance of the concept of territory in the encounter between 
European States and African political entities. It will be shown that the Euro-
pean States mainly used cession and protectorate treaties to acquire African 
territory and that the difference between cession and establishing a protector-
ate, while delicate, is essential (§2). The main questions to be addressed are 
whether international law applied to these treaties and, if so, what the inter-
national law status of these treaties was. The reason for discussing the interna-
tional legal framework and its underlying principles is that it is precisely the 
treaty practices of European States and African polities in the late nineteenth 
century that reveal a persistent and inherent tension between international 
law and politics. The chapter concludes with an introduction of three case 
studies on the treaty practices in British Nigeria, French Equatorial Africa and 
German Cameroon (§3).
2 Treaties, Cession and Protectorates
As Edward Keene points out, treaties are ‘valuable indicators’ in that they ‘pro-
vide a concrete way of assessing the norms that international actors believe to 
be operating at any given time.’8 In essence, the acquisition of African territory 
by European States in the late nineteenth century revolves around the transfer 
and exercise of sovereignty. Chapter 3 has shown that there was a crucial dif-
ference between de facto sovereignty, i.e., the factual exercise of sovereignty, 
and de iure sovereignty, i.e., the recognition of being sovereign and possessing 
sovereign rights. Recognition of sovereignty and personality under interna-
tional law was a pivotal notion in nineteenth-century positivist legal  doctrine. 
Positivist legal scholars were mainly occupied with establishing which acts 
were sufficient to determine that a European State had acquired sovereign 
rights over a territory, whether State control of that territory was effective, and 
whether a State could claim a valid title to the territory. The perceived differ-
ence in degree of civilization between the European and non-European worlds 
was the main argument to justify the territorial expansion beyond  Europe.9 
The  African political entities headed by their ruler were not recognized by 
8 E. Keene, ‘A Case Study of the Construction of International Hierarchy: British Treaty- Making 
Against the Slave Trade in the Early Nineteenth Century,’ International Organization, 61 
(2007), 333.
9 See Anghie, Imperialism; E. Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism 
and Order in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2002); A. Pagden, Lords of All the 
World. Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500–c. 1800 (New Haven, Conn.: 
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 European States as equal counterparts. As Anghie argues, the recognition 
doctrine was about ‘affirming the power of the European states to claim sov-
ereignty, to reinforce their authority to make such determinations and, con-
sequently, to make sovereignty a possession that they could then proceed to 
dispense, deny, create or partially grant.’10 He also asserts that the history of 
sovereignty doctrine in the nineteenth century ‘is a history of the processes by 
which European states, by developing a complex vocabulary of cultural and 
racial discrimination, set about establishing and presiding over a system of au-
thority by which they could develop the powers to determine who is and is not 
sovereign.’11 In the context of the scramble for Africa, these processes made it 
imperative to establish whether African rulers possessed and exercised sover-
eign rights to territory and whether they could lawfully alienate these rights.
Although it is true that the doctrine of recognition of sovereignty depend-
ed on the discretionary powers of a selective group of European and a few 
non-European States, recognition itself did not have to be explicit: it could be 
inferred from common practice. Contemporary doctrine held that nineteenth-
century international law applied only to the members of the family of civi-
lized nations, but in the confrontation between European States and African 
political entities, rules certainly were applied: the acquisition of Africa did not 
occur in a legal vacuum. African rulers transferred sovereign rights to Euro-
pean States and it is this transfer process which implies European recognition 
of African rulers possessing sovereign rights. Cession and, mainly, protectorate 
treaties between African rulers and European States were the most frequently 
used instruments to cede partial or full sovereignty. This side of colonial prac-
tice has so far received relatively little attention in international legal doctrine.
The key question is, of course, whether the native African rulers possessed 
sovereign rights. Doctrinally, African political entities were not regarded as 
subjects of international law, i.e., as sovereign States. Their authoritative and 
independent status was not recognized explicitly by the members of the fam-
ily of civilized nations, i.e., European and a handful of non-European States. 
It remains unclear, however, how these native rulers could lawfully transfer 
sovereign rights over territory to the European States by means of treaties. 
 Answering this question requires assessing the status of the cession and 
protectorate treaty practices on the African continent in the framework of 
nineteenth- century international law as well as establishing the authority of 
 Yale University Press, 1995) and E. Tourme Jouannet, The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations: 
A History of International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), Chapter 11.
10 Anghie, Imperialism, 100.
11 Ibid.
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the treaties themselves. In his study on treaty practices between Europeans 
and Africans, Alexandrowicz makes it clear that both the European and the 
African parties were well aware of the content of the object of transfer: ‘Sov-
ereignty in Europe was at that time mostly vested in absolute emperors or 
semi-absolute monarchs whose sovereign rights were as much considered as 
derived from dynastic and divine origin as the sovereignty of African rulers.’12
As a matter of common understanding in international legal doctrine, the 
legal effect given by Europeans to the treaties they concluded with Africans 
depended on the legal status Europeans were prepared to concede to African 
rulers. Europeans considered Africans to be uncivilized, living in primitive po-
litical entities, and represented by kings and rulers who were not sovereigns in 
the proper, i.e., Euopean, sense of the word.13 These treaties were consequently 
not awarded the status of international treaties governed by the basic principle 
of pacta sunt servanda: as the majority of nineteenth-century legal scholars 
argued, they were ‘binding only on the conscience and could be enforced or 
ignored at will.’14 However, not only is this theoretical presumption underlying 
the institution of ‘unequal treaties’15 questionable in itself, it is also, as will be 
shown, rebutted by international legal practice.
Rules of law did apply to the relationships between European States and 
African polities, because these relationships were formalized and declared 
binding in treaties. These rules of law concerned the law of nations in its 
broad sense, not the narrow or limited understanding of international law as 
inter-State law conceive and imposed by nineteenth-century European law-
yers and politicians. Extrinsic though these rules of law may have been – i.e., 
falling outside the scope of the conventional family of civilized nations – they 
were nonetheless valid rules of law, because the European States and the 
12 Alexandrowicz, ‘Role of Treaties,’ 39. ‘While the metaphysical or theological background 
of divinity and dynasty might have been different, both European and African rulers were 
in perfect agreement as to the nature of transactions concluded and as to the transfer of 
territorial sovereignty and title in international law.’ Ibid., 40. See also C.H. Alexandrow-
icz, ‘New and Original States: The Issue of Reversion to Sovereignty,’ International Affairs, 
45 (1969), 465–480.
13 Umozurike, International Law and Colonialism, 43. See Elias, Africa and the Development 
of International Law, 19.
14 Umozurike, International Law and Colonialism in Africa, 43.
15 See H. Kleinschmidt, ‘Das europäische Völkerrecht und die ungleichen Verträge um 
die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts,’ Publications of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur – und 
Völkerkunde Ostasiens, (2007) 1–83. Available at: <http://www.oag.jp/images/publica 
tions/oag_taschenbuch/Vertraege-Kleinschmidt-lang0704.pdf> [accessed on 18 April 
2014]; and F. Nozari, Unequal Treaties in International Law (Stockholm: Bryan Sundt, 1971).
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African polities agreed on them and applied them. It is this practice of 
nineteenth- century international law that calls for a restatement of the defini-
tion and role of international law, and Alexandrowicz does just that. He  considers 
international law to be ‘a mechanism which is not confined to the coopera-
tion of states in conditions of perfect mutual understanding.’16 Alexandrowicz 
gives a positive yet pragmatic definition of international law by stating that it is 
aimed at the reconciliation of ‘even opposing ideologies or civilisations in spite 
of each party’s dogmatic insistence on certain principles. In such cases the task 
of international law is to provide a forum for coexistence and to reduce the 
barriers of prejudice.’17 Alexandrowicz’ perception of international law is that 
it was not only imposed on non-civilized nations and created by the encoun-
ter between civilized and non-civilized nations (as Anghie argues), he regards 
the existence of the law of nations as a necessary condition for the European-
African encounter to take place. On this view, the European-African confronta-
tion could only have played out the way it did because of the existence and use 
of international law. This book endorses this instrumental view.
The next step is to analyse the cession and protectorate treaties conclud-
ed between Europeans States and African rulers on the basis of the follow-
ing questions. Are the cession and protectorate treaties concluded between 
European States and African rulers in the late nineteenth century indeed just 
‘ein Stück Papier mit Negerkreuzen darunter,’18 a status they were assigned by 
contemporary legal scholars influenced by positivist thought and upheld by 
twentieth-century international legal doctrine? Or do these documents have 
legal value after all? The highly relevant follow-up question is whether treaties 
could only be concluded by States, or by other sovereign entities too.
Before discussing the cession and protectorate treaties concluded between 
European colonial powers and African rulers, three preliminary remarks must 
be made. The first one is that by concluding cession and protectorate treaties, 
the European colonial powers acknowledged that Africa was no terra nullius: 
‘European States, in establishing their dominion over countries inhabited 
by people in a more or less backward stage of political development, have 
16 Alexandrowicz, ‘Role of Treaties,’ 29. Soviet lawyers of the twentieth century accused 
the nineteenth-century legal doctrine of this limited understanding of international law 
based on one community or family of nations according to one common ideology. They 
argued that international law existed independent of any ideology. See G.I. Tunkin, Theo-
ry of International Law, transl by W.E. Butler (London, Allen and Unwin, 1974).
17 Alexandrowicz, ‘Role of Treaties,’ 29.
18 Bismarck as quoted in F.F. Müller, Deutschland – Zanzibar – Ostafrika. Geschichte einer 
deutschen Kolonialeroberung 1884–1890 (Berlin: Rütten and Loening, 1959), 301.
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 adopted as the method of such extension, Cession or Conquest, and have not 
based their rights upon the Occupation of territorium nullius.’19 Within living 
memory, the continent had been covered by a network of political entities re-
sembling European-style States and a variety of empires which yet revealed 
some similarities and even traces of unity. In other words, pre-colonial Africa 
was covered and inhabited by political communities, and they were acknowl-
edged as such by European States. As has been shown above, at the end of the 
nineteenth century it was commonly accepted, both in theory and in practice, 
that Africa was not terra nullius, and this effectively ruled out the possibility 
of acquiring African territory by occupation.20 Instead, derivative modes had 
to be used in order to acquire sovereign rights over territory and an elaborate 
practice of concluding treaties between European States and African rulers 
arose. Representing Britain in treaty negotiations with African rulers, the ex-
plorer and colonial administrator Lord Lugard (1858–1945) had occasion to ob-
serve that the conclusion of treaties was no longer an exclusive competence 
of and activity between sovereign European States: ‘They [the local African 
king and chiefs, MvdL] most thoroughly understand the nature of a written 
contract, and consider nothing definitely binding till it is written down. Most 
of them write. Every clause is discussed in all its bearings, sometimes for days; 
words are altered, and the foresight and discrimination which the natives show 
in forecasting the bearing in the future of every stipulation is as keen almost 
as would be that of Europeans […].’21 European and African contracting par-
ties negotiated and concluded treaties as would two equal European sovereign 
entities.
To all intents and purposes then, the sovereign rights of rulers of African na-
tive polities were recognized by European States.22 Put differently, the native 
19 Lindley, Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory, 43. See also C.H. Alexandrow-
icz, ‘The Afro-Asian World and the Law of Nations (Historical Aspects),’ Recueil des Cours, 
123 (1968), 172; H. Bull, ‘European States and African Political Communities,’ in: H. Bull and 
A. Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 
99–114 and J. Fisch, ‘Africa as Terra Nullius,’ in: S. Förster, W.J. Mommsen and R.E. Robinson 
(eds.), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa (Oxford University Press, 1988), 347–375.
20 See Onuma, ‘When was the Law of International Society Born,’ 49. See also J. Fisch, Die 
europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht. Die Auseinandersetzungen um den Status der 
überseeischen Gebiete vom 15. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1984) and 
Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, 27 and 38.
21 F. Lugard, ‘Treaty Making in Africa,’ Geographical Journal (1893), 54.
22 Alexandrowicz summarizes the writing of Hesse on the legal capacity of contracting par-
ties and the legal character of the contract or treaty, as follows: ‘The author referring to 
the Rulers (called Captains) emphasises that they had what [Hesse] defines as “Aktiv-
legitimation” i.e. active capacity to confer rights in their territories to other sovereigns. 
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rulers’ acknowledged ability to conclude treaties confirmed their as sovereigns 
or, at the very least, as international legal subjects. While international law 
in its doctrinally limited sense did not apply to relations between European 
States and African natives, the well-attested practice of treaties having been 
concluded does corroborate the applicability of the law of nations, including 
natural law and customary law principles of pacta sunt servanda and bona fides 
on these relations. This is in keeping with Dionisio Anzilotti’s argument that 
rulers representing their peoples possess international personality and that 
such agreements are consequently international treaties.23 Brownlie concurs: 
concluding treaties with various types of polities is possible as long as they 
have some kind of a territorial base and a more or less definable and unified 
social structure.24 These conditions are confirmed by the International Court 
of Justice (icj) in its Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara (1975) when it 
states that the land belonging to politically and socially organized tribal societ-
ies is not terra nullius.25 The reasoning of the Court is based mainly on the fact 
that in the late nineteenth century the Spanish negotiated and concluded trea-
ties with the peoples living on Western-Saharan soil, and the Court confirms 
that territorial acquisition by occupation is original, while acquisition by ces-
sion is derivative.26 Following this line of reasoning, the Court acknowledges 
the legal personality of the African polities concerned and the ability of their 
rulers to transfer sovereign rights over territory under nineteenth-century in-
ternational law.
Although this Advisory Opinion of the icj might be constructed as serv-
ing the competitive interests of European States vying for African territory,27 
it did contribute towards relaxing the tight doctrinal bond between State and 
The  German agencies (Companies) which exercised delegated sovereign powers and were 
the transferees of those rights by treaty and are defined as having “Passivlegitimation” i.e. 
the capacity to receive the rights.’ Alexandrowicz, European-African  Confrontation, 39.
23 D. Anzilotti, Cours de droit international, transl. by G. Gidel (Paris: Sirey, 1929), 129–130.
24 I. Brownlie, ‘The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for the Law of 
Nations,’ in: H. Bull and A. Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984), 362.
25 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975, icj Reports 4.
26 Ibid., §§ 79 and 80.
27 ‘It suited the European powers to have a cloak of legitimacy laid over their claims to ces-
sion vis-à-vis rival claims by other European powers.’ Andrews, ‘Concept of Statehood,’ 
122. See also L. Benton, ‘From International Law to Imperial Constitutions: The Problem 
of Quasi-Sovereignty, 1870–1900,’ Law and History Review, 26 (2008), 595–620; S. Touval, 
‘Treaties, Borders, and the Partition of Africa,’ Journal of African History, 7 (1966), 279–293 
and C.M. Warner, ‘The Political Economy of “Quasi-Statehood” and the Demise of 19th 
Century African Politics,’ Review of International Studies, 25 (1999), 233–255.
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 sovereignty, especially as regards the treaty-based establishment of European 
protectorates in Africa. For this reason, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that 
the introduction of the protectorate treaty was a turning point in colonial 
or imperial history. The crucial point here is that the very act of establishing 
protectorates by means of treaties recognized and affirmed the native rulers’ 
sovereign rights to control and direct the internal affairs of their political com-
munities. This argument is supported by the British policy of indirect, which 
Chapter 8 will address in more detail. For now two observations are worth 
bearing in mind. The first of these is that a European State which concluded a 
treaty with an African ruler implicitly or explicitly recognized the capacity of 
that ruler to transfer sovereignty.28 The second observation is that if a Europe-
an State based its territorial claims on treaties concluded with African rulers, 
it would often justify these claims by arguing that, first, it had acquired rights 
through treaties, and that, second, it had entered into mutual obligations to-
wards an African nation ‘which it could not honourably relinquish.’29 In sum, 
in defending their territorial claims, the European States would refer to the 
proprietary rights these treaties had created as well as their contractual obliga-
tions under these treaties.
The second preliminary remark concerns the contracting parties and the 
addressees of the cession and protectorate treaties. Although the treaties were 
concluded between European States and African rulers, it was the presence of 
other European States in Africa that proved a driving force. In the early days 
of the scramble for Africa, it is unlikely that a European contracting party, 
on signing the treaty, had the premeditated objective of extinguishing pre-
existing rights; its main purpose would have been to prevent other European 
powers from acquiring the territory concerned. New Imperialism was all about 
finishing first: African territory was to be acquired on a first come, first served 
basis. In trading terms, the cession and protectorate treaties were first and fore-
most ‘receipts,’ proof of transfer, for the acquisition of certain pieces of African 
territory. In late nineteenth-century Africa, bilateral cession and protectorate 
treaties often reflected the tripartite relations between the contracting African 
28 ‘The content of the treaties made with the chiefs is also significant. In most of them there 
was an express provision recognizing the sovereignty of the chiefs and their capacity to 
cede their territory to whomever they so wished. If the British and the other European 
colonizing states felt that the chiefs did not have the expressed powers it seems odd that 
they should have been made the subject of the treaties.’ J. Mugambwa, ‘Treaties or Scraps 
of Paper? A Second Look at the Legal Character of the Nineteenth Century British/Afri-
can Colonial Agreements,’ Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, 
20 (1987), 84.
29 Touval, ‘Treaties,’ 288.
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rulers, the contracting European colonial powers and rival European States. 
While the bilateral treaties themselves did not explicitly consider, serve or re-
flect the interests of third parties, European rivals amongst them, such trea-
ties did signal to European competitors that the territory concerned was out 
of their reach.30 In this sense, the rivalry between European colonial powers 
was a constant: unseen, in the wings so to speak, yet always there. Treaties 
‘formalized the consent of indigenous peoples to European colonial activities 
and therefore provided legitimacy and legality to the European appropriation 
of much of the globe.’31
The third preliminary remark is that although African rulers were some-
times unfamiliar with the political, institutional and diplomatic workings of 
European States this does not mean that these rulers played no part in the 
European acquisition and partition of Africa. As Saadia Touval observes, ‘Afri-
can societies did not exist in a political vacuum, and their leaders usually had 
political experience gained in dealing with neighbouring societies, with tribal 
authorities that were superior or subordinate to them, and with rival groups or 
individuals.’32 African rulers had a keen sense of the significance and vulner-
ability of their political position, especially in relation to rival tribes. That is 
why, according to Touval, ‘they were aware of some possible implications and 
uses of their newly created relationship with the white man.’33 The local rul-
ers seized the opportunity offered by European ambition to collaborate with 
the Europeans to strengthen their position with regard to other African rulers. 
In some cases, African rulers tried to preserve as much of their authority and 
independence as possible, by ‘playing off the European powers against each 
other.’34 African rulers, in other words, maintained and even increased the 
political pressure in the arena in which European States competed for African 
territory. Moreover, African rulers themselves took the initiative to conclude 
treaties with European States in their search for protection against certain Eu-
ropean powers which ‘seemed to them at the time a much greater evil.’35 In 
sum, African rulers were not merely on the receiving end of European norms 
30 For a contemporary illustration of the concurring European interests on the African con-
tinent, see A.-G. De Lapradelle, ‘Chronique Internationale 1898–1899,’ Revue de droit pub-
lic et de la science politique, 11 (1899), 277–308.
31 S. Belmessous, ‘The Paradox of an Empire by Treaty,’ in: S. Belmessous (ed.), Empire by 
Treaty. Negotiating European Expansion, 1600–1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 11.





and values, they also actively created law that governed relations between 
them and their European counterparts. There are cases in which they used and 
misused European recognition in concluding bilateral treaties.
These three preliminary remarks demonstrate the controversy over the va-
lidity of the treaties concluded between European States and African rulers. 
The African rulers representing their peoples had the power to conclude in-
ternational treaties, whether it concerns cession of protectorate treaties. The 
validity of these treaties, however, was intensely debated.36 Three main valid-
ity issues were the alleged inalienability of native sovereignty,37 the consent 
of both parties38 and the fulfilment of the formal requirements of registration 
and publication. Onuma enumerates these and related validity issues, pointing 
out that these issues also engaged contemporary legal doctrine:
In the ‘scramble for Africa,’ European powers did question the validity of 
the agreements concluded by their rivals and African rulers. Issues which 
a third (European) party raised in attacking the validity of the agreements 
between a rival European power and an African ruler ranged widely: 
(1) whether an African agent held the authority to dispose the territory or 
the authority to rule, (2) whether a European agent held the authority to 
represent his country, (3) whether the agreement was concluded accord-
ing to the appropriate rules of the African political entity, (4) whether the 
‘genuine’ will of the African ruler was expressed, especially whether there 
was not an element of coercion or fraud, and so on.39
Onuma continues:
However, hardly any European state seemed to attack other European 
states for concluding an agreement with an African ruler on the ground 
36 See, for example, Alexandrowicz, European-African Confrontation; Anghie, Imperialism, 
65–82, Belmessous (ed.), Empire by Treaty; J. Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights un-
der International Law. From Victims to Actors (Ardsley, New York: Transnational, 2006), 
42–54; Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, 136–143; Mugambwa, ‘Treaties or Scraps of Paper,’ 
79–93 and Roelofsen, ‘Treaties between European and Non-European Powers,’ 409–417.
37 T. Meron, ‘The Authority to Make Treaties in the Late Middle Ages,’ American Journal of 
International Law, 89 (1995), 3–6 and Pemberton, ‘So-Called Right of Civilisation,’ 49–50.
38 In the context of the treaty conclusion between the European State and the African ruler, 
the condition of African ruler’s voluntary consent to entering the treaty was indeed ques-
tioned, especially during the Berlin Conference (1884–1885) by the American delegate 
Mr. Kasson. See, for example, Alexandrowicz, ‘Role of Treaties,’ 46–47.
39 Onuma, ‘When Was the Law of International Society Born,’ 48–49.
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that African tribes were uncivilized and therefore not entitled to con-
clude a treaty with an European state. This fact suggests that despite the 
notion of international law as the law of/among civilized nations, which 
prevailed among European states during this period, the European states 
implicitly recognized with each other the capacity of African rulers under 
international law as long as they appeared as a party of a treaty purport-
ing the cession of their territory and the establishment of protectorates.40
What Onuma’s account shows is that the legality question is far more imma-
nent than the validity question. That is why in this and the following chapters 
it is not so much the validity of the cession and protectorate treaties but rather 
the extent to which European States complied with them that will be the ob-
ject of scrutiny. Although the legality of these treaties is conditional on their 
being valid, European compliance with and enforcement of these treaties has 
remained underexposed in international legal doctrine. Therefore the validity 
of the treaties between the European and African contracting parties is pre-
supposed on the basis of the existence of and subsequent conduct upon these 
treaties, and, thus, international legal practice to be able to examine the legal-
ity of these treaties. Before discussing the cession and protectorate treaties in 
more detail, the next section first explains the international legal framework in 
which these treaties were concluded.
2.1 International Legal Theory
The core feature of treaties is that they are intended to create legal obligations 
between the contracting parties. The fundamental principles of concluding 
treaties, universally accepted and applicable, were pacta sunt servanda,41 good 
faith, freedom of consent, equality of parties, reciprocity of rights and duties, 
and nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet. These principles applied 
to relations between all nations, regardless of whether they were recognized 
as States or whether they were members of the family of civilized nations. 
Transcending the dualist world view, they applied to and between nations, and 
the validity and application of these principles were recognized by both Euro-
pean and non-European nations. These principles went beyond the dichotomy 
40 Ibid., 49.
41 ‘No Government would decline to accept the principle pacta sunt servanda, and the very 
fact that Governments find it necessary to spend so much effort in explaining in a particu-
lar case that the pactum has ceased to exist, or that the act complained of is not a breach 
of it, either by reason of an implied term or for some other reason, is the best acknowl-
edgement of that principle.’ McNair, Law of Treaties, 493.
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between the civilized, State-centric European world and the non-civilized 
African world.42 Although international law in its narrow understanding of 
inter-State law did not regulate relations between European States and African 
political entities, the law of nations did.
This law of nations is founded on, and consists first and foremost of, contrac-
tual relationships between nations. It is the principle of pacta sunt servanda – 
the possibility of binding oneself by agreement to another – that is constitu-
tive of international law and legal order.43 The principle of pacta sunt servanda 
makes agreements legally binding,44 and the principle of bona fides or good 
faith expresses the moral axiom of fairness.45 In other words, the integrity of 
the international legal community stands or falls with these two principles 
being complied with,46 an observation which dates back to the seventeenth 
century. While Grotius was mainly concerned with identifying the circum-
stances and conditions that render promises binding,47 Pufendorf formulated 
42 Although the African continent was not organized according to the European State 
system, there were sovereign or semi-sovereign entities. Alexandrowicz enumerated the 
African polities which existed around 1872. See Alexandrowicz, ‘Role of Treaties,’ 28.
43 ‘The earliest primitive communities, without a legislature or officials of any kind must 
have lived by certain primary rules, without which no community could retain that de-
gree of cohesiveness which is essential for its very existence. […]The fact of community 
[…] and speculations about the origin of law have led to a wide acceptance of the view 
that in all communities a primary or basic rule about the obligation of “promises” must 
have existed.’ J.F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law (Aldershot, Brookfield: Hants, 
Dartmouth, 1991), 6. See also D.J. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 137–206 and M. de Taube, ‘L’inviolabilité des traités,’ Hague Recueil 
des Cours, 32 (1930), 295.
44 On the principle of pacta sunt servanda, see I.A. Akrum, Pacta sunt servanda en rebus sic 
stantibus in het volkenrecht (Paramaribo: Van de Boomen, 1978); R. Hyland, ‘Pacta Sunt 
Servanda: A Mediation,’ Virginia Journal of International Law, 34 (1993–1994), 405–433; J.L. 
Kunz, ‘The Meaning and the Range of the Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda,’ American Journal 
of International Law, 39 (1945), 180–197; I.I. Likashuk, ‘The Principle Pacta Sunt Servanda 
and the Nature of Obligation under International Law,’ American Journal of International 
Law, 83 (1989), 513–518; M.P. Sharp, ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda,’ Columbia Law Review, 41 (1941), 
783–798 and H. Wehberg, ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda,’ American Journal of International Law, 53 
(1959), 775–786.
45 See O’Connor, Good Faith, 42. See also E. Zoller, La Bonne Foi en Droit International Pub-
lic (Paris: Pedone, 1977). For an account on good faith in the common law tradition, see 
R. Zimmerman, ‘Good Faith and Equity,’ in: R. Zimmerman and D. Visser (eds.), Southern 
Cross. Civil and Common law in South Africa (Kenwyn: Juta, 1996), 217–260.
46 See, for example, J.P. Humphrey, ‘On the Foundations of International Law,’ American 
Journal of International Law, 39 (1945), 231–243.
47 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, 2.11.1.4., Prol. 6 and 15.
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the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which he based on the social contract.48 It 
was Suarez, in his De legibus ac Deo legislatore (1612), who introduced the max-
im in the modern law of nations. Grotius, in his turn, strengthened the position 
of the principle as a legal principle and considered it the foundation of the 
law of nations. He asserted that positive law as it applies to relations between 
nations and between sovereign rulers and their subjects is ultimately based on 
agreements among or common to peoples and individuals. The principle of 
pacta sunt servanda makes these agreements binding. As a maxim, pacta sunt 
servanda was a ‘necessary cornerstone for the survival of a legal system after 
the collapse of the old European order,’49 and so, as Lesaffer asserts, is bona 
fides: ‘Without this, both treaties and custom would lose their juridical dimen-
sion and the law would become completely obsolete in the organization of 
relations between now truly sovereign princes.’50 David Bederman confirms 
that the principle of pacta sunt servanda ‘was a necessary corollary for in-
telligible rules of treaty interpretation.’51 He argues that ‘there would be no 
point in having autonomous rules for construing disputed treaty texts unless it 
was widely believed that the obligations contained in treaties were to be 
48 S. Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium libri octo, ed. by J. Brown Scott and transl. by 
C. and W. Oldfather (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), at 3.4. Pacta sunt servanda, according 
to Pufendorf, required that human sociability observed agreements faithfully. He based 
his argument on Cicero and Augustine. See Hyland, ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda,’ 425–426.
49 R.C.H. Lesaffer, ‘The Medieval Canon Law of Contract and Early Modern Treaty Law,’ Jour-
nal of the History of International Law, 2 (2002), 196.
50 Ibid. ‘The accentuation of the principle of “pacta sunt servanda” in the early modern doc-
trine of the law of nations has to be explained as a reaction to the collapse of the medieval 
international order of the respublica christiana and the emergence of the sovereign state. 
[…] The affirmation of the sovereign state and the collapse of Christian unity led to a long 
and severe crisis of the European legal order from the sixteenth century to the second half 
of the seventeenth century. The emergence of international law doctrine was an attempt 
of the intellectual elite to remedy this. […] In this way, one can say that natural law came 
to hold the same place that Roman, feudal and above all canon law had held until the 
beginning of the sixteenth century. When the theorists of international law of the early 
modern and modern period started to elaborate this natural law, they very often fell back 
on the general principles of private law. Natural law thusway was a bridge between inter-
national law and private law. In the matter of consensualism and contract, this included 
bridging the distance between international law and canon law.’ Ibid., 180 and 198.
51 D.J. Bederman, ‘Grotius and his Followers on Treaty Construction,’ Journal of the History 
of International Law, 3 (2001), 35. On treaty interpretation, see H. Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive 
Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties,’ British 
Yearbook of International Law, 26 (1949), 48–85 and C.C. Hyde, ‘Concerning the Interpre-
tation of Treaties,’ American Journal of International Law, 3 (1909), 46–61.
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performed in good faith.’52 This fundamental character of pacta sunt servan-
da clearly puts the principle beyond such legal perspectives as naturalism 
and positivism.53 Indeed, the international legal principles of pacta sunt ser-
vanda and good faith not only had universal significance from a natural law 
perspective,54 they were also in line with State conviction and practice,55 i.e., 
customary law.
In general, the ‘sanctity of contracts’ principle signifies that treaty obliga-
tions have to be fulfilled in good faith. The legally binding force of the  principle 
of pacta sunt servanda, however, has met with debate. Among other critical 
scholars,56 Onuma puts the principle into perspective and challenges its 
binding force. He argues that while the rule of pacta sunt servanda in its gen-
eral sense is universally and timelessly valid, ‘the substance of such a supra- 
historical and universal rule would be so vague and equivocal, lacking the 
strictly binding character of law, that specific legal consequences could hardly 
be deduced from it.’57 Onuma continues to state that ‘the validity or existence 
of the “common” rule of pacta sunt servanda in the naïve and general sense of 
the term does not necessarily secure that normative expectations of each party 
would be realized through this rule in a stable and reliable manner.’58 He con-
cludes by saying that ‘even if both parties concluded an agreement, the actual 
implementation of such an agreement would depend on various contingent 
factors.’59 Although Onuma is right to observe that the principle of pacta sunt 
52 Bederman, ‘Grotius,’ 35.
53 See A. Orakhelashvili, ‘The Origins of Consensual Positivism – Pufendorf, Wolff and 
 Vattel,’ in: A. Orakhelashvili (ed.), Research Handbook on the Theory and History of Inter-
national Law (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2011), 110.
54 J.C. Bluntschli, Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staaten als Rechtsbuch Dargestellt 
(Nördlingen: Beck, 1868), 55. Bluntschli argued that the applicability of international law 
was not dependend on the degree of civilization of a political entity; it covered all the 
peoples across the world. See G. Gozzi, ‘History of International Law and Western Civili-
zation,’ International Community Law Review, 9 (2007), 358.
55 Not only between European States and other European polities interaction took place on 
the basis of pacta sunt servanda and bona fides, e.g., Lesaffer, Peace Treaties.
56 Among the skeptics of pacta sunt servanda are J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1938), 208; F. Pfluger, Die einseitigen Rechtsgeschäfte im Völkerrecht 
 (Zurich: Schulthess, 1936), 20–21 and G. Scelle, Précis de Droit des Gens, vol. ii (Paris: Sirey, 
1934), 336.
57 Onuma, ‘When was the Law of International Society Born,’ 40. See also Y. Onuma, ‘Agree-
ment,’ in: Y. Onuma (ed.), A Normative Approach to War. Peace, War, and Justice in Hugo 
Grotius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 174–220.
58 Onuma, ‘When was the Law of International Society Born,’ 40.
59 Ibid.
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servanda does not in and of itself impose any enforceable obligation under 
international law and that it should always be attended by actual obligations, 
these observations do not detract from the fundamental character of the prin-
ciple.60 The viability of the international legal community depends on the con-
sent of and agreements between its members. Together with the principle of 
good faith the principle of pacta sunt servanda is the higher norm, which goes 
beyond the will of the contracting parties. Hersch Lauterpacht (1897–1960) de-
scribes the nature of the principle as follows:
But from a more general point of view what appears to those directly 
concerned as an immediate source of the obligation is only a condition 
under which a higher, more comprehensive rule shall become operative. 
Thus the will of the parties is only a condition under which the higher 
rule, i.e. that promises should be kept, comes into operation. It is a rule of 
municipal law which, as between individuals, gives legal force to prom-
ises; it is the objective validity, independent of the will of States, of the 
rule pacta sunt servanda which renders legally possible the working of 
conventional international law.61
The rule of pacta sunt servanda thus imparts objective force to international 
treaties. In this sense, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, accompanied by 
good faith, can be considered the Grundnorm of international law: ‘Pacta sunt 
servanda is a customary norm of general international law, a constitutional 
norm of a superior rank, which institutes a particular procedure for the cre-
ation of norms of international law, namely the treaty-procedure.’62 Anzilotti 
60 See, for example, G. Schwarzenberger, International Law, 3rd edn (London: Stevens and 
Sons, 1957), 15.
61 H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (London: Long-
mans, Green and Co., 1927), 57. ‘Now, a legal rule is an objective norm independent of the 
will of the person who is bound by it. To say that the binding force of treaties is derived 
from the will of contracting parties who, through an act of self-limitation, give up a part of 
their sovereignty, is to leave unanswered the query why the treaty continues to be binding 
after the will of one party has undergone a change. The will of the parties can never be the 
ultimate source of the binding force of a contract whose continued validity is necessarily 
grounded in a higher objective rule.’ Ibid., 56.
62 Kunz, ‘Meaning and Range,’ 181. ‘Pacta sunt servanda means the institution, by general 
international law, of a special procedure – the treaty procedure – for the creation of 
international norms. Norms, thus created, are valid and must be kept, as long as no norm-
abolishing fact, as laid down by norms of international law, has occurred.’ Ibid., 197.
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too points to the principle as an integral part of international law.63 The in-
timate relationship between the principles of pacta sunt servanda and good 
faith is addressed by the International Law Commission (ilc) in its commen-
tary to Article 23 of the Vienna Convention (1966): ‘Pacta sunt servanda – the 
rule that treaties are binding on the parties and must be performed in good 
faith – is the fundamental principle of the law of treaties. […] There is much 
authority in the jurisprudence of international tribunals for the proposition 
that in the present context the principle of good faith is a legal principle which 
forms an integral part of the rule pacta sunt servanda.’64 In its commentary, the 
ilc also refers to case law of the Permanent Court of International Justice65 
and the icj66 which emphasizes the fundamental character of both principles. 
In the course of time, the theory and practice of international law have shaped 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda from a customary to a written rule. But 
what status did the rules on the sanctity of contracts and good faith have in 
the nineteenth century, more specifically regarding the acquisition of African 
territory by means of cession and protectorates?
As a universal principle, pacta sunt servanda was familiar to both European 
and African parties throughout the life cycle of cession and protectorate trea-
ties (negotiation, conclusion and execution). The principle was acknowledged 
by the Africans and played an important role in the lives of Africans, because it 
enabled orderly and friendly relations within political communities and with 
other communities to be maintained. ‘Agreements were often entered into by 
one king or paramount chief with another as much to regulate their external 
relations as to promote territorial advancement. There were, of course, well 
established rules for securing a truce as for regulating the practice of warfare.’67 
63 D. Anzilotti, Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts, vol. i (Berlin, Leipzig: De Gruyter 1929), 38 ff and 
49 ff.
64 Commentary on Article 23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Nations, Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, vol. ii (New York: United Nations, 1966), 211. See also 
C. Binder, The Pacta Sunt Servanda Rule in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
A Pilar and Its Safeguards (Leyden: Nijhoff, 2008) and W.P. Gormley, ‘The Codification of 
Pacta Sunt Servanda by the International Law Commission: The Preservation of Classical 
Norms of Moral Force and Good Faith,’ Saint Louis University Law Journal, 14 (1969–1970), 
367–428.
65 Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig 
Territory, pcij, 1932, Series A/B, No. 44, 28; and Minority Schools in Albania, pcij, 1935, 
Series A/B, No. 64, 19 and 20.
66 Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgment, 1952, icj 
Reports 212.
67 Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law, 44. Elias provides and discusses a 
good example of the applicability of pacta sunt servanda in and among African polities, 
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Moreover, referring to Lord Lugard’s experiences in Eastern and Western 
Africa, Alexandrowicz gives examples of African rulers’ familiarity with and 
commitment to the principle of pacta sunt servanda.68 Alexandrowicz shows 
how before the nineteenth century international relations and diplomacy were 
based on mutual compliance with promises made between European States 
and non-European political entities.69 The obvious conclusion must be that 
the principle that agreements must be kept was indeed recognized by both 
European and African contracting parties. In this sense, the law of nations 
did apply to the European-African contacts, or, in the words of Elias: ‘[T]hese 
relationships must have thrown up certain general principles of international 
behaviour, certain universally accepted standards of international conduct 
between one State and another.’70
Although there is consensus in legal doctrine that the existence of cession 
and protectorate treaties did not presume equality between parties71 – African 
territories inhabited by natives governed by their rulers were not considered 
by quoting a treaty concluded between the Association Internationale Africaine and the 
Chiefs of Pallaballa, documented in H.M. Stanley, The Congo and the Founding of its Free 
State (New York: Harper, 1885), 197: ‘Proverb after proverb could be quoted from many 
different African languages to the effect that it has always been an established principle 
that agreements must be kept. One illustration should be sufficient. When H.M. Stanley, 
acting as Chief Agent of the Association Internationale Africaine, signed a treaty with five 
Chiefs of the districts of Pallaballa in the Congo on 8 January, 1883, the use of the expres-
sion “Cession of Territory” had to be technically interpreted in a subsequent treaty of 19 
April, 1884, to exclude the subsoil of the territory purported to be sold under the earlier 
treaty which must be taken to relate only to “The purchase of the Suzerainty by the As-
sociation.” This second exercise was necessary because the chiefs, on being told that their 
first treaty had transferred an absolute title to the European grantees, were anxious either 
to set aside the whole transactions at once or to have it rectified in order to avoid a breach 
of the agreement later on. It is interesting to record that a little while previously the five 
chiefs had solemnly declared, in Article 5 of another treaty entered into among them-
selves as follows: “The confederated districts guarantee that the treaties made between 
them shall be respected.”’ Ibid.
68 Alexandrowicz, ‘Role of Treaties,’ 47–50. See also Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, 41.
69 C.H. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East In-
dies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) and Alexandrowicz, European-African Confrontation. 
Gustavo Gossi, for example, shows that the principle of pacta sunt servanda also applied 
to international Islamic law: Gozzi, ‘History of International Law,’ 361–364.
70 Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law, 45.
71 G. Jèze, Etude théorique et pratique sur l’occupation comme mode d’acquérir les territoires 
en droit international (Paris: Giard and Brière, 1896), 128 and K.F. Heimburger, Der Erwerb 
der Gebietshoheit (Karlsruhe : Braun, 1888), 114. Arnold McNair stated that ‘according to 
the modern doctrine of international law, and agreement made between a State and a na-
tive chief or tribe cannot be regarded as a treaty in the international sense of the term; nor 
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States – reciprocal relations between the European and African parties is not 
rejected. This observation raises the question what the nature was of the rela-
tionship between Europeans and Africans that was established by concluding 
cession and protectorate treaties. In other words, what was the legal value or 
authority of these documents? This question will be addressed next.
2.2 Cession and Protectorate Treaties
As a derivative mode of acquisition, cession is based on consensus about the 
transfer of sovereignty over territory. Although cession mainly occurs by way 
of treaty, the expression of consensus is not bound to any particular form. In 
nineteenth-century legal doctrine, cession entailed ‘the formal transfer of do-
minion by a previous lawful possessor.’72 The dominion to be formally trans-
ferred refers to sovereignty, i.e., both internal and external sovereign powers. 
As the continuity principle prescribed, there was no automatic or necessary 
extinguishment of existing private property rights to the land. This principle 
was commonly accepted within international law in the context of State suc-
cession. The acquiring State, however, did have the competence to enact legis-
lation in order to acquire and allocate property rights to land. In this respect, 
the general rule was (and still is) that private property shall not be taken for 
public use without compensation (the Lockean ‘takings clause’).73 Cession of 
land by a State had to be effected by the person or body that had been so au-
thorized under the constitution of that State. Not fulfilling this condition of 
authority would make the cession void. The cession would also be voidable 
if it had been obtained through fraud or by coercion brought to bear on the 
persons negotiating on behalf of the ceding State.74 Moreover, under certain 
conditions, a forced cession could resemble a conquest. The question that 
follows from these observations is whether nineteenth-century international 
can it be said that such an agreement produces the international legal effects commonly 
produced by a treaty.’ McNair, Law of Treaties, 52–53.
72 T.A. Walker, A Manual of Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1895), 
32. ‘The area of territory conveyed and the moment of the transfer of sovereignty are 
alike ruled by the express terms of the instrument of conveyance. Provided good faith be 
shown by the parties to the contract, the determination of the boundaries of the region 
conveyed must thus be a mere matter of textual interpretation and of the facts of the 
previous ownership. The date of transfer, in default of express determination in the con-
vention itself, must be taken to be that of the signature of the instrument.’ Ibid.
73 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. by P. Laslett (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
at II.135.
74 Lindley, Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory, 166.
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law allowed cession agreements to be concluded between European States and 
African rulers.
According to Lindley, for a cession to be valid it had to meet five condi-
tions.75 First, an agreement made by a native sovereign could only be validly 
made with, or with the consent of, the ruler or government that had the su-
preme rights to the rights over the region. Second, with regard to the capacity 
of the parties, the treaty should be concluded or approved by an authorized 
person. The third condition concerns the form of a cession: the agreement 
should be made or executed in a form which was common to the contracting 
parties. Fourth, it had to be ensured that the natives concerned understood the 
provisions of the treaty. And, fifth, the cession of sovereign rights from the na-
tive ruler to the European State should not involve compulsion. Contemporary 
international legal doctrine, however, remained silent on what compulsion 
entailed. Although cession between two members of the family of civilized na-
tions made under compulsion were considered void, this consequence was not 
often attached to compulsory cessions made between Europeans and native 
rulers.76 It was, however, considered important that the contracting natives 
entered into the agreement freely, and although Lindley did not ascertain that 
these rules fell within the scope of international law in its narrow sense,77 he 
acknowledged that if these rules ‘are not in substance complied with, the ac-
quiring Power loses the legal protection which a valid Agreement would have 
given it for a reasonable time between the making of the Agreement and the es-
tablishment of an efficient administration over the territory.’78 In other words, 
if the European State did not fulfil the cession conditions within a reasonable 
period of time after the actual acquisition, the cession of the sovereign rights 
to the territory would not be considered legal. Interestingly, Lindley seems to 
have applied norms of international law in its narrow sense of inter-State law 
to relations between European States and non-European political entities.
The second legal instrument often used to establish territorial title was 
the protectorate treaty. Protectorates were constructs devised by politicians 
and primarily so for financial reasons: they were seen as a means to avoid the 
75 Ibid., 169–172.
76 Ibid., 174–175.
77 Lindley also excluded non-European peoples on the ground of the dichotomy European 
versus non-European order, by quoting Westlake: ‘[Westlake] objects that if International 
Law made any such requirement, a Power might have fulfilled the conditions laid down 
by the Final Act of the Berlin Conference and yet be liable to have its title disputed on the 
ground that the cession from the natives was bad in regard to such matters as the capacity 
of the native authority to make the cession, or the form in which it was made.’ Ibid., 175.
78 Ibid., 177.
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financial burden of instituting a full-blown colonial government.79 Yet the 
definition and the scope of the concept of protectorate are not unambiguous. 
A common contemporary definition of a protectorate reads as follows: ‘Protec-
torate is the recognition of the right of the aboriginal or other actual inhabit-
ants to their own country, with no further assumption of territorial rights than 
is necessary to maintain the paramount authority and to discharge the duties 
of the protecting power.’80 Or, to use the words of the British jurist Sir Henry 
Jenkyns (1838–1899): ‘By the exclusion of external relations with foreign pow-
ers, the protector is held according to international law to assume the external 
sovereignty of the protected territory, and the territory becomes what is termed 
by international writers a semi-sovereign state […].’81 A protectorate implied 
that European power did not possess either its soil or its population. Westlake 
defines protectorate as ‘a relation existing between two states, of which the 
protected one is controlled or even wholly represented in its foreign affairs by 
the protecting one, while the latter has such authority in the internal affairs of 
the former, if any, as the arrangements between them provide for.’82 He con-
cludes that the ‘protected state is therefore not independent, but neither does 
it altogether lose an international existence, for its foreign affairs are distinctly 
its own, even when wholly managed for it by the protecting state.’83 Initially, 
Westlake subscribes to the view that protectorates could only be established 
between two States, but he concedes that ‘in recent times a practice has arisen 
by which in such [uncivilized, MvdL] regions civilised powers assume and ex-
ercise certain rights in more or less well defined districts, to which rights and 
districts, for the term is used to express both the one and the other, the name of 
a protectorate is given by analogy.’84 In short, protectorate treaties transferred 
external sovereignty rights over territory to the protecting State and could be 
concluded between European powers and African rulers as equals in order to 
create a mutual relationship of protection.
A twentieth-century definition of the protectorate is given by Alexandro-
wicz, and an intriguing definition it is, because it emphasizes the duty of the 
protecting State: ‘The protectorate means a split of sovereignty and its purpose 
79 W.E. Hall, International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1880), 24.
80 Memo by Lord Selborne, January 3rd, 1885, quoted in W.R. Louis, ‘The Berlin Congo Con-
ference,’ in: P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), France and Britain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry 
and Colonial Rule (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), 209.
81 Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction, 166.




is to vest in the Protector rights of external sovereignty while leaving rights of 
internal sovereignty in the protected entity. In this way the Protector shelters 
another entity against the external hazards of power politics.’85 The validity 
of a protectorate treaty, like that of a cession treaty, was dependent on several 
conditions.86 When a protectorate was established, often by way of a protector-
ate treaty,87 internal sovereignty rights remained in the hands of the protected 
entity.88 As a European entitlement to overseas territories, a protectorate was 
not considered to be part of the dominions of the European motherland and 
could not be classified as a European possession.89 This element was the cru-
cial difference between a colony and a protectorate.90 In theory, protectorate 
treaties between European powers and African native rulers implied that the 
Europeans recognized, either implicitly or explicitly, the internal sovereignty 
of the native rulers, and this recognition included acknowledgement of the 
power of these rulers to regulate existing and future property rights within 
their territories.
85 Alexandrowicz, TEuropean-African Confrontation, 62. On the nature of the treaty of pro-
tection, see C.H. Alexandrowicz, ‘The Juridical Expression of the Sacred Trust of Civiliza-
tion,’ American Journal of International Law, 65 (1971), 152.
86 In general four conditions had to be met: ‘(1) The parties to the treaty must be possessed 
of full contractual capacity, i.e. they must, in general, be independent states. (2) The con-
tracting agents must contract within the terms of their authority. […] (3) The contracting 
parties must freely consent to the terms of the treaty. […] (4) The object of the treaty must 
not contravene the principles of international law.’ Walker, Manual of Public International 
Law, 84.
87 ‘Yet the existence of the “protectorate agreement” gave the outward appearance that the 
African societies had entered into the governing relationships voluntary and, further-
more, continued, in certain capacities, to rule themselves. Indirect rule thus gave the 
European states power, but without the responsibilities they would have encountered 
through direct rule.’ M. Mulligan, ‘Nigeria, the British Presence in West Africa and Inter-
national Law in the 19th Century,’ Journal of the History of International Law, 11 (2009), 293.
88 Thomas Baty described four stages of development in the history of the protectorate. See 
T. Baty, ‘Protectorates and Mandates,’ British Yearbook of International Law, 2 (1921–1922), 
114–115.
89 See C. Lucas, The Partition and Colonization of Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), 211. 
See also Elias, Nigerian Land Law, 17.
90 See Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction, 192–193. In this light, it should be reminded that 
British practice, was based on the feudal system of land tenure, in which it is recognized 
that the Crown has the ultimate title to territory – the Queen is sovereign and owns all the 
land within her dominion. See K. McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1989).
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However, there was no common understanding and use of the protectorate 
concept among the colonizing powers during the acquisition of Africa in the 
late nineteenth century. The Great Powers involved in the struggle for African 
territory – Britain, France and Germany – held different views on the extent, 
substance and implications of protectorates. These differences generated a 
considerable amount of theoretical and abstract scholarly literature. Accord-
ing to Grewe, for example, British scholars, in contrast to their German and 
French counterparts, ‘sought to maintain the fiction of a legal distinction be-
tween “colony” and “protectorate,”’ because, as Grewe asserts, ‘it was the Brit-
ish view that the protectorate relationship did not give the protector State any 
jurisdictional authority over the nationals of other States sojourning in the 
territory of the protectorate.’91 From the perspective of German international 
legal doctrine, the distinction between colony and protectorate was ‘complete-
ly fluid,’ and the new, hybrid political institution of the colonial protectorate 
was transitional filling. From the French perspective, as Grewe describes it, 
the ‘protectorate is only a restriction, a limitation, a moderation, to which the 
victorious power submits in its own interest, to the degree it deems appropri-
ate; at any time it can draw the last consequences of its conquest.’92 Whether 
there is merit in Grewe’s theoretical qualifications of the British, German and 
French interpretation of the protectorate concept can only be investigated by 
analysing the protectorate treaties these powers concluded with African rulers 
in the late nineteenth century. In other words, the question to be answered 
is whether these theoretical assumptions are supported by empirical find-
ings. Did international legal theory address the practice of treaty-making be-
tween Europeans and Africans?93 The question is material, because the value 
and authority of the protectorate treaties concluded between African rulers 
and European States under nineteenth-century international law can only be 
determined on the basis of both international legal theory and practice.
3 Conclusion
New Imperialism on the African continent implied a European struggle for 
title to territory in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Bilateral 
91 Grewe, Epochs of International Law, 473.
92 Ibid., 474.
93 Jörg Fisch points also at the alleged discrepancy between theory and practice: Fisch, 
‘Africa as Terra Nullius,’ 358, 360–369. In this light, Koskenniemi speaks of the universal-
ism versus relativism opposition: Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, 136–143.
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treaties between European States and African rulers representing their peo-
ples, which effected cession of territorial sovereignty or established protector-
ates, were the two legal instruments most commonly used to create European 
title to African territory. This chapter’s has addressed two central questions. 
The first one concerned the meaning and role of territory in the context of the 
European treaty-based acquisition and partition of Africa, and the second one 
the status of cession and protectorate treaties between European States and 
African rules in nineteenth-century international law. Were these treaties mere-
ly pieces of paper marked with a cross by African rulers, a status constructed by 
contemporary legal scholars following a positivist line of reasoning and upheld 
by twentieth-century international legal scholarship? Or did these documents 
have legal value after all? In other words, were these cession and protectorate 
treaties sources of law? An attempt to answer these questions will have to take 
into account the implementation and the consequences of these treaties, and 
these questions are crucial in setting the stage for the question whether these 
treaties were valid and if they were whether treaty obligations were violated.
The very existence of cession and protectorate treaties implies that the Eu-
ropean confrontation with nations in the non-civilized part of the world did 
not occur in a legal vacuum. In this confrontation between members of the 
family of civilized nations and non-member nations, more specifically the 
European-African confrontation, the law of nations applied. This fact effec-
tively means that the dualist world view can be regarded as being fictitious. 
It is  questionable to what extent there really existed, as proclaimed by main-
stream contemporary international legal doctrine, two worlds, one civilized, 
the other non-civilized – a divide characterized by two different missions: one 
of toleration between the members of the family of civilized nations, and one 
of civilization between these members and nations that were not recognized 
as  members. Although contemporary legal doctrine emphasized a dichotomist 
world view supported by the civilization argument, practice shows that Europe-
an States did conclude bilateral treaties with African political entities, and this 
practice implies that African rulers were acknowledged to have the capacity 
to conclude treaties and to possess sovereign powers. The cession and protec-
torate treaties between European States and African political entities estab-
lished mutual relations between the contracting parties.94 By using such legal 
instruments and by signing them, the Europeans acknowledged the capacity 
of the African rulers to conclude treaties and to transfer sovereign rights over 
territory. Put differently, cession and protectorate treaties were acknowledged 
as treaties between two sovereign contracting parties. This also implies that 
94 See Alexandrowicz, ‘Afro-Asian World and the Law of Nations’, 208.
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the capacity to conclude treaties did not require European-style statehood. It 
was not the narrow interpretation of international law as inter-State law but 
the law of nations that regulated the confrontation and relations between 
States and other political entities.
Contemporary and current international legal doctrine is too radical in ar-
guing for the existence of two worlds, one in which international law applied 
and one in which it did not. International legal practice does not support this 
strict dualist perspective: both the possibility of concluding bilateral treaties in 
the non-civilized world and their existence imply that international law did in-
deed apply to relations between European States and African political entities. 
A number of key principles and rules of international law – most prominently 
pacta sunt servanda and bona fides – went beyond the State versus non-State 
dichotomy. In other words, there were indeed rules of law which universally 
applied to encounters between nations: the law of nations. Within the com-
munity of civilized nations, international law is a specific branch of the law of 
nations.
Determining the status of the cession and protectorate treaties on the 
 basis of the narrow understanding of nineteenth-century international law, 
as  contemporary legal scholars did, is just one part of the story: it provides 
the theoretical and Euro-centric perspective on the value of these treaties. The 
subsequent question to be answered is what the meaning of these treaties was 
in the broader context of the law of nations? The next three Chapters will ex-
amine and compare the background to and the texts of the treaties conclud-
ed between European States and African political entities in British Nigeria, 
French Equatorial Africa and German Cameroon. Sovereignty and property 
and the relationship between these two legal phenomena will be at the heart 
of this analysis. The purpose of performing these case studies is to establish 
the status and value of these treaties in nineteenth-century international law. 
These case studies also examine what happened after the cession and protec-
torate treated had been concluded. Only then can it be determined whether 
these treaties were complied with, whether, by extension, international law 




In the 1880s, while France was occupied with the Sudan and Germany not 
yet a serious competitor, Great Britain acquired its most important overseas 
territory in the Western part of Africa, Nigeria, so named by Lady Flora Lugard 
(1852–1929), British journalist and wife of Lord Lugard, first Governor-General 
of the territory.1 Britain initially targeted the Nigerian coast, which is formed by 
the Niger Delta and its tributaries. Britain acquired this territory by conclud-
ing treaties, specifically protectorate treaties, with Nigerian native rulers. This 
chapter aims to examine the context of these treaties in terms of their negotia-
tions, texts and follow-up.
Traditionally, protectorate treaties were concluded between two States by 
which one State transferred its external sovereign rights – its rights to enter 
into and maintain relations with other States – to the protecting State. In the 
age of New Imperialism, however, Britain used protectorate treaties not only 
to acquire external sovereignty, but also internal sovereign rights, i.e., the rights 
to control the internal affairs of the African polity it had undertaken to pro-
tect. And having acquired internal sovereignty rights, Britain also claimed to 
have acquired proprietary rights to African land. To substantiate this main 
argument, the current chapter appraises imperium and dominium and their 
relationship in the context of the British colonization of Nigeria in the late 
nineteenth century. It explores how the concepts of dominium and imperium 
appeared in the treaties between the British and the Nigerian people(s), and 
whether the institutions of territorial sovereignty and land ownership were 
used accurately and consistently. The chapter offers an analysis of protectorate 
treaties, specifically treaty provisions that concern the transfer of territorial 
sovereignty and private property of land, as well as the remedies under and be-
yond the treaties which could be invoked in case of breach of treaty. First, the 
historical background to the British presence in Nigeria is outlined (§2). Sec-
ond, the theoretical framework of title to territory is explained from the British 
perspective (§3). Third, the results of a study and analysis of treaty practices 
between British and Nigerians are presented (§4). Fourth, the chapter assesses 
the lawfulness of these treaties and other kinds of agreements by discussing 
British conduct and the legislation enacted by the British after treaties had 
1 Lady Lugard introduced the name in The Times on 8 January 1897.
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been concluded as well as the role of the British colonial judiciary and its case 
law (§5). Finally, the findings are summarized and British colonial practices 
in Nigeria are placed in the broader context of the European acquisition and 
partition of Africa in the late nineteenth century (§6).
2 Historical Background
As earl as the seventeenth century, the British had found their way to the 
 West-African coast, where the main economic activity was trading slaves. The 
abolition of the British slave trade on 1 January 1808 radically changed British 
motives for being in Africa and therefore their activities. In the 1830s, a lively 
trade in palm oil developed. Especially the interior was rich in this oil, and 
it was the waterways, the Oil Rivers, of which the Niger was the most impor-
tant, that brought the British to the area. European tradesmen were forbidden 
by their own authorities to do business directly with African natives, which is 
why African middlemen were used to liaise between the oil producers in the 
Hinterland and the European traders on the coast. The intermediate trade took 
place in the coastal city states of Brass, Bonny, and Calabar, which did not fall 
under British dominion and where trade and politics were hardly separable. 
The African middlemen had the monopoly on the intermediate trade, secured 
by  commercial treaties with British traders. The British historian Augustus 
Mockler-Ferryman (1856–1930) paints a clear picture of contemporary prac-
tices in the Niger area: ‘The common theory that “trade follows the flag” hardly 
holds good with regard to the Niger, for that the Union Jack now floats over the 
greater part of these vast territories is due almost entirely to the efforts of trad-
ers and trading companies, though it is only fair to add that the British Govern-
ment has usually backed up the traders whenever necessary.’2 Consolidating its 
commercial interests on the West-African coast and the Niger  became Britain’s 
primary objective. This consolidation involved concluding treaties between 
British agents and African rulers or peoples on such issues as the abolition of 
the slave trade and human sacrifices, the promotion of peaceful trade and the 
protection of British subjects and missionaries.3
2 A.F. Mockler-Ferryman, ‘British Nigeria,’ Journal of the Royal African Society, 1 (1902), 160. See 
also M. Crowder, The Story of Nigeria (London, 1962); and M. Crowder, Colonial West Africa 
Collected Essays (London, 1978).
3 J.C. Anene, Southern Nigeria in Transition 1885–1906. Theory and Practice in a Colonial Protec-
torate (Cambridge University Press, 1966), 31–32.
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Another important trade centre for British agents was the Kingdom of 
 Lagos. Here, the growing palm oil trade drew British attention. In 1861, Britain 
convinced the King of Lagos, Docemo, to dispose of his empire in favour of the 
British in return for an annual bonus of gbp 1,000. As a result, Lagos became an 
English Crown colony. In 1849, a British consul had been appointed to control 
the area of the Oil Rivers. The consul looked after the British interests and over 
time earned the respect of the African rulers, who appealed to him when in dif-
ficulty. However, the consul’s judicial and administrative duties (and  powers) 
were limited to British subjects. Other than appointing a consul the British 
Government took no action – hence the name ‘informal empire.’4
The British consolidated their commercial interests in the Niger Delta and 
its watershed5 mainly through concluding treaties between British agents and 
African rulers and their peoples. Although the British government did not 
want to be directly involved in the acquisition and administration of overseas 
territories, mainly for financial reasons, it did promise traders that they could 
count on military support, if necessary. This restraint remained British govern-
ment policy until the 1880s.
In 1880, British consul Edward Hewett found that informal empire no longer 
sufficed. Britain exercised exclusive influence over territories without having 
acquired formal possession of them. As consul, Hewett was expected to main-
tain order and uphold the law, but he did not have the authority to perform his 
duties. He advocated a formal empire for two reasons: to overrule the power-
ful position of the African middlemen and to avoid French interference.6 In 
April 1882, Hewett requested the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of 
Kimberley (1826–1902), to establish a protectorate or a Crown colony in the 
Nigerian coast area. Remarkably, this request was accompanied by letters 
from the Cameroonians in which the African rulers ‘were alleged to be will-
ing to surrender their country to the British Queen.’7 Kimberley, however, 
rejected the request.8 A member of the anti-imperial Government of Prime 
Minister William Gladstone (1809–1898), Kimberley emphasized the addition-
al responsibilities of the British government when acquiring the territory of 
4 Wesseling, Verdeel en heers, 233. See Sanderson, ‘European Partition of Africa,’ 97. See also 
W.R. Johnston, Sovereignty and Protection: A Study of British Jurisdictional Imperialism in the 
Late Nineteenth Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 1973).
5 See P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, ‘The Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas, 1750–
1914,’ Economic History Review, 33 (1980), 463–490.
6 Pakenham, Scramble for Africa, 192.
7 Anene, Southern Nigeria in Transition, 56.
8 Wesseling, Verdeel en heers, 234.
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‘barbarians.’ British occupation of the Niger would only lead to war, war would 
require funding and taxes would have to be raised in the home country to re-
plenish the treasury.
Then Sir George Goldie Taubman (1846–1925; hereafter ‘Sir Goldie’) entered 
the stage.9 From 1877, he led a very successful trading company, initially named 
the United African Company, which in 1882 became the National African Com-
pany. A trader and an imperialist, Sir Goldie dreamt of building a vast Brit-
ish empire based on commerce on the African continent. Since the 1870s, the 
British had obtained access to the Niger and, alongside the trade in the Niger 
Delta with its African trade centres and middlemen, a new trade market had 
been established in which British did business directly with African produc-
ers. French traders also found their way into the interior, which led to fierce 
competition between them and the British. At the end of 1884, following vari-
ous mergers with British and French trading companies, Sir Goldie and his Na-
tional African Company had the trade monopoly on the Lower Niger. British 
rule in the Lower Niger area was acknowledged by the European powers at the 
Berlin Conference (1884–1885).
However, this did satisfy Sir Goldie’s ambitions; he aimed to expand his 
power to the interior and add a new colony to the British Empire. He set up 
more and more trading posts along the Niger and concluded treaties with Af-
rican rulers, 37 agreements by 1884.10 In these treaties, the rulers put their sig-
natures under clauses stipulating that they ‘ceded the whole of our territory to 
the National African Company (Limited) and their descendants for ever’ and 
that they consented to the National African Company’s monopoly on trade.11 
The Dutch historian Henk Wesseling correctly observes that the National Afri-
can Company ruled de facto as some sort of government over the Hinterland, 
even without the official permission of the British government.12 Although 
Hewett and Sir Goldie both secured treaties with the rulers of the Oil Rivers 
and the Niger districts, it was Sir Goldie’s company that landed better deals, be-
cause African rulers ‘ceded’ their territories to the National African Company 
‘in perpetuity.’ What Sir Goldie aimed for, however, was an official mandate by 
the British government, by way of a charter, because only then would he be 
9 For an elaboration on Sir Goldie’s life, see J.E. Flint, Sir George Goldie and the Making of 
Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).
10 Wesseling, Verdeel en heers, 236.
11 E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, 3rd edition, vol. i (London: Frank Cass, 1967), 
131–154.
12 Wesseling, Verdeel en heers, 236.
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able to attain his political purpose: the incorporation of Nigeria into the Brit-
ish Empire.13
Initially, the British government remained reluctant to intervene in Nigeria. 
Although the necessity for political action became increasingly clear in the 
early 1880s, the British government feared the financial and political conse-
quences. However, by the end of 1883 the British government changed its mind 
because the need to control the trade market and the African middlemen be-
came urgent and competition with the French stiffened.14 In July 1884, Hewett 
was empowered to conclude treaties with the object of establishing a British 
protectorate in the Niger area. The British Foreign Office sent him there with 
a number of standard treaty forms, each containing the same eight articles. 
Under these provisions African territory was brought under British protection 
and Britain obtained the right to free trade, which effectively ended the Afri-
can middlemen’s power. Whether or not these treaties were understood by the 
African natives who signed them, they were of vital importance to the British: 
these treaties were the title deeds of Britain’s prospective colony of Nigeria. 
However, two other European powers with colonial aspirations – France and 
Germany – became increasingly eager to acquire African territory and did not 
avoid a confrontation with Britain. As a result, a steeplechase could not be 
avoided.
In contending for concluding protectorate treaties with African rulers, 
Bismarck acted more swiftly than the British: he sent the German explorer 
Gustav Nachtigal (1834–1885) with the war ship on a mission to the African 
west coast.15 Nachtigal travelled on the warship Möwe, and on 5 July 1884 he 
concluded treaties in Togoland. He subsequently, on 14 July, succeeded in con-
cluding a protectorate treaty for the territory of Cameroon, beating Hewett to 
it, who had yet to go ashore.16 Here the first signs of the scramble for Africa 
appear. Despite this competition, no conflict arose between the two powers: 
at the Conference of Berlin, Britain recognized Germany’s sovereignty over 
Cameroon and Bismarck supported the British title to the Niger area. Soon 
after the Conference, which accelerated the scramble and put a strain on in-
ternational relations, Britain and Germany signed an agreement demarcating 
their spheres of influence in Nigeria and Cameroon. The criterion of effective 
13 Ibid., 237.
14 See, for example, P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), France and Britain in Africa: Imperial 
Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971).
15 See, for example, P.M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860–1914 (Lon-
don: Allen and Unwin, 1980).
16 Wesseling, Verdeel en heers, 239.
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occupation, introduced at the Berlin Conference, implied that a valid title to 
territory could only be established if a European power was able to defend 
the territory against external attacks and to secure peace and order within the 
area. This requirement of effective occupation outlawed the British ‘colonial’ 
policy of informal empire and encouraged rival expeditions.
In contrast with the French government’s colonial policy of direct rule 
aimed at assimilation, the attitude of the British government to the events on 
the African continent was tentative and indecisive. It took some time until the 
British grasped the imperial reality. Important players in the British political 
arena at the end of the nineteenth century were the liberals Gladstone, Earl 
Granville (1815–1891) and Sir Harcourt (1827–1904). Lord Rosebery (1847–1929), 
who was a convinced imperialist, succeeded Gladstone in 1894 as Prime Min-
ister. The following year, the conservatives seized power in British politics, 
and Lord Salisbury (1830–1903) took his place as Prime Minister. He appointed 
 Joseph Chamberlain (1836–1914) as Secretary for the Colonies. It was Chamber-
lain who propagated the transition to formal empire in Africa. He condemned 
liberalism and propagated an active political and economic role of the British 
State. The period of laissez faire was had ended, as had the era of freedom of 
trade; Chamberlain believed in protectionism and imperial preference.17 The 
new policy or regime turned on investment and development, in which ‘scien-
tific administration’ and ‘constructive imperialism’ were considered key con-
cepts of the ambition to establish a British Empire from the Cape to Cairo.18
Returning to the Nigerian situation, the British government asserted its 
sphere of influence or protectorate power not only over the coastal area be-
tween Lagos and Cameroon, but also over the territory behind the coastal strip 
up to where the Niger and the Benue Rivers converged. After the Conference 
of Berlin, there was a growing consensus that a protectorate did not suffice 
to justify or claim total rule over a territory. Although the Final Act did not 
prescribe effective occupation of the Hinterland as a condition for closing the 
door on other European powers, this condition was increasingly emphasized 
in practice.19 Faced with this trend, the British government could only con-
ceive of one solution, namely, to grant Sir Goldie’s National African Company a 
Royal Charter. Goldie’s desire for such a charter met with resistance in political 
circles, because of the grant’s foreseen financial and political consequences. 
The Charter authorized Sir Goldie’s company, renamed the Royal Niger Com-
pany, to administer those territories in the Niger basin regarding which it had 
17 Ibid., p. 259.
18 Ibid.
19 See Fisch, ‘Africa as Terra Nullius,’ 347–375.
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concluded protectorate treaties. As will be argued, the British reinterpreted 
these treaties in a way that allowed them to claim comprehensive and absolute 
cession of African territory to the company. Although the Royal Charter grant-
ed to the company merely recognized the company’s claim, the Royal  Niger 
Company demanded full sovereignty over the area. Instead of operating in 
the name of the British Crown, the Company presumed it had acquired sover-
eign rights over the territory. In addition to the Royal Charter, which granted 
the Company sovereign rights and the capacity to intervene as a government, 
the Company would receive a trade monopoly.20 On 10 July 1886, the Royal 
Niger Company, succeeding the National African Company, was constituted, al-
though enthusiasm and support for this move were modest.21 Questions arose 
about the costs of increased British involvement and doubts were expressed as 
to whether trading companies were indeed able to represent Britain’s interests 
and control the acquired territory. The chartered Company eventually secured 
a tract of territory covering the Niger and Benue basins, an area almost twice 
the size of Britain, and one which, with the exception of South-Africa, would 
prove to be the most remunerative of tropical Africa. Thus, Britain possessed a 
protectorate and the Royal Niger Company had a charter, but the British gov-
ernment continued to have reservations about intervening in and assuming re-
sponsibility for local affairs; it remained cautious and tried to keep its distance.
Even so, Britain found itself increasingly drawn into the affairs of the pro-
tectorate of Nigeria and Sir Goldie’s chartered company because of problems 
and conflicts between British tradesmen in the Niger Delta and the Royal Niger 
Company. In addition, the relationship between the British and the African na-
tives was troubled. Especially in its relations with African rulers, Britain began 
to interpret the protectorate treaty in ever broader terms. At first, the British 
strategy of choice was one of ‘preventive imperialism’: the British Crown ex-
tended its ‘gracious favour and protection’ to the African people and territory, 
a philosophy that is perfectly described in a letter of the British consul in Ni-
geria, Hewett, to an African ruler with whom the British were negotiating a 
treaty: ‘The Queen does not want to take your country or your markets, but at 
the same time is anxious that no other nation should take them.’22
Nonetheless, conflicts between traders and African natives became more 
frequent, intense and violent. The African natives resented the European 
merchants for entering the interior markets, because the European presence 
20 Wesseling, Verdeel en heers, 239.
21 Ibid., 240.
22 f.o. 84/1862, see letter from Hewett to Jaja from 1 July 1884, which is attached to the cor-
respondence from Jaja to Salisbury on 5 May 1887.
chapter 5102
threatened their commercial advantages as middlemen. This volatile situation 
forced Britain’s hand and the British intensified their involvement in the Ni-
gerian protectorate. In April 1886, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs in-
formed Hewett that the limited interpretation of the protection treaties should 
be abandoned, and that Britain should claim its sovereignty over the whole 
territory of Southern Nigeria.23 In this way the concept of the protectorate be-
came to be interpreted so broadly as to transform its substance. This trend is 
confirmed by Anene, who states that ‘[t]he illusion that in a colonial protector-
ate the internal sovereignty of the indigenous rulers was to be respected was 
apparently preserved by the nature of the task imposed on the British Consul. 
[…] European writers have referred to this period as the “paper protectorate.” 
This view is based on the assumption that it was the business of Britain to es-
tablish an elaborate Crown colony administration in 1885. Britain had in fact 
no legal or moral right to do so.’24
This situation, of course, led to conflicts and disputes between the 
merchants and the African inhabitants. As a protectorate power, Britain did 
not have the authority to intervene in the internal affairs of the African poli-
ties, which, as will be shown, was clearly expressed in the concluded treaties. 
The British government became increasingly involved in the problematic colo-
nial affairs regarding the Oil Rivers and the Niger, and it became clear that the 
colonial policy of consular rule could not be maintained. The Oil Rivers Pro-
tectorate existed only on paper and nothing was undertaken to make it really 
effective. The consul was not averse to making use of African rulers to admin-
ister the Protectorate. Support for establishing a Crown colony grew. A report 
on the Royal Niger Company argued that ‘the best form of administering the 
district […] would be by a strong Consular administration’ under the supervi-
sion of an executive which had to ‘maintain order and assist in opening up 
the country,’ if necessary by means of ‘armed police or constabulary.’25 In 1891, 
the protectorate became a de iure colony with de facto direct rule. A consul-
general was given broad authority; the headquarters arose in Old Calabar and 
a vice-consul was placed in charge of the five other principal rivers: Opobo, 
23 Wesseling, Verdeel en heers, 241.
24 Anene, Southern Nigeria in Transition, 73. ‘The creation of a status for protectorates 
different from that of colonies was intended to give the Crown a free hand in dealing with 
the people in areas the Crown itself designated as “foreign land” under its control. It was 
a technicality for differential treatment that could hardly be justified.’ Umozurike, Inter-
national Law and Colonialism, 48.
25 Report on the Royal Niger Company by Major Macdonald, 93, as quoted in Anene, South-
ern Nigeria in Transition, 130.
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Benin, Brass, Bonny and Forcados. An administrator for the Niger Delta was ap-
pointed in 1893, and the area was henceforth called the Niger Coast Protector-
ate. This effectively put an end to Sir Goldie’s ideal, unified British rule under 
his Royal Niger Company: British traders did not want to subject themselves to 
Sir Goldie and the Lower Niger area was ruled by two opposing British parties, 
the government in the Delta and the Company on the river.26
Although the British and French spheres of influence had been defined in 
a convention between the two powers in 1890, tensions between the two were 
commonplace. France provoked the British by stating that they had no real 
power, in the sense of effective occupation, over the Lower Niger area. This 
meant, so the French asserted, that the British claims could not be maintained 
in practice. The danger of a violent collision between the two parties was real 
and may even have seemed inevitable. British military forces went northwards 
to the Middle and Upper Niger, and French soldiers sought their way to the east 
and the south, heading for the sea and the Lower Niger. The two sides did in-
deed clash over the areas of Dahomey and Borgu, both of strategic importance 
because of their position along the Niger.27 A detailed examination of these 
conflicts is beyond the scope of this chapter; but it is worth to draw attention to 
the main player on the Nigerian territory: Lord Lugard, also called ‘The Maker 
of Nigeria.’28 It was Lord Lugard, famous for his The Dual Mandate in Tropical 
Africa,29 who introduced the administrative system of ‘indirect rule.’30
Lord Lugard, a professional soldier who first served the British government 
in East Africa, fought against the French over territory in West Africa. Although 
attempts at peaceful negotiations were made, territorial expansion took prior-
ity in the eyes of the two powers. From 1896 on, the French were active in the 
West African arena, and in 1897 even occupied the city of Bussa claimed by 
Britain, situated near the border with French Dahomey (present-day  Benin). 
As a matter of fact, there was no effective British presence in  Bussa, but Sir 
Goldie’s Royal Niger Company had already concluded treaties with local rul-
ers in 1885 and thus had recognized treaty rights to the territory of  Bussa. 
Here, title to territory based on effective occupation clashed with title to 
26 Wesseling, Verdeel en heers, 243.
27 For further reading on these conflicts between France and Britain, see ibid., 260–265; and 
Pakenham, Scramble for Africa, 452–469.
28 Wesseling, Verdeel en heers, 261. For the life story of Lord Lugard, see M. Perham and 
M. Bull (eds.), The Diaries of Lord Lugard (London: Faber and Faber, 1963).
29 Lugard, Dual Mandate.
30 Although Lord Lugard introduced the term ‘indirect rule,’ the phenomenon of hybrid gov-
ernance was not new. See Pagden, Lords of All the World, 127.
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territory founded on treaty rights. Paper protectorates no longer sufficed. How-
ever, if Britain gave in on this point, its Niger policy would collapse, because 
that policy rested squarely on the treaties the Royal Niger Company had con-
cluded with the African rulers.31 Moreover, as Bussa was the gateway to the 
Niger, French occupation of the city would threaten the trade monopoly and, 
by extension, the economic future of the Royal Niger Company. British Min-
ister of Colonies Chamberlain was prepared to support Sir Goldie’s Company 
and he gave him financial and military aid. At the end of 1897, the West African 
Frontier Force, a field force under the command of Lord Lugard, was set up, 
consisting of men from the Haussa and Yoruba peoples. Lord Lugard was given 
a free hand by Chamberlain in achieving a single objective as part of a chess-
board policy: next to every French settlement, a British one had to be set up.
As was to be expected, this chessboard policy resulted in many incidents: 
a hoist-the-flag race between France and Britain ensued, leaving effective oc-
cupation a fanciful notion. What is more, the indigenous population fell vic-
tim to this violent competition. The Foreign Office, later the Colonial Office,32 
formally regretted the need for military domination, but it was adamant that 
there were no alternatives to military subjugation in dealing with ‘barbarians.’33 
Eventually, both parties recognized that the situation was irregular and unen-
durable. They signed a convention on 14 June 1898, which laid to rest an antag-
onism that had lasted twenty years. Britain made some territorial concessions 
to France, but it retained political control over the Lower Niger area.
The British-French Niger Convention of 1898 dividing West Africa roughly 
mirrored the process of the partition of the whole of Africa by the European 
colonial powers. It clearly reflects the differences in British and French ambi-
tions: As British imperialism was economically inspired, Britain settled for the 
small but economically most profitable area in West Africa, Nigeria and the 
Gold Coast. The French, aspiring to political power and prestige, aimed to gain 
as much territory as possible in an effort to establish the largest empire. The 
British government entered into negotiations with the Royal Niger Company 
in order to arrange the administration of and the authority over the territory. 
In 1900, the Niger Coast Protectorate was united with the Lower Niger area, 
which until then had been under the supervision of Sir Goldie’s company – a 
31 Wesseling, Verdeel en heers, 264.
32 On the role of the Colonial Office in British Nigeria, see J.M. Carland, The Colonial Office 
and Nigeria, 1898–1914 (London: Macmillan, 1985). On the Colonial Office and its history, 
see D.M. Young, The Colonial Office in the Early Nineteenth Century (London: Longmans, 
1961).
33 Anene, Southern Nigeria in Transition, 323.
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move that resulted in the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. On 9 August 1899, 
the Royal Niger Company transferred its powers to the British government, in 
exchange for gbp 865,000. In a letter to the Secretary of Treasure of 15 June 
1899, the Foreign Office put forward the reasons for revoking the Charter: ‘The 
West African Frontier Force, now under imperial officers, calls for direct Impe-
rial control; the situation created towards other firms by the commercial posi-
tion of the Company, which, although strictly within the right devolving upon 
it by Charter, has succeeded in establishing a practical monopoly of trade; the 
manner in which this commercial monopoly presses on the native traders […] 
are some of the arguments which have influenced his Lordship.’34The Colony 
of Lagos remained an administrative unit and a new Protectorate of Northern 
Nigeria was constituted.
At first, Nigeria under British rule was split up into three administrative ar-
eas. Northern Nigeria was subjected to the British and became a protectorate 
between 1900 and 1903 under the supervision of Lord Lugard, who occupied 
the emirates of Kano and Sokoto on 3 February and 15 March 1903 respectively,. 
Subsequently, in 1906, the Colony of Lagos was added to the Protectorate of 
Southern Nigeria. The positions of consul-general and consul were abolished 
and a High Commissioner was appointed. The Protectorate of Southern Nige-
ria was administered by a High Commissioner, four Divisional Commissioners, 
three Travelling District Commissioners, nine District Commissioners, a Chief 
Justice, Judges, an Attorney General, and other officials.35 Southern Nigeria 
was divided into four districts – Western, Central, Eastern, and Cross River – 
and on each of the principal rivers a Commissioner’s Court was established. In 
the course of time, native courts and courts of justice were instituted in every 
district to assist the European courts.
As almost all British overseas territories, Nigeria was administered through 
indirect rule, a system of government that was allowed the British colonial ad-
ministration to rule the African inhabitants through their native rulers. Lord 
Lugard described this system of administration as follows:
The essential feature of the system […] is that the native chiefs are con-
stituted as an integral part of the machinery of the administration. There 
are not two sets of rulers – the British and the native – working either 
separately or in co-operation, but a single Government in which the na-
tive chiefs have well-defined duties and an acknowledged status equally 
34 Papers relating to the Surrender of the Charter of the Royal Niger Company, C. 9372 
(1899), as quoted in Mockler-Ferryman, ‘British Nigeria,’ 165.
35 Ibid.
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with British officers. Their duties should never conflict, and should over-
lap as little as possible. They should be complementary to each other, 
and the chief himself must understand that he has no right to place and 
power unless he renders his proper services to the State.36
Indirect rule mobilized existing tribal structures and traditions, based on cus-
tomary law, to help govern the subjected peoples and territories. However, the 
British authorities limited the power of local rulers to govern their societies by 
retaining ultimate ruling power: Britain had the final say.
How did the British obtain these jurisdictional powers over African terri-
tory? Answer this question requires taking a closer look at the substance of 
the treaties and other agreements British delegates and companies concluded 
with African, in particular Southern Nigerian, rulers and peoples.
3 Treaties and Contracts between Britain and African Natives
In 1909, the total length of British frontiers in Africa ranged between 16,000 
and 17,000 miles, of which approximately 10,000 miles had already been sur-
veyed, approximately 6,000 miles were marked on the ground, and 2,150 miles 
were marked and ratified in accordance with common procedures.37 A brief 
glance at the list of treaties and agreements concluded in Southern Nigeria 
as provided by the librarian and archivist Sir Edward Hertslet (1824–1902) in 
his The Map of Africa by Treaty (1894)38 brings home the enormity of the scale 
36 Lugard, Dual Mandate, 203. ‘British Africa […] has been home of indirect rule, both in 
the sense of utilizing native officials and of developing along native lines. Nigeria has 
its policy determined by British Residents and the general work of administration over-
looked by them: but the ordinary system of rule is by powerful native chiefs and councils, 
which have the power of drafting local budgets and imposing taxes.’ S.H. Roberts, The His-
tory of French Colonial Policy 1870–1925 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1963), p. 642. See 
Carland, Colonial Office and Nigeria, 66–79. On native administration in other British ter-
ritories in Africa, see Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories, 
vol. v (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1953).
37 Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, viii. See J.E. Flint, ‘Nigeria: The Colonial Experience from 
1870 to 1914,’ in: L.H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960, vol. v 
(Cambridge University Press, 1969), 225.
38 Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty. The object of this book was, as Hertslet formulated it 
himself, ‘to show how, by Treaty, Conquest, or Cession, or under the name of a Protector-
ate, European Powers have succeeded, at different times, in obtaining a footing in various 
parts of the African Continent, and how those occupations have been greatly extended 
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of the acquisition of territory and land by cession. The authentic minutes of 
the treaties between Europeans and African natives could be written in the 
language of the European contracting party and, subsequently, translated into 
the local African language, or in the languages of both contracting parties. Al-
though Britain also concluded various territorial agreements with France and 
Germany, in what follows attention will be directed at the treaty and contrac-
tual relationships Britain established with the African rulers and their peoples.
The following sections analyse the types of treaties and agreements concern-
ing Nigerian territory British representatives or trading companies concluded 
with African rulers.39 First, a number of essential treaties from the second half 
of the 1800s will be analysed and discussed. Next, the treaties concluded be-
tween British and Nigerians in the age of New Imperialism will be scrutinized. 
It is important to bear in mind that the treaties concluded in the 1850s and 
1860s mostly reflected economic considerations, as earlier treaties had done, 
while later treaties were increasingly political in nature. Along with this transi-
tion from economic to political incentives, protectorate treaties would come to 
be used far more often than cession treaties. Another fundamental trend was 
that the treaty texts would include clauses on sovereignty and property as well 
as use a variety of synonyms for ‘have’ and ‘transfer.’
3.1 Early Stage: Cession Treaties and Trade Contracts
One of the first treaties transferring title to territory the British concluded was 
in the Lagos area. On 1 March 1852, Akitoye, the King of Lagos and the Church 
Missionary Society signed an agreement that granted pieces of land to the Brit-
ish missionaries.40 The purpose of this transfer of land was to build churches, 
schools, and dwelling houses for missionaries and native agents. The transfer 
of the land was worded as follows: ‘That King Akitoye has made over to the Rev. 
C.A. Gollmer the above specified pieces of land for the benefit of the Church 
Missionary Society, without any condition, and free of expense, and without 
limit of time, he declares by placing his mark to his name in the presence of his 
during the last few years; in other words, to enable all those who are interested in the 
development of Africa to examine for themselves the TITLE DEEDS by which each For-
eign Power maintains its right to the Possessions which it holds, or to Territory which it 
occupies, or claims influence over, in that part of the world.’ Ibid., vi.
39 Note that Edward Hertslet summarized ten forms of standardized treaties, which the Na-
tional African Company and, later on, the Royal Niger Company used to conclude agree-
ments with native rulers between 1884 and 1892. Ibid., 137–154.
40 For a detailed address of the treaty conclusion and the subsequent annexation by Britain 
of Lagos, see A.G. Hopkins, ‘Property Rights and Empire Building: Britain’s Annexation of 
Lagos, 1861,’ Journal of Economic History, 40 (1980), 777–798.
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Chiefs and others.’ The precise meaning of ‘has made over’ is unclear. Did the 
object of transfer comprise only rights of use of the land, or land ownership? 
Or did the transfer even concern rights of sovereignty? At this stage, the agree-
ment of King Akitoye and the Church Missionary Society is likely to have been 
of a purely private character, in which no territorial sovereignty was involved. 
It was an economic transfer in which only private rights over land passed from 
the African ruler to an English community.
The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a change in the nature 
of the agreements that were concluded between Europeans and African na-
tives. The original aim of these agreements had been to establish trade and 
economic relations, but political considerations began to play an increasingly 
important role in the regulation of European-African relations. With the grad-
ual transition from an economic to a political nature of the agreements, the 
terminology used shifted from a private to a public one. This shift was marked 
in particular by the introduction in the 1860s of the term ‘treaty’ to denote legal 
relationships between British agents and African natives. A clear example of 
one of the few cession treaties41 is the one transferring sovereignty rights over 
the Lagos territory from the local ruler to Britain. On 22 June 1861, the Brit-
ish Government decided to appropriate Lagos as a British Dependence. King 
Docemo, son of Akitoye, initially refused to transfer his territory to Britain and 
declined to sign the treaty with the Britain. The British representatives antici-
pated Docemo’s resistance by including a passage in the treaty text in which 
they declared that they did not intend to violate the sovereign rights of the 
King: ‘Her Majesty’s Government would be most unwilling that the establish-
ment of British Sovereignty at Lagos should be attended with any injustice to 
Docemo.’42 The treaty also specified that the King of Lagos would receive a 
pension from the British. Nevertheless, the treaty of 6 August 1861 ceding the 
Lagos territory clearly identified ‘dominion and sovereignty’ as the objects of 
transfer. It explicitly spoke of ‘British occupation’ by ‘the taking of possession 
of Lagos.’ Article i of the 1861 treaty reads as follows:
I, Docemo, do, with the consent and advice of my Council, give, transfer, 
and by these presents grant and confirm unto the Queen of Great Britain, 
her heirs and successors for ever, the port and island of Lagos, with all 
the rights, profits, territories and appurtenances whatsoever thereunto 
41 Cession of all-comprehensive sovereignty over territory was a hardly used by the British 
to acquire title to African territory. For the overview of concluded cession treaties by the 
British on Southern-Nigerian territory, see Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 89–111.
42 Ibid., 92.
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belonging, and as well the profits and revenue as the direct, full, and ab-
solute dominion and sovereignty of the said port, island, and premises, 
with all the royalties thereof, freely, fully, entirely, and absolutely. I do also 
covenant and grant that the quiet and peaceable possession thereof shall, 
with all possible speed, be freely and effectually delivered to the Queen 
of Great Britain, or such person as Her Majesty shall thereunto appoint, 
for her use in the performance of this grant; the inhabitants of the said 
island and territories, as the Queen’s subjects, and under her sovereignty, 
Crown, jurisdiction, and government, being still suffered to live there.
Despite the transfer of sovereignty, Docemo retained some of his rights and 
duties under Article ii of the 1861 treaty. Yet from Docemo’s perspective and 
that of his people, it remained unclear what the precise object of cession was. 
The treaty stipulations are clear to the extent that sovereignty was transferred, 
but did this transfer automatically imply that the natives lost their property 
rights to the land?43 While from the treaty text it is clear that sovereignty was 
the object of transfer, the status of the natives’ property rights after the ces-
sion remained unclear; their protection was minimal, as follows from the word 
‘suffered’ in the last sentence of Article i. However, Article iii stated that ‘in 
the transfer of lands, the stamp of Docemo affixed to the document will be 
proof that there are no other native claims upon it, and for this purpose he will 
be permitted to use it as hitherto.’ According to Antony Hopkins, this clause 
served two purposes, namely, ‘to clarify the fact that Docemo had ceded only 
political sovereignty, and not possession of the land of Lagos; and to confirm 
the validity of the system of land grants which had come into being during the 
consular period.’44 Whether or not Docemo was aware of the significance of his 
signature and regardless of his intended object of transfer, he ceded full sover-
eignty rights over the territory to the British Crown, which in its turn promised 
not to interfere with Docemo’s and his people’s use of the land. However, as 
will be argued later (§4), the practice of issuing land grants and instituting 
individual land ownership by the British authorities, however, turned out to 
be a source of commercial benefits for the British and led to the expropriation 
of native land.45 On 6 August, a provision was added to the treaty, in which 
43 This unclear treaty formulation is admitted in Meek, Land, 294.
44 Hopkins, ‘Property Rights and Empire Building,’ 789.
45 ‘The land market became the pulse of commercial activity: prosperity and expansion 
 encouraged successful merchants to buy land and extend credit; falling profits and 
contraction led to credit squeezes and foreclosed mortgages. Inequalities derived from 
 differential landownership developed as fortunate or skilful businessmen accumulated 
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Docemo declared to have ‘understood the foregoing Treaty perfectly and 
agrees to all conditions thereof.’46
In the same year (1861), the King of Bagroo and his chiefs ceded their ter-
ritory to the British Queen. They declared to ‘cede, surrender, give over, and 
transfer […] the full, entire, free, and unlimited right, possession, dominion, 
and sovereignty’ in and over their land. The wording of the treaty is unam-
biguous: Great Britain extended its sovereignty over the territory of Bagroo and 
the people of Bagroo were subjected to British jurisdiction. The question that 
remains, however, is whether the people of Bagroo retained ownership of the 
land.
Another example of ceding sovereign rights over territory in the early years 
of British rule over Nigeria concerned the territory of Badagry. On 7 July 1863, 
British lieutenant-governor, commander-in-chief, vice-admiral and acting con-
sul John Hawley Glover, in the name of Her Britannic Majesty, concluded an 
agreement with the rulers of Badagry (representing their people) which trans-
ferred the territory of Badagry to Britain. It should be noted that this covenant 
was a cession agreement: the term ‘treaty’ was not used. Article i enumerated 
the purposes of the agreement: ‘In order for the better keeping of the peace 
and quiet of the well-disposed persons living in Badagry, and for the better 
security of their lives and properties, as also for the purpose of setting aside all 
pretentions on the part of the King of Porto-Novo and others to the right and 
royalty of this district of Badagry […]’ In other words, the main objective of the 
agreement was to protect the Badagry people. Article i continued:
We, whose names are hereunto subscribed, being Chiefs of Badagry, have 
freely and willingly ceded to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, her 
heirs and successors, for ever, the town of Badagry, and all the rights and 
territories and appurtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging, as well as 
all profits and revenues, absolute dominion and sovereignty of the said 
town and territory of Badagry, freely, fully, entirely and absolutely.
Under this provision the native rulers directly ceded their sovereignty rights 
over the Badagry territory to Britain. The Badagry people became subjects of 
the British and consequently had to rely on the British government for protec-
tion of their person, goods and rights.
property, and as the unlucky or the incompetent sank into landless obscurity or moved 
elsewhere.’ Ibid., 791–792.
46 Additional Article to the Treaty of Cession of the Island of Lagos to the British Crown of 
6 August 1861. February 18, 1862.
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Next to transactions of sovereignty rights over territory, agreements on 
property rights to land were concluded and even more common, as the inden-
ture between the people of Okeodan and Britain on 17 July 1863 shows. The 
main provision of the document reads as follows:
[T]he said Chiefs have consented and agreed to the said Thomas Tickel 
[resident agent] to grant and convey to Her Majesty the Queen of Great 
Britain, her heirs and successors for ever, the piece or parcel of land […] 
and […] that they have the right to grant and convey the said land to 
Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, her heirs and successors, not-
withstanding any act of the said Chiefs done or committed; and that 
any of Her Majesty’s representatives […] shall have peaceable and quiet 
possession of the said land free from all incumbrances […] And the said 
hereinbefore- named Chief releases to Her Majesty the Queen of Great 
Britain, her heirs and successors, for ever, all claims upon the said land.
Clearly, this agreement ‘granted and conveyed’ land ownership from the rulers 
of Okeodan to the British Crown. It is a case of public authorities acting in a 
private capacity. The natives retained the right to stay on and enjoy the land 
and its fruits. Jurisdictional rights over the territory were not mentioned. These 
types of agreements were negotiated and concluded between Europeans (pri-
vate individuals, companies and States) and African rulers and natives.47 Most 
of these early treaties contain a provision excluding cession of territory to Eu-
ropean States and other political entities. Such an exclusion clause commonly 
read as follows: ‘It is further agreed that no cession of territory, and no other 
Treaty or agreement, shall be made by the King of […] than the one they have 
now made with Great Britain without the full understanding and consent of 
the British Government,’ as it says in the treaty Britain concluded with the rul-
ers of Aboh on 13 October 1863.
The cession treaty between the King of the Samoo Bullom country and Great 
Britain, concluded on 2 May 1877, explicitly mentions both the transfer of sov-
ereign rights over the territory and the continuation of native property rights 
to the land: the British Queen accepted the sovereignty over the territory – 
including the waters – under the condition of ‘reserving and guaranteeing […] 
to the native inhabitants of the said islands and lands so ceded aforesaid […] 
and assigns the full, free, and entire possession of so much of the said lands 
as is now held and occupied by them, save and except such sovereignty as 
aforesaid.’ In this contractual relationship with a native ruler, Britain did 
47 Alexandrowicz, European-African Confrontation.
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distinguish between sovereignty and property rights. A similar distinction can 
be observed in an agreement the native ruler Nquiliso concluded with the Brit-
ish Major H.G. Elliot on 17 July 1878. While the agreement dealt with the ces-
sion of sovereignty in the first article of the agreement – ‘Nquiliso cedes […] all 
sovereign rights which he now possesses, or is entitled to claim’ – the second 
article stipulated that the ruler ‘agrees to cede to […] such portions of land as 
may hereafter agreed upon’ and that ‘the land […] be paid for at a fair valuation.’ 
In other words, the British treaty party explicitly acknowledged the existence of 
the natives’ private rights to land and recognized that a fair price had to be paid 
by British settlers to these natives if these settlers wanted to acquire ownership 
of the land.
3.2 The 1880s and 1890s: Protectorate Treaties
Before the Conference of Berlin (1884–1885) Britain concluded various types 
of agreements with African natives for the purpose of subjecting the  African 
 people to the protection of the British Crown. As mentioned before, the 
 political aspect became gained in prominence in establishing relationships 
between European and African parties, and this rise of political influence co-
incided with the institution of a public legal sphere. From the middle of 1884 
onwards, concluding treaties would become the exclusive instrument to create 
legal relations between the Europeans and African natives. Feeling the pres-
sure of French and German rivalry, the British changed their colonial policy 
from indirect rule to a more directly regulated form of government. Establish-
ing protectorates instead of concluding cession treaties turned out to be an 
effective and efficient way of acquiring title to territory: a protectorate kept 
France and Germany out and limited the financial burdens on Britain.  Shortly 
after the Conference of Berlin had ended, a notification was issued in the 
 London Gazette, proclaiming the establishment of the British protectorate over 
the Niger Districts, the Oil Rivers Protectorate: ‘It is hereby notified for public 
information that, under and by virtue of certain Treaties concluded between 
the month of July last and the present date, and by other lawful means, the 
territories on the West Coast of Africa, herein after referred to as the Niger 
Districts, were placed under the Protection of Her Majesty the Queen from the 
date of the said Treaties respectively […].’48
Between 1884 and 1892, the National African Company and its successor, the 
Royal Niger Company, concluded several treaties with native rulers and their 
peoples and others inhabiting and possessing territories in the basin of the 
48 See Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 117.
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Niger District.49 In these treaties of protection, the native rulers committed 
themselves not to transfer their territories to others by way of cession, or to 
enter into treaty negotiations with foreign States without the notification and 
preceding consent of the British Government. These treaties had been stan-
dardized: all that remained to be specified were date, place, names and terri-
tory. Standardized treaty forms thus completed only required signing.
In addition to the treaties concluded by trading companies, Hewett in 1884 
concluded several treaties with native rulers and their peoples in the Niger 
Districts that subjected the territories of these rulers and peoples to the protec-
tion of Britain.50 These treaties prioritized transferring sovereignty; property 
rights were explicitly excluded from transfer to the British. It would seem that 
the British became increasingly aware of the differences between sovereignty 
and property, so much so that they ensure that these concepts were explicitly 
mentioned in their treaties with African natives. The objective of these trea-
ties – establishing a relationship of protection between Britain and the African 
polity – was expressed unambiguously, as in the treaty of 4 July 1884 with the 
rulers of New Calabar: ‘[the Queen of Great Britain] undertakes to extend to 
them, and to the territory under their authority and jurisdiction, her gracious 
favour and protection.’ Inserting exclusion clauses in these treaties underlined 
this relationship, because in these provisions the African contracting party 
granted the British ‘the right to trade, to work mines, to cultivate ground, to 
gather produce of any kind, or to carry on any other occupations in our coun-
try’ and declared that they would ‘not grant such rights to, nor deal in any way 
with any strangers and foreigners, nor enter into any Treaties whatever with 
them, without the consent and authority [of the British].’51 In the treaty be-
tween the King and Chiefs of Opobo, concluded on 1 July 1884 and used as a 
model for many treaties in this part of Africa, the native rulers had to ‘agree’ 
and ‘promise’ to ‘refrain from entering into any correspondence, Agreement, 
or Treaty with any foreign nation or Power, except with the knowledge and 
sanction of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government.’ Moreover, non-intervention 
clauses were routinely included in these treaties, declaring that the British 
would ‘bind themselves not to interfere with any of the native laws or customs 
of the country.’ Or, as the National African Company declared in its agreement 
with the rulers of Atani, concluded on 20 September 1884, the British contract-
ing party undertook to ‘respect all native laws and customs of the country, and 
49 For the texts of the treaties, as they are divided into ten categories, see ibid., 137–154.
50 See ibid., 116.
51 See ibid., 137–154.
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not to interfere with the existing rights of any of the natives without first ob-
taining their consent.’
That Britain increasingly had to rely on treaties of protection with African 
rulers to realize the expansion of its empire and to prevent other European 
States from acquiring title to African territory was the consequence of the 
competitive atmosphere between European colonial powers stirred up by the 
Conference of Berlin. In October 1885, shortly after the Conference had ended, 
at a time when competitive tensions between European powers increased, 
Britain established a protectorate by treaty over the territory of Mahin. The 
intense rivalry between Germany and Britain had a significant impact on this 
treaty. Amapetu, the King of Mahin, who represented his people and territory, 
played a crucial role in the struggle for power between the two European co-
lonial powers. The Mahin treaty addressed the issues of who acquired title to 
the Mahin territory, whether the treaty was concluded validly, and what the 
prospective rights to the territory implied, and it settled these issues in favour 
of the British Crown. Article i of the Mahin treaty of 24 October 1885 clearly 
expressed the object of the treaty:
King Amapetu, of Mahin, led by the desire to strengthen and enlarge 
the relations, commercial and otherwise, maintained by the trading and 
mercantile community of Lagos with him and his country, to protect the 
independence of the latter, to fortify his Government, to procure to his 
subjects the advantages of civilization, and to secure to strangers the due 
protection of life and property, begs Her Majesty the Queen of Great Brit-
ain and Ireland, Empress of India, to take him and his country, including 
the island or land called Atijere, and all portions of his country bounded 
by the sea, under Her most gracious protection. [Italics added]
From this passage it can be deduced that the object of the treaty was twofold: 
transferring partial sovereignty rights over the territory and establishing a pro-
tectorate. It is clear that the British Crown was burdened with the protection of 
the ‘independence’ of the territory under Amapetu’s rule. The exclusion clause 
that was included in the treaty (Article ii) straightforwardly stated that ‘King 
Amapetu hereby engages not to cede his country nor any parts of it to any oth-
er Power, nor to conclude treaties with other Governments without the special 
consent of Her majesty the Queen.’52
52 The rulers agreed ‘to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement or treaty 
with any foreign nation and to submit all disputes with other neighbouring states for 
settlement by the British Consuls.’ Flint, Sir George Goldie, 225.
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Another interesting development was the enactment in the year 1888 of 
several proclamations and declarations at a time when Britain was negotiat-
ing treaties with African rulers. In these written acts, the independence of a 
certain territory was emphasized and the exclusion clause took a prominent 
place in these documents.53 The treaty between Britain and the Kingdom of 
Ketu is a case in point. This treaty established a relationship of protection 
and was signed by both contracting parties: ‘We, the King-designate, Chiefs, 
Elders, and people of the kingdom of Ketu, hereby offer ourselves and our 
territory to be included within the protectorate of Her Majesty’s Government of 
Lagos […].’The treaty also contained very clear provisions on the exclusion of 
other foreign States from the concerned territory: ‘We engage not to enter into 
any negotiations with any foreign State without the express permission of Her 
Majesty’s Government,’ and ‘[w]e further engage to make no cession of ter-
ritory, and no Treaty or Agreement other than one we now have made, with-
out the full understanding and consent of the Governor for the time being of 
the Colony of Lagos on behalf of Her Majesty.’ The treaty thus clearly allocates 
internal sovereignty rights to the protected entity and external sovereignty 
rights to the protecting State – as a traditional protectorate required.
Another example of an African ruler issuing a declaration confirming his 
agreement to his territory being placed under the protection of the British 
Crown concerns the territory of Ilaro. On 21 July 1888, a ‘convention’ on the 
transfer of partial sovereignty rights over territory was signed and it included 
a sound exclusion clause. The very next day, the King of Ilaro issued a dec-
laration in which he underlined the independence of the Kingdom whilst 
reaffirming that the Kingdom would subject itself to the protection of ‘Her 
Britannic Majesty’: ‘[W]e entreat Her said Majesty to take our territory under 
her gracious protection; accordingly, and to include it in the protectorate of 
her Colony of Lagos.’ Several questions arise as to the compatibility of the 
declaration and the convention as well as to the interpretation of the texts of 
both documents.54 The King of Ilaro signed a treaty of protection transferring 
external sovereignty to Britain and formally reaffirmed this transfer in a sepa-
rate declaration.
In some cases, the British did not have to resort to bilateral treaties with Ni-
gerian rulers to gain sovereign rights over territory. These rulers issued a unilat-
eral declaration in which they transferred their sovereignty and property rights 
53 See, for example, the Proclamation of the British Protectorate over Igbessa (15 May 1888); 
the Declaration of the King and Chiefs of Ife (22 May 1888); the Declaration of the King 
and Chiefs of Itebu (28 May 1888), see Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 104–107.
54 These questions involve the issue of the validity of the treaty. See Chapter 4.
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over a certain territory to the British Queen. A case in point is that of Kosoko, 
the ex-ruler of Epé and the former King of Lagos.55 The question is whether 
a native ruler had the power to transfer sovereign and proprietary rights uni-
laterally without consulting his people, especially when considering that he 
represented his people and their rights. It is safe to say that the validity of such 
unilateral proclamations is controversial.
The early treaties made an explicit distinction between sovereignty rights 
and private property rights appeared, while treaties concluded in the 1880s and 
1890s used shorter, standardized and general formulations that did not specify 
how existing land rights were affected. As a result, treaty provisions left more 
room for discretion: clear statements on, for example, non-interference with 
native customs, laws and property rights featured less prominently in the trea-
ties and eventually disappeared altogether.56 The fundamental change was the 
increasing indeterminacy of the scope of the sovereign rights over territory, i.e., 
the object of transfer in the treaties between Britain and the African natives. 
The scope and substance of the relationship of protection remained unclear: 
the division of sovereignty rights between Britain as protector and the African 
ruler as the protected party was no longer articulated in any significant detail. 
This indeterminacy led to British interference with the sovereign rights of the 
African ruler, British control of the internal affairs of the polity and, eventually, 
British expropriation of native land.
As indicated earlier, in the early years of concluding protectorate treaties, 
the British would explicitly undertake not to interfere with the property rights 
of the African inhabitants. The protectorate treaties left the door open to 
acquiring private property rights to land, but private property rights to land 
could only be acquired if compensation was paid. Sovereignty rights were 
transferred, native proprietary rights to land remained unaffected and such 
property rights could only be acquired by (or on behalf of) the European con-
tracting party if the native African owners were compensated, as a standard 
treaty form of the National African Company stated: ‘[T]he National African 
Company (Limited) will not interfere with any of the native laws, and also not 
encroach on any private property unless the value is agreed upon by the own-
er and the said Company.’57 However, the successor to the National African 
55 See Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 95.
56 See, for example, the protectorate treaty concluded by Royal Niger Company with the 
African rulers of the Boussa territory (near Borgu) on 20 January 1890. Hertslet, Map of 
Africa by Treaty, 154.
57 Ibid., 137. A standard formulation of a protectorate treaty concluded by the National Af-
rican Company contained the following provisions: ‘[T]he National African Company 
(Limited) agree:
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Company, the Royal Niger Company, while quick to use its discretionary pow-
ers to acquire title to land, proved less willing to pay compensation to African 
natives.58 In actual fact, compensation was hardly ever paid, and even when it 
was paid, it neither represented the value of the acquired land nor amounted 
to a reasonable sum. As the Royal Niger Company not only acted in its own 
private interest, but was also mandated by the British government to conclude 
protectorate treaties and rule the protected Nigerian territories in the name 
of the British Crown, the distinction between sovereignty and property and, 
1.  The said Company will not interfere with any of the native laws, and will not encroach 
on any private property unless the value is agreed upon by the owner and the said 
Company.
2.  The said Company will not interfere with any of the ground now occupied by the na-
tives of the country unless agreed to both sides.
3.  The said Company reserve to themselves the right of excluding foreign settlers other 
than those now settled in the country.
4.  The said Company agree to respect the rights of the native landowners, and the said 
Company will not take possession of their land without payment of the same.’ Ibid.
58 A standard treaty format used by the Royal Niger Company consisted of the following 
provisions:
1.  We, the undersigned King and Chiefs of … [territory], with the view of bettering the 
condition of our country and people, do this day cede to the Company, including as 
above their assigns, for ever, the whole of our territory, but the Company shall pay pri-
vate landowners a reasonable amount for any portion of land that the Company may 
require from time to time.
2.  We thereby give to the Company and their assigns, for ever, full jurisdiction of every 
kind, and we pledge ourselves not to enter into any war with other tribes without the 
sanction of the Company.
3.  We give to the Company and their assigns, for ever, the sole right to mine in any portion 
of our territory.
4.  We bind ourselves not to have any intercourse as representing our tribe or state, on 
tribal or state affairs, with any person or persons other than the Company, who are 
hereby recognised as the authorised Government of our territories: but this provision 
shall in no way authorise any monopoly of trade, direct or indirect, by the Company 
or others, nor any restriction of private or commercial intercourse with any person or 
persons of any nation whatsoever, subject, however, to administrative dispositions in 
the interest of commerce and of order.
5.  In consideration of the foregoing, the Company bind themselves not to interfere with 
any of the native laws or customs of the country, consistently with the maintenance of 
order and good government, and the progress of civilisation.
6.  The Company bind themselves to protect, so far as practicable, the said King and Chiefs 
from the attacks of any neighbouring aggressive tribes.
7.  In consideration of the above, the Company have this day paid the said King and Chiefs 
of … [territory] goods to the value of … [amount], receipt of which is hereby acknowl-
edged. Ibid.
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more generally, between public and private law blurred. It is also worth noting 
that the treaties did not specify remedies in case parties breached their con-
tractual obligations.
In 1885, the National African Company was granted a Royal Charter and 
was renamed the Royal Niger Company. This event was a milestone in Brit-
ain’s presence in Nigeria. The Royal Charter contained various passages which 
were, from a legal point of view, controversial, debatable and, even, disput-
able, especially those provisions that concerned the rights, duties, tasks and 
competences of the Royal Niger Company. The mandate of the Company was 
neither well defined nor strictly demarcated. The Crown confirmed the Com-
pany’s entitlement to the sovereignty rights African rulers in the Niger basin 
had ceded to the Company, and it authorized the Company to administer these 
rights for the Company’s own benefits. Here, the private interests of the Com-
pany and the public interests of the British authorities became entangled. The 
main duties of the Company were to advocate and continue trade on Nigerian 
territory and to establish an administration on the basis of delegated sover-
eignty: ‘[T]hey have two duties to fulfil, the return of a satisfactory dividend to 
their shareholders, and the administration of the territories entrusted to them 
to the advantage of the natives within it.’59 When the Royal Niger Company 
was constituted (under Royal Charter), the number of rights possessed by the 
British State changed; the activities of a private entity were backed by the pub-
lic involvement of the British State. The Company was assigned the task of 
administering those territories regarding which it had signed protectorate trea-
ties: ‘The treaties were thus reinterpreted by the British so that they claimed 
complete and perpetual cession of territory to the company. The Niger Com-
pany then purported to be the complete sovereign ruler of the area, and the 
British protectorate granted to the company was simply a recognition of the 
company’s claim.’60 This confusion of private and public interests soon led to 
many problems and conflicts which required the British government to inter-
vene directly. The Royal Charter was withdrawn in 1899.
The British tendency to rule their Nigerian territories directly ran parallel 
to the phenomenon of the ‘colonial protectorate’ which obliterated the dif-
ference between a colony and a protectorate. In principle, a protectorate was 
established by means of a treaty concluded between a European State and an 
African political entity and only transferred external sovereignty rights over 
59 S. McCalmont Hill, ‘The Growth and Development of International Law in Africa,’ Law 
Quarterly Review, 16 (1900), 259.
60 Mulligan, ‘Nigeria,’ 290. The text of the original document is published in the Parliamen-
tary Papers, 1899, vol. lxiii, C. 9372. See Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 125–126 and 154.
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territory. After the protectorate treaty had been concluded, however, the Euro-
pean State would exercise all-comprehensive sovereignty rights – resembling 
its control over a colony – over the ‘protected’ territory. Michael Mulligan as-
serts this deployment of the colonial protectorate by Britain by arguing that ‘in 
the Niger Delta, as elsewhere, the model of indirect rule that had been preva-
lent since the early 1880s was thus superseded by more direct rule. The pro-
tectorate, which had formally been a means of control of external sovereignty, 
now encompassed control of internal sovereignty as well.’61 In theory, Britain 
acquired external sovereignty rights over the African territory by establishing 
a relationship of protection with the African ruler on the basis of a treaty. In 
practice, however, the British expanded their exercise of sovereignty rights to 
include control over the internal affairs of the African polity. In other words, 
the protectorate treaty was the first step to fully fledged colonial rule by Brit-
ain. This shift towards increased interference in the internal affairs of Nigerian 
polities can be clearly seen in Article 5 of the treaty Britain concluded on 2 Sep-
tember 1887 with the rulers of the Obako district on the Upper Opobo River: 
‘The Kings and Chiefs of Obako hereby engage to assist the British consular or 
other officers in the execution of such duties as may be assigned to them; and, 
further, to act upon their advice in matters relating to the administration of 
justice, the development of the resources of the country, the interests of com-
merce, or in any other matter in relation to peace, order, and good government, 
and the general progress of civilization.’
Britain concluded hundreds of treaties (or similar agreements) with native 
Nigerian rulers and these could of course not all be discussed here, but the few 
that have are a fairly representative selection. Initially, the British made a clear 
distinction between cession to acquire sovereignty over territory and the es-
tablishment of protectorates. Cession treaties, however, were soon abandoned 
in favour of acquiring title to territory by establishing treaty-based relation-
ships of protection with African rulers and their polity. The treaty concluded 
with native ruler Kazembe on 31 October 1891 is an exception. It was a cession 
treaty and it explicitly distinguished sovereignty rights and proprietary rights: 
‘I [Kazembe] do hereby cede to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain […] the 
full sovereign rights of my country, reserving only the proprietary rights to the 
soil.’ The protectorate treaties differentiated between rights of sovereignty and 
property and they would invariably contain exclusion non-intervention claus-
es. When the scramble for Africa intensified, protectorate treaties were stan-
dardized, formalized and generalized: contractual arrangements of the rights 
and duties of the contracting parties became less detailed. The distinction 
61 Mulligan, ‘Nigeria,’ 300.
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between external and internal sovereignty rights was articulated less clearly 
and this indeterminacy gave the British colonizer broader discretionary pow-
ers. Nevertheless, Britain continued to distinguish between sovereignty and 
property in their treaties with African rulers.
However, after the treaties had been concluded, interpretation and compli-
ance issues arose that had to be resolved. Even Britain, which favoured estab-
lishing protectorates over creating colonies and which discountenanced direct 
intervention and involvement in its overseas territories, gradually resorted to 
direct rule of these territories. In addition to exercising external sovereignty 
rights, Britain started to interfere in the internal affairs of the African political 
entities it had concluded treaties with and thus encroached on the sovereign 
rights of the rulers concerned. There were two reasons for this increasing in-
terference. First, the intensified power struggle between the main European 
States on the African territory eroded Britain’s reluctance to acquire and rule its 
overseas territories. Traditionally, it had insisted that economics and trade, not 
politics, should determine overseas relations, but this position changed when 
France and Germany entered the scene to realize their desire to expand their 
empires by way of formal rule. The condition of effective control, as explicitly 
included in Article 35 of the Final Act of the Berlin Conference, strengthened 
Britain’s urge to intensify its rule in the protectorates. Second, the number and 
scope of conflicts and problems in the protectorates increased. These conflicts 
emerged among British settlers and traders, between them and the native in-
habitants and among the African natives themselves. Preventing and settling 
these conflicts required intensified British authority to establish law and order. 
It should be noted that in this period the British hardly, if ever, used the con-
struct of the colonial protectorate to justify their interference in the internal af-
fairs of African polities. What the analysis of British treaty practices in Nigeria 
in the late nineteenth century shows is the high frequency of recurrence of the 
dichotomies of theory versus practice, of the wording of the treaty texts versus 
the interpretation of these texts and of law versus politics.
4 Legislation in the Wake of the Acquisition of Sovereignty  
over Territory
Now that it has been established how property and sovereignty issues were 
addressed in treaties and agreements between Britain and Nigerian natives 
transferring sovereign rights over territory, the next question to be answered is 
how existing sovereignty and property rights fared after the treaties had been 
signed. To that end, post-treaty legislation and case law will be examined, but 
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first two particular features of the British constitutional system must be brief-
ly commented on, because they are relevant to understanding British rule of 
overseas territories. The first feature is Britain’s dualist legal system. To confer 
title to territory on the Crown, the mode of acquisition had to be acknowl-
edged by law and the status of treaties transferring title depended on munici-
pal law. A treaty, as indeed any instrument of customary international law, had 
no effect in municipal law if it were not incorporated or adopted. And if mu-
nicipal law provided a solution for a problem and international law suggested 
a different solution, the latter solution had to be rejected. In other words, in-
ternational law was supplementary law and its position vis-à-vis municipal law 
was subordinate. This dualism was and still is a leading feature of the British 
legal system.
The effect of this dualist approach was that the British Crown was not 
bound by international law that had not been incorporated into its national 
legal system and as a consequence had enormous freedom of action in the in-
ternational practice of acquiring territories. In practice, the Crown, exercising 
its prerogative powers, would often claim unilaterally to have acquired both 
sovereignty and ultimate property rights over the territory, regardless of the 
mode of acquisition (i.e., cession or protectorate treaty) and without any inter-
vention from the legislature. The Act of State, understood as the unlimited and 
unimpaired power of the Crown, was a powerful British weapon. Power, not 
law, had the final word in the acquisition of overseas territory. Power served the 
Crown and it was through power that the Crown acquired and exercised rights. 
This of course raises the question whether in the context of the acquisition 
of territory the dualist British legal system and the prerogative powers of the 
Crown implied that Britain was not bound to norms of international law. This 
question will be addressed in Chapter 8.
The second feature concerns British understanding of the relationship be-
tween property and sovereignty. In the late nineteenth century, British doc-
trine made a clear distinction between territorial sovereignty and ownership of 
land, as Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray observes: ‘[I]t must be emphasized that by 
acquisition of territory we do not mean acquisition of title to the land. That is 
a very different matter.’62 In case of a territory belonging to the Crown’s domin-
ions, sovereignty vested in the Crown is of two kinds: the power of government 
and the title to the land.63 While territorial sovereignty and property of land 
are unified with regard to the Crown’s dominions, in a protectorate the Crown 
only had external sovereignty rights over the territory. In the case of cession, 
62 K. Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1966), 99.
63 Ibid., 625.
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the Crown acquired jurisdiction over the territory and ultimate ownership of 
the land. The distinction between territorial sovereignty and land ownership 
is explicitly referred to in British legal doctrine: ‘[O]wnership of the country 
is radically different from ownership of the land: the former can belong only 
to a sovereign, the latter to anyone.’64 Under feudal law, British land fell under 
the sovereignty and was the property of the Crown, which implied that ‘when 
a new colonial possession is acquired by the Crown and governed by English 
law, the title so acquired is not merely territorial but also proprietary.’65 In oth-
er words, when the Crown acquired territorial sovereignty through conquest, 
occupation or cession, it also acquired ultimate land ownership. Because the 
Crown was considered to be the supreme proprietor – at the apex of the feu-
dal pyramid – rights in land were by definition always relative. In a colony, 
irrespective of the application of feudal law, the absolute or ultimate title to 
land was vested in the Crown. In a protectorate, feudal law, as such, was not ap-
plied.66 These two characteristics of the British constitutional system underlay 
and helped shape Britain’s colonial venture.
After acquiring Nigerian territory by means of treaties, the British Crown 
had legislative powers over ceded territories: ‘For conquered and ceded Colo-
nies, it is established beyond question that the Sovereign has full power under 
the Prerogative to make laws either in the constituent field or otherwise.’67 
According to the Foreign Jurisdiction Act (1890), there is a difference in the 
extent of legislative powers of the Crown with regard to protectorates, a differ-
ence that will be addressed later in this section. Although the British govern-
ment was reluctant to engage in direct rule in the African territories, it became 
increasingly involved in governing its colonies and protectorates. Legislation 
enacted for the Nigerian area,68 often Orders in Council, were the follow-up 
to the protectorate and cession treaties in the sense that such legislation in-
tended to implement the arrangements laid down in these treaties. In gen-
eral, the powers and duties of the legislature in the colonies and protectorates 




67 K. Roberts-Wray, ‘The Authority of the United Kingdom in Dependent Territories,’ in: 
J.N.D. Anderson, Changing Law in Developing Countries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963), 
17.
68 For the texts of the acts, see R.F. Irvin, Collection of the Principal Enactments and Cases 
Relating to Titles to Land in Nigeria (London: Stevens and Sons, 1916). See also C. Mwalimu, 
The Nigerian Legal System, vol. ii (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 298–318.
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therefore be enacted in territories acquired by means of cession and protector-
ate treaties.
Following the conclusion of the 1863 Lagos cession treaty, an extensive 
system of land grants was established, and this system took individual land 
ownership as its point of departure.69 The British authorities controlled the 
allocation of property in land by issuing Crown grants to both settlers and Af-
rican natives claiming land. Between 1868 and 1912 the British authorities in 
Lagos issued some 4,000 Crown grants.70 Transactions between persons hold-
ing rights under the Crown grants had caused difficulties and conflicts, since 
these transactions had sometimes been effected under native customary law 
and sometimes under British common law. To regulate titles to territory and 
settle disputes legislation seemed to be the solution.
In addition to acquiring rights through treaties, Britain introduced stat-
utes regulating land tenure in the southern part of Nigeria. Legislation, most-
ly  Orders in Council, prohibited land speculation in an attempt to ensure 
subsistence- level production and a continuous supply to the market. The 
Orders in Council regulated the competition for land and land grabbing and 
clarified the legal relationships between competitors and the titles to the ter-
ritories. British Parliament intervened more and more and British governance 
in Nigeria became increasingly direct.
One of the most influential statutes of the time was the Foreign Juris-
diction   Act (1890), replacing its 1843 predecessor,71 which authorized the 
British Crown to exercise jurisdiction over all natives and foreigners in its 
69 Although individual landownership was made available for Nigerian natives, communal 
landownership did not disappear. See K. Mann, ‘African and European Initiatives in the 
Transformation of Land Tenure in Colonial Lagos (West Africa), 1840–1920,’ in: S. Belmes-
sous (ed.), Native Claims. Indigenous Law against Empire, 1500–1920 (Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 239.
70 Meek, Land, 295.
71 The 1843 version of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act stated that ‘it is and shall be lawful for Her 
Majesty to hold, exercise and enjoy any power or jurisdiction which Her Majesty hath, or 
may have at any time have, within any country or place out of Her Majesty’s dominions 
in the same and as manner as if Her Majesty has acquired such power or jurisdiction by 
the cession or conquest of territory,’ and that the British Crown is empowered ‘to establish 
laws and institutions and to constitute courts and officers for the peace, order, and good 
government of Her Majesty’s subject and others within existing and future settlements on 
or adjacent to the coast of Africa.’ p.r.o., f.o. 881/2258, London Gazette, 27 February 1872. 
See Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth, 166. For a more detailed account of the Foreign Juris-
diction Act (1890), see H. Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction beyond the Seas (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1902), 148–164.
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protectorates, despite the fact that Britain did not officially possess these ter-
ritories. Article 1 of the Act stated that the Crown had the power to exercise 
jurisdiction ‘within a foreign country in the same and as ample a manner as if 
Her Majesty had acquired that jurisdiction by the cession or conquest of ter-
ritory.’ To be clear, ‘foreign country’ referred to countries outside the Crown’s 
dominions. As a consequence, the British Crown had exclusive control over 
the foreign relations of its protectorates and was responsible for the internal 
peace and order of these territories. The British Crown conferred powers on 
itself to act within a territory, regardless of how that territory had been ac-
quired, and this self-authorization considerably extended the scope of Brit-
ain’s legal personality under international law. Moreover, Crown jurisdiction 
could not be challenged in court. The Preamble to the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 
1890 stipulated that the law was determined in Westminster and applied to 
Britain and its colonies and dominions. As a result of this Act the distinction 
between a protectorate and a colony blurred and eventually disappeared al-
together, and this change also had implications for the distinction between 
sovereignty rights and private property rights. The relationship between ter-
ritorial sovereignty and private land ownership will be addressed later. While 
it remained unclear whether the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 also applied 
to protectorates,  considering that protectorates were officially not part of the 
Crown dominions, the Order in Council of 1892 stated explicitly that the es-
tablishment of a protectorate implied Britain’s right to govern the subjects of 
a protectorate.72 With this Order in Council the British allocated the rights of 
internal sovereignty to themselves; a move that was commonly accepted by 
the European States in their competition for African territory.
Second, the Native Lands Acquisition Proclamation (1900) provided that ‘no 
person other than a Native shall either directly or indirectly acquire any inter-
est in or right over land within Southern Nigeria from the Natives without the 
written consent of the High Commissioner first had and obtained. Any such 
interest in or right over land acquired without such consent shall be void.’73 
In other words, bureaucratic thresholds such as consular consent in order to 
transfer land were built into land acquisition by the British. This shows that 
African native rulers no longer had a say in the allocation of rights to land and 
that they gradually lost the sovereignty rights they had retained under the pro-
tectorate treaties to the British authorities.
Third, the Public Lands Act (1903) provided that the British governor had 
the competence to take any ‘lands required for public purposes for an estate 
72 See McCalmont Hill, ‘Growth and Development of International Law,’ 261.
73 Article 1 of the Native Lands Acquisition Proclamation (1900).
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in fee simple or for a less estate, on paying compensation to be agreed on or 
determined by the Supreme Court of the Colony.’ The Act further ruled that 
‘the Governor is to give notice to all the persons interested in the land, or to the 
persons authorized by the Ordinance to sell and convey it.’ The ruler of the Af-
rican polity was authorized to sell and convey land in property of a native com-
munity in fee simple, whether or not such conveyance was in contravention of 
any native law or custom. In addition, ‘[t]here [would] be no compensation for 
land unoccupied unless it [wa]s proved that, for at least six months during the 
ten years preceding any notice, certain kinds of beneficial use have been made 
of it. In other cases the Court [wa]s to assess the compensation according to 
the value at the time when the notice was served, inclusive of damage done by 
severance.’74
Fourth, the Crown Lands Management Proclamation (1906) regulated the 
management, control and disposition of Crown Lands in the Protectorate of 
Southern Nigeria. It provided that the ‘High Commissioner shall have the man-
agement of all Crown lands in the protectorate, and may at any time and from 
time to time sell, lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of such lands as he may 
think fit.’75 Article 1 of the Proclamation defined Crown lands as ‘all lands and 
all rights in and over lands which at any time of after the commencement of 
this proclamation are vested in, held in trust for, or otherwise belong to His 
Majesty, his heirs and successors.’ In addition to having obtained sovereignty, 
the British Crown acquired ultimate land ownership by issuing an Order in 
Council (1907) which stipulated that the lands of the protectorate of South-
ern Nigeria were Crown lands: ‘His [the African ruler’s] personal property and 
personal rights are in that case secured to him; but the property in the soil 
itself belongs neither to him nor to his tribe, but lies in the protecting power, 
who may grant unreserved portions to settlers or occupants. In such a case the 
title to the land is usually secured by registration in a court provided for that 
purpose, presided over by the resident or administrator.’76 The effect of this 
Order in Council was that internal and external sovereignty rights, whose sep-
arateness was essential to the difference between a protectorate and a colony, 
merged and this in turn led, at least on paper, to the expropriation of land 
owned by natives.
Fifth, Crown lands were lands which the Royal Niger Company acquired 
through the various treaties it had concluded with the local rulers. These lands 
74 See Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary of the Southern Provinces of Nigeria, 1921, 2 a.c. 399 or 3 
n.l.r. 21.
75 Article 3 of the Crown Lands Management Proclamation (1906).
76 McCalmont Hill, ‘Growth and Development of International Law,’ 263.
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were taken over by the British government under the Niger Lands Transfer Or-
dinance (1916). Sections  2 and 4 of this Ordinance are particularly relevant. 
They stipulated that ‘all the lands and rights within the Southern provinces of 
the protectorate belonging to the Niger Company Limited […] on January 1, 
1900 […] shall be and are hereby vested as from January 1, 1900, in the Governor 
in trust for Her Majesty.’ However, certain lands and rights to these lands, such 
as trading posts and natural resources, remained in the hands of the Company. 
Although the Ordinance gave the British government control over these lands, 
in practice it left the local inhabitants in undisturbed possession and enjoy-
ment of their rights under local law and custom.
Sixth, the Native Lands Acquisition Ordinance (1908) regulated the acquisi-
tion of native-held land by foreigners, British nationals and other non-natives. 
It was repealed in 1917. Article 3 of the ordinance provided that ‘(a) No alien 
shall acquire any interest or right in or over any land within the Protectorate 
from a native except under an instrument which has received the approval of 
the Governor’; and ‘(b) Any instrument which has not received the approval of 
the Governor as required by this section shall be null and void.’77 Article 4 pro-
vided a remedy in the form of a penalty 4 if there Article 3 was not complied 
with. In other words, the Ordinance authorized the acquisition of privately 
owned land by the British government, i.e., Crown lands, conditional on the 
consent of the British authorities.
Seventh and last, the Public Lands Acquisition Act (1917) authorized the 
Governor ‘to acquire lands when required for public purposes.’ Rights to unoc-
cupied lands automatically accrued to Britain. Section 13 of this Act defined 
unoccupied lands: ‘Lands shall be deemed to be unoccupied where it is not 
proved that beneficial use thereof for cultivation, or habitation, or for collect-
ing or storing water of for any industrial purpose has been had for a continu-
ous period of at least six months during the period of ten years immediately 
preceding the publication of the notice stating that such lands are required for 
public purposes.’ In other words, this Act gave the British authorities and set-
tlers the power to expel African natives from their own lands when their use of 
the land did not meet British expectations.
By enacting legislation after cession treaties had been signed and protec-
torates had been established in the Niger area, Britain gradually acquired full 
sovereignty over the territory and ownership of the lands. The Foreign Jurisdic-
tion Act (1890) and the proclamation of Crown lands proved crucial stages in 
this process.
77 The Nigeria Handbook. Containing Statistical and General Information respecting the Colo-
ny and Protectorate, 5th edn (Lagos: The Government Printer, 1924), 178.
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5 The Judiciary and Its Case Law
As has been argued, after cession and protectorate treaties had been conclud-
ed, the instrument British authorities used most to control the territory was 
legislation. In the same period, case law emerged on the acquisition of sov-
ereign rights and land ownership, as the various treaties gave rise to conflicts 
that were brought before colonial courts. The treaty concluded between Brit-
ain and the rulers of Okrika on 17 May 1888 contains the typical formulation of 
jurisdiction: ‘It is agreed that full and exclusive jurisdiction, civil and criminal, 
over British subjects and their property in the territory of Okrika is reserved 
to Her Britannic Majesty, to be exercised by such Consular or other officers as 
Her Majesty shall appoint for that purpose. The same jurisdiction is likewise 
reserved to Her Majesty in the said territory of Okrika over foreign subjects 
enjoying British protection, who shall be deemed to be included in the expres-
sion “British subject” throughout this Treaty.’
A selection of judgments delivered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council will be considered to ascertain how treaties concluded between Brit-
ain and African native rulers were interpreted and executed. This analysis will 
be preceded by a brief exploration of the judiciary system in British Nigeria 
and the division of judicial authority between the Nigerian protectorate and 
Britain.
5.1 Colonial Judiciary
English law was first formally introduced in Southern Nigeria by the enact-
ment of the Supreme Court Ordinance (1876), which in essence accepted that 
the native populations continued to observe and be governed by their custom-
ary law. However, this acknowledgement of and respect for native laws was not 
unconditional, because these laws should not be ‘repugnant to natural justice, 
equity and good science.’78 Furthermore, the natives’ customary laws should of 
course not conflict with any colonial legislation enacted by Britain.
Although English would officially only take effect in Southern Nigeria in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the first judgments based on English law 
were pronounced in the early nineteenth century. The courts delivering these 
judgments never entirely replaced the natives’ judicial systems. Indeed,  the 
courts were primarily established to advance British interests and not for 
the benefit of Nigerians. Serving justice was considered a secondary priority. 
78 See O. Adewoye, The Judicial System in Southern Nigeria, 1854–1954 (London: Longman, 
1977), 25–26. See also W.M. Hailey, An African Survey. Revised 1956 (Oxford University 
Press, 1957).
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As Omoniyi Adewoye drily observes, ‘the courts might have served the ends 
of justice, but they served much more besides.’79 They were, after all, deployed 
as instruments of Britain’s policy of conquest and control over Southern Ni-
geria. The courts had been put in place for the clear if admittedly not express 
purpose of serving British interests, adjudicating mutual trade disputes and 
resolving conflicts with African natives. Nevertheless, to avert the appearance 
of partiality these new courts had to judge cases brought before them in ac-
cordance with the law.
The British-established courts in Southern Nigeria served a dual and some-
times contradictory purpose of formalizing legal relations between natives 
and British and of extending British territorial influence. The first proper 
 English-style courts to be established in Nigeria were the courts of equity. 
These were constituted in the Niger Delta by Hewett, the first opening its doors 
in the district town of Bonny in 1854. These courts were established in response 
to the necessity ‘to administer some rough form of justice between Africans 
and European supercargoes trading along the Niger coast.’80 Justice was ad-
ministered in accordance with the principles of fairness and sincerity, applied 
to the circumstances of a particular case.81 These courts would mostly concern 
themselves with trade disputes and with drafting and enforcing regulations on 
matters of common interest to European traders. Courts of equity were com-
posed mainly of British traders, with only a few native leaders or rulers serving, 
and were instruments to extend and perpetuate British power over the terri-
tory. The importance of the courts is described by Adewoye:
The Court of equity was a tribunal not only for settling European dis-
puted locally, but also for dealing with conflicts between Africans and 
European traders. Undoubtedly it marked a significant step in the estab-
lishment of British power and authority in the Niger delta. For by the 
use of the court European traders and British officials were able to move 
away from the precincts of the African ruler and operate on the basis of 
an institution outside his purview. Not only did the court require no sanc-
tions from the local ruler, in some instances it also exercised jurisdiction, 
formally or informally, over his subjects.82
79 Adewoye, Judicial System, 31.
80 Ibid., 33.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 36. ‘The Court of Equity was meant to be a forum in which disputes involving any 
parties in trade, whether Europeans or Africans, could be settled without resorting to 
measures that would disrupt trade or cause social strife. However, its significance lies in 
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The British consul in the Niger Delta also held jurisdictional power. It fell to 
him to enforce the agreements and treaties concluded between the native rul-
ers and the British government and he was authorized to make rules and regu-
lations to maintain peace, order and good government – by British standards 
of course – in the territory under his control.
The Royal Niger Company established its own courts under the Charter it 
had been granted, an arrangement that conferred governmental and admin-
istrative powers on the Company. In practice, this meant that districts agents 
of the Company had the authority to try a limited range of civil and criminal 
cases.
Other more or less judicial institutions were a number of governing coun-
cils, which were introduced in 1885. These governing councils had been au-
thorized to dispose of a wide range of jurisdictional issues: they were charged 
with enforcing consular orders, preserving the peace, maintaining the physical 
and communicational infrastructure, regulating commerce and adjudicating 
minor civil and criminal actions. It was these governing councils that pulled 
the strings on Nigerian soil and, even more so than courts of equity, served as 
instruments of the British colonial establishment.
Alongside these British judicial institutions, there was a variety of native 
courts, which performed judicial and administrative duties. It is a fair to ask, 
however, to what extent these courts were ‘native.’ African rulers did serve on 
these courts. However, as follows from the proclamation establishing a Supreme 
Court for the Southern Nigeria Protectorate (see below), it is fair to ask to what 
extent these native courts could genuinely take cognizance of native interests. 
In May 1900, a proclamation established a Supreme Court for the Southern Ni-
geria Protectorate. Section 9 of the proclamation stipulated the competences 
of the new Supreme Court: the Supreme Court ‘shall possess and exercise, so 
far as circumstances admit, all the jurisdictions, powers and authorities which 
are vested in or capable of being exercised by Her Majesty’s High Court of Jus-
tice in England.’ It was awarded full jurisdiction over all courts in the Southern 
that it was the first instance in which Britain’s merchants in the area were united for con-
certed action. It thereby provided the necessary basis on which future diplomacy would 
have to work and make imperialism there a reality. In the early years of its foundation the 
Court of Equity was not given official recognition by the British government. And yet it 
always enjoyed the good will – and at times the active support – of the British Consuls 
in the region. Indirectly therefore – and perhaps without knowing it – the British gov-
ernment was providing cover for a protectionist syndicate.’ A.D. Nzemeke, ‘Free Trade 
and Territorial Partition in Nineteenth-Century West Africa: Course and Outcome,’ in: 
S. Förster, W.J. Mommsen, and R. Robinson (eds.), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa. The Berlin 
Africa Conference 1884–1885 and the Onset of Partition (Oxford University Press, 1988), 61.
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Nigeria Protectorate. The applicable law, according to Section 11 of the procla-
mation, was to be ‘the Common Law, the doctrines of Equity, and the statutes 
of general application which were in force in England on 1 January 1900.’ In 
practice, the Supreme Court only adjudicated conflicts among British subjects 
and between British subjects and African natives and other European settlers, 
because lack of staff and resources kept it from deploying the full scope of its 
jurisdiction. In the territory of the Royal Niger Company, the Supreme Court 
mostly heard commercial disputes and cases involving foreigners.
How did the native population receive these ‘made in England’ judicial 
authorities that were imported and imposed on them without their say-so? 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the natives were initially distrustful of these institu-
tions and reluctant to bring cases before them, preferring to rely on their own 
judicial bodies to administer justice by customary law standards. Nonetheless, 
when it became clear that the British and their courts were there to stay, the 
native population came to terms with the British style of dispensing justice. 
After the Lagos Colony and the Southern Nigeria Protectorate merged in 1906, 
some changes in the judicial organization had to be implemented to create a 
unified legal entity.
Although the Privy Council was not physically present in the Britain’s over-
seas territories, it did play a determinative role in matters judicial and legisla-
tive. In addition, the Privy Council was the executive institution of the British 
Crown and took a prominent place in colonial affairs, as the Crown was closely 
involved with its territorial possessions. In other words, all three branches of 
State organization – administration, legislature and judiciary – were united in 
the position and activities of the Privy Council. In 1834, the Judicial Committee 
was instituted to deal with the legal affairs of the Privy Council and it served as 
the supreme court of appeal for the British colonies, protectorates and other 
dependent territories.
On a final note, British judges, both in the overseas territories and at home, 
often relied on the Act of State doctrine: they would decline to decide many 
a case that concerned the Crown’s prerogatives, because courts of justice 
were not allowed to review these prerogatives. Consequently, as James Gathii 
states, ‘common law courts effectively made the entire complement of the 
Crown’s prerogatives in a protectorate or foreign possession not amenable 
to judicial review and only limitable at the discretion of the Crown by moral 
principles.’83
83 Gathii, ‘Imperialism,’ 1044.
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5.2 Case Law
Do the judgments of the Nigerian courts and the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council offer proof of the inaccurate and inconsistent use of imperium 
and dominium at the time of Nigeria’s and Africa’s colonization?. The Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council formulated intriguing judgments on the 
treaty-based transfer of sovereignty and private property rights and developed 
interesting arguments.84 Although most judgments of the Privy Council that 
will be discussed concern the British overseas territory of Southern Nigeria, 
some key decisions regarding South Africa, Rhodesia and Swaziland will also 
be dealt with. These decisions show close similarities on the facts and in how 
the British operated with respect to land acquisition. The cases to be discussed 
represent the leading opinions of the Privy Council in its case law on colo-
nial affairs. The selected judgments give an explanatory and to all intents and 
purposes complete survey of the treaty practices concerned. They also answer 
the question whether the central legal concepts of territorial sovereignty and 
private property were used accurately and consistently in the interpretation of 
the treaties concluded with African natives as part of a strategy to maximize 
the rights and powers of the British. What will also be assessed is whether Ju-
dicial Committee of the Privy Council considered the British colonization of 
Nigeria legal. The cases to be considered set important precedents.85
84 See Elias, Nigerian Land Law, 17–71 and Olawoye, Title to Land.
85 The considered judgments form a precedent in the following cases: Nirea Tamaki v. Bak-
er, 1901, a.c. 561; Chief Young Dede and another v. The African Association, Limited, 1911, 1 
n.l.r. 130; The Commissioner of Lands v. The Oniru, 1912, 2 n.l.r. 72; Oduntan Onisiwo v. 
The Attorney-General, 1912, 2 n.l.r. 79; Akpan Awo v. Cookey Gam, 1913, 2 n.l.r. 100; Adeg-
bola v. Johnson & Lawanson, 1921, 3 n.l.r. 81; Eyamba v. Holmes & Moore, 1924, 5 n.l.r. 83; 
Chief Ndoko v. Chief Ikore and The Attorney General, 1926, 7 n.l.r. 76; Lieutenant-Governor 
of the Southern Provinces v. Bakare Ajakaiye and Alli Laditan and Lieutenant-Governor of 
the Southern Provinces v. Eni Igbakan Dosumu and Fadiya Okoya, 1927, 7 n.l.r. 21; Chief 
Ndoko v. Chief Ikoro and The Attorney-General, 1927, 7 n.l.r. 76; Uwani v. Akom and others, 
1928, 8 n.l.r. 19; Ogini v. Thomas, Governor’s Deputy and Owa of Ilesha and others, 1928, 8 
n.l.r. 41; Efana Efana Henshaw v. Elijah Hensaw, Andem Ewa and others, and Compagnie 
Francaise de l’Afrique Occidentale, 1928, 8 n.l.r. 77; Bakare Ajakaiye and another v. The 
Lieutenant-Governor, Southern Provinces of Nigeria, 1929, a.c. 679 or 9 n.l.r. 1; Sakariyawo 
Oshodi v. Moriamo Dakolo and others, 1930, 9 n.l.r. 13; Brimah Balogun and Scottish Ni-
geria Mortgage and Trust Co. Ltd. v. Saka Chief Oshodi, 1930, 10. n.l.r. 36; Okafo Egbuche 
and another v. Chief Idigo and another, 1931, 11 n.l.r. 140; Eleko v. Officer Administering 
the Government of Nigeria, 1931, a.c 662; Egbuche and another v. Chief Idigo and another, 
1934, 11 n.l.r. 140; Chief Secretary to the Government v. James George and others, 1942, 16 
n.l.r. 88; Chief Akinlolu Oloto v. Victor Williams and Charles Williams, 1943, 17 n.l.r. 27; 
Bankole Ajibola and another v. Shittu Ajibola, 1947, 18 n.l.r. 125; Edun v. Thomas, 1947, 
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After the Conference of Berlin (1884–1885), the scramble for Africa rapidly 
intensified as France and Germany began to seek and compete for territorial 
expansion in earnest. The British felt threatened and regarded its rivals ambi-
tions and efforts an attack on its own interests. The British government be-
came especially convinced that it had to strengthen its titles to territories, as 
nominal protectorates and colonies no longer sufficed. As the Berlin Confer-
ence had decided and as was laid down in its Final Act, aspiring colonizers 
would have to demonstrate effective control over the concerned territories. 
Britain strengthened its titles to territory by granting a Royal Charter to the 
most important British trading company, by adapting the content of the ces-
sion treaties (blurring the distinction between sovereignty rights and property 
rights), and by enacting Orders in Council, official laws in the British overseas 
territories, which affected the cession treaties concluded between Britain and 
African natives. These Orders in Council repealed and revoked the cession 
treaties by declaring and promulgating that the ceded territories not only fell 
under British sovereignty, but were in fact the property of the British Crown. 
In other words, national laws were enacted to correct, adapt or repeal cession 
treaties for the purpose of acquiring property rights over land, thus expanding 
British control over the territory. Other legal instruments, such as ordinances, 
commands and proclamations, were also enacted, applied and enforced to 
unilaterally transfer African private property rights over land to the British 
Crown – without the consent or involvement of African natives having been 
sought.
British practices on the African continent come to light in the case law of 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. As regards the practice of con-
cluding cession treaties, it was recognized that the African contracting party, 
the native ruler, was an independent sovereign, who had the power to conclude 
cession treaties to transfer sovereignty.86 In addition, the Judicial Committee 
repeatedly affirmed the distinction between a protectorate and a colony or an-
nexation as well as the consequences and implications of these different legal 
institutes.87 Generally, cession treaties concluded between the British Crown 
19 n.l.r. 22; Chief Commissioner, Eastern Provinces v. Ononye and others, 1944, 17 n.l.r. 
142; and Garuba v. The Public Trustee, 1947, 18 n.l.r. 132. This list of cases is not pretended 
to be exhaustive. For an elaboration on several of these cases, see Elias, Nigerian Land 
Law, 17–71. See also Olawoye, Title to Land.
86 Thomas Cook and James Charles Cook v. Sir James Gordon Sprigg, 1899, a.c. 572 (Appeal 
from the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council).
87 This comes especially to the forefront in the case of Rex v. The Earl of Crewe, ex parte Sek-
gome, 1910, 2 K.B. 576 (Appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council).
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and a native ruler were held to transfer territorial sovereignty with the proviso 
that such transfer did not affect natives’ property rights to land – a proviso that 
reflects adherence to the continuity principle.
The Judicial Committee acknowledged that British jurisdiction had at times 
been stretched to its limits by means of Orders in Council, but it held that such 
conduct was considered an Act of State, which for that reason could be neither 
challenged in court nor attributed under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act (1890).88 
The Judicial Committee also ruled on the allocation of power to the British 
Crown and the chartered trading companies: the former acquired sovereignty 
over the territory, the latter rights of enjoyment in view of their trading pur-
poses and objects.89 In Southern Rhodesia (1919)90 the Judicial Committee held 
that ‘a manifestation by Orders in Council of the intention of the Crown to 
exercise full dominion over lands which are un-allotted is sufficient for the es-
tablishment of complete power.’ Orders in Council enacted over ‘unalienated’ 
lands could therefore establish sovereignty rights over territory in favour of 
the Crown; the Crown had the capacity to unilaterally annex territory to its 
dominions.
The differences between concepts and their understanding in various le-
gal orders were also taken into account. If concepts were transplanted from 
one legal order to another, this should be done with caution, as the Judicial 
Committee took care to point out.91 With respect to the nature of native land 
tenure, which was taken to be communal,92 the Judicial Committee asserted 
that the British title to the territory was qualified by the rights of enjoyment 
or use of the native communities that inhabited the territory; these rights had 
been recognized by the British Crown as the outcome of deliberate policy. In 
cession cases, the Judicial Committee recognized the continuity doctrine: ‘No 
doubt there was a cession to the British Crown, along with the Sovereignty, 
of the radical or ultimate title to the land, in the new Colony, but this cession 
appears to have been made on the footing that the rights of property of the 
inhabitants were to be fully respected.’93 Referring to The Attorney-General of 
88 See ibid.
89 The Attorney-General of Southern Nigeria v. Holt, 1915, a.c. 599 (Appeal from the Supreme 
Court of Southern Nigeria to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council).
90 Southern Rhodesia, In re, 1919, a.c. 211 (Appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council).
91 Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary of the Southern Provinces of Nigeria, 1921, 2 a.c. 399 or 3 
n.l.r. 21 (Appeal from the Divisional Court of Southern Nigeria to the Privy Council).
92 See Nigeria Handbook, 177–179.
93 Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary of the Southern Provinces of Nigeria, 1921, 2 a.c. 399 or 3 
n.l.r. 21.
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Southern Nigeria v. Holt (1915), the Judicial Committee in Amodu Tijani v. The 
Secretary of the Southern Provinces of Nigeria (1921) held that while the cession 
treaty between the British Crown and a native ruler effectuated a transfer of 
rights, it did not affect the factual situation: the private property rights of the 
natives had to be respected.94 Continuity of existing property rights to land 
which changed jurisdictional power was the general rule.
Eventually, the Judicial Committee would rule that a cession treaty grant-
ed the British Crown all rights of protection, legislation, jurisdiction and 
 administration over the territory and inhabitants of that territory, provided 
that the natives were guaranteed their laws and customs, and their grazing 
and  agricultural rights, ‘so far as not inconsistent with the laws pursuant to 
the convention.’95 Here, a crucial qualification of the continuity doctrine was 
introduced: in the case of cession, existing property rights had to be respected 
as long as they were consistent with British law.
The establishment of a protectorate gave the British Crown territorial sov-
ereignty in the international relations of the protected territory; protectorates 
were not part of the Crown’s dominions. British authorities had certain if lim-
ited powers to enact legislation, but they could not interfere with the private 
property rights, more specifically the land ownership, of the native population.
In conclusion, as to whether imperium and dominium were used consistent-
ly, it can be said that the object and purpose of the cession treaties were at first 
generally clear: the transfer of sovereignty over territory from an African native 
ruler to the British Crown on condition that the private property rights over 
land of the natives were respected. However, by way of subsequently enacted 
legislation – a competence the British obtained when they acquired sovereign 
power – the Crown did interfere in private property rights of natives. Britain 
had the formal competence to enact legislation regarding the allocation of 
land ownership, because it had acquired jurisdictional rights over the territory 
by way of cession. In exercising this authority, Britain did not breach the law. 
The continuity principle, however, was ignored soon after the cession treaty 
had been signed, and natives were subjected to mass expropriation. Although 
the principle of continuity carried weight in court cases involving the transfer 
of sovereignty, it cannot be concluded that failure to respect the continuity 
principle constituted a violation of law. The principle served as a standard of 
good behaviour, a political guideline. Disregarding the continuity principle 
and not respecting native land ownership, while morally objectionable, were 
94 See Meek, Land, 26–27.
95 Sobhuza ii v. Allister M. Miller and others, 1926, Annual Digest 1925–1926, No. 28 (Appeal 
from The Special Court of Swaziland to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council).
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not illegal. If, however, the protection of native property and proprietary rights 
had been explicitly formulated, as it had been in most cession treaties, Britain 
failed to comply with its treaty obligations. In these cases, the cession of sover-
eignty over territory was illegal.
As regards protectorate treaties, in Sobhuza ii v. Allister M. Miller and oth-
ers (1926),96 the Judicial Committee established the factual situation of the 
transfer of sovereignty rights and the legislative powers involved. What it did 
not do, however, was conclude that these practices were unlawful, illegal, or 
a violation of treaty obligations. The Judicial Committee did not address the 
legality issue, because the Foreign Jurisdiction Act and the Act of State doc-
trine prevented it from doing so. It affirmed that a protectorate implied that 
the protector only had the power to exercise external sovereignty rights. Inter-
ference in affairs of internal sovereignty was, however, not entirely excluded. 
Legislative acts, mostly in Orders in Council, would be issued (with increasing 
frequency), extending external sovereignty rights to include internal sover-
eignty rights. Mostly for financial and political reasons, a protectorate would 
continue to go by that name, but in practice, a protectorate essentially was a 
colony or a Crown dominion. Accordingly, the protecting power could acquire 
native property rights by way of these legislative acts. The Judicial Committee 
refrained from assessing the legality of these practices, because Acts of State 
were not open to judicial review.
Lastly, in Adeyinka Oyekan and others v. Musendiku Adele (1957),97 the Ju-
dicial Committee of the Privy Council lucidly summarized its position on the 
effect of the Act of State on a cession treaty between the Crown and African 
natives. Its conclusion merits full quotation:
[T]he Treaty of Cession was an Act of State by which the British Crown 
acquired full rights of sovereignty over Lagos. In these circumstances the 
courts of law will not take it upon themselves to construe the Treaty. The 
effect of the Act of State is to give to the British Crown sovereign power 
to make laws and to enforce them, and therefore the power to recog-
nise existing rights or extinguish them or to create new ones. In order to 
ascertain what rights pass to the Crown or are retained by the inhabit-
ants, the courts of law look, not to the Treaty, but to the conduct of the 
British Crown. It has been laid down by their Lordships’ Board that ‘Any 
96 Ibid.
97 Adeyinka Oyekan and others v. Musendiku Adele, Journal of African Law, 1 (1957), 186–192 
(Appeal from the West African Court of Appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council).
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inhabitant of the territory can make good in the municipal courts es-
tablished by the new sovereign only such rights as that sovereign has, 
through his officers, recognised. Such rights as he had under the rule 
of his predecessors avail him nothing.’ […] In inquiring, however, what 
rights are recognised, there is one guiding principle. It is this: the courts 
will assume that the British Crown intends that the rights of property 
of the inhabitants are to be fully respected. Whilst therefore the British 
Crown, as Sovereign, can make laws enabling it compulsorily to acquire 
land for public purposes. It will see that proper compensation is awarded 
to every one of the inhabitants who has by native law an interest in it: and 
the courts will declare the inhabitants entitled to compensation accord-
ing to their interests, even though those interests are of a kind unknown 
to English law […]. Furthermore if a dispute arises between the inhabit-
ants as to the right to occupy a piece of land, it will be determined accord-
ing to native law and custom, without importing English conceptions of 
property law […] except, of course, in those cases, now growing in num-
ber, where English conceptions of individual ownership have superseded 
previous conceptions.
In sum, although the conclusion of a cession treaty was considered to be an 
Act of State by which the English Crown acquired sovereign powers over the 
African territory concerned, the Judicial Committee once again considers 
that native property rights should be respected and be valued in accordance 
with native customary law. In other words, the Judicial Committee recognized 
the continued existence of native property rights, and I if native property 
were expropriated, the native proprietor was entitled to compensation. Here 
the analysis of the Judicial Committee stops, because the Act of State doctrine 
prescribes judicial restraint in matters involving the Crown. Their Lordships 
were not prepared to interpret the cession treaty to determine whether it safe-
guarded existing rights; they would only consider the conduct of the Crown, 
because the rationale of the Act of State ‘is to give to the British Crown sover-
eign power to make laws to enforce them, or create new ones.’98 Consequently, 
no reference was made to any British wrongdoing in failing to meet their treaty 
obligations and to respect native property rights. The Judicial Committee ul-
timately refrained from concluding that in failing to adhere to the continuity 
principle, the Crown acted unlawfully. The continuity principle – which po-
tentially restricted the Act of State doctrine – yielded to that doctrine; political 
expediency prevailed over legal argument; might is right.
98 Adeyinka Oyekan and others v. Musendiku Adele, 1957, 2 All e.r. 785, 788.
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6 Conclusion
Two main questions have been addressed in this chapter. The first of these was 
how in the second half of the nineteenth century property and sovereignty 
were arranged in treaties and agreements between Britain and Nigerian na-
tives transferring sovereign rights over territory. The second was how existing 
native sovereignty and property rights fared after treaties had been concluded. 
Although there had been a British presence on the African continent for some 
centuries, British rule on and over Nigerian territory started with the cession 
of Lagos in 1861. Many treaties transferring sovereign rights over territory were 
to follow. From the mid-1800s onwards, the nature of the agreements between 
Britain and African natives changed. Where they had originally been driven 
by economic concerns, they gradually came to be politically motivated. This 
shift concurred with the increasing use of treaties over contracts. Public law in-
struments thus gained prominence as a means of regulating relations between 
Britain and African natives. Britain continued to control its overseas territories 
through indirect rule.
In the 1880s, the competition between European States for title to African 
territory reached fever pitch. The contest between Britain and its two main 
European rivals, France and Germany, combined with the political pressure 
fuelled by the Conference of Berlin (1884–1885) to compel Britain to abandon 
its policy of indirect rule and to gradually assume direct control over its Afri-
can territories. The growing emphasis on effective control of extra-European 
territories and the European race for African territory boosted the use of pro-
tectorate treaties over cession treaties to acquire sovereignty rights over Afri-
can territory. When it transpired that establishing a traditional protectorate 
was unrealistic, European politicians introduced the colonial protectorate to 
acquire and justify title to African territory. Britain was fully involved in and 
actively contributed to these high-pace developments.
Britain concluded many treaties transferring sovereignty rights from 
Nigerian rulers to the British State. As time went by and more treaties were 
concluded, ambiguities in protectorate treaties on the precise object of trans-
fer increased. This development gave rise to the question how the sovereignty 
rights of the native rulers and the existing native rights to land were affect-
ed. Boundaries between British sovereignty exercised over the territory and 
the sovereignty rights of the native rulers blurred, and this indeterminacy 
helped to pave the way for the extension and strengthening of British rule over 
Nigeria. Under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act (1890), the British authorities 
in the Nigerian territories could, in the name of the Crown, enact Orders in 
Council which were regarded as Acts of State. By way of these Orders Britain 
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unilaterally awarded itself territorial sovereignty at the expense of the native 
rulers, whose sovereignty were effectively deprived of any substance. The Or-
ders in Council enabled the British authorities to set up concession systems 
granting lands and rights to land to British settlers, necessarily implying the 
appropriation of native property and entitlements. The Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council confirmed Britain’s practice of establishing colonial protec-
torates by means of treaties, but refused to assess the lawfulness of this prac-
tice. Britain’s acquisition and direct rule of Nigeria were accomplished through 
Acts of State that were not open to judicial review.
But questions remain. Was it legally permissible to set aside the continu-
ity principle after the cession treaties had been concluded? Could national 
legislative acts repeal the treaties establishing protectorates? Did these acts 
 override treaties that had been concluded under international law? Could trea-
ties be lawfully amended or repealed under national law without the consent 
of the other treaty party required by contemporary international law? How 
should the fundamental principles underlying the conclusion, interpretation 
and execution of treaties be assessed? And did Britain and, more generally, Eu-
ropean States violate international law? Chapter 8 addresses these questions 





As in Britain, the imperialist wind blew through French politics and society 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This renewed interest 
in overseas territories originated in a national trauma: the loss of most of the 
Alsace-Lorraine region to Germany in 1871. This event, a keenly felt humilia-
tion, would determine French foreign policy until after World War i. French 
foreign and, by extension, colonial policy was directed at restoring its status 
among the other European powers: ‘France had to reforge her prestige in the 
community of European nations. This, according to Jules Ferry, would have to 
be done, not on the Rhine, but in Africa.’1 France mitigated its revanchist at-
titude to Germany over time as it adjusted its national polities. Weighing the 
pros and cons of its colonial venture in Africa, France decided on an autono-
mous colonial policy. Subordination, centralization, executive supremacy, 
uniformity and formality characterized French rule of its African territories. 
However, French criticism of informal empire, the system of rule used by Brit-
ain and, to a lesser extent, Germany,2 diminished in the 1890s when France 
realized that direct rule of the overseas territories was impossible and that it 
necessarily had to deploy trading companies active on the ground.
Despite its preference to acquire African territory by way of occupation, 
French control over Equatorial Africa originated in the establishment of pro-
tectorates by concluding treaties with native rulers in the 1880s and 1890s.3 
Once the French and African contracting parties had signed the treaty text, 
French law, administration and institutions were imported into the protector-
ate. French sovereignty being exercised over African territory put considerable 
strain on both the sovereign rights of the native ruler and native land owner-
ship. It is this tension that gives rise to the two main questions to be addressed 
in this chapter. First, what property and sovereignty arrangements were made 
in the treaties and other agreements concluded between the French and the 
people residing in Equatorial Africa in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury? Second, how did existing sovereignty and property rights fare after the 
1 J.J. Cooke, New French Imperialism 1880–1910: The Third Republic and Colonial Expansion 
(Newton Abbot, Hamden: David and Charles, Archon Books, 1973), 11.
2 See Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, 144.
3 Fisch, ‘Africa as Terra Nullius,’ 354–357.
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treaties had been signed? The main purpose of the current chapter is to estab-
lish the facts of the treaty-making practices between France and African rulers 
as a prelude to assessing the legality of these practices in Chapter 8.
First a brief historical background to French presence in Equatorial Africa 
will be given (§2). Next, the treaty texts and practices between France and na-
tive rulers in Central Africa will be analysed and evaluated, with particular at-
tention being paid to the transfer of sovereignty over territory and the French 
approach to native land ownership (§3). Following this exploration, the dis-
cussion will shift to the legislation France enacted in Equatorial Africa after 
the treaties had been concluded (§4) and the interpretation and execution of 
the treaties (§5). The chapter concludes with some remarks on the issue of the 
legality of the French colonization of Africa (§6).
2 Historical Background
By the time of Third French Republic was established, France’s imperial history 
stretched back to the sixteenth century. In the second half of the eighteenth 
century, France had lost a great deal of territory and influence in India, Can-
ada and the Caribbean to Britain. In the early nineteenth century, the French 
set their heart on imperial expansion in Northern Africa, with the acquisition 
of Algeria as its first major result4 after its unsuccessful invasion of Egypt in 
1798–1801.5 From the seventeenth century onwards, the Senegal in West Africa 
was the lifeline for French trade.6 West Africa was the springboard for French 
territorial expansion on the African continent.7 The appropriation of Tunisia 
in 1881 proved pivotal in the founding of the French Empire and in France’s 
rehabilitation on the international scene. Although France was especially in-
terested in the Arabic part of the continent, Sub-Saharan Africa played a vital 
role in French colonial practice. French rule was established over a territory 
stretching 1,400 miles from the lower Congo River to Lake Chad, and consisted 
of present-day Gabon, the Congo Republic, the Central African Republic and 
the southern part of Chad. In the late nineteenth century, this area was known 
4 J. Sessions, By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2011).
5 A.L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 
1895–1930 (Stanford University Press, 1997), 16–19. See Wesseling, Verdeel en heers, 27–28.
6 Wesseling, Verdeel en heers, 218–219.
7 Ibid., 220–232.
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as French Equatorial Africa,8 covering 2,687,190 square kilometres,9 i.e., more 
than five times the surface area of France. Before elaborating on the coloni-
zation of this specific part of Africa, French imperial practices on the whole 
continent will be considered.
French colonial policy and practice reflected the view of the French liberal 
government minister Jules Ferry (1832–1893) that economic, political and cul-
tural considerations were the main drivers of French territorial expansion in 
Africa,.10 As Minister of Foreign Affairs (1883–1885) and Prime Minister (1880–
1881 and 1883–1885), Ferry laid the foundation for French colonialism. He felt 
that economic considerations dominated France’s national and international 
politics and these considerations required industrialization, protection, mar-
kets and colonies.11 From a political perspective France wanted to restore the 
balance of power by expanding its sphere of influence outside Europe. It was 
especially the political ambition behind the scramble for Africa that height-
ened tensions between France and its European contenders,12 and as the 
Fashoda incident (1898) proved, the antagonism between France and Britain 
in particular was palpable.13
Even so, the cultural incentive also mattered. The French believed in the 
superiority of their culture and saw it as their mission to civilize others. This 
conviction explains why the French policy of assimilation, influenced by 
nationalist and patriotic sentiments, played a central role in France’s rule 
8 See C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, ‘French Congo and Gabon, 1886–1905,’ in: G.N. Sanderson 
and R. Oliver (eds.), The Cambridge History of Africa, vol. vi (Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 298–314. See also A. Mangongo-Nzambi, ‘La délimitation des frontiers du Gabon 
(1885–1911),’ Cahiers d’études africaines, 9 (1969), 5–53.
9 As is determined in 1920. The total extent of the whole French Empire amounted in that 
same year 10,184,810 square kilometres. See Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy, xvi.
10 Wesseling, Verdeel en heers, 33. See also J. Darcy, La Conquête de l’Afrique (Paris: Perrin, 
1900).
11 S.H. Roberts, The History of French Colonial Policy 1870–1925 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon 
Books, 1963), 15.
12 See G. Hardy, La Politique Coloniale et le Partage de la Terre au xix et xx Siècles (Paris: Albin 
Michel, 1937).
13 See D. Bates, The Fashoda Incident of 1898: Encounter on the Nile (Oxford University Press, 
1984); W. Churchill, The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1902), Chapter 17; D. Levering Lewis, The Race to Fashoda: Euro-
pean Colonialism and African Resistance in the Scramble for Africa (New York: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1987) and C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, ‘Gabriel Hanotaux, the 
Colonial Party and the Fashoda Strategy,’ Journal of Imperial Commonwealth History, 3 
(1975), 22–104.
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of African territory.14 Assimilation was the ‘system which tends to efface all 
 difference between the colonies and the motherland, and which views the 
colonies simply as a prolongation of the mother-country beyond the seas.’15 
 Overseas territories were, in other words, considered extensions of the Euro-
pean mainland. ‘Assimilation, by giving the colonies institutions analogous 
to those of metropolitan France, little by little removes the distances which 
separate the diverse parts of French territory and finally realizes their intimate 
union through the application of common legislation.’16 In the acquired ter-
ritories French administration would be established and Paris would assume 
control. In keeping with the earlier tradition of colonization, as in Algeria in 
the 1830s, government by direct colonial rule became the standard of French 
colonial policy. The development of the overseas territories as particular and 
separate entities could not be countenanced: ‘[T]hey were pieces in the wider 
organism and their sole function was to strengthen France and to serve her 
needs. They had to develop along the lines France needed, they had to sac-
rifice themselves if need be for France.’17 This zeal and firmness in France’s 
policy towards overseas territories differed markedly from the British strategy 
and attitude towards Africa and its indigenous population. British rule was 
first and foremost based on maintaining existing political relationships and 
respecting  – indirect rule. The mission of civilization and assimilation pur-
sued by France in its overseas territories in the late nineteenth century was not 
universally embraced. Critics, among them the French jurist Charles Salomon 
(1862–1936), averred that the civilization argument was just a means to further 
commerce and increase economic benefits.18
In 1890s, France came to realize that it could not establish effective con-
trol in all of its territories on the African continent: it relied increasingly on 
the efforts of trading companies, which were mandated to acquire territory by 
means of treaties with native rulers and to establish control over these territo-
ries. This gradual loosening of direct rule led to disorder and conflicts, and it 
left the French authorities facing a dilemma. On the one hand, the aim of for-
mally extending French sovereignty in Africa by direct political control based 
14 See, for example, Conklin, Mission to Civilize.
15 Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy, 67. See R.F. Betts, Assimilation and Association 
in French Colonial Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).
16 A. Arnaud and H. Méray, Les Colonies françaises, organization administrative, judiciaire, 
politique et financière (Paris: Challamel, 1900), 4, translated in Betts, Assimilation, 8.
17 Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy, 23. See O.-Ch. Galtier, Des Conditions de 
l’Occupation des Territoires dans le Droit International Contemporain (Toulouse: Lagarde 
et Sebille, 1901), 72.
18 C. Salomon, L’Occupation des Territoires sans Maître (Paris: Giard, 1889), 195.
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on the civilization mission was to avoid and mitigate the excesses of economic 
exploitation. On the other hand, as direct rule of African territories turned out 
to be politically and financially unattainable, the French authorities recruited 
private companies to colonize and control the overseas territories. Yet these 
companies failed to maintain order and to keep out European competitors, 
and by the end of the century the French authorities felt they had no choice 
but to intervene again and restore order through direct rule: ‘Eventually the 
companies resorted to protectionist practices (in breach of their charters), 
proved unable to administer territories granted to them, or failed to forestall 
expansions by other powers.’19
The quest for scientific knowledge was another reason for France to seek 
territorial expansion in Africa, and the French authorities dispatched explorers 
and scientists on missions to the African Hinterland. These private individuals 
and associations also concluded treaties with native polities. The French gov-
ernment preferred independent and, above all, inexpensive explorers to com-
mercial companies, governmental diplomats and military forces. The support 
of private initiatives and associations, such as the Comité de l’Afrique française 
and the Union colonial française, enabled the French to penetrate the lands be-
tween the Oubanghi and Chari rivers. However, the thirst for scientific knowl-
edge soon turned into a rush for territory, driven by nationalist motives.20
In Equatorial Africa, a dedicated and adventurous man acted as trailblazer 
for French colonization: Pierre Savorgnan De Brazza (1852–1905), an Italian by 
birth who became a French citizen. He was a French patriot and served as a 
junior officer in the French navy. Although De Brazza’s first expedition (1870–
1878) was a private undertaking, to his mind he went to Africa to establish a 
great empire in the name and for the benefit of the French State. The main 
purposes of his expedition were to secure for France ‘un accroissement ter-
ritorial de sa primitive colonie en même temps qu’un accès privilégiée vers 
le basin du Congo[:]’21 territory and trade privileges. On his second mission 
(1879–1882), aimed at opening the Congo River to French navigation, De  Brazza 
founded Franceville on the Upper Ogowé – in the south-east of present-day 
19 Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, 117.
20 G. Teissier, ‘La mise en valeur du Congo,’ Année coloniale, 1 (1899), 60 as quoted by M.A. 
Rouget, L’Expansion coloniale au Congo Français (Paris: Larose, 1906), 613.
21 M. Dubois and A. Terrier, Les colonies françaises. Un siècle d’expansion coloniale (Paris: 
Challamel, 1901), 583. On the extent of the Congo Basin and the French control over it, 
see G. de Courcel, ‘The Berlin Act of 26 February 1885,’ in: S. Förster, W.J. Mommsen, and 
R. Robinson (eds.), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa. The Berlin Africa Conference 1884–1885 
and the Onset of Partition (Oxford University Press, 1988), 251.
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Gabon – and Brazzaville, located on the Congo River opposite Belgian Leopol-
dville (now Kinshasa). These two posts developed into hubs for trade in goods 
and services. To acquire valid and titles to territory, De Brazza concluded trea-
ties with African rulers on the transfer of sovereign rights over territory. France 
thus acquired a vast area of territory covering the north bank of the Congo 
between Brazzaville and Ubangui.
French politicians, however, were unaware of De Brazza’s efforts to extend 
France’s empire on the African continent. And if they had heard of them, they 
were reticent about welcoming the results of De Brazza’s colonial venture, 
French experiences in Algeria being fresh in their minds.22 At first, the French 
public were not enthusiastic either about their republic’s renewed colonial 
interest in the African continent;23 what occupied French citizens was eco-
nomic, social and political instability on the home front. Eventually, however, 
French politicians were won over to imperialism and they succeeded in har-
nessing popular support. In November 1882, French Parliament recognized the 
bilateral treaties De Brazza had concluded with African rulers – these formed 
the constitutional basis of the newly established protectorate of French Congo 
(1891), existing of the united territories of Congo and Gabon.
De Brazza opened up a territory for trade and control that was four times 
the size of France. He undertook a third mission (1883–1885), which resulted in 
the acquisition of the territories of Loango and Pointe-Noire by concluding bi-
lateral treaties with the rulers of both territories. French legal scholars consid-
ered the acquisition of African territory by way of ‘peaceful’ bilateral treaties 
a symbol of French civilization and courtesy, and they favourably compared 
De Brazza’s working method to that of explorers who were employed by the 
other European colonizers, such as the British-American journalist for the New 
York Herald and explorer Henry Morton Stanley (1841–1904), who served the 
Belgian King Leopold ii (1835–1909), and the German adventurer Carl Peters 
(1856–1918), who opened up East Africa in Germany’s campaign for imperial ex-
pansion.24 After De Brazza’s explorative and acquisitive activities in the French 
Congo, he was dismissed by the French government and succeeded by Emile 
Gentil (1866–1914). Gentil was mandated to exploit the acquired territories for 
trade and economic benefits, violently oppressing the native population as he 
did so.25 In the final years of the 1800s, De Brazza was recalled from the French 
22 See Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, 110. See also Cooke, New French Imperialism, 13–14.
23 See Betts, Assimilation, 3.
24 Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, 107.
25 See G. Hanotaux and A. Martineau, Histoire des Colonies Françaises et de l’Expansion de la 
France dans le Monde, vol. iv (Paris: Plon, 1929), 441–534.
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Congo, because he was deemed to have exhausted his usefulness and even re-
garded as an obstacle to French colonial policy. Through his expeditions, De 
Brazza had come to appreciate the interests of the natives inhabitants, even 
to the point of defending them and their interests against the French colonial 
ruler. He acted openly against the brutal economic exploitation of the territory 
and the horrendous consequences it had for the natives and their lands.26
In the wake of the Conference of Berlin and its Final Act (1885), the de-
marcation between the Independent State of Congo, ruled by Leopold ii, and 
French Equatorial Africa had to be settled – a delicate matter –27 as had the 
border between French Equatorial Africa and German Cameroon. In 1894, 
France and Germany signed a convention on the delineation of the border be-
tween Equatorial Africa and Cameroon, which was reaffirmed at the conven-
tion of 18 April 1908. As from 1890, the French desire to create a united French 
empire in Africa connecting the French territories in North, West and Central 
Africa determined the development of French Equatorial Africa. In July 1898, 
the Anglo-French treaty on the Niger delimited the spheres of interest be-
tween the two States. The border between French Equatorial Africa and British 
Sudan was agreed on in March 1899. Finally, the territory of Oubangui-Chari, 
the area south of Chad, was added to the French empire between October 1910 
and February 1911. The protectorate treaties concluded between the European 
powers and native rulers in the race of the former for African territory was the 
main mode of establishing the borders of the territories under the control of 
the different European States. In other words, the delimitation of the French 
empire depended on the protectorate treaties concluded with natives.
3 French Treaty Practice in Equatorial Africa
Although legal doctrine distinguished various modes of acquisition, the actual 
practice of acquisition was not as clear-cut. France often acquired African ter-
ritory through a combination of occupation, cession and protection. In theory, 
occupation as an original mode and cession as a derivative mode were regarded 
as opposites; the use of occupation excluded the use of cession and vice versa. 
France relied on the cultural differences between Frenchmen and the African 
natives to justify the acquisition of African territory through occupation. In 
view of the combined use of modes, the late nineteenth century jurist Octave 
26 R. West, Brazza of the Congo (Newton Abbot: Victorian, 1973), 156.
27 See for the exact delimitation Hanotaux and Martineau, Histoire des Colonies Françaises, 
425.
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Galtier, for example, introduced the phenomenon of fictive occupation.28 A 
contemporary of his, Pierre Dareste, professor of colonial legislation in Paris, 
rejected the civilization argument as justification for occupation.29 On the one 
hand, he argued, their lack of civilization excluded the natives from enjoying 
sovereignty and property rights, as was indeed the position of the French au-
thorities, including the judiciary. He observed that non-civilized populations 
inhabited the land and that this did not stop the French from considering Af-
rica terra nullius. On the other hand, Dareste pointed out that some cession 
and many protectorate treaties were concluded between French agents and 
African rulers, and these treaties implied French recognition of the presence 
and entitlement of the African polities.
Salomon introduced another acquisition mode next to occupation and ces-
sion. While acknowledging that cession and protectorate treaties were con-
cluded between French representatives and African rulers, he reasoned that 
these treaties did not entail a traditional transfer of sovereignty between two 
civilized entities, but between the civilized French State and barbarous African 
polities.30 Salomon argued for a hybrid mode of acquisition: qualified occu-
pation. It recognized that the land was inhabited by African political entities 
which were able to sign treaties transferring sovereign rights, but which came 
down to occupation of the land – the presence and entitlement of the native 
population were ignored. The French colonizer assumed the acquisition not 
only of sovereignty over the territory, but also of proprietary rights to the land. 
Although the French acknowledged that original acquisition of African terri-
tory was impossible and that they therefore had no choice but to conclude 
bilateral treaties with the rulers of African polities, they did not recognize the 
African treaty party as an equal. In practice, the French obtained full control 
over the territory, which they justified by referring to the civilization argu-
ment. Salomon referred to the treaty between De Brazza and Makoko, which 
will be addressed later in this section, as an example of qualified occupation.31 
French interpretation and application of the modes of acquisition, based on 
distinction between civilized and non-civilized nations, was ambiguous. In 
theory, France recognized its African co-contracting party, while in practice 
the French behaved as if the territory had been acquired by occupation. What 
28 Galtier, Conditions de l’Occupation, 76–77.
29 P. Dareste, Recueil de législation, doctrine et jurisprudence coloniales, vol. xxix (Paris: Sirey, 
1927), 6.
30 Salomon, Occupation, 235–236. See also Jèze, Étude théorique, 117.
31 Salomon, Occupation, 235.
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Salomon called qualified occupation, a quasi-original mode of acquisition, was 
in effect a colonial protectorate.
The acquisition of African territory by occupation became untenable and 
forced the French to use derivative modes of acquisition and to rely increas-
ingly on bilateral treaties with native rulers. This does not mean that France 
had not signed treaties with African nations before. France had been conclud-
ing treaties with African natives since the early seventeenth century, especial-
ly in North Africa in present-day Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.32 The object 
of these treaties involved either commercial issues, such as trade privileges, 
customs duties and the payment of debts, or more political concerns, such as 
establishing peaceful relationships. Although France concluded treaties with 
African rulers in the early 1800s,33 in the second half of the nineteenth century 
cession and protectorate treaties were the fundament of French title to African 
territory and the expansion of French rule over the territory.34
Before discussing particular treaty practices and texts, two remarks have are 
called for. The first one concerns the status of native rulers and their recog-
nition by France. The French assumed that the African treaty party had the 
capacity to transfer territorial sovereignty rights. This legal competence of the 
African ruler was often expressed explicitly in one of the treaty provisions, a 
non-intervention clause. In such a clause the African ruler declared that he 
and his people were independent of any foreign power. In the majority of 
cases, the French used the negative formulation of the native ruler’s capacity, 
in which the native ruler had to state that he – and other chiefs of the territory – 
was not dependent on any external control: ‘Nous n’avons jamais signé ou con-
tracté aucun engagement avec l’étranger – que nous ne dependons d’aucun 
Chef ayant signé ou contracté en notre nom un semblable engagement […].’35 
Moreover, these treaties often contained a provision stipulating that earlier 
32 On the French treaties with African natives in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
see Alexandrowicz, European-African Confrontation, 9 and 18–28.
33 See E. Rouard de Card, Les Traités de Protectorat conclus par la France en Afrique 1870–1895 
(Paris: Pedone, 1897).
34 For an overview of the cession and protectorate treaties concluded by France with 
African rulers in Equatorial Africa between 1819 and 1890, see Hertslet, Map of Africa by 
Treaty, 634–641.
35 Declaration of the native rulers of Dambbo, made on 15 November 1883, quoted in Alex-
androwicz, European-African Confrontation, 35. Such declarations can also be found in 
many other treaties, as Alexandrowicz enumerated: the treaties with the rulers of Campo 
on 19 November 1883, with the rulers of Boughié, Igouba and Miongo of the country of 
Andjé (Gabon) on 6 June 1884, and with Massai on 22 August 1884. Ibid.
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treaties with other foreign powers were null and void.36 At the time when a 
treaty was signed, the French recognized the African ruler as an independent 
sovereign who intended to transfer sovereign rights over his territory to France.
The second remark concerns the validity of the treaties that had been con-
cluded. As has been argued, for the purpose of acquiring title to territory the 
French acknowledged the capacity of African rulers representing their people 
to conclude treaties transferring sovereign rights. Motivated by self-interest, 
France, and European States generally, deemed international law applicable 
when dealing with African polities. The French could take possession of in-
habited African territory under two conditions. First, the native ruler had to 
consent to France taking possession of the territory, and this consent had to 
be given freely and expressed intelligibly. Second, French possession should 
not deprive the natives of land usage.37 However, many questions arose with 
regard to the validity of the treaties. Had the cession or protectorate treaty 
been concluded and signed voluntarily or had it been imposed? Did the indig-
enous treaty party truly, i.e., conceptually, understand the treaty text? Did the 
 native ruler oversee the consequences of the treaty? Had the signatures of the 
native chiefs been obtained in accordance with the principle of informed and 
free consent? As mentioned in Chapter 1, the validity, or legality, of the treaties 
is problematic, but answering the questions this issue gives rise to is not the 
objective of this book. Instead, the main line of inquiry is to establish whether 
the Europeans kept the promises they had laid down in the treaties.
To that end, in the following sections the cession and protectorate treaties 
France concluded with African rulers will be analysed.
3.1 Cession Treaties
Treaties between France and African rulers in Equatorial Africa date back to 
the 1810s.38 As in the case of Britain, these treaties were traditional cession 
treaties.39 The French, however, continued to use cession treaties more of-
ten alongside establishing protectorates. Between 1839 and 1843, the French 
concluded treaties with King Denis and King Louis, who possessed the land 
on the left and right banks of the Gabon respectively. These treaties awarded 
36 See ibid., 67.
37 Jèze, Étude Théorique, 116.
38 Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 634.
39 Many titles to territory were acquired by the French by the conclusion of cession treaties 
in Equatorial Africa. It concerned, for example, the territories of Gabon (9 February 1839), 
Grand Bassam (19 February 1942), Batanga (30 March 1942), Nalous (27 July 1848), Cayor 
(2 February 1862), etc. For an extensive overview, see ibid., 634–641.
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territorial concessions or privileges to France. France used the territory to 
build military batteries and fortifications on the ground. In 1842, Louis ceded 
his sovereignty, ‘la souveraineté pleine et entière,’ to France. He also ceded 
the property rights over the old village of his father, giving the French a free 
hand in building whatever they wanted on this piece of land. In other words, 
by means of this treaty both the sovereignty rights and some of the property 
rights of Louis were transferred to the French.
Other cession treaties were to follow and all would contain a standard pro-
vision on the transfer of full sovereignty rights over the territory: ‘la souver-
aineté de la rivière du Gabon, comme de toutes les terres, îles et presqu’îles ou 
caps baignant cette rivière était concédée pleine et entière sur les deux rives 
à Sa Majesté le roi des Français.’40 On 19 February 1842, the French lieuten-
ants L’Alouette and La Malonine and captain Le Brick de Marseille signed a 
treaty in the name of France with the native ruler King Peter of the territory of 
Grand Bassam.  Full sovereignty rights over the territory and the river of Grand 
 Bassam were ceded to the King of France. Moreover, the French appropriated 
the exclusive right to dispose of the land, to cultivate it and to build on it: they 
had the discretion to decide on the usage of land and on buying of land from 
the actual owners. Additionally, an exclusion clause was inserted, stating that 
another State or nation was not allowed to interfere with French sovereignty 
over the territory.41 With this cession treaty, all-comprehensive sovereignty 
rights were transferred from an African native ruler to the French. This transfer 
included the power to appropriate and allocate property rights to the land. The 
French guaranteed the protection of the native inhabitants, which expressed 
the reciprocal element of the treaty relationship. Similar treaties were con-
cluded with King Koako (1843 and 1845) and with the rulers of Cagnut (1851), 
the island of Elobey (1855) and Cape Lopez (1862).42
In the Cape Lopez treaty, concluded on 1 June 1862, the native rulers of Cape 
Lopez transferred the sovereign rights to their territory to France, as Article 1 
of the treaty stipulated: ‘concèdent de leur plein gré au Gouvernement fran-
çais la souveraineté de leurs territoires.’ The natives and their rights fell under 
the authority of the French and the French government explicitly undertook 
to protect the native subjects in Article 4: ‘Le Gouvernement français accorde 
aux Rois et Chefs signataires du présent traité et à leurs sujets, […] protection.’ 
40 Rouard de Card, Traités de Protectorat, 83–84.
41 The formulation of an exclusion clause, initially based on the protection of commercial 
interests, but later on political ones too, within cession and protectorate treaties was com-
mon practice. See Alexandrowicz, European-African Confrontation, 55–56.
42 H. Paulin, L’Afrique Equatoriale Française (Paris: Eyrolles, 1924), 6.
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The implications of this transfer for existing property rights to lands within the 
territory would only become clear at a later stage. In the treaty between the 
King of Cayor and France of 4 December 1863, the King undertook to recog-
nize ‘la suzeraineté de l’Empereur des Français et se placer sous la protection 
de la France’ (Article 2). In the treaty concluded between colonel M.E. Pinet-
Laprade and King Malégui-Touré, the King agreed to ‘placer lui, son pays et 
ses sujets sous la suzeraineté et le protectorat de la France.’ And in the treaty 
between France, represented by Governor M.E. Pinet-Laprade, and the King 
Douka of Landoumas of 21 January 1866, declared to ‘placer lui et son pays sous 
la suzeraineté de la France’ (Article 1). In Article 2, the Governor recognized 
Douka as the King of Landoumas and promised to protect him. Of particular 
interest is the fifth treaty provision, which contained an explicit expression of 
the continuity principle: ‘Rien n’est change pour le moment aux Conventions 
qui règlent les droits que paient à Douka les traitants pour leurs établissements 
à terre.’ The treaty would not annul existing rights to the land.
Another example of a cession treaty as formulated by the French authorities 
is that between the Kings of Bériby and Lieutenant François-Eugène Crespin 
on 4 February 1868. In this treaty, the Kings ‘concèdent […] la souveraineté 
pleine et entière de tout le territoire soumis à leur autorité.’ Sovereignty rights 
over the territory of Bériby were transferred to France, but the applicability of 
the continuity principle was implicitly recognized: ‘les Français auront donc 
seuls le droit d’y arborer leur pavillon et d’y créer tous les établissements ou 
fortifications qu’ils jugeront utiles ou nécessaires, en achetant les terrains aux 
propriétaires actuels’ (Article 1). Explicit references to this principle were un-
common. Usually, only words expressing the cession of sovereignty over the 
concerned territory were used, as the treaty with the King of Dahomey trans-
ferring Kotonou beach, concluded on 19 May 1868: ‘Le roi de Dahomey […] fait 
cession à la France de la plage de Kotonou.’ Or, as in the treaty with the King of 
Boungé of 23 August 1873, the native ruler gave France ‘en toute propriété tous 
les territoires sous sa domination.’ To conclude this enumeration, on 3 April 
1879, King Bey-Scherbro of the Samo territory concluded a treaty with the 
French Colonel M.G. Brière de l’Isle, in which the King declared to place ‘son 
pays et ses sujets sous la suzeraineté et le protection de la France et s’engage 
à ne jamais céder aucune partie de sa souveraineté sans le consentement du 
Gouvernement de français.’
French cession treaties concluded with native rulers were clear on the 
object of transfer: sovereignty over territory.43 Until the early 1870s, France 
43 See, for example, the cession treaties regarding Gabon of 9 February 1839 and Batanga of 
30 March 1842. See A.J.H. de Clercq and J. de Clercq, Recueil des Traités de la France, vol. iv 
(Paris: Amyot, 1865), 445 and 617.
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concluded few treaties on the transfer of territorial sovereignty with native 
rulers in Equatorial Africa. This period of low treaty intensity, however, was 
marked by a gradual, if incomplete, transition from the use of cession treaties 
to the use of protectorate treaties.
3.2 Protectorate Treaties
A characteristic feature of French protectorate treaties44 was their emphasis 
on the ‘protection’ the French would offer to the territory and to native inhab-
itants. The French considered an exclusion clause constitutive of establishing 
of a protectorate. Often a non-intervention clause was included in the treaties, 
underlining the division of sovereignty rights between France and the native 
ruler. One of the first protection treaties the French concluded in Equatorial 
Africa was that of 14 January 1868. The signatures at the bottom of the docu-
ment were those of the French lieutenant Aymès and the rulers of Fernand 
Vaz. The French considered the acquisition of this territory an important ac-
complishment, because this area, a lagoon in which the Ogooué disembogued, 
gave access to an enormous Hinterland. This estuary was well known for its 
economic riches, such as palm oil and rubber trees. Article 1 formed the basis 
for the transfer of partial sovereignty.45 The native rulers consented to cede 
their sovereignty over their territories to the French government to the extent 
that the cede sovereignty included the right to enter into relationships with 
foreign nations and to protect the territory against foreign intervention. Ar-
ticle 2 contained an exclusion clause by which the French assumed exclusive 
rights to establish and develop ‘their’ land and to limit the freedom of the na-
tives exercising their rights by subjecting such exercise to the consent of the 
French government: ‘Les Français auront seuls le droit d’y arborer leur pavil-
lon. Les Rois et les Chefs susdits s’engagent à n’autoriser sur leurs territoires 
aucun établissement de quelque nature que ce soit sans l’agrément du Gou-
vernement français.’
The effectuation of a treaty establishing a relationship of protection did 
not depend on the form and length of the treaty. For example, the treaty of 
14  February 1868 between captain Bougarel, officially representing France, 
and the ruler of Bilogue, Eyano, contained just a few sentences and its main 
purpose was to establish ‘la protection française.’ In short but clear wording a 
44 For an overview of the protectorate treaties France concluded in Equatorial Africa, see 
Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 634–641.
45 ‘Article 1 – Les Rois et les Chefs ci-dessus dénommés concèdent de leur plein gré au 
Gouvernement français la souveraineté de leurs territoires et, par suite, le droit exclu-
sif de traiter avec les puissances étrangères et d’y fonder tels établissements qu’il jugera 
convenable.’
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French protectorate over the Bilogue territory was instituted. In general, how-
ever, as protectorate treaties gained prominence, indefinite or ambiguous for-
mulation of the treaty provisions prevailed. It was especially when the scope 
of transferred rights had to be established that words failed. On the one hand, 
the French intended to establish protectorates and accordingly classified these 
treaties as protectorate treaties. On the other hand, subsequent French con-
duct suggested that all-comprehensive sovereignty rights over the territory had 
been transferred. In the majority of cases, the subject of natives’ proprietary 
rights to land was addressed and arranged explicitly in the treaties. Formula-
tions such as ‘Les chefs et tous les indigènes conservent l’entière propriété de 
leurs terres’ are common in French protectorate treaties.46 A final observation 
is that a majority of the treaties concluded in the 1860s were signed by official 
representatives of the French government, often in a military capacity. This 
indicated the public nature of the French colonial venture, a corollary of the 
French policy of direct rule.
On 17 October 1867, the French High Commissioner of Gabon and the Gold 
Coast, Mr Fleuriot de Langle, signed a protectorate treaty with the rulers of 
the Seckiani, a people on the Gabonese coast. This treaty followed earlier trea-
ties of commerce and political relations concluded in 1842, 1844 and 1845, and 
aimed at establishing a French protectorate. Article 2 of the treaty stated that 
the rulers consented to French intervention in political affairs: ‘[N]ous avons 
librement consenti entre ses mains un traité qui donne à la France le droit 
d’intervention politique dans nos affaires.’ The treaty also expressed the inten-
tion to treat the African natives and French citizens as equals (Article 5). In the 
final provision of the treaty, the native rulers undertook to place themselves 
under the sovereignty of the French government and to become subjects of the 
French Empire (Article 6). The object of the treaty – transfer of partial external 
sovereignty – was clear, but the extent of the transferred sovereignty was not. 
On the one hand, the text seems to indicate the transfer of full internal and 
external sovereignty rights. For example, the provision on equal treatment of 
African natives implies that the African polity was placed under French super-
vision and supports the claim that sovereignty was ceded. On the other hand, 
the treaty is officially archived in the French records as a protectorate treaty, 
which suggests the transfer of external sovereignty rights only. In addition, the 
treaty did not address the issue of the effect of the treaty on existing rights to 
46 Article 3 of the protectorate treaty between France and the rulers of the Konga territory of 
12 October 1888. A.J.H. de Clercq and J. de Clercq, Recueil des Traités de la France, vol. xviii 
(Paris: Durand et Pedone-Lauriel, 1893), 120–121.
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land. No mention was made of native land ownership. This is another indica-
tion that this treaty established a protectorate, because such rights need not be 
addressed when instituting a relationship of protection. This lack of specificity 
might even benefit the native population, because there was a very real chance 
that formulating existing rights would narrow their scope.
The race for African territory, more specifically Equatorial Africa, truly be-
gan in the 1870s. On 24 October 1877, for example, the rulers of Fouta placed 
their territory ‘sous la protection de la France.’ Several explorers entered the 
mainland of Equatorial Africa, with De Brazza as the main contender. His first 
mission was from 1875 to 1878, which took him to and beyond the Ogooué River, 
second in importance to the Congo River only, and two branches of the Congo, 
the Alima and the Likona. De Brazza concluded various treaties with African 
rulers and their people, creating the protectorate of French Congo, which con-
tained ‘un grand nombre de petits royaumes ou de villages, grâces aux traités 
régulièrement passés avec les chefs indigènes par M. de Brazza lui-même.’47 
The protectorate existed of a patchwork of native kingdoms and other political 
entities, with which De Brazza had concluded treaties. When De Brazza en-
countered African tribes living on the banks of the river occurred, local rituals 
and customs were observed to establish friendly relations and trust between 
the African natives and the French.48 These contacts were vital in opening the 
door to French trade on and rule over the territory.
During his second mission in Equatorial Africa, which started in 1879, De 
Brazza aimed to open up the Congo and to secure for France free navigation 
of the Congo River. It was not all plain sailing though: Stanley entered the fray. 
What emerged was a competition for treaties to acquire title to territory in 
this part of Africa between an Italian who acted in the name of France and a 
British American who served a Belgian sovereign. Before De Brazza founded 
Franceville on the confluence of the Ogooué and the Passa, he set foot on the 
territory of the Batékes. This native community was ruled by King Makoko. 
Makoko welcomed De Brazza and subsequently signed a protectorate treaty 
on 10 September 1880. This protectorate treaty with the Batékes people is one 
of the most cited treaty texts in French colonial history, and it is yet another 
case of ambiguity attending the distinction between cession and establishing 
a protectorate appeared. This confusion was mainly caused by the use of the 
words ‘prise de possession.’ According to the literal text of the treaty, Makoko 
transferred external and internal sovereignty over the territory to France. It is 
47 Rouard de Card, Traités de Protectorat, 84.
48 West, Brazza, 83. The French could, however, count for native resistance too. Ibid.
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clear that the sovereignty rights over the specified territory were ceded from 
Makoko to De Brazza. The treaty emphasised taking possession of the terri-
tory in the name of France. The term possession was used, referring not to the 
public but rather the private law sphere. What remained unclear was whether 
this meant the transfer of external and internal sovereignty or merely external 
sovereignty over the territory and whether proprietary rights to the land were 
involved in the transfer or not.
Two opposing explanations can be offered for the fact that the treaty either 
mentioned native property rights not at all or only in passing. One is that the 
treaty concluded between De Brazza and Makoko established a conventional 
relationship of protection, leaving internal sovereignty rights, and by exten-
sion the right to possess and allocate private rights to property, to the people 
of the Batékes. The other is that full sovereignty over the territory was trans-
ferred, as part of which transfer the French also obtained the competence to 
acquire and allocate property rights to land. From the treaty text the nature 
of the treaty cannot be derived. French legal doctrine, however, assumed that 
the treaty established a protectorate over Makoko’s territory: ‘Le 10 septembre 
1880, intervint une traité par lequel le roi Makoko soumettait ses Etats à notre 
protectorat.’49 It was not until November 1882, that French Parliament recog-
nized the series of bilateral treaties concluded by De Brazza with African rul-
ers, constituting the French Congo.50 Many French jurists regarded the treaty 
as genuinely negotiated between De Brazza and Makoko – ‘Makoko was nei-
ther coerced nor tricked’51 – and that the treaty was therefore to be conceived 
as having been validly concluded. According to these authors, among whom 
Henry Brunschwig, the treaty between the two parties was concluded on a 
basis of equality and brought reciprocal advantages, and was therefore not 
founded on the hierarchical relationship presumed by the civilization mission.
After having mandated sergeant Malamine to establish colonial rule over 
the protectorate, De Brazza continued on his explorative and acquisitive 
journey into the Hinterland of Gabon along the Congo. He was, however, not 
the only person acting and concluding treaties under the auspices of France. 
49 Rouard de Card, Traités de Protectorat, 85.
50 The ratification of the treaty with King Makoko was asked for separately by the Govern-
ment to the Chambers. For the text of the request, see Dubois and Terrier, Colonies fran-
çaises, 605. For more details on this treaty and its ratification by the French Government, 
see J. Stengers, ‘The Partition of Africa: L’Impérialisme Colonial de la fin du XIX-Siècle: 
Mythe ou Realité,’ Journal of African History, 3 (1962), 469–491.
51 H. Brunschwig, ‘La négociation du traité Makoko,’ Cahiers D’Etudes Africaines, 6 (1966), 11. 
See also West, Brazza, 110.
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In addition to the efforts of several explorers to establish a French protector-
ate in Equatorial Africa,52 the Ministry of the Marine in the 1880s directed at-
tempts to establish new settlements in the estuaries of the Congo and Ogo-
oué rivers. The responsible minister instructed Mr Cordier, the commandant 
of the ship Sagittaire, to conclude treaties with the natives living in these 
 deltas. On 12 March 1883, Cordier concluded a treaty with the King of Loango, 
Manimacosso- Chicusso, which placed the concerned territory under the pro-
tection of France. A closer look at the text of this treaty is necessary, because 
it is representative of the majority of the treaties concluded between French 
agents and African rulers in the area and because it uses some noteworthy 
concepts, formulations and references. The main provision of the treaty was 
Article 1: ‘S.M. le roi de Loango déclare placer son pays sous la suzeraineté 
et le protectorat de la France.’ On the basis of this provision Manimacosso- 
Chicusso placed his territory under the suzerainty and protection of France. 
The use of the feudal law concept of suzerainty is noteworthy. The term protec-
torate in combination with suzerainty was common in French protectorates.53 
 Although establishing a protectorate and referring to a suzerainty relationship 
are not necessarily contradictory, their combined use can and did cause confu-
sion. On the one hand the term suzerainty suggested a hierarchical relation-
ship between France and the African polity. On the other hand, a protectorate 
presumed the existence of reciprocal obligations between the two contracting 
parties. Despite (or quite possibly because of) this ambiguity, treaty formula-
tions of this kind enabled France to divide sovereignty rights between itself 
and the native ruler.54 A case in point is the treaty with native ruler Moré Sé-
dou of 21 April 1880, who placed ‘son pays et ses sujets sous la suzeraineté et le 
protection de la France.’
52 Notorious names of explorers were those of Dolisie, Dunod, Fourneau, Cholet, de Pou-
mayrac de Masredon and Gaillard. A. Dolisie concluded an important treaty with the na-
tive rulers of the territories of Mobendjellé, on 5 September 1887. For the treaty text, see 
Rouard de Card, Traités de Protectorat, 182–183.
53 Treaties containing this combination of suzerainty and protection regarded the territories 
of Haback (21 April 1880), Candiah, Maneah and Tombo (20 June 1880), Loango (12 March 
1883), Bramaya (14 June 1883), Bangone and Betimbe (5 September 1883),  Ouvinia (23 Au-
gust 1884), Djolof (18 April 1885), Caniak (2 February 1887), Impfondo (21 September 1887), 
Bougombo (6 October 1888), Bozolo (8 and 9 October 1888), Bozangné (11 October 1888), 
Badjongo (11 October 1888), Konga (12 October 1888), Bodjo (19 October 1888), Boyelé 
(21 October 1888), N’Goma (22 October 1888), Mondjimbo (23 October 1888), Bollembé 
(30 October 1888) and Longo (4 November 1888). See Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 
634–641.
54 See Alexandrowicz, European-African Confrontation, 80.
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Unlike the foregoing treaties, the protectorate treaty concluded with 
 Manimacosso-Chicusso explicitly mentioned the property rights of the Afri-
can inhabitants. Article 3 stipulated that Manimacosso-Chicusso and his sub-
jects would retain their property rights and the liberties accompanying these 
rights, such as use and sale of the land. Article 4 laid down the freedom of com-
merce, the prohibition of slave trade and the acknowledgement of the equal 
status of the African and French contracting parties. These provisions suggest 
a non-hierarchical protection relationship. The reiteration of the prohibition 
of slave trade appeared in almost every treaty which the French concluded 
with African natives. The assertion of this prohibition reflected French com-
mitment to human civilization and served first and foremost to advertise and 
justify French colonial practices on the African continent. Article 5 was an ex-
clusion clause. The last provision of the treaty acknowledged the public nature 
of the agreement by stating that the treaty would enter into force after French 
Parliament had ratified it.
As compared to the treaty concluded with the King of the Batékes, this 
treaty was far more detailed and precise on the object of transfer. Clearly, the 
territory of Manimacosso-Chicusso was placed under the protection of France 
and the natives’ property rights would be respected. Property rights were not 
included in the transfer of rights over the territory: they were left unaltered in 
the hands and at the free disposal of the African natives. To all intents and pur-
poses then, a traditional protectorate was established: Manimacosso- Chicusso 
retained his internal sovereignty and therefore the authority to allocate and 
regulate property rights. Numerous treaties were concluded in the Congo 
containing a general provision to the effect that the African ruler concerned, 
representing his people in the treaty with the French, and his people would 
retain the property rights to their lands: ‘Conserveront l’entière proprieté de 
leurs terres.’55
A good example of establishing a traditional protectorate is offered by the 
treaty between France, represented by Captain Galliéni, and several African 
rulers in the Haut-Niger territory on 3 April 1880. The rulers declared that they 
‘vivent indépendants de toute puissance étrangère et qu’ils usent de cette in-
dépendance pour placer, de leur plein gré, eux, leur pays et les populations 
qu’ils administrent, sous le protectorat exclusif de la France’ (Article 1). In this 
provision then the rulers asserted their independence and agreed to place it 
55 Ibid., 102. Treaties containing this clause are enumerated by Alexandrowicz: the treaty 
with the rulers Ouiyou and Kikoua Mobai on 15 August 1891, Zebia and Couma of Libonga 
on 28 August 1891, Doungouta of Cetema on 30 August 1891, the ruler of Dambassa on 
1 September 1891, and Nikessé of Yakomo on 6 September 1891.
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exclusively under French protection. Article 2 described in some detail what 
this protection by France entailed: ‘Le Gouvernement français s’engage à ne 
jamais s’immiscer dans les affaires intérieures du pays, à laisser chaque chef 
gouverner et administrer son peuple suivant leurs us et coutumes ou religion; 
à ne rien changer dans la constitution du pays qu’il prend sous la protection.’ A 
protectorate, in its traditional sense, meant abstaining from interference in the 
internal affairs of the native population and respecting their laws and customs. 
The same formulation can be found in the treaties with the ruler of Foula-
dougou, Boulounkoun-Dafa, concluded on 16 April 1880 and with the rulers of 
the Kita territory of 25 April 1880. A frequently used variation on the clarifica-
tion of the division of rights and duties within a protectorate can be found in 
the treaty concluded with the King of Gadougou on 12 March 1881. In Article 
1, the King declared to place his territory under the exclusive protectorate of 
France and, in Article 2, France ‘promet aide et protection au roi Bassi; elle ne 
s’immiscera pas dans les affaires intérieures du pays.’
This extensive explanation of the division of rights between France and the 
native ruler in the context of a protectorate disappeared from the treaties in 
the course of time. In 1884, for example, when a French protectorate was es-
tablished over the territory of Niécoma, Article 1 stated the following: ‘Le pays 
de Niécoma est place sous la protection de la France.’ No description or indica-
tion of the rights and duties of either treaty party was given. Another example 
of a basic protection treaty is that signed on 15 December 1883 by the rulers of 
the Bata territory and France in Libreville. The rulers ‘demand[ent] la protec-
tion du Gouvernement français’ – they asked for the protection of the French 
government. What this protection entailed was not articulated. This became 
common practice in the treaties concluded during the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century. For example, the treaty with the rulers of Cottocrou, con-
cluded on 21 July 1887, only stated that the rulers concerned ‘reconnaissent 
la protection française,’ and in the treaty of 23 December 1888, the ruler of 
Kantora declared that his territory ‘est placé sous la protectorat de la France.’
In addition to individuals, whether or not mandated by the French State, 
associations also entered into treaties with African rulers. The aim of the trea-
ties concluded by these associations was that of ‘relinquishing sovereignty,’ 
as Alexandrowicz characterizes the purport of the activities of these associa-
tions.56 The private initiatives of the associations led by the French explorer 
56 Ibid., 58–59. Examples of provisions stating that cession of territory ‘involves relin-
quishment’ of rights are to be found in the treaty with the King of Dieba of 14 June 1883, 
the King of Vindenou of 29 December 1883 and King Kinguela Macassa of 20 March 1884. 
Ibid, 59.
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Paul Crampel (1864–1891) and the Polish explorer Jean Dybowski (1856–1928) 
were welcomed enthusiastically and supported by the French government. 
Both men contributed to the territorial extension of France by signing several 
treaties with native rulers. A treaty that is representative of these private ini-
tiatives is the treaty of 18 October 1888 concluded between the rulers of the 
villages of Mindong and Kaléton and Crampel, who signed the treaty in the 
name of France. Article 1 brought the territories and peoples of Mindong and 
Kaléton under the ‘sovereignty and protection’ of France and confirmed that 
other nations were excluded from obtaining sovereign rights over the territo-
ries concerned: only external sovereignty rights would change hands. However, 
the substance of the relationship of protection was not defined and articu-
lated. Under Article 2 and 4, the French treaty party received some rights and 
privileges regarding the use of the territory, but the treaty text did not imply or 
suggest installing a French administration. These provisions can be construed 
as an intention of the French not to interfere with the internal sovereignty of 
the African rulers. Article 3 subjected the settlement and acquisition of land 
within the territories concerned by Frenchmen and ‘strangers’ to approval of 
the French authorities, more specifically the commissioner-general.57 While 
this indicates French interference with the internal sovereignty rights of the 
rulers of the Mindong and Kaléton polities, at least in relation to strangers, it 
does not automatically exclude a relationship of protection. Article 3 did imply 
that the natives could not freely dispose of their property rights, but in Article 
5 the French undertook to respect the law and customs of the native inhabit-
ants, as long as these did not contradict humanity. Article 6 stipulated that the 
natives would be treated as French subjects. That the agreement involved the 
establishment of a treaty relationship between France and the native rulers 
was recognized in Article 7, which referred to the need of treaty ratification.
The vagueness in determining the object of transfer indicates that the 
French gave themselves room for discretion. In the twilight zone between ces-
sion and protectorate, they were free to act as if they held sovereign authority 
in controlling the territory and to serve French interests. The treaties France 
concluded with native rulers exemplify the paradox of the colonial protector-
ate. On the one hand only external sovereignty rights were subject to trans-
fer, as the establishment of a protectorate indicated. On the other hand, the 
extent of the transferred sovereign rights was indeterminate, which imbued 
the French with much space to expand their rule over the territory, as will be 
57 ‘Aucun Français ou étranger ne pourra s’établir ni acheter de terrain dans la région s’il 
n’est agent du gouvernement et envoyé par le commissaire général ou l’autorité compé-
tente ou s’il n’a reçu de la dite autorité une permission spéciale à cet effet.’ Ibid.
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argued later on (§4). In comparison to Britain, France was less reluctant to em-
ploy colonial protectorates. The use of open formulations and contradictions 
left room for discretion on the side of the French authorities.
Another situation in which the precise object of transfer and the division 
of sovereignty rights were left undetermined was the treaty concluded be-
tween France and King Glass, ruler of his people living in a part of Gabon, 
on 28 March 1844. Article 4 of the treaty contained a non-intervention clause 
stipulating that ‘[c]onsidérant la bonne administration intérieure du Roi Glass 
rien n’y sera change.’ Here, the division of sovereign rights into an external 
and an internal element, between the protector and the protected, was obvi-
ous. Article 1, however, seemed to imply the transfer of external and internal 
sovereignty in that it stated that ‘Le Roi Glass […] concede la souveraineté […].’ 
What this formulation makes clear is that the French were well aware of the 
distinction between a protectorate and a colony or annexation.
In response to the increasing competition for African territory in the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century, the French simplified their treaty texts. 
Short and standardized treaties became common practice in the rush for ter-
ritorial title. Such a standard treaty, consisting of three sentences, was conclud-
ed on 5 December 1891 between Dybowski and M’Poko, the ruler of the villages 
of Makorou.58 Under the exclusion clause,59 the territory was placed under the 
protection of France. Under this treaty the natives committed themselves to 
protecting French citizens and to guaranteeing the French free passage and 
settlement on the territory. This indicated that the rulers retained their rights 
of internal sovereignty. As in other protectorate treaties, the substance of this 
relationship of protection was not determined, but in view of the wording of 
the treaty a traditional protectorate was established, implying that only exter-
nal sovereignty was transferred from the native ruler M’Poko to France.
3.3 Evaluation of French Treaty Practices
What does this analysis of French treaty practices in Equatorial Africa yield? 
First, from the 1850s onwards, the nature of French treaty practices on the Af-
rican continent gradually changed. Initially, cession under the assumption of 
the continuity principle was the main mode to acquire sovereignty over Afri-
can territory. Cession, however, was soon abandoned and establishing protec-
torates became the means to gain control over territory. The French developed 
a broad practice of instituting colonial protectorates on the basis of  bilateral 
58 Rouard de Card, Traités de Protectorat, 186–187.
59 Often this exclusion clause was accompanied by the prohibition directed to the African 
natives to alienate land to other Europeans. See Dareste, Recueil de législation, 1827, 2.
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treaties they concluded with native rulers. From a financial, political and 
practical perspective, annexation of African territory was undesirable and 
impossible. Title to African territory had to be acquired through protectorate 
treaties that aimed to exclude other European States from claiming the territo-
ry. Preferring protectorates to cession of sovereignty over territory was a care-
fully considered policy change implemented by the French colonial power.
Second, the substance of the established relationships of protection was 
indeterminate as a result of ambiguous and contradictory terminology, such 
as the simultaneous use of protectorate-related terminology and the concept 
of suzerainty. While the wording of the treaty would often indicate a tradi-
tional protectorate based on a relationship between equal parties, the African 
polity was placed under the suzerainty of France, a move which effectively 
constituted a hierarchical relationship between the dominant French and the 
subordinate African contracting parties.60 Some of the first treaties included 
a non-intervention clause. Such a clause stated that the treaty-based relation-
ship of protection between Frenchmen and African natives conferred external 
sovereignty rights on France, while the African ruler preserved the authority 
over the internal affairs of his polity. In addition, the French contracting party 
often expressly undertook to respect native laws and customs on condition 
that these did not conflict with French standards.
Third, if existing rights to land were mentioned in the treaties at all, France 
promised to respect them – in keeping with the continuity principle. Free dis-
posal of the property and rights was excluded; such disposal was subject to 
French approval. The treaties concluded in the period when the scramble was 
at its fiercest did not address existing rights of natives at all.
Fourth, the French civilizing mission was incorporated in the treaties. The 
African contracting party was expected to accommodate French individuals 
and authorities and to develop its culture in accordance with French civiliza-
tion.61 Assimilation of local people to French law and customs was often ex-
plicitly addressed in the treaties with such formulations as ‘Le chef s’engage 
à user de toute son influence pour faire bénéficier les populations soumises à 
son autorité de tous les avantages de civilisation.’62
60 See Galtier, Conditions de l’Occupation, 80.
61 See J. Vernier de Byans, Condition Juridique et Politique des Indigènes dans les Possessions 
Coloniales (Paris: Leclerc, 1906).
62 Article 5 of the protectorate treaty between France and the ruler of the Bodjo-Bagoumba 
territory (Congo) of 19 October 1888. A.J.H. de Clercq and J. de Clercq, Recueil des Traités 
de la France, vol. xviii (Paris: Durand et Pedone-Lauriel, 1893), 140–141.
161French Equatorial Africa
During the scramble for Africa, the French used standardized treaties which 
established relationships of protection. Towards the end of the European race 
for territory, the wording of French treaties with native rulers became increas-
ingly vague, especially in describing which rights were transferred to what ex-
tent from the ruler to France. This indeterminateness gave the French much 
room for discretion in interpreting and executing the treaties. This evaluation 
raises the question whether and how treaty obligations and guarantees were 
brought into practice and whether this practice observed contemporary inter-
national law. To address this question the following sections will explore the 
legislation enacted by the French authorities in the territories in Equatorial 
Africa and case law on the conduct of France after it had signed a protectorate 
treaty.
4 Legislation in the Wake of the Transfer of External Sovereignty
France regarded its overseas territories as extensions of the European moth-
erland: the colonies were integral parts of the French Republic and the Colo-
nial Office was charged with the central organization of the colonial system. In 
fulfilling its task, the Colonial Office was supported by the Conseil Supérieur, 
an independent organ of experts that was tasked to give advice on colonial 
matters. The Colonial Office functioned on a very general level in that it only 
observed everyday colonial matters and developments. In practice, the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior Affairs determined the actual 
administration of the colonies. The French Ministry of the Colonies is often 
characterized as being ‘the mouthpiece of central interests’ in that it had ‘no 
function of linking the interests of both colony and mother-country.’63 The 
Colonial Office was used as an instrument by two Ministries to realize their 
politics.
The French authorities preferred to rule the overseas territories through 
legislation and by applying the legal system directly, but the French govern-
ment was forced to delegate competences to authorities and private individu-
als and companies in the colonies themselves, because centralized rule over 
the overseas territories proved untenable. Nevertheless, French Parliament re-
tained its position of sovereign power in that its acts could not be challenged 
and it had the power to bar any legislative act in and regarding the overseas 
63 Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy, 136. Roberts adds to this: ‘Nor is it [the French 
Ministry of Colonies] concerned only with questions of general policy: it administers and 
governs as well decides policy.’ Ibid.
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territories. French Parliament used its competence to legislate in all matters 
colonial. Legislation in the colonies existed for the greater part of decrees, 
ordered and imposed by French authorities. Legislating by way of decrees 
was considered an effective and consequent way to control non-European 
territories.64
Decrees regarding concessions and determining the public domain in 
French Equatorial Africa were necessary to organize the territory and posses-
sion of land.65 Legal security in transactions of real estate and low transaction 
costs were essential to territorial trade and exploitation. A special commission 
was established in 1898, which had to design a concession system enabling 
companies to divide the lands in Equatorial Africa. The concession system was 
based on two premises: French land law applied to the African territories and 
the French State owned all lands which were ‘vacant et sans maître.’ France 
had the right to dispose of the land and allocate possession of it to others, and 
concessionaires’ associations obtained a monopoly on land possession.66 To 
achieve effective control over the territory, establishing a regime of registered 
property and determining public domain lands were crucial. Decrees were 
proclaimed enabling large-scale concessions and allocations of land by and to 
France and its subjects.67 This system of concessions delegated to some large 
colonial companies ‘la libre possession de certains territoires avec obligation 
pour elles d’y créer des routes, d’y améliorer le cours des fleuves, d’y utiliser 
le sol, mais aussi avec la sécurité que personne ne pourra vernir derrière elles 
jouir et bénéficier de leurs dépenses et de leurs efforts.’68 These associations 
were given the right by the French State to use the land and to buy plots of 
land from native inhabitants which they possessed within ceded territory.69 
By simple decree – bypassing both French Parliament and the Conseil d’Etat – 
the French government delegated the authority to organize the police force, 
levy taxes, administer justice and conclude treaties with other nations to these 
colonial companies.
64 On French legislation in its overseas colonies, see P. Dislère, Traité de législation coloniale, 
2nd edn (Paris: Dupont, 1897).
65 See J. Imbart de la Tour, La question du domaine et l’organisation de la propriété dans les 
colonies françaises (Paris: Challamel, 1900).
66 For the conditions to obtain a concession, see Journal Officiel du Gabon, 1re année, N° 8, 
p. 3, as published Rouget, Expansion coloniale, 617.
67 See Paulin, Afrique Equatoriale, 78.
68 E. Etienne, Les compagnies de colonisation (Paris: Challamel, 1897), as quoted by Paulin, 
Afrique Equatoriale, 78. See also Pauliat Report in Journal Officiel (1898), 13.
69 F. Challaye, Le Congo Français. La Question Internationale du Congo (Paris: Alcan, 1909), 
168.
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An example of a decree instituting a large-scale concession system was the 
decree of 28 March 1899, promulgated in French Congo. The concessions in-
volved hundreds of thousands of hectares of land.70 The decree stated that 
the concessionaires would have a quasi-monopoly for thirty years on the agri-
cultural and industrial exploitation of the specified lands as well as on the ex-
ploitation of the forests.71 In exchange for the use and exploitation of the land, 
a license fee had to be paid and the French administration was authorized to 
intervene in this system of conceding and allocating land.
As a consequence of the extent of the rights and liberties the French State 
was willing to delegate, many associations and companies of concessionaires72 
were established to organize and exploit French territories, and a truly unprec-
edented rush for concessions ensued. Great parts of Equatorial Africa fell into 
the hands of private settlers and companies. Disorder came to dominate day-
to-day reality and was ubiquitous: ‘A concession virtually meant the handing-
over of a given area to a private Company, with its power untrammeled within 
that area, − in fact, the setting up of so many enclaves of practically indepen-
dent trading kingdoms within the colony.’73 Often the companies did not 
observe the principle of free navigation, did not comply with the rules and 
conditions imposed by the French authorities and failed to respect the rights 
of the native inhabitants – the latter were frequently dispossessed.74
Instituting these concession systems met with resistance. Opponents of the 
system pointed to the presence of African polities and argued that the lands 
of Equatorial Africa were held in collective property by the indigenous inhab-
itants. These lands, the critics argued, were not ‘vacant et sans maître,’ they 
were not terra nullius. In fact, so the critics argued, African natives were dispos-
sessed of their lands as a consequence of the concession systems. Regarding 
these dispossessions, Félicien Challaye (1875–1967), a lieutenant of De Brazza, 
70 Already in 1893 the so-called Daumas concession took place, which conceded 11 million 
hectares from the French State to the settler Daumas. For the text of the concession docu-
ment, see Rouget, Expansion coloniale, 610.
71 Paulin, Afrique Equatoriale, 79.
72 The active associations of concessionaires were in Gabon, the Société agricole, forestière 
et industrielle pour l’Afrique (s.a.f.i.f.) and the Compagnie de la N’Goko-Sangha (later the 
Compagnie Française Congo-Cameroun); and in the Moyen-Congo, the Société française 
du Haut-Congo, the Société l’Alimaienne, the Société de l’Ongomo, the Société de l’Alima, 
the Compagnie de la Lefini, the Compagnie de la Kimé et de la Kéni, the Société de la Sang-
ha Equatoriale, the Compagnie forestière Sangha-Oubanghi and the Société Française 
l’Ouhamé-Nana. See Paulin, Afrique Equatoriale, 81–82.
73 G. Bruel, L’Afrique Equatoriale Française (Paris: Larose, 1918), 430.
74 Paulin, Afrique Equatoriale, 79.
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who was to report on French colonial practices, stated that France did not ob-
serve its international obligations. He urged the French State to intervene and 
put a stop to the illegal situation.75 Paris did react. In 1898, a Commission of 
Colonial Concessions was set up in Paris, which introduced a new concession 
system by formulating the obligations of the individual and collective conces-
sionaires in the famous Pauliat Report.76 The Report supported the idea of es-
tablishing reserves in which the natives had to live, a suggestion adopted by 
the French authorities. What the Report did not do was end or limit the race 
between French companies for concessions to African land.
In addition to instituting concession systems, the French authorities intro-
duced a registration system for real property. This system of land ownership 
registration was based on the French Code Civil and aimed to bring order and 
prevent conflicts. These objectives were, however, never realized. The registra-
tion system turned out to be so complex as to render the desired overview 
unattainable, and it resulted in conflicts between Europeans and between Eu-
ropeans and African natives. The French authorities responded by enacting 
more legislation and the resultant workload increase caused the colonial judi-
cial system to grow exponentially.
In an attempt to establish effective control and to regulate the appropria-
tion and allocation of rights to land in Equatorial Africa, the French created 
new administrative and judicial bodies. Direct rule implied the imposition of 
French administrative and judicial culture on the native inhabitants: dictated 
assimilation.77 Although the native population of Equatorial Africa resisted 
French rule, they were unable to stop France’s imperial expansion and its con-
sequences. Colonial legislation extinguished African natives’ rights.78 Both 
native sovereignty and property rights were undermined after the protectorate 
treaties had been concluded. Whether this unilateral extension of French sov-
ereignty over African territory accorded with contemporary international law 
is an issue that will be addressed in Chapter 8.
5 Case Law and the Interpretation of Treaties
French conduct after the protectorate treaties in Equatorial Africa had been 
concluded entailed the gradual acquisition of full sovereign powers over the 
75 Challaye, Congo Français, 185. See J.-L. de Lanessan, Principes de Colonisation (Paris:  Alcan, 
1897), 59.
76 Pauliat Report in Journal Officiel (1898).
77 Dareste, Recueil de législation, 12.
78 See De Lanessan, Principes de Colonisation, 59.
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territory by the unilateral enactment of legislation. The French gave them-
selves the authority to regulate and allocate property rights, which in practice 
meant dispossessing natives and often relocating them to reserves. In their 
relations with other European colonial powers, the French government used 
the treaties with the African natives to substantiate their claims to the land. 
Using a selection of judicial decisions, this section offers a brief evaluation of 
France’s interpretation and execution of its protectorate treaties.
The first thing to be observed is that French case law was not as extensive 
and rich as that of Britain. There are very few judicial decisions that directly 
address sovereignty and property rights and the relationship between the two 
concepts in the context of the French acquisition of African territory. In addi-
tion to the difference in legal traditions (civil law and common law), two main 
reasons can be adduced to explain the scarcity of relevant case law. First, the 
natives of Equatorial Africa had limited access to French colonial courts. Na-
tives would face many obstacles in trying to bring their case before court: their 
presumed lack of civilization, the small number of colonial courts throughout 
the entire French-controlled territory in central Africa (making for virtually 
unfeasible travel distances) and the financial obligations attached to institut-
ing legal action made it hard if not impossible for natives to claim their rights 
in court.
The judicial system in Equatorial Africa, modelled after the French domestic 
system, was hierarchical. The system ranged from courts of first instance to the 
highest instances of the Cour de Cassation or the Conseil d’Etat, both located in 
Paris. Courts were often called Justices de paix. Every protectorate, which was 
divided into areas, had its own judges and courts based on the model of French 
judicial organization. The French Congo, for example, had four Justices de paix, 
located in Brazzaville, Loango, Loudima and Ouesso. In Libreville, capital of 
the Gabon protectorate, a tribunal of first instance and a Justice de paix were 
instituted, and two Justices de paix could be found in the interior, in N’Djolé 
and Fernand Vaz. Oubangui-Chari accommodated two Justices de paix, one 
in Fort de Possel and the other in Bangui, and the protectorate of Dahomey 
boasted two Justices de paix (in Cotonou and Grand Popo). As these courts 
were instituted and managed by the French authorities, the independence and 
impartiality of the serving judges was not to be taken for granted. There was, 
however, also a number of mixed courts, in which both French and African 
judges settled disputes between Frenchmen and African natives.79
The second reason for the relatively low number of judicial decisions was 
that the French legal system was bureaucratic and centralized. As there were 
many administrative procedures to be followed to file complaints against the 
79 Alexandrowicz, European-African Confrontation., 85–89.
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French authorities, in the majority of cases a solution was found within the 
political and bureaucratic channels of French colonial administration. Most 
disputes on territorial rights and land ownership were settled out of court.
The introduction of the French legal system into Equatorial Africa was con-
ceived as very formalistic. With the Code Civil as the fundament, French legal 
conceptions and constructs were applied to the African context. For example, 
the question whether taxes were indivisible in the case of African nations, as 
their property regimes regarding land were dissimilar to the French system.80 
The introduction by the French of concepts such sale and concession into 
these local systems of collective land ownership led to complex situations. 
According to the French colonizers, the sale of land in the strict sense of the 
word was ‘tout à fait inconnue des indigenes de l’Afrique […] qui ne sont ja-
mais entrés en contact avec des européens ou avec des indigènes civilisés.’81 As 
Chapter 2 has shown, the European categorization of natives’ property rights 
to land as collective, inalienable and dependent on the personal relationship 
between the rulers and their subjects did not match day-to-day reality.82 Nev-
ertheless, the nature of native land tenure was totally different from ownership 
described in the Code Civil, determined as it was by the individual and alien-
able nature of property. Through the formalistic and assimilative approach of 
the French colonizers, a system of individual proprietary rights regarding land 
and the concession system were transplanted into the native legal system and 
society. Legal questions and conflicts were bound to arise.83
For example, in a case before the French court at Loango (1900),84 the main 
question was whether the natives living in a defined area of the French Congo 
possessed the land they inhabited. The conflict arose between British traders 
and the French State. The British traders claimed ownership of the land, argu-
ing that African natives had owned the land they had transferred to the Brit-
ish, while the French litigant denied this could have happened, referred to the 
treaty concluded between the French agent Cordier and an African ruler on 
12March 1883. In the wake of this protectorate treaty, which did not determine 
the scope of the sovereignty rights transferred, the French introduced the sys-
tem of land concessions. In essence, the Court had to decide whether it was the 
80 Tribunal civil de Nouméa, 28 octobre 1925, in: Dareste, Recueil de législation, 1927.
81 P. Dareste, Le regime de la propriété foncière en Afrique Occidentale (Paris: Marchal et 
 Billard, 1908), 8.
82 See ibid., 16.
83 For more details and an extensive exposition of case law, see ibid. and P. Dareste, Les col-
lectivités indigènes devant les tribunaux français (Cannes, 1912).
84 The case can be found in Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy, 350.
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British or the French who held ownership title to the land and therefore had 
the power to alienate the land. The Court decided in favour of the French liti-
gant by stating that the land fell within the French system of concessions, that 
within this system the land did not belong to the natives and that the natives 
could not have validly transferred title to the land to third persons without the 
approval of the concessionary power, i.e., the French administration. In other 
words, natives only possessed rights of enjoyment. It was France, according to 
the Court, that possessed the ultimate title of ownership to the land. As the na-
tives had not owned the land, the British settlers could not have acquired this 
right, let alone transfer it.
In the John Holt case (1905),85 the issue of the legality of the colonial protec-
torate was of some relevance. The Cour de Cassation had to decide whether the 
trading company of John Holt had proprietary rights to, exploitation rights of 
and building rights on a particular piece of land in French Congo. On the basis 
of the preceding decision of the Cour de Cassation, this question was answered 
in the negative: the French State had acquired exclusive rights of sovereignty 
over the territory as well as property rights to the land by way of occupation. 
The Court argued that under international law private persons cannot occupy 
territory. The Court based its reasoning on Article 539 Code Civil and the De-
cree of 28 March 1899, which implied that both the public and the private do-
main were in the hands of the French State after it had acquired territory by 
way of occupation. All proprietary rights to land accrued to the French State. 
The Court referred to the rights of the African natives three times.86 First, the 
Court spoke of the presence of African natives inhabiting the territory and the 
possibility of occupation at the same time. African natives inhabiting, using 
and owning the land did not prevent the Court from confirming the status of 
the territory as that of terra nullius. Second, the Court did not acknowledge the 
existence of natives’ property rights to the land before the French acquired the 
territory. According to the Court, natives did not possess the land by French 
standards of land ownership. Third, the Court recognized the applicability 
of international law in this situation. It argued that only sovereign States had 
the power to acquire sovereign rights over territory by way of occupation. The 
Court pointed out that occupation could only be effected by States, not by pri-
vate persons or companies such as the trading company of John Holt.
85 John Holt et C° c. Cie Coloniale de l’Ogooué, Cour de Cassation (Chambre civile), 30 March 
1905, in: P. Dareste (ed.), Recueil de législation, doctrine et jurisprudence coloniales, vol. xiii 
(Paris: Sirey, 1905), 97–102.
86 Ibid., 102.
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The Cour de Cassation thus confirmed the transition from occupation of 
terra nullius to territorium nullius on the basis of the cultural differences be-
tween the French occupier and the native inhabitants.87 In the John Holt case 
the Court argued that occupation, as a concept of international law, could 
only be effected by a sovereign State such and that through occupation France 
had acquired both all-comprehensive sovereignty rights over the territory and 
full rights of land ownership.88 This ruling set a precedent for several judicial 
 decisions.89 This monopoly of the French State on the occupation of terra 
 nullius conferred general and exclusive proprietary on the French State follow-
ing occupation of territory. The presence of African people on this territory 
did not alter the status of the territory of terra nullius. The inhabitants people 
were considered non-civilized and their political entities non-States.90 In sum, 
French colonial courts commonly upheld French occupation of African terri-
tory as well as its justification, the civilization argument.91
Nevertheless, the Court affirmed that the question of the applicability of 
international law required French lawyers to perform a delicate balancing act. 
On the one hand they would argue that international law regulated only rela-
tions between the members of the family of civilized nations. On the other 
hand, they would have to admit that international law did play a part in the 
acquisition of African territory, as international law also governed relations 
between what were termed civilized and non-civilized countries. Whether 
France complied with its international obligations when it colonized Africa is 
a question that will be addressed at a later stage.
87 Ibid., 97–102. See H. Bonfils and P. Fauchille, Manuel de Droit International Public, 3rd edn 
(Paris: Pedone, 1901), 300 and Jèze, Étude théorique, 59.
88 John Holt et C° c. Cie Coloniale de l’Ogooué, Cour de Cassation (Chambre civile), 30 March 
1905, in : Dareste, Recueil de législation, 1905, 97–102.
89 The judgment on the John Holt case formed a confirmation of several other decisions: Juge 
de paix de Libreville, 13 May 1899, Recueil 1899, 118; Conseil d’appel du Congo, 10  January 
1900, Recueil 1903, 5; Chambre des requêtes, 11 March 1902, Recueil 1903, 5; Juge de paix de 
Loango, 27 November 1901, Recueil 1901, 96 ; Conseil d’appel de Libreville, 27 November 
1901, Recueil 1902, 26; Juge de paix de Libreville, 24 September 1900, Recueil 1901, 96; Con-
seil d’appel de Libreville, 24 October 1901, Recueil 1901, 168; Tribunal civil de Libreville, 16 
January 1902, Recueil 1902, 56; Conseil d’appel de Libreville, 17 June 1902, Recueil 1903, 61; 
Tribunal civil de Libreville, 18 June 1902, Recueil 1903, 22; Tribunal supérieur de Libreville, 
27 January 1904, Recueil 1904, 132 and Tribunal de 1re instance de Libreville, 14 May 1903, 
Recueil 1905, 73. These cases were all published in Dareste, Recueil de législation, 1905.
90 See, for example J. Chailley, ‘La Politique Indigène aux Colonies,’ Revue Bleue, 12 (1888), 
354–358; and A. Girault, Les Colonies Françaises avant et depuis 1815 (Paris: Sirey, 1943).
91 Dareste, Recueil de législation, 1927, 6.
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There is hardly any case law that sheds light on the relationship between 
French and African sovereignty rights and on how this relationship affected 
property rights. French authorities or settlers and African natives rarely met 
head-on in legal proceedings. In the majority of cases, sovereignty and proprie-
tary issues arose in disputes between French settlers or companies and French 
local authorities. Many disputes over the concession system were brought 
before colonial courts. French courts often had to offer an interpretation in 
conflicts between Frenchmen, and in these legal disputes native land owner-
ship, natives’ private property rights, the definition of uninhabited territories 
and the nature of rights transferred from African natives to French colonialists 
were rarely involved directly.
As mentioned earlier, the concession system, which presupposed the ap-
plicability of French law and the absolute property rights of the French State, 
had to organize and allocate land ownership to establish legal security regard-
ing transactions of real estate and reduce transaction costs. While under these 
concession systems natives often retained the option to acquire title to a piece 
of land, in practice hardly any native inhabitants exercised it. Natives tried to 
live as much as possible in accordance with to their own laws and customs. 
From the case law of colonial courts it can be inferred that French courts tried 
to do justice to both natives and the French colonizers: they would recognize 
native property rights yet at the same time confirm the absoluteness and ex-
clusiveness of French property rights to African land. Although there were cas-
es in which judges reminded the French of the rights of African natives and of 
the duties of the French colonizer towards the native populations, the legality 
of cession and protectorate treaties and the subsequent implementation of the 
concession system were never questioned, let alone rejected.
Whether, in the case of cession, the continuity principle was respected, 
whether the French failed to comply with their obligations articulated in pro-
tectorate treaties, whether natives’ rights of sovereignty and property were im-
paired, and whether international law was violated are questions the French 
judiciary did not address. As a consequence of regarding the colonization of 
Africa as an Act of State, French courts never evaluated its legality: Acts of 
State could not be subjected to judicial review.
6 Conclusion
Although the French did not use cession treaties to acquire territorial rights 
very often, ceding territory by way of treaty was a recognized mode of terri-
torial acquisition and the French did sometimes use it. As has been shown, 
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cession treaties transferred full sovereignty over territory from native rulers 
to the French. In keeping with the continuity principle, no property rights 
were involved in these transfers, a matter which was explicitly stipulated in 
the treaties.92 Soon after the treaties had been signed, however, existing rights 
to the territory were extinguished. The French introduced their own methods 
and systems of regulating and allocating proprietary rights to land, and these 
methods and systems ignored native sovereignty and land ownership. Day-to-
day practice showed that the protected African territory came under French 
colonial rule. This raises the question whether France acted in accordance 
with the law.
The legality question also comes to the fore in the context of treaties es-
tablishing protectorates. In traditional protectorates, sovereignty was divided 
between France as the protector and the African native polity as the protected 
entity without any diminution of sovereignty rights.93 Tasks and competences 
had to be assigned to both France and the African ruler. The French, however, 
faced problems which required them to intervene directly and consequently 
to extend their sovereignty rights to include not only external relations and 
defence, but also internal affairs. This development required French legal doc-
trine to justify French appropriation of extended sovereignty rights at the ex-
pense of the competences of the African ruler. French legal doctrine argued 
that although France promised to preserve native institutions, laws and cus-
toms as much as possible, changes and interventions by French authorities 
were unavoidable.
According to the French jurist Arthur Girault (1865–1930), there were several 
reasons why France needed to extend sovereign rights over the territory from 
external to internal sovereignty.94 The first of these was that all legal institu-
tions inevitably evolve over time. After the protectorate treaties had been con-
cluded, transformations in the law were necessary to respond to the day-to-day 
problems that arose in society. Native legal institutions in Africa had to evolve: 
new needs arose because of the European presence on the African ground, and 
this presence created challenges for the natives to adapt to the new situation. 
New legal institutions were established under French rule. In other words, 
92 However, many exceptions on the rule exist. See Jèze, Étude théorique, 203.
93 A. Girault, ‘La condition juridique des indigènes dans les pays de protectorat,’ in: 
P.  Dareste, Recueil de législation, doctrine et jurisprudence coloniales, vol. 25 (Paris: Sirey, 
1922), 3. The sharing of sovereignty was confirmed by Engelhardt: E. Engelhardt, Les Pro-
tectorats Anciens et Modernes (Paris: Pedone, 1896), 207.
94 Girault, ‘Condition juridique des indigènes,’ 3–6.
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Girault asserted that France was permitted to interfere in the internal affairs of 
the protected African territories, because it became part of them.
Girault’s second argument is that the case law of the colonial courts and tri-
bunals expanded and influenced the evolution of the law in the protectorates. 
The judicial interpretation of texts and the adaptation of customary rules were 
based on the changing factual situation in which these texts and customs had 
to function. Another factor that required native African law to evolve was the 
introduction of French legal concepts made. Moreover, French civil servants 
had to apply the law to every-day events and situations. The establishment and 
development of case law, the introduction of legal concepts and the presence 
of civil servants necessitated the French extension of sovereignty. In other 
words, French interference with the rights of internal sovereignty of the native 
ruler was a posteriori justifiable.
Girault’s third argument supporting the rationale behind the French ex-
tension of sovereignty rights concerned the various legislative modifications 
imposed by the French. Although the French initially intended to introduce 
these legislative changes through a dialogue with the African natives, France 
eventually resorted to creating and enacting legislation unilaterally. Girault 
recognized that while the initial intention of mutual agreement was in con-
formity with the rationale of the protectorate treaty, in practice that intention 
never bore fruit. Decrees were the most frequently used legislative instrument 
to rule a protectorate. In Girault’s view, extension of external sovereignty rights 
to control over internal affairs by way of unilateral legislation was acceptable.
Fourthly, in addition to the development of case law and the enactment of 
legislation, legal reports were written on the situation in the protected terri-
tories and the relationship between the French and the African natives. Na-
tionally and internationally, the plurality and inconsistency of different legal 
systems proved problematic. Legal conflicts arose between France, the African 
polities and the international legal order. To settle and avoid disputes, differ-
ences between these three levels of legal order had to be resolved. Consequent-
ly, legislation had to be enacted to effectuate the necessary adjustments, which 
implied transformations in native law. Girault argued that for the benefit of 
French, native and international law, intervention in the internal affairs of the 
protected African entity was unavoidable.
Finally, the status of the natives after signing a protectorate treaty changed 
as a result of the French presence. Changing societal circumstances required 
the French colonizer to respond adequately. Girault gave these five reasons 
for French interference to justify French practices. It is perhaps worth noting 
that justifying the French extension of sovereignty rights after the protector-
ate treaties had been concluded can be considered to imply an admission on 
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Girault’s part that France did not comply with its obligations towards the Afri-
can ruler, nor towards the nation as a whole.
The jurist Édouard Engelhardt (1828–1916), assistant to Ferry (see Sections 1 
and 2), clearly outlined France’s duties towards the African nation when a 
protectorate had been established: ‘Le protecteur et le garant en effet prom-
ettent aide et assistance au protégé et au garanti et il peut même arriver que 
l’engagement du garant comprenne la clause fondamentale, soit formelle, soit 
implicite, de tout pacte de protectorat, c’est-à-dire qu’il porte sur la défense de 
l’intégrité territoriale du garanti.’95 Under the protectorate treaty, France guar-
anteed help and assistance to the protected, implying the crucial duty of de-
fending the territorial integrity of the African nation. Although it fell to France 
to maintain external relations, African internal autonomy had to be respected. 
In practice, however, the natives lost their lands, including their proprietary 
rights to these lands, and the authority of the native ruler was impaired. Ac-
cording to Engelhardt, the transfer of external sovereignty itself implied possi-
bilities of extending it to include competences that were originally part of the 
internal autonomy of the protected entity. In this sense, he agreed with Girault: 
the extension of France’s sovereignty was a natural process triggered by the 
treaty-based establishment of a protectorate.96
Another French jurist, Frantz Despagnet (1857–1906), confirmed that ef-
fective occupation of a protectorate would lead to the acquisition of all- 
comprehensive sovereign rights over territory in that a protectorate was ‘une 
sorte de conquête morale precedent et justifiant par la suite la conquête 
matérielle.’97 Despagnet argued that when a civilized State such as France es-
tablished a protectorate in an uncivilized African entity, France imposed its 
sovereignty and the African entity would become a colony under the rule of 
the protecting State. After the protectorate treaty had been negotiated and 
signed, and as French legal doctrine asserted, annexation was therefore the 
logical next step.
Given these justifications for the French acquisition practices on the Af-
rican continent, the question remains whether the unilateral extension of 
sovereignty by France on the basis of a protectorate treaty was legal. Was the 
acquisition of all-comprehensive sovereignty indeed a logical consequence or 
a natural process – in other words, a legal act – after a protectorate treaty had 
been concluded? More importantly, was France legally obligated to respect 
95 Engelhardt, Protectorats Anciens et Modernes, 216.
96 See ibid., 216–217.
97 Despagnet quoted in McCalmont Hill, ‘Growth and Development of International Law,’ 
251.
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native land ownership and the native ruler’s sovereign rights, to comply with 
the treaty provisions and to act in accordance with international law? Chapter 
8 will address these vital questions. According to Koskenniemi, the most char-
acteristic aspect of nineteenth-century French international law was ‘its ability 
to connect a cosmopolitan outlook with an impeccably patriotic alignment 
behind French interests.’98 The question is, however, whether this French ap-
proach to international law represented and accorded with international law 
as it stood at the time.




After the unification of Germany in 1871, a decade passed before Germany’s im-
perial ambitions and its quest for territorial expansion became a matter of  public 
debate. In the 1880s, the call for colonial activities became stronger as German 
private trading companies applied to their government for an official mandate 
to acquire and rule African territory. Despite his initial reluctance to become in-
volved in colonial affairs, Chancellor Bismarck yielded to the twin temptation 
of expanding Germany’s international power and creating an overseas empire. 
The Germans acquired their first territories in the tropical and rivery part of Sub-
Saharan Africa. The colonial protectorate of Deutsches Kamerun was established 
on the basis of bilateral treaties between Germany and African native rulers.
The central issue of this chapter is the German acquisition of Africa in par-
ticular Cameroonian, territory by way of treaties in the late nineteenth century. 
The aim will be to establish the historical context in which these treaties were 
negotiated and concluded and to analyse the treaty texts. The textual analysis 
will address property and sovereignty arrangements in the treaties transfer-
ring territorial sovereignty from the Cameroonian rulers to Germany. Once the 
treaty-making context has been outlined, the next question to be addressed is 
how existing sovereignty and property rights fared after the treaties had been 
signed. Specifically, the chapter will first discuss the historical context of the 
German colonial venture in Africa, more specifically Cameroon (§2). Second, 
protectorate treaties concluded between Germany and Cameroonian polities 
will be analysed to find out whether and how sovereign and property rights were 
mentioned (§3). Third, the chapter will examine how Germany established its 
control over the territory by means of legislation after the treaties had been 
concluded (§4). Fourth, the interpretation and execution of the treaties will be 
explored by discussing German conduct and the reactions of native inhabit-
ants (§5). The chapter will conclude by making some observations anticipating 
the question whether Germany’s acquisition of Cameroon was legal (§6).
2 Historical Background
Bismarck dominated the internal and foreign policies of the new German Em-
pire from its foundation in 1871 to the early 1890s. He intended to transform 
© Mieke van der Linden, 2017 | doi 10.1163/9789004321199_008 
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Germany into one of the greatest military powers on the European continent. 
In terms of imperial expansion, however, Germany was often considered to lag 
behind. In the early 1870s, Germany was neither prepared nor able to acquire 
overseas territories. It was fully occupied with internal affairs and was there-
fore not in a position to match the colonial aspirations of other European pow-
ers.1 The unification of Germany, however, not only redrew the geographical 
map of Europe, it also betrayed a strong nationalistic mindset, which was a key 
driver of Germany’s imperial expansion in the 1880s.2 Initially, Bismarck had 
no need for colonies and even labelled colonial adventures as irrational activi-
ties.3 In the 1870s, Bismarck’s diplomacy4 was trained on a calculated strategy 
1 For an extensive overview of the pressing internal affairs occupying German politics in the 
last three decades of the nineteenth century, see H.-U. Wehler, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 
1871–1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1994). See also W.J. Mommsen, Imperial 
Germany 1867–1918: Politics, Culture and Society in an Authoritarian State (London: Arnold, 
1997).
2 For an extensive overview of the general motives of the German colonization mission, see 
A. Bernard, ‘Germany’s Colonial Aims,’ Journal of the Royal African Society, 16 (1917), 306–313; 
T. Büttner, Geschichte Afrikas. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, vol. ii (Berlin: Akademie, 
1976); F.R. Cana, ‘German Aims in Africa,’ Journal of the Royal African Society, 14 (1915), 355–
365; Förster, Mommsen and Robinson, Bismarck, Europe and Africa; K. Hausen, Deutsche 
Kolonialherrschaft in Afrika. Wirtschaftsinteressen und Kolonialverwaltung in Kamerun vor 
1914 (Zurich, Freiburg: Atlantis, 1970); P. Heine and U. van der Heyden (eds.), Festschrift zum 
60. Geburtstag von Peter Sebald. Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Kolonialismus in Afri-
ka (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1995); G. Knopp, Das Weltreich der Deutschen. Von kolonialen 
Träumen, Kriegen und Abenteuern (München: Pendo, 2010); Mommsen, Imperial Germany; 
H. Schnee, Kolonialmacht Deutschland (Berlin: Hillger, 1940); H. Sippel, ‘Aspects of Colonial 
Land Law in German East Africa: German East Africa Company, Crown Land Ordinance, Eu-
ropean Plantations and Reserved Areas for Africans,’ in: R. Debusmann and S. Arnold (eds.), 
Land Law and Land Ownership in Africa. Case Studies from Colonial and Contemporary Cam-
eroon and Tanzania (Bayreuth: Bayreuth African Studies, 1996), 3–38; H. Stoecker (ed.), Ger-
man Imperialism in Africa. From the Beginnings until the Second World War (London: Hurst, 
1977); H. Zache, Das Deutsche Kolonialbuch (Berlin, Leipzig: Andermann, 1926) and H. Zache, 
Imperialismus und Kolonialpolitik (Berlin: Kolonialdruckerei, 1927).
3 Wesseling, Verdeel en Heers, 137. Bismarck put forward four different reasons why colonies 
would be an absurd liability for the Reich, which are formulated by Pakenham in the form of 
four questions: ‘First, would new colonies pay their own way? … Second, was public opinion 
ready for them? … Third, how could the German navy defend such colonies? … Fourth, what 
about the damage to his own diplomacy?’ Pakenham, Scramble for Africa, 203–204.
4 On the developments in the diplomatic field and the role of Germany, see A. Green, 
Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001); H. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 
103–200; G. Knopp, Das Weltreich der Deutschen. Von kolonialen Träumen, Kriegen und Aben-
teuern (München: Pendo, 2010); Mommsen, Imperial Germany; W. Mulligan, ‘Restrained 
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of diverting the attention and energies of the major European powers away 
from the European continent to overseas territories.5 Directing his attentions 
to sustaining the European balance of power and to strengthening Germany’s 
position within Europe, Bismarck did not see colonization as the way forward. 
First, Germany had no military infrastructure and means to acquire and protect 
foreign territory, and Bismarck was loath to make the necessary investments. 
Second, Germany had no trading companies that were capable of exploiting 
the colonies on a large scale and Bismarck did not desire to facilitate them. 
Germany was not in need of resources. In fact, overproduction was already 
causing many problems on the European mainland. Third, the financial bur-
den of acquiring and especially ruling colonies curbed public enthusiasm for 
a colonial venture in Africa. Or, in the words of Bismarck: ‘Wir sind noch nicht 
reich genug, um uns den Luxus von Kolonien leisten zu können.’6  Bismarck’s 
perspective on looking after German national interests in Germany’s relations 
with other European States was continental; Bismarck’s ‘map of Africa was in 
Europe.’7
However, in the years 1884–1885 Bismarck changed his mind,8 as he came 
under pressure of the nationalist movements within parliament,9 the trading 
companies lobby and internal social problems. An accumulation of political, 
economic and social considerations were the incentive for Bismarck to par-
ticipate in the quest for African territory. Mary Townsend eloquently describes 
this mixture of motives, which convinced German politicians, and Bismarck 
in particular, of the need for territorial expansion: ‘[A]n enhanced national 
consciousness expressed by Germans both at home and abroad; a swollen purse 
requiring objects for expenditure, and then a depleted purse in need of large 
dividends regardless of risk; and abnormally inflated production demanding 
outlet markets; mushroom industries clamouring for raw materials; an 
Competition: International Relations,’ in: S. Berger (ed.), A Companion to Nineteenth-Century 
Europe, 1789–1914 (Malden, Oxford, Carlton: Blackwell, 2006), 401–422; J.L. Richardson, Crisis 
Diplomacy. The Great Powers since the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Cambridge University Press, 
1994) and Wehler, Deutsche Kaiserreich.
5 W.J. Mommsen, ‘Bismarck, the Concert of Europe, and the Future of West Africa, 1883–1885,’ 
in: S. Förster, W.J. Mommsen and R. Robinson (eds.), Bismarck, Europe and Africa (Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 153.
6 L. Gall, Bismarck: Der weiße Revolutionair (Frankfurt: Propyläen, 1980), 617.
7 This remark was made by Bismarck to a German traveller in Africa on 5 December 1888, as 
quoted in Gall, Bismarck, 623.
8 See Wesseling, Verdeel en Heers, 142–144.
9 See P. Grupp, Deutschland, Frankreich und die Kolonien (Tübingen: Mohr, 1980), 47–85 and 
86–211.
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overstocked labor market using emigration as a safety-value; and finally, an ever 
growing navy promising protection to overseas ventures and investments.’10 
Bismarck’s overall conclusion was that Germany could not afford to let France 
and Great Britain take the lead in the quest for colonies. Although the ben-
efits of a colonial venture in Africa remained uncertain, Bismarck argued that 
Germany’s future depended on overseas possessions.11 In general, Bismarck 
was prepared to respect all existing and future colonial possessions of other 
powers, large or small, as long as they could be considered to have been prop-
erly established and were recognized under international law. In addition, far 
from impeding exploratory initiatives, he encouraged German nationals to sail 
the oceans in an effort to open up undiscovered worlds and to conduct profit-
able trade.
Initially, Germany’s colonial policy was conditional: the German govern-
ment should not be directly involved in the colonial activities of its nation-
als. ‘Das Reich wollte keine überseeischen Provinzen erwerben, sondern die 
wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit deutscher Unternehmer in einer geordneten, sta-
atlichen Regierung unterstehenden Gebieten unter seinen Schutz stellen.’12 
Private trading companies had to bear the costs and risks of their undertak-
ings. While the German State was the nominal protector, trading companies 
bore maximum responsibility and government intervention was kept to a 
minimum. This construction, which Bismarck called the Schutzgebiet, will be 
addressed in Section 3. The only support these companies could rely on was 
‘imperial backing,’13 a political construction analogous to the British model of 
Royal Charters.
German politicians anticipated voter sentiments to gain support for a 
German venture on the African continent, especially by pointing out that the 
10 M.E. Townsend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism 1871–1885 (New York, London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1921), 16–17. On the motives of Bismarck and his national pol-
icy, see also V.G. Fanso, ‘Trade and Supremacy on the Cameroon Coast, 1879–1887,’ in: 
M. Njeuma, Introduction to the History of Cameroon Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 72 and H. Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Domestic Origins 
of Germany’s Colonial Expansion under Bismarck,’ Past & Present, 42 (1969), 140–159.
11 In a speech before the Reichstag on 26 January 1889, Bismarck explained the following: 
‘Ich muß an Jahrzehnte, an die Zukunft meiner Landsleute denken, ich muß daran den-
ken ob man mir nicht nach zwanzig, nach dreißig Jahren den Vorwurf machen wird daß 
dieser furchtsane Kanzler damals nicht die Courage gehabt hat uns jenen Besitz zu si-
chern, der jetzt ein guter geworden ist.’ Quoted in Wesseling, Verdeel en Heers, 143–144.
12 P. Sack, ‘Grundzüge der Rechts- und Verwaltungsordnung,’ in: R. Voigt and P. Sack (eds.), 
Kolonialisierung des Rechts (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001), 46.
13 Mommsen, Imperial Germany, 79.
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scramble for African territory had already begun, but so far only between Brit-
ain and France. Every minute counted. If Germany did not claim territories 
immediately, the chance to establish a firm German presence on African ter-
ritory would be lost forever. This time-is-of-the-essence feeling created an at-
mosphere of pressure in which the political class acted and decided on the 
German colonial venture. It was called Torschlusspanik, i.e., the panic that 
came from the feeling that time was running out, the fear of Germany miss-
ing out. Eventually, Bismarck proved susceptible to this panic. To Bismarck, 
engaging in colonial ventures meant political safety and social order for some 
more time. In addition to these national considerations, the Congress of Berlin 
(1878) made clear that Germany could no longer neglect international interests 
and affairs. The Torschlusspanik fed the urge to strengthen Germany’s interna-
tional position.
The first steps of the German colonial venture were taken by Bismarck when 
he decided to force Britain to abandon its policy of informal empire, as this 
policy implied excluding German political influence from African territory 
neither occupied nor claimed by Britain. British colonial policy was based on 
classic liberalism in that it used the method of indirect imperialism, implying 
that the flag would follow trade. Free trade, exploitation and no State interven-
tion were the leading principles of this manner of acquiring and controlling 
overseas territory. Bismarck rejected British claims to universal supremacy in 
colonial issues, which resulted in a German-French colonial entente and the 
convening of the Berlin Conference in 1884. Official protection had to be ex-
tended to German nationals inhabiting overseas territories where Great Brit-
ain did not exercise jurisdiction de facto and where German subjects and their 
interests were not protected. Formal protectorates, which were mainly insti-
tuted by the British, could no longer be tolerated. Effective occupation,14 as 
was the Final Act of Berlin had stipulated, would henceforth be the criterion 
by which territorial claims of European powers in overseas regions were to be 
supported and assessed. The Conference agreed on a formula that specified 
which conditions had to be fulfilled (and when) in order to deem territorial 
occupation effective.15
In November 1883, although he still hesitated, Bismarck agreed to dispatch 
a mission led by Gustav Nachtigal (1834–1885), an explorer and former consul-
general, to collect information about Cameroon and the trade activities there, 
14 See H. Sippel, ‘Typische Ausprägungen des deutschen kolonialen Rechts- und Verwal-
tungssystems in Afrika,’ in: R. Voigt and P. Sack (eds.), Kolonialisierung des Rechts (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2001), 351.
15 See Articles 34 and 35 of the Final Act of the Berlin Conference (1885).
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and to support the establishment of a naval patrol, a consular service, negotia-
tions for a coaling station along the Cameroonian coast and trade agreements 
with the native rulers – activities that as yet did not imply annexation. How-
ever, before Nachtigal and his men reached the Cameroonian coast, Berlin had 
changed his orders. Bismarck had had to yield to pressure exerted by German 
commercial merchants looking after their interests and whose political lobby 
could muster broad popular support. Nachtigal was instructed to apprehend 
the coast between Bimbia and Cape St. John, hoist the German flag and declare 
that the German trading companies had signed treaties with the rulers. In this 
part of Africa, the Germans and their commercial interests had to be protected 
directly by Germany. In fact, this official mandate by the German government 
to conclude treaties with native rulers in order to acquire sovereign rights over 
the territory merely confirmed current practice. Even before Bismarck had 
given his assent, private initiatives to conclude treaties were undertaken by 
the German trading companies of Woermann and Jantzen & Thormählen.16
Bismarck opted for private commercial control by trading companies and 
never aimed to establish colonies, as the latter alternative required a complex 
administration and meant a heavy financial burden. Relatively soon, however, 
all investments by the German government in the acquisition and adminis-
tration of African territory proved unprofitable. In addition, colonies needed 
schemes to attract settlers from the motherland. Overseas territories generally 
tended to become a burden on the European governments. Bismarck wanted 
an institution that would merely protect German trading interests, with trad-
ers bearing the responsibility and with minimal government involvement. 
As Great Britain did, Germany considered setting up chartered companies – 
companies with a Königliche Freibrief. Bismarck promised to safeguard the 
African claims of the trading companies and associations from interventions 
or attacks by foreign powers. In return, the occupied land would fall under 
the sovereignty of the German Empire. These chartered companies, as newly 
established legal persons,17 would acquire territory without creating adminis-
trative and financial responsibilities for the German State. The charter system 
enabled Bismarck to implement a colonial policy without needing to ask the 
16 See S.G. Ardener, Eye-Witnesses to the Annexation of Cameroon 1883–1887 (Buea: Govern-
ment Press, 1968), 22–23. See also Fanso, ‘Trade and Supremacy,’ 77–78.
17 For a more detailed reading, see H. Sippel, ‘Recht und Herrschaft in Kolonialer Frühzeit: 
Die Rechtsverhältnisse in den Schutzgebieten der Deutsch-Ostafrikanischen Gesellschaft 
(1885–1890),’ in: P. Heine and U. van der Heyden (eds.), Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von 
Peter Sebald. Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Kolonialismus in Afrika (Pfaffenweiler: 
Centaurus, 1995), 469.
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Reichstag for public financing. However, the chartered companies were put in 
charge of law and order in the colony: they became responsible for executing a 
colonial policy in return for trade monopolies in the acquired territories. As a 
consequence, the companies had to conclude numerous treaties with African 
natives to acquire territory, each tribe having to be negotiated with separately. 
Bismarck as Chancellor became the central statesman and the German Empire 
assumed supreme power over the African territories acquired by private com-
panies and associations. Nonetheless, these rights were limited by the privileg-
es granted by imperial charter to the companies and associations. Prominent 
German trade companies were Woermann, which began its trading activities 
in 1868 on the Cameroonian territory, and Jantzen & Thormählen, starting its 
activities in 1875.18
On 14 July 1884, Nachtigal hoisted the German flag in Cameroon, a terri-
tory with a surface of 191,130 square miles.19 This ceremony signalled the of-
ficial inception of Germany’s colonial venture in the Cameroon, which was to 
last 30 years. Nachtigal concluded treaties with native rulers, more precisely 
with the native rulers Bell, Akwa, Dido, Malimba and Lock Priso, to secure 
commercial interests, to protect German settlers and to pre-empt the British. 
Nachtigal continued his mission and concluded several treaties with the native 
rulers of the Bimbia, Malimba, Klein-Batanga, Plantation and Kriby, situated 
in the south of Cameroon. After Nachtigal had concluded a treaty with King 
Bell transferring sovereign rights over the Duala territory, the Germans met 
with resistance from the contenders of King Bell. When the Germans violently 
crushed the resistance, war ensued.20 Although the Duala War delayed the ac-
quisition process, Cameroon was acquired before the beginning of the Berlin 
Conference in November 1884.
After his conversion to colonialism in 1884–1885, Bismarck acted quickly 
and forcefully. He abandoned the policy of using chartered trade companies 
to acquire and occupy African territory. Bismarck now wanted direct influence 
over the overseas territories. Germany aimed at opening up the Hinterland to 
18 These trade companies had their own procedures and were mainly focused on work-
ing according to their individual interests. See K. Schlimm, Das Grundstücksrecht in den 
deutschen Kolonien (Leipzig: Hoffmann, 1905), 25–31.
19 W.A. Crabtree, ‘German Colonies in Africa,’ Journal of the Royal African Society, 14 (1914), 
1–14.
20 See A. Rüger, ‘Die Duala und die Kolonialmacht 1884–1914. Eine Studie über die histo-
rischen Ursprünge des afrikanischen Antokolonialismus,’ in: H. Stoecker (ed.), Kamerun 
unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft, vol. ii (Berlin: Rütten and Loening, 1968), 181–258. For 
personal experiences with the Duala war, see Ardener, Eye-Witnesses to the Annexation of 
Cameroon, 31–40.
181German Cameroon
facilitate commercial interaction and at imposing German rule on the Afri-
can population, treating them as second-class German subjects, in contrast to 
the German settlers, mostly farmers, who were considered first-class German 
citizens. This transition to direct rule was motivated by the inescapable fact 
that German chartered trading companies were not up to the task of main-
taining law and order in the territories. Following the abolition of slave trade, 
trade companies bartered European goods such as cloth, arms, gunpowder 
and liquor for local palm oil, palm kernels, rubber and ivory. Trading, however, 
was accompanied by unrest and disorder. Native middlemen, who held a mo-
nopoly on the trade between the Germans and the natives in the Hinterland, 
fiercely resisted what they considered the German threat to their position. In 
consequence, the way into the Hinterland had to be kept open by German sol-
diers and violent clashes between natives and traders were not uncommon. 
In addition to trade between Germans and African natives being precarious, 
the trading companies wanted to establish their own plantations on the fertile 
grounds.21 As mentioned before, the chartered companies were unsuccessful 
at maintaining order. Even though it had been the desire to avoid the financial 
burdens of colonisation which had inspired the deployment of trading com-
panies, this scheme turned out to be a costly affair after all; it was the Ger-
man government which had to take care of settling of conflicts between the 
companies and the natives. After it became clear that the private trade com-
panies had failed to carry out their mandate properly, they were initially kept 
operational artificially, which was a thorn in the flesh of German financers.22 
Finally, in 1889, the chartered companies were dissolved and the German gov-
ernment took over the administration of the colonies, which meant that it had 
to bear the political and financial responsibilities. From this moment onwards, 
German authorities ruled the African territories by imposing German law.
In addition to the increasing number of disputes between German traders 
and African natives, there was another reason for the German government to 
tighten its control over the Cameroonian territory. Although Bismarck had 
aimed to use the chartered companies to control the acquired African terri-
tory and therefore had had to facilitate them, the interests of the German mer-
chants clashed with those of the government. Political and economic interests 
differed and eventually the political argument won out. The early explorations 
of the trading companies did not penetrate the real Hinterland of the colony. 
21 P. Müllendorff, ‘The Development of German West Africa (Kamerun),’ Journal of the Royal 
African Society, 2 (1902), 70–92.
22 Wesseling, Verdeel en Heers, 164. See also Sippel, ‘Recht und Herrschaft in Kolonialer Früh-
zeit,’ 483–484.
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‘Since the German Government at home discouraged efforts to exploit the Hin-
terland by way of the Niger in competition with the English or by way of the 
Congo in competition with the French,’ Harry Rudin notes, the German gov-
ernor in the Cameroons ‘felt that the best policy was to work gradually from 
the coast toward the interior and to establish friendly relations with the native 
kings in the immediate neighbourhood.’23 Some German traders were clearly 
unhappy with the political agenda of the German authorities; they preferred to 
open up the interior to trade.
Another important player on the Cameroon scene was Adolf Woermann, 
head of the eponymous Hamburg-based company, one of the biggest German 
trading companies in Africa. As the Reich’s agent in Cameroon, Woermann 
had concluded the first treaties, but now Bismarck expected him to control 
the newly acquired protectorate under imperial charter. He stated that ‘Die 
Besitzergreifung erfolgt sofort, nachdem genannte Firmen die Verträge abge-
schlossen haben; dieselbe wird dokumentiert durch Aufziehen der deutschen 
Flagge in einem jeden der abgetretenen Gebiete sowie durch öffentliche Erk-
lärung, dass das Land nunmehr deutsches Eigentum sei.’24 Here Woermann 
related the conclusion of a treaty between his company and an African ruler to 
German acquisition of property rights over the land. Subsequently,  Woermann 
declared that he was a trader, not an administrator, thus declining the German 
government’s mandate. Consequently, the financial consequences of estab-
lishing and maintaining colonies would be the Reich’s responsibility and not 
that of the traders.
Although the trading companies had no interest in managing the territory 
and refused to fulfil the responsibility which the German government had im-
posed on them by way of imperial charter, their influence on the rule of the 
occupied territory was formative. In addition to the unwillingness of the char-
tered companies to perform administrative tasks, another factor led to the shift 
in German policy from indirect to direct rule. States increasingly used their 
power and resources to make pre-emptive territorial acquisitions, and this 
 exerted pressure on the liberal principles of free trade and market freedom: 
‘[T]here was no longer any thought of keeping the state’s role in the economy 
23 H.R. Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons, 1884–1914: A Case Study in Modern Imperialism 
(Hamden: Archon Books, 1968), 80.
24 Sammlung sämtlicher Drucksachen des Reichstages, 6. Legislaturperiode, i. Session 
1884/5. Togo-Gebiet und Biafra Bai, Nr. 41 Bl. 31, as quoted in A. Kum’a Ndumbe, Das 
Deutsche Kaiserreich in Kamerun. Wie Deutschland in Kamerun seine Kolonialmacht 
aufbauen konnte, 1840–1910 (Douala, Berlin: AfricAvenir, Exchange & Dialogue, 2008), 
75–76.
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and society to a minimum and of holding taxes as low as possible.’25 In this 
way, the colonial venture was endorsed by the German public. Colonial enter-
prise was no longer considered objectionable as a financial burden to be borne 
by the German tax payer. Imperialism became a legitimate aspiration of the 
government and had the support of the public in the motherland.
From the moment the Germans went ashore on Cameroonian territory, 
which was in fact indirectly controlled by Britain, the race between the two 
powers commenced, either party trying to acquire as much territory as possible 
as quickly as possible by concluding treaties with African natives. Britain had 
trade posts along the coast and rivers, and even possessed a strictly delimited 
territory, Victoria. In the late 1850s, Alfred Saker, a British Baptist missionary, 
had bought a piece of land along the Cameroonian coast from King William of 
Bimbia for gbp 2,000. This new settlement, named after Queen Victoria, came 
under the protection of the British government and was administered by the 
Baptist Mission, called the Basler Mission.26 Even when the Germans acquired 
Cameroon, Victoria remained British. The competition for territory between 
Britain and Germany led to a race to obtain as many signatures as possible of 
native rulers and eventually deprived the native populations of a fair share. 
Both the German and British representatives offered gifts to native rulers to se-
cure their signatures to treaties in which they renounced their sovereign rights 
to the territory. And both European States accused each other of misleading 
the native rulers. In Section 3, German treaty practices and the wording of the 
treaties they concluded will be are analysed and discussed in more detail.
At the Berlin Conference there were signs of a gradual rapprochement be-
tween Britain and Germany: Britain accepted that Germany had entered the 
colonial arena and acknowledged the German territories on the African conti-
nent. In the end, the British and the Germans came to an understanding on the 
British trade posts and Victoria: in January 1887, the British pieces of territory 
were transferred to Germany in exchange for monetary compensation. The 
British agreed to the German take-over of the territory, because they believed 
25 Mommsen, Imperial Germany, 72.
26 For a detailed reading on this Mission, see A. Eckert, ‘Missions, Land Politics and Real 
Estate in Colonial Douala,’ in: R. Debusmann and S. Arnold (eds.), Land Law and Land 
Ownership in Africa. Case Studies from Colonial and Contemporary Cameroon and Tanza-
nia (Bayreuth: Bayreuth African Studies, 1996), 187–201; C.F. Fisiy, ‘Techniques of Land 
Acquisition: The Concept of “Crown Lands” in Colonial and Post-Colonial Cameroon,’ in: 
R. Debusmann and S. Arnold (eds.), Land Law and Land Ownership in Africa. Case Stud-
ies from Colonial and Contemporary Cameroon and Tanzania (Bayreuth: Bayreuth African 
Studies, 1996), 231 and N.B. Wagner, Die deutschen Schutzgebiete. Erwerb, Organisation und 
Verlust aus juristischer Sicht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002), 84–86.
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France to pose the greater threat to the British Empire. The French had to be 
kept out at all costs, even if Britain had to surrender territory to the Germans. 
The end of the German-British rivalry was sealed by the agreement between 
the two powers of 1 July 1890. This agreement defined their respective spheres 
of influence in East, West, and South-West Africa.27 The boundaries of Cam-
eroon were definitively laid down in the treaties concluded with Britain and 
France in 1893 and 1894 respectively.
German sovereignty was not only contested by European colonial powers, 
it was also and on several occasions disputed by the natives. This lasted un-
til 1899, when the Germans ultimately defeated the natives and the interior 
was definitely opened up to trade.28 By 1905, the Cameroonian Hinterland had 
been fairly well explored and had been subjected to German control. However, 
much work had to be done to control the territory effectively and there still 
remained the difficult task of delimiting the territory by exactly marking the 
boarders, kilometre by kilometre. After 1905, attention shifted from exploring 
Cameroon to exploiting it in the sense of its social, economic, and political 
development.
On 4 November 1911, the territory of German Cameroon was significantly 
enlarged when France ceded part of French Congo. In return, Germany sur-
rendered its existing rights in Morocco and the territory of Togo in 1914. With 
World War i, the disintegration of the German Empire began. Between 1914 
and 1918, German colonies and protectorates were attacked or conquered by 
Britain, France and Belgium. Cameroon was subjugated by the British and 
French and divided between them even before the war on the European 
continent came to an end.29 After World War, i Germany was forced to 
renounce all of the territories it had acquired in Africa. Cameroon gained inde-
pendence in 1960, but disputes over boundaries and titles to territory continue 
to the present day.30
27 With regard to the African west coast, the borderline was drawn between the British Gold 
Coast colony and the German Togo protectorate, the Volta districts, and the Rio del Rey. 
Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 694.
28 C.T. Hagberg Wright, ‘German Methods of Development in Africa,’ Journal of the Royal 
African Society, 1 (1901), 23. See also G. Meinecke, Deutschland und seine Kolonien im Jahre 
1896: amtlicher Bericht über die erste deutsche Kolonial-Ausstellung (Berlin: Reimer, 1897).
29 See L. Elango, ‘The Anglo-French “Condominium” in Cameroon, 1914–1916: The Myth and 
the Reality,’ The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 18 (1985), 656–673.
30 See Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: 
Equatorial Guinea intervening), 2002, icj Reports 303.
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3 Treaties between Germany and Cameroonian Rulers
3.1 Validity of Treaties
Although many treaties were concluded between the German and the natives, 
especially along the coast, the Germans categorized the thinly populated areas 
of the Hinterland as terra nullius or herrenloses Land, which freed the way for 
occupation as a legitimate mode of territorial acquisition. Consequently, two 
types of problems arose, reflecting two distinct stages of territorial acquisition 
by treaty. The first set of problems concerned the validity of the treaty. The 
second type concerned the interpretation and execution of the treaties after 
they had been concluded. Although attention will be mostly on what hap-
pened after the treaties between Germans and Cameroonian natives had been 
concluded, the first phase – treaty negotiations – will be addressed briefly to 
establish a context.
The first phase in which validity problems arose was the one in which treaty 
conditions were negotiated. Four problems will be explored. First, the German 
classification of territory as herrenloses Land or terra nullius is problematic. 
Initially, contemporary international legal doctrine understood herrenloses 
Land as completely uninhabited territory ‘in denen also kein privatrechtliches 
Eigenthum bestehen konnte.’31 Terra nullius comprised territory entirely lack-
ing in public or private mastery. However, in the last two decades of the 1800s, 
when the struggle between European States for titles to African territory came 
to a head, the scope of terra nullius was reinterpreted and reformulated by cen-
tralizing the concept of State: ‘Als herrenlos im völkerrechtlichen Sinne gilt 
daher jedes Gebiet, in dem die Staatsgewalt eines völkerrechtlich anerkannten 
Rechtssubjeckts nicht besteht.’32 Non-State territory could be occupied and 
this rendered cession unnecessary; native habitation was irrelevant and title 
to territory could be acquired by occupation regardless. Not terra nullius, but 
territorium nullius became the condition.
During the first years of the German colonial venture on Cameroonian ter-
ritory, the explorers would almost always encounter native communities living 
on the land. Some areas were densely populated, others were almost deserted. 
In their urge for territorial acquisition, the Germans used the concept of her-
renloses Land for territories that lacked Staatlichkeit. As a consequence, these 
territories were subjected to the sovereignty of the German Emperor and were 
31 C. Bornhak, ‘Die Anfänge des deutschen Kolonialstaatsrechts,’ Archiv für öffentliches 
Rechts 2 (1887), p. 6.
32 C. Bornhak, ‘Die Anfänge des deutschen Kolonialstaatsrechts,’ Archiv für öffentliches 
Rechts 2 (1887), p. 7.
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even declared Germany’s private possession, i.e., Kronland. The standard of 
Staatlichkeit, however, and its application implied a broad discretionary power 
of the German State. In the majority of cases, the imposition of the predicate 
herrenloses Land and the institution of Kronland meant direct expropriation of 
land inhabited by natives. In addition to the sovereign rights over the territory, 
the German State acquired the proprietary rights to the land without taking 
into account the existing land rights of the native populations inhabiting the 
lands. However, the greater part of the Cameroons came under German rule by 
way of protectorate and Schutzgebiet treaties.
The second problem regarding the validity of the treaties concerns the sta-
tus of the trading companies and the powers delegated to them by the German 
State. The question is whether these trading companies could conclude treaties 
with the purpose of acquiring sovereignty rights over Cameroonian  territory. 
Although the companies were protected by the German government  – they 
had been awarded imperial charters – it remains questionable whether these 
companies, as private actors, could acquire sovereignty transferred to them by 
native rulers by way of treaty. Contacts between the trading companies and the 
African natives were first and foremost driven by private interests: the compa-
nies wanted to trade, expand their market and make a profit. For that reason, it 
could even be argued that the various treaties, contracts and other agreements 
should be regarded as private law transactions concluded for the purpose of 
acquire land ownership. In other words, rather than sovereignty, property was 
the object of transfer, as the German jurist Ferdinand Lentner (1841–1919) ac-
knowledged in 1886: ‘Alle diese Regalien und Monopolien sind nicht als von 
der Gesellschaft selbstständig erworbene Hoheitsrechte, sondern nur als dem 
Grund und Boden anhaftende Privatrechte zu betrachten.’33 In general, the na-
tive rulers implicitly recognized Passivlegitimation, i.e., the legal capacity of 
the German companies to obtain sovereign rights through negotiating and 
concluding treaties.34
The third problem was that the status of the native rulers and the substance 
of, their rights and powers were ambiguous. Were these rulers sovereigns 
33 F. Lentner, Das Internationale Colonialrecht im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, Wien, 1886, p. 91. 
‘Die innere Verfassung der Kolonialgesellschaften gehört nicht in das Staatsrecht, sondern 
ist privatrechtlicher Natur.’ C. Bornhak, ‘Die Anfänge des deutschen Kolonialstaatsrechts,’ 
Archiv für öffentliches Rechts 2 (1887), p. 35.
34 C.H. Alexandrowicz, The European-African Confrontation. A Study in Treaty Making, 
Leiden, 1973, p. 43. Alexandrowicz added that ‘[t]erritory acquired by the Company 
vested in the European Sovereign under whose law the Company was established.’ Ibid, 
footnote 72.
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under nineteenth-century ‘European’ international law? Conceptual differ-
ences and misunderstandings between Africans and Europeans, in particular 
between Cameroonians and Germans, could also affect the validity of the trea-
ties, contracts, and other agreements they concluded. In the majority of cases, 
natives and Germans held different views on the nature of their legal obliga-
tions whose written manifestation often reflected German standards. Eventu-
ally, the German understanding and interpretation prevailed and the native 
perspective disappeared from view. The question remains whether the native 
rulers would have signed the treaties at all if they had known the practical im-
plications of these legal institutions, which proved disastrous to their subjects? 
After all, the native rulers were unfamiliar with European contract law, public 
international law and the legal terms used in the treaties.35
The fourth problem was whether the international legal standards on trea-
ties applied. While the German and later Swiss writer Hermann Hesse (1877–
1962) considered the treaties concluded with African natives to be instruments 
governed by the rules of Völkerrecht,36 the German jurist Franz von Liszt (1851–
1919) was less generous and argued that the scope of international law had to 
be interpreted strictly in the sense that it only applied to relations between 
sovereign States.37 He did not devote a single word to the applicability of in-
ternational law in reference to the acquisition of territory by means of treaties 
between State actors such as Germany and non-State entities such as African 
polities. In German contemporary legal doctrine, African polities were not 
recognized as subjects of international law: ‘Eroberung und Abtretung finden 
35 This indeterminacy of territorial acquisition is well described by Eckart Rohde: ‘Bis 
1888 kam es vorwiegend im für den Plantagenbau hervorragend geeigneten Gebiet am 
Kamerunberg zu einer Reihe unsystematischer Landerwerbungen, die teilweise auf der 
Grundlage von Kaufverträgen, teilweise schlicht durch die Okkupation ungenutzten Lan-
des vollzogen wurden. Der zweifelhafte Charakter dieser Erwerbungen, an denen sich 
auch Gouverneur von Soden bedenkenlos beteiligte, dokumentiert sich, abgesehen vom 
lächerlich niedrigen „Kaufpreis“ (Schnaps oder Handelswaren, für 1 ha wurde maximal 
1 Mark gezahlt), darin, dass die auf afrikanischer Seite als Vertragsunterzeichner figuri-
erenden Dorfoberen wahrscheinlich gewohnheitsrechtlich überhaupt nicht legitimiert 
waren, Land zu veräußern. … die Afrikaner keineswegs die europäische Konzeption von 
Landerwerb, Grundbesitz und den damit verbundenen uneingeschränkten Landrechten 
teilten.’ E. Rohde, Grundbesitz und Landkonflikte in Kamerun. Der Bedeutungswandel von 
Land in der Bamiléké-Region während der europäischen Kolonisation, Hamburg, 1996, p. 70.
36 H. Hesse, Die Landfrage und die Frage der Rechtsgültigkeit der Konzessionen in Südwe-
stafrika, Jena, 1906.
37 Von Liszt adopted a State centric approach in his whole work on international law. See 
F. von Liszt, Das Völkerrecht Systematisch Dargestellt (12th edn.), Berlin, 1925.
chapter 7188
nur statt gegenüber einem Staate, der Subjekt des Völkerrechts ist […] Durch 
Abtretung kann als Kolonie nur erworben worden das Gebiet einer Macht, die 
Subjekt des Völkerrechts ist.’38 The derivative modes of acquisition, conquest 
and cession could be effected between two States, i.e., subjects of international 
law. In practice, however, it was very useful from the German perspective to be 
able to conclude treaties with Africans in order to realize imperial expansion. 
It should be noted that the Germans hardly used cession to acquire territorial 
title on the African continent. They established protectorates, more specifi-
cally colonial protectorates or Schutzgebiete, through which, as will be argued 
below, they gradually obtained all-comprehensive sovereignty over the Camer-
oons. The treaties establishing Schutzgebiete substantiated Germany’s claims to 
Cameroonian territory in its relations with other European powers. These trea-
ties effectively served a triangular relationship between Cameroonian  natives, 
Germany and other European States. Whether international legal standards on 
treaty making applied to the treaties between Europeans and Africans, more 
specifically Germans and Cameroonians, is a question to which two opposing 
answers can be given. In theory, the Cameroonian polities were not recognized 
as subjects of international law, either in German legal doctrine or in German 
politics. Consequently, treaties establishing Schutzgebiete were not considered 
treaties under international law and transferring sovereign rights from an Afri-
can native ruler to a European State was therefore considered impossible. The 
applicability of international law to the treaty negotiations and the resulting 
treaties between natives and Germans was wholly dependent on Germany’s 
conduct in its relations to rival European States. In practice, however, these 
treaties were negotiated and concluded under international law as it applied 
to the members of the family of civilized States, with the intention of trans-
ferring sovereign rights, recognized the sovereign status of the Cameroonian 
ruler concerned and granted European States title to African territory. As will 
be shown later, this dichotomy between theory and practice also qualifies the 
answer to the question whether treaties were violated.
Although the validity of the treaties is questionable, they were concluded 
by Germany with the native rulers and recognized by the other competing 
European powers as valid territorial claims. These treaties were accepted as a 
given, as were their factual and legal consequences. However, the interpreta-
tion and execution of the treaties were unclear and controversial, in particu-
lar when taking the object of transfer – territorial sovereignty and/or private 
 landownership – into account.
38 C. Bornhak, ‘Die Anfänge des deutschen Kolonialstaatsrechts,’ Archiv für öffentliches 
Rechts 2 (1887), pp. 4 and 5.
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3.2 Treaty Practice
Before analysing the treaties between the Germany and Cameroonian native 
rulers, the conceptual and theoretical framework which characterized the Ger-
man colonization of Africa has to be outlined. On a preliminary note, it should 
be observed that the Germans made three fundamental distinctions between 
claims to land and/or territory, namely, Eingeborenen Land, nicht-eingeborenen 
Land, and herrenloses Land.39 Eingeborenen Land comprised land possessed 
and controlled by natives. Land controlled neither by natives nor by Germans, 
but occupied by other Europeans was called nicht-eingeborenen Land. Her-
renloses Land was land over which no sovereign power was exercised. Einge-
borenen Land and nicht-eingeborenen Land could be the object to derivative 
acquisition of title to territory. Herrenloses Land, by contrast, was eligible for 
occupation.
In the context of German imperial expansion, Schutzgebiet, herrenloses 
Land, and Kronland were key concepts. Although each had its own mean-
ing and connotations, all were closely related. Of these three concepts, the 
Schutzgebiet played a particularly vital role in the German acquisition of Afri-
ca. Bismarck preferred establishing Schutzgebiete to claiming title. The institu-
tion of a Schutzgebiet was a political instrument and had no legal foundation. 
A Schutzgebiet was the German interpretation of the colonial protectorate, and 
implied power or control without political and economic responsibility for 
the African natives: ‘Als staatrechtliches oder koloniales “Protektorat” oder als 
“Schutzgewalt” über “Schutzgebiete” pflegt man in neuer Zeit sowohl die Lande-
shoheit über überseeische Kolonien, wie die völkerrechtlichten Befugnisse in 
der Interessensphäre oder dem Hinterlande zu bezeichnen.’40 A Schutzgebiet 
implied the exercise of limited sovereign rights, namely, ‘zum Schutze gegen 
innere und äussere Feinde und zum Zwecke der Rechtsprechung für Europäer 
beabsichtigt ist.’41 While in both a Schutzgebiet and a traditional protectorate 
the protected entity officially retained its internal sovereignty rights, there 
are two differences between the two. First, the protectorate was part of inter-
national law and the Schutzgebiet – a wholly political construct – was not.42 
Second, when a Schutzgebiet was established by treaty, initially a relationship 
39 Schlimm, Grundstücksrecht in den deutschen Kolonien, 51–77.
40 F. von Liszt, Das Völkerrecht Systematisch Dargestellt, 12th edn. (Berlin: Springer, 1925), 106. 
See also V. von Poser und Gross-Naedlitz, Die rechtliche Stellung der deutschen Schutzge-
biete (Breslau: Marcus, 1903).
41 C. Bornhak, ‘Die Anfänge des deutschen Kolonialstaatsrechts,’ Archiv für öffentliches 
Rechts, 2 (1887), 14.
42 See Wagner, Deutschen Schutzgebiete, 204.
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of protection was instituted between Germany and the African native ruler, 
which opened the door to Germany acquiring the native ruler’s rights of inter-
nal sovereignty too. The German Schutzgebiet had to be regarded as a hybrid of 
a protectorate and a colony, on a par with the British and French concept of the 
colonial protectorate: in theory a protectorate was established, in practice the 
treaty was interpreted through colonial legislation as ceding full sovereignty.
At first, German trading companies carrying a mandate of the German gov-
ernment, a Schutzbrief, concluded treaties with African natives establishing 
Schutzgebiete. Through these treaties, Germany explicitly acquired external 
sovereignty rights and implicitly acquired internal sovereignty rights. Initially, 
the aim was to constitute protectorates, but, as will be seen when discussing 
German treaty-making practice, the precise scope of sovereignty rights was 
not articulated, which gave the German authorities discretionary room to in-
terpret and exercise these rights. Germany controlled the external relations 
and was able to exclude European powers and other foreign entities from the 
territory without having to establish a central and costly administration. In 
practice, as will be argued, Germany increasingly intervened in the internal 
affairs of the protectorate territory and thus came to control internal sover-
eignty rights as well. Although in theory the distinction between a colony and 
a protectorate was maintained, in practice the dividing line between the two 
concepts blurred and finally disappeared.
The second and the third relevant concepts in the context of the German 
colonial venture, herrenloses Land and Kronland, are closely connected – a 
connection that is particularly apparent in the imperial decree (Verordnung) 
of 15 June 1896. This Verordnung stated that all unoccupied land, herrenloses 
Land or terra nullius, in Cameroon was declared Kronland: all unoccupied 
land would fall within German jurisdiction and would become the property 
of Germany. The nineteenth-century German jurist Karl Schlimm defined her-
renloses Land negatively by arguing that it did not involve Eingeborenen Land 
and nicht-eingeborenen Land.43 In his definition of herrenloses Land, Schlimm 
emphasized the existence of property rights and he alluded to sovereignty. 
Herrenloses Land could be occupied by the German sovereign State, which 
empowered Germany to exclude other States or polities from the territories. 
The territory was considered part of the German Empire and of the space over 
which the German State could exercise its sovereignty.44 Labelling African ter-
ritory as Kronland especially served the interests of trading companies and 
private associations, because it gave them access to the Hinterland and enable 
43 Schlimm, Grundstücksrecht in den deutschen Kolonien, 21.
44 See ibid., 48.
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direct contact, trade and exploitation. The decree referred to above will be con-
sidered in more detail later, because it was issued after the territory had been 
occupied. Only terra nullius, which included territory inhabited by nomadic 
peoples, could be occupied, according to Von Liszt’s interpretation of the con-
cept of occupation in the context of international law.45 In his view, terra nul-
lius or herrenloses Land is non-State territory. Concluding treaties with natives 
inhabiting the territory concerned did not affect its status as terra nullius. This 
limited interpretation of terra nullius was, however, questioned.46 Although 
the equation of terra nullius with non-State territory primarily served the in-
terests of the German State, it must be noted that the expansion of the  German 
Empire on the African continent was accomplished mainly by concluding 
 bilateral treaties with African rulers and not through occupation. Having clari-
fied the German conceptions and assumptions regarding Germany’s acquisi-
tion of Africa, the German practice of treaty-making needs to be addressed.
Concluding treaties with native rulers was part and parcel of the German 
quest for African territory, as it was for Britain and France. Unlike Britain and 
France, however, Germany had no colonial experience in establishing overseas 
territories before 1884. As a result, for a number of years the Germans used a 
single treaty model to acquire African territory. By using this model, the Ger-
mans presumed that the native rulers and their peoples subjected themselves 
and their land to the superiority of the German State: ‘Der Besitzergreifung 
geht jezt gewöhnlich vorher ein Vertrag mit den eingeborenen Machthabern, 
durch welchem diese sich der Gewalt des erwerbenden Staates unterwerfen.’47 
The acquisition proper was a symbolic act, such as hoisting the flag or raising 
border posts – acts that symbolized the establishment of effective occupation 
of the territory.
On 12 July 1884, Germany and the African rulers Bell, Akwa and Didos signed 
a treaty constituting a German protectorate, more precisely a Schutzgebiet, 
over the Cameroonian territory, and on 15 October 1884 the German govern-
ment communicated its acquisition to the other European powers and the 
United States. This communication specified the exact extent of the territory 
on the west coast of Africa that was placed under the protection of Germa-
ny. This official statement was made by the German Baron von Plessen to the 
45 Von Liszt, Völkerrecht, 1925, 158–159.
46 Note that Cameroonian territory was inhabited by native political entities whose indi-
vidual members possessed the land. See H. Kraus, Die moderne Bodengesetzgebung in Ka-
merun 1884–1964 (Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer, 1966), 31.
47 Bornhak, ‘Anfänge des deutschen Kolonialstaatsrechts,’ 7.
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British Earl Granville, both leading their respective country’s Ministry of Colo-
nial and Foreign Affairs:
The Government of His Majesty the Emperor, with a view to insure more 
effectually German commercial interests on the West Coast of Africa, 
has taken certain districts of this coast under its protection. This has 
been effected in virtue of Treaties which have been in part concluded by 
Dr Nachtigal, the Consul-General dispatched to West Africa, with inde-
pendent Chiefs, and partly in virtue of applications for protection made 
by Imperial subjects, who have acquired certain tracts by covenants with 
independent Chiefs.48
Treaties transferring sovereign rights from Cameroonian rulers to Nachtigal, 
who operated in the name of Germany, was the legal basis that supported 
the title claim of the German State to the Cameroons. It should be noted that 
the German notification speaks of ‘protection’ and ‘independent Chiefs.’ This 
statement laid the foundation for 30 years of German presence on the territory.
The acquisition of territory was mainly effectuated by German trad-
ing companies, which had a governmental mandate to acquire and exercise 
sovereignty rights. As even the mere possibility of Germany acquiring sover-
eign rights over African territory through mandated private companies con-
cluding treaties with native rulers is questionable, the validity of the treaties 
themselves – on which rested Germany’s title claim to the Cameroons – is 
doubtful. The most important reason for these trading companies to partici-
pate in this colonial venture and to conclude treaties with natives transferring 
sovereign rights was to advance their own interests, as can be inferred from an 
instruction letter the German trader Adolf Woermann wrote to his representa-
tive in Cameroon, Eduard Schmidt, on 6 May 1884:
At the same time as the cession of sovereignty, you should by all means 
get the cession of very extensive lands as private property – especially 
those suitable for plantations. There is no doubt that, if the country be-
comes German, there will be many attempts to establish extensive plan-
tations, and so it is always a good thing if the land is already in our private 
ownership, so that we can re-sell it later. You must naturally try to buy as 
cheaply as possible. One can get the land for nearly nothing.49
48 Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 693.
49 As translated in English by Ardener, Eye-Witnesses to the Annexation of Cameroon, 85. For 
the original German version of the message of Woermann to Schmidt dated 6 May 1884, 
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Woermann explicitly referred to cession, implying the transfer of all-com-
prehensive sovereignty rights by treaty from the native ruler to the trading 
company acting on behalf of the German State. What is also relevant is that 
Woermann separated the acquisition of territorial sovereignty rights from the 
proprietary rights to the land. The former were to be acquired by treaty, the 
latter by contracts of sale. The trading companies went overseas to trade, to 
expand their markets and to make a profit rather than to manage a territory as 
an instrument of the German government. They were in Africa for commercial 
reasons, not to rule the territory.
Before the Germans went ashore, the British already controlled the 
Cameroonian coast. From the 1840s onwards, the British had signed treaties 
with local rulers that emphasized trade and its benefits, the protection and 
organization of the territory, and the prohibition and suppression of slave 
trade. The transfer of sovereignty and private property rights was not explicitly 
mentioned in these treaties. In these treaties the natives often promised to 
comport themselves ‘as good and faithful subjects, under the penalty of incur-
ring the displeasure of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government,’ or they agreed 
that ‘Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain would extend to the natives and 
the territory under their authority and jurisdiction, her gracious favour and 
protection.’ It is even true, that, in 1881, several Cameroonian rulers asked the 
British government for annexation.50 Britain never replied to this request. The 
British had concluded treaties with such Cameroonian Kings as Bell, Akwa, and 
William – the same rulers with whom the Germans, after they had set foot on 
Cameroonian territory, also concluded treaties. Great Britain had established 
see Bundesarchiv Potsdam, Reichskolonialamt, 4447, p. 60 ff. The letter is reproduced in 
H.-P. Jaeck, ‘Die deutsche Annexion: Die Anfänge der Deutschen Kolonialherrschaft,’ in: 
H. Stoecker (ed.), Kamerun unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft, vol. i (Berlin: Rütten and 
Loening, 1960), 92 ff.
50 A letter, signed by King Akwa, Prince Dido Akwa, Prince Black, Prince Joe Garner and 
Prince Lawton, was directly addressed to Queen Victoria: ‘Dearest Madam, We your ser-
vants join together and thoughts its better to write you a nice loving letter which will tell 
you about all our wishes. We wish to have your laws in our towns. We want to have every 
faction altered, also we will do according to your consuls word. Plenty wars here in our 
country. Plenty murder and plenty idol worshippers. Perhaps these lines of our writing 
will look to you as an idle tale. We have spoken to the English Consul plenty times about 
having an English government here. We never have answer from you, so we wish to write 
ourselves. When we heard about Calabar River, how they have all English laws in their 
towns, and how they have put away all their superstitions, oh we shall be very glad to be 
like Calabar now.’ Ardener, Eye-Witnesses to the Annexation of Cameroon, 19–20.
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trade posts and settlements on the coast and informally ruled the Cameroons 
between 1840 and 1884.
In the second week of July 1884, a cluster of treaties was concluded between 
Germany and several native rulers. Within the scope of this cluster, the Ger-
mans considered two documents constitutive of their relationship with Cam-
eroonian natives. The first document was a declaration made by native rulers 
on 12 July 1884, which expressed their agreement to German presence on their 
territory if several conditions were met.51 Although the document did not con-
tain any legal obligations, the Germans felt obliged to respect the rulers’ claims 
and to observe the provisions of the document. The most important claims 
concerned the maintenance of the rulers’ monopoly of interior markets, the 
supply of monetary means to finance these markets, the continuance of trade, 
and the non-interference with some local customs. Above all, the rulers re-
quired annexation instead of protection, but without taking the land on which 
they lived and which they cultivated. In other words, the rulers requested that 
the territory be subjected to German sovereignty and that the proprietary 
rights of the natives to the land be respected. Consul Schultze signed the docu-
ment to express Germany’s commitment to the rulers’ claims.
The second constitutive document was the treaty concluded on 12 July 1884 
between the representative of the trade companies of Woermann and Jantzen 
& Thormählen, Eduard Schmidt, and the rulers of the territory in question, 
which – in the words of the treaty – established a protectorate.52 The preamble 
to the treaty established that sovereignty, legislative authority and administra-
tive power were transferred by the treaty subject to a number of reservations, 
of which the preservation of natives’ property rights was the most prominent 
(§3). What is very clear is that the aim was not to constitute a traditional pro-
tectorate, but a Schutzgebiet. On the one hand, the scope of the transferred 
sovereign rights remained undetermined, but they comprised more than the 
exercise of external sovereignty. On the other hand, the Germans explicitly 
consented (§4) to the native rulers’ demands to maintain and regulate their 
peoples’ proprietary rights to land, the rights of the rulers to rule their peoples 
in accordance with their own customs and laws (§3) and to levy taxes, which 
51 For the text of the document, see M. Buchner, Aurora Colonialis: Brüchstücke eines Tage-
buchs aus dem Beginn unserer Kolonialpolitik 1884/85 (Munich: Piloty and Loehle, 1914), 70.
52 Protectoratvertrag vom 12./13. Juli 1884, Reichskolonialamt Nr. 4447, Bl. 3. As reproduced 
in Stoecker, Kamerun unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft, 259. For the German text, reli-
ance has to be made on a document in which Nachtigal reported Bismarck on the acqui-
sition of sovereign rights from the Duala rulers under several conditions or reservations. 
See Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons, 425.
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implied that this treaty did not involve cession of full sovereign rights over the 
territory. Formulating non-intervention clauses (preserving internal sovereign-
ty) was common practice in writing treaty texts for the purpose of establishing 
protectorates (§5).
When the German authority notified the British of this treaty, the British 
Embassy presented the British interpretation of the treaty and its conditions: 
the treaty was valid subject to the rights of third parties; former treaties of 
friendship and commerce remained in force; the land of the towns and vil-
lages remained the private property of the natives; the rulers continued to levy 
their dues as before; and the natives retained for the present their customs and 
usages.53 The British translation of the conditions evidenced the unambigu-
ous nature of these conditions. Although the scope of the object of  transfer – 
 sovereignty – was not addressed explicitly in the treaty, the native rulers’ 
 competences to rule their peoples, the continuance of private property rights 
of the Cameroonian natives and the maintenance of their customs and usages 
were to be respected by the Germans.
Of particular interest is how the 1884 treaty was negotiated and conclud-
ed. The treaty itself was negotiated and concluded by the Duala rulers, rep-
resented by King Bell, King Akwa and King Dido, and four representatives of 
the German trading companies Woermann and Jantzen & Thormählen, with 
Schmidt acted on their behalf.54 Nachtigal, the representative of the German 
State, did not sign the treaty. Sovereign rights were thus directly transferred to 
the two German companies. It was two days after the treaty had been signed, 
on 14 July 1884, that the companies handed the treaty to Nachtigal. Nachtigal 
then circulated a statement informing the British settlers and tradesmen pres-
ent on the territory of the conclusion of the treaty and the establishment of 
the protectorate: ‘[A] Treaty with the Kings and Chiefs of this river has been 
concluded and lawfully legalized by the German Consul of Gaboon […]. The 
character of the Treaty has caused me to hoist the Imperial German flag in 
this country, and to put it under the suzerainty of His Majesty the Emperor 
of Germany.’55 Nachtigal used ‘suzerainty’ to indicate the competences of the 
German authority on the territory, without specifying the precise meaning of 
this term. German legal doctrine offers no clear definition of suzerainty in the 
context of the establishment of Schutzgebiete on the African continent. Only 
Von Holtzendorff noted in his Handbuch des Völkerrechts (1885) that interven-
tion in the self-government of the protected State by the protecting State is 
53 Ibid., 425 and 40–41. See also Kum’a Ndumbe, Deutsche Kaiserreich in Kamerun, 78–79.
54 Ardener, Eye-Witnesses to the Annexation of Cameroon, 24.
55 Buchner, Aurora Colonialis, 74.
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justified if such an intervention is necessary to safeguard the protecting State’s 
responsibilities towards foreign nations.56 Like the French, the Germans used 
the term suzerainty in their protectorate treaties to describe their competenc-
es within the protectorate, which gave the German authorities the freedom to 
act at will and to rule the territory and the inhabiting subjects as the Germans 
deemed necessary.
After the British residing on the territory and rival European States had 
been notified, the Duala treaty was ratified and entered into force. In day-to-
day practice, the chartered trading companies exerted a great deal of influence 
over the German rule of the Duala area of the Cameroonian territory. The 1884 
treaty and its subsequent execution are representative of the conclusion and 
realization of subsequent treaties between Germany and Cameroonian rul-
ers. The treaties were originally written in German and were signed or marked 
with crosses by the native rulers after they had been given a translation, or at 
least an interpretation, in their native languages. The signing of the treaties 
or contracts was accompanied by symbolic acts such as hoisting the imperial 
German flag and a ceremonial volley.
One such standardized treaty was negotiated and concluded in the Bimbia 
area between the rulers of Bimbia, represented by their King William, and del-
egates of the two largest German trading companies on 11 July 1884.57 In the 
preamble, the treaty explicitly mentioned the transfer of sovereignty, legisla-
tive authority and administrative power to the trading companies acting un-
der the mandate of the German State. The non-interference with existing and 
future property rights to the land was assured (§3) and the rights of the rulers 
to collect taxes was acknowledged (§4). In contrast to the Duala treaty, the 
Bimbia treaty did not guarantee rulers control over their territory and peoples 
in accordance with their own laws and customs.
As was the case with the Duala treaty, the treaty transferring sovereignty 
over the Bimbia area did not specify the scope of the sovereignty rights. It is 
clear that not only external sovereignty rights were the object of transfer. On 
the one hand, sovereign, legislative, and administrative powers were explicitly 
mentioned as objects of transfer, which could indicate cession rather than es-
tablishing a protectorate. On the other hand, sovereign competences, including 
the power to regulate and allocate property rights, were left to the native rul-
ers. This ambiguity in the treaty text gave the German authorities non-specific 
56 F. von Holtzendorff, Handbuch des Völkerrechts auf Grundlage Europäischer Staatspraxis, 
vol. ii (Berlin: Habel, 1885), 102.
57 Copy of Draft Treaty signed at Bimbia, German Factory, 11 July 1884, Foreign Office papers, 
403/32. Reproduced in Ardener, Eye-Witnesses to the Annexation of Cameroon, 58.
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discretionary powers. As will be argued, the Germans would eventually misuse 
this room for discretion to gain more extensive sovereign rights over territory.
A Schutz- und Freundschaftsvertrag was concluded between the ruler of 
Bethany and Nachtigal on 28 October 1884. In Article 1 of the treaty, the native 
ruler ‘bittet Se. Majestät den deutschen Kaiser, über das von ihm beherrschte 
Gebiet die Schutzherrlichkeit übernehmen zu wollen’ and, in his turn, the Ger-
man Emperor guaranteed the native ruler ‘Seinen allerhöchsten Schutz.’ The 
protective character of the relationship was articulated in Article 9, in which 
the Germans promised to respect the natives’ ‘bestehenden Sitten und Ge-
bräuche,’ not to act in contradiction of the ‘Gesetze und Verordnungen ihres 
eigenen Landes verstossen würde’ and to pay ‘Steuern’ to the native ruler. This 
treaty text is very clear on what protection entailed: while the Germans would 
control the independence of the territory, the native ruler retained his sover-
eignty rights with regard to the governance of the territory.
On 29 January 1885, an agreement was concluded regarding the sale of the 
land in the Mahin area. Under the agreement, the King of the Mahin area sold 
the land to Mr Gaiser, a tradesman from Hamburg. On 11 March 1885, a trea-
ty was concluded and signed by the same King of Mahin, but this time with 
Nachtigal, the German commissioner and consul-general for the west coast of 
Africa. The aim of this treaty was to secure the extension of the German pro-
tectorate over the territories of Mahin and Mahin Beach. However, this treaty 
was never approved and recognized by Bismarck. Why Bismarck did not con-
firm German rule over this territory remains unclear. The British were quick 
to seize the opportunity and they approached the King of Mahin to conclude 
a treaty ceding sovereign rights over the territory to the Crown. Both areas, 
Mahin and Mahin Beach, were ceded to Great Britain on 24 October 1885.58
In the Cameroons, the struggle between Germany and Great Britain, and 
to a lesser extent France, for treaties with native rulers and their peoples led 
to fragmented territorial acquisition.59 Both Germany and Britain controlled 
small plots or areas of land, which in the majority of cases did not have clear 
borders. Overlapping claims and misunderstandings in defining and delim-
iting lands led to conflicts between the Germans and the British. This situa-
tion did not only confuse the European powers themselves, it went beyond 
the understanding of the natives too. As a consequence of this German-British 
rivalry, the natives inhabiting this part of Central Africa were divided into two 
camps, a situation that triggered conflicts among native peoples: one camp 
supported German rule, the other upheld British domination. An example of 
58 See Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 694.
59 Jaeck, ‘Deutsche Annexion,’ 77.
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this rivalry was the refusal of the native ruler Lock Priso from Hickory Town to 
conclude a treaty with the Germans,60 because he preferred his territory to be 
under British rule. Amid this confusion, African natives found they had a mea-
sure of influence on the State and rule to which they wanted to be subjected. 
The original inhabitants had the de facto power to play off Britain and German 
against each another.
A final example of a treaty concluded between Germany and a native ruler 
is that of 23 October 1885 between H.E. Goering and C.G. Büttner as represen-
tatives of the German Emperor and the ruler of the Hereros, Maharero Katy-
amuaha. Although this treaty was not concluded in Cameroon but in South 
West Africa, it is representative of the treaties Germany concluded at the time. 
In Article 1, Maharero asked the German Emperor to convey the ‘Schutzher-
rlichkeit über ihn und sein Volk’ and the Emperor accepted Maharero’s request 
and promised the native ruler ‘seinen Allerhöchsten Schutz.’ This relationship 
of protection was expressed using the same formula as in the treaty between 
Nachtigal and the ruler of Bethany discussed above. Existing native laws and 
customs would be respected by the Germans, the Germans promised not to 
act contrary to native rules and taxes were to be payed to the native ruler (Ar-
ticle 3). In other words, the division of sovereignty rights was clearly articu-
lated in the treaty. As in every protectorate treaty the Germans concluded on 
the African continent, this treaty contained an exclusivity clause: ‘Art. ii. Der 
Oberhäuptling der Hereros verpflichtet sich, sein Land oder Theile desselben 
nicht an eine andere Nation oder Angehörige derselben ohne Zustimmung 
Seiner Majestät des Deutschen Kaisers abzutreten, noch Verträge mit anderem 
Regierungen abzuschliessen ohne jene Zustimmung.’ This provision affirmed 
the division of sovereignty rights between Germany and the native ruler. It was 
the Germans who controlled relations with other political entities. Whether 
in practice this division was upheld and the internal sovereignty rights of the 
African ruler were respected is a question that will be addressed in the next 
Section.
To summarize, Germany had no colonial history when it decided to go to 
Africa in the 1880s. In the context of its imperial expansion, Germany intended 
to establish colonial protectorates on the African continent. Acquiring Afri-
can territory by cession or establishing protectorates in the traditional sense, 
the Germans excluded at forehand. Trading companies played a central role 
in the creation of the informal empire; they concluded many treaties with 
native rulers in the name of the German State. While these treaties stated 
protection as their purpose, in practice, as will be argued later, annexation was 
60 See Kum’a Ndumbe, Deutsche Kaiserreich in Kamerun, 78.
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effectuated. Schutzgebiet treaties contained the same ambiguity as the treaties 
the British and the French concluded with native rulers. The Treaty of 12 July 
1884, for example, spoke of the transfer of sovereignty, legislative authority and 
administrative power, but included a non-intervention clause and a guaran-
tee to preserve natives’ property rights to land. Another noteworthy feature of 
the treaties establishing German protectorates in the Cameroonian area was 
that within such a protectorate a relationship of suzerainty was established. 
Eventually, as will be seen next, establishing a Schutzgebiet opened the door 
to annexation.
4 Legislation Following the Conclusion of Treaties
After the conclusion of bilateral treaties between Germans and African natives, 
indirect rule by the German chartered trading companies proved a failure. 
This and the emerging resistance of native people caused the German State 
to intervention directly in ruling the territory and its inhabitants in an at-
tempt to restore law and order. In the turmoil caused by the trading compa-
nies that primarily served their own interests, the interests of Germany as well 
as those of the individuals and peoples living in the overseas territories were 
neglected. A central authority exercising sovereignty rights had to be instituted 
to overcome and avoid further deterioration of relations within the acquired 
territories.
The Germans instituted strict control over the territory and subjected it to 
German norms and values, as Andreas Eckert’s characterization of the German 
colonial State shows: ‘Der koloniale Staat war ein autoritärer Verwaltungssta-
at ohne Gewaltenteilung, eine Despotie, die sich auf eine Herrschaftsallianz 
mit den Kräften des Hinterlandes stützte. […] Daraus resultierte ein Staat, in 
dem Macht personengebunden blieb, und Recht ein Instrument, Gehorsam 
zu erzwingen.’61 German law was enforced by a central authority and imposed 
on Germans, other Europeans and African natives inhabiting the territory. Al-
though the Germans never officially considered assimilation part of their co-
lonial policy, as France did, the essence of German rule was to align natives’ 
laws and customs with those of the Germans, fully assimilating the former. 
Enacting legislation was the main instrument to subject African territory and 
61 A. Eckert, ‘Verwaltung, Recht und koloniale Praxis in Kamerun, 1884–1914,’ in: R. Voigt and 
P. Sack (eds.), Kolonialisierung des Rechts (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001), 169. See also Jaeck, 
‘Deutsche Annexion,’ 81–95.
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people to German norms and values.62 Cameroonian territory was considered 
to be an extension of the German motherland on the European continent. It 
was centrally ruled by German authorities without any involvement of the 
African rulers. As a consequence, native interests were ignored. This caused 
many difficulties, especially with regard to land ownership. After the first ap-
propriations of Cameroonian territory by the Germans, land ownership came 
to be regulated by system of concessions, many of which were granted to the 
Gesellschaft Süd-Kamerun and the Gesellschaft Nordwest-Kamerun. As will be 
argued later, the effect of granting these concessions was that native land own-
ership was disregarded.
Colonial law in Cameroon comprised a mixture of two legal systems, i.e., 
German-Prussian law and traditional custom-based native law. The core 
 features of colonial law were that it recognized German dominance over the 
subordinated territory and people of Cameroon and that it underwrote the in-
strumental, facilitating role of the territory, its resources and peoples in serving 
Germany’s interests.63 The subjected territory became part of and served the 
European State: internationally, it lost its status as a separate and independent 
entity. Excluding the African political entity from the international legal order 
and, in consequence, disapplying international law is the basic premise of the 
European approach to non-European polities. Nevertheless, some legal schol-
ars pointed to the advantages of colonial law in the sense of creating oppor-
tunities and encouraging development: ‘[C]olonial law not only defined the 
terms of domination and colonial exploitation; it also introduced new modes 
of conflict resolutions, notions of individual freedom, and modern property 
rights, and thus changed the structure of indigenous societies.’64 According to 
these scholars, the introduction of German law and the adaption and suppres-
sion of native law and custom not only created problems, but also offered solu-
tions and opportunities.
Irrespective of how territory was acquired, the newly obtained areas needed 
legal rules and courts. In addition, the substance and application of local cus-
tomary laws had to be evaluated and categorized. A balance had to be found 
62 For a comprise overview and texts of the legislation enacted in Cameroon, see J. Ruppel, 
Die Landesgesetzgebung für das Schutzgebiet Kamerun (Berlin: Mittler, 1912).
63 For a description of the hierarchical nature of German colonial law, see P. Sack, ‘Grun-
dzüge,’ 43. See also Eckert, ‘Verwaltung,’ 173.
64 G. Hardach, ‘Defining Separate Spheres: German Rule and Colonial Law in Micronesia,’ 
in: H. Hiery and J.M. MacKenzie (eds.), European Impact and Pacific Influence. British and 
German Colonial Policy in the Pacific Islands and the Indigenous Response (London: Tauris, 
1997), 231.
201German Cameroon
between the law of the colonized and that of the colonizer. Inevitably, a dual 
system of courts emerged on colonial territories, one exclusively administering 
native law and the other administering the new law, imported by the Europe-
ans. Applying the law in colonial territories did not only involve controlling 
the territories by means of set rules and procedures, but also demonstrating 
possession, labour, power and authority.65 Law in the overseas territories con-
sisted not only of positive law, institutions and procedures introduced by the 
Germans; it also had to deal with native customary law and to react to the chal-
lenges this confrontation brought about.
As the Cameroonian interior was gradually subjected to German control, 
mainly through treaties concluded with native rulers, authority was pro-
claimed by the heads of expeditions, most often representatives of trading 
companies. In the majority of cases, such an expeditionary leader would gov-
ern a particular administrative area as a Bezirksamtman. The development of 
administrative control over the Hinterland evolved gradually, accompanied by 
juridization, unification and centralization of German control over the terri-
tory. Like that of the French, German colonial administration was a centralized 
organization. The territory was administered directly by German officials: the 
Governor, the Chancellor and two Secretaries with a local council consisting 
of three merchants. The leading position within the colonial administration in 
Cameroon was held by the Governor: he controlled the legislative, the execu-
tive and the judiciary powers in Cameroon.66
German control of Cameroon was mainly effectuated by the Governor is-
suing decrees, Verordnungen. Two of the main subjects of regulation were the 
seizure and allocation of proprietary rights to land.67 Direct rule was intro-
duced to the detriment of native traditions, customs, laws and institutions. 
Legislative, administrative and judicial bodies were instituted in accordance 
with the German model and legal system by the Gesetz betreffend die Rechtsver-
hältnisse der deutschen Schutzgebiete of 17 April 1886. This law established that 
two different legal systems applied to the Cameroonian territory: the imported 
German law applied to the Germans inhabiting the territory, and traditional 
customary law, for the time being, continued to apply to the native popula-
tion. It was characteristic of the colonial legislative, administrative and judicial 
65 Eckert, ‘Verwaltung,’ 174.
66 See Sack, ‘Grundzüge,’ 47. The Governor’s powers were determined by the Schutzgebi-
etsgesetz from 1 January 1901.
67 Harald Sippel described this transition from the acquisition of territory to the organi-
zation and administration of Cameroon and the appropriation and distribution of land 
rights: Sippel, ‘Typische Ausprägungen,’ 352.
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system that the German Emperor possessed absolute power over legislation 
and administration, a power conferred on him by §1 of the aforementioned law 
of 17 April 1886: ‘Die Schutzgewalt in den deutschen Schutzgebieten übt der 
Kaiser im Namen des Reichs aus.’ This shows the close relationship between 
the Schutzgebiete and Germany.
The effect of the Verordnung of 27 March 1888,68 as laid down by Governor 
Julius Freiherr von Soden (1846–1921), was that ownership of land formerly 
owned or held by native inhabitants and acquired by means of a treaty would 
fall under the authority of the German Emperor (§1); ultimate land ownership 
accrued to the German Emperor. The decree stipulated that land ownership 
depended on the possessors developing their holdings within four years. De-
veloped land meant land used for mining, building and agriculture: the no-
madic way of life – hunting and gathering – was excluded (§4). Dispossession 
of land was possible only for reasons of public interest: land ownership can be 
taken ‘nur aus Gründen des öffentlichen Wohles für Unternehmen.’ Whether 
dispossession was for the common good was a decision the Governor would 
take at his discretion: his decision could not be appealed (§8).
Subsequently, the Verordnung of 2 July 188869 authorized the German 
Governor to formulate the conditions under which land was to be acquired 
by Germans, which regarded both modes of acquisition: treaties with natives 
and occupation of herrenloses Land (§21). Cession and occupation were both 
legally recognized modes of territorial acquisition by which Germans could 
obtain proprietary rights to land. Section 21 of the decree stipulated that all 
land-related regulations were to be approved by the German Emperor and that 
all lands had to be officially registered in the Grundbuch, the central register 
in which land ownership was laid down and which was based on a system of 
individual property.
These decrees, issued in March and July 1888, formally introduced German 
land law in Equatorial Africa – to the detriment of traditional native land law. 
68 Verordnung betreffend den Erwerb und Verlust, sowie die Beschränkungen des Grun-
deigenthums, vom 27. März 1888. Reproduced in A. Zimmermann, Die deutsche 
Kolonial- Gesetzgebung. Sammlung der auf die deutschen Schutzgebiete bezüglichen Ge-
setze,  Verordnungen, Erlasse und internationalen Vereinbarungen, mit Anmerkungen und 
 Sachregister, 1893–1897 (Berlin: Mittler, 1898), 249–251.
69 Verordnung betreffend den Erwerb und Verlust, sowie die Beschränkungen des Grun-
deigenthums, vom 27. März 1888. Reproduced in Zimmermann, Deutsche Kolonial- 
Gesetzgebung, 250. See also the Verfügung des Reichskanzlers betreffend die Führung 
der Grundbücher und das Verfahren in Grundbuchsachen in den Schutzgebieten von 
Kamerun und Togo, vom 7. Juli 1888. Reproduced in Zimmermann, Deutsche Kolonial-
Gesetzgebung, 199–206.
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In practice, however, the Germans did take into account the formal require-
ment of the Governor’s approval in case of land sale between natives and 
 Germans. The fact that the sale and lease of African land was harmful to 
 natives’ interests was not considered an issue until several reports of abuses 
appeared.70 In 1894, it fell to the German Governor of the Cameroons, Eugen 
Ritter von Zimmerer (1843–1918), to regulate the transfer of land between na-
tives and Germans, because natives refused to accept the unbridled taking 
of their lands by the Germans – a situation that led to conflicts and clashes 
between the two parties. Several reports were written on how the Germans 
misused their position as the dominating power in their relationship with the 
Cameroonian natives. In response to the abuses and disorder, a Verordnung 
was issued at the end of 1894, which required that all land treaties, contracts, 
and other agreements between natives and Germans had to be publicized by 
persons who had been authorized by the Government to do so.71
However, far from decreasing, the number of conflicts rose. In view of these 
conflicts over land allocation and speculation, − particularly harmful to the 
economic prosperity of both German and Cameroonian parties – the German 
government intervened again in an attempt to resolve land transaction prob-
lems. On 15 June 1896 it issued the Verordnung known as the Kronlandgesetz,,72 
a decree that was crucial to the colonial land policy, or Grundstücksrecht, in the 
Schutzgebiet of the Cameroons, because it had to regulate the institution, oc-
cupation and use of Kronland as well as the seizure and allocation of property 
in land. Under this decree all unoccupied territory, herrenloses Land or terra 
nullius, in the Cameroons was declared Kronland (§1), which implied that all 
unoccupied land was appropriated and categorized as property of the German 
State:
Vorbehaltlich der Eigentumansprüche oder sonstigen dinglichen An-
sprüche, welche Private oder juristische Personen, Häuptlinge oder un-
ter den Eingeborenen bestehende Gemeinschaften nachweisen können, 
sowie vorbehaltlich der durch Verträge mit der kaiserlichen Regierung 
70 See Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons, 398.
71 §1 of the Verordnung betreffend Grunderwerb in Kamerun, vom 24. Dezember 1894, Ko-
lonialblatt 1895, p. 101. Reproduced in Zimmermann, Deutsche Kolonial-Gesetzgebung, 
133–134.
72 Allerhöchste Verordnung über die Schaffung, Besitzergreifung und Veräußerung von Kro-
nland und über den Erwerb und die Veräußerung von Grundstücken im Schutzgebiete 
von Kamerun, vom 15. Juni 1896, Kolonialblatt 1896, pp. 435 bis 437. Reproduced in Zim-
mermann, Deutsche Kolonial-Gesetzgebung, 232–233.
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begründeten Okkupationsrechte Dritter ist alles Land innerhalb des 
Schutzgebietes von Kamerun als herrenloses Kronland. Das Eigentum 
daran steht dem Reiche zu.
In order to distribute and allocate the land in a fair manner, land commissions 
were appointed to identify and delimit the unoccupied lands and to determine 
private entitlements to land, which could be challenged in court (§4). These 
land commissions were instituted per district and, in most cases, consisted of 
four German civil servants and two German settlers. No Cameroonian rulers 
or subjects sat on these land commissions. When Germans, whether private 
individuals or trading companies, wanted to settle in the vicinity of native vil-
lages, the decree stipulated that enough land was to remain in native hands 
to meet their needs and even those of a larger population (§3). As a guideline 
for delimiting native land, the following rule was established and applied: ‘at 
least six hectares of land should be allowed for each hut in addition to the 
land occupied by the hut and that used for planting.’73 The remaining land 
was tagged as unoccupied and was automatically categorized as property of 
the German State. Transferring ownership of or leasing Kronland was subject 
to approval by the Governor in consultation with the German Emperor, who 
also determined on which conditions land could be sold and leased (§6) and 
under which terms the government would allow the construction of rails, 
roads, canals, telegraph, post offices, etc. (§8). If natives were to transfer their 
land to Germans, whether by sale or lease, for a period longer than 15 years, 
assent of the Governor was required in order for such a transfer to be valid 
(§11). According to §12, the Governor had the authority to empower individu-
als or companies to seek land not yet under the control of or mapped by the 
land commissions, and to take possession of this land, regardless of whether 
it was herrenloses Land. Subsequently, the Governor would recognize this land 
as unoccupied land. Detailed interpretation and specific execution of the prin-
ciples laid down in this Kronlandgesetz were the responsibility of the German 
Governor and the Cameroonian Chancellor (§13). In this respect, the German 
Emperor’s comments on the decree of 15 June 1896,74 which explained cer-
tain provisions of the decree in more detail for the purpose of facilitating its 
73 Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons, 401–402. See also Fisiy, ‘Techniques of Land Acquisi-
tion,’ 237.
74 Verfügung des Reichskanzlers betreffend die Ausführung Verordnung vom 15. Juni 1896 
über die Schaffung, Besitzergreifung und Veräußerung von Kronland und über den Er-
werb und die Veräußerung von Grundstücken im Schutzgebiete von Kamerun, vom 17. 
Oktober 1896, Kolonialblatt, p. 667.
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execution, is confusing. Although the decree testifies to the German govern-
ment’s mercilessness in taking land from its original owners, the Chancellor 
urged to take the natives’ position and interests into account (§2). Although 
the Chancellor recognized the subordinate position of the original inhabitants 
of Cameroon and the massive appropriation of their lands as a consequence of 
German presence on the territory, he did not take action to undo and prevent 
these practices. Natives’ proprietary rights to land were consciously ignored by 
the Germans, and the plight of natives continued to be one of legal uncertainty 
and insecurity.
As a consequence of the Kronlandgesetz, the number and the surface area of 
plantations possessed by German individuals and companies increased expo-
nentially in the 1890s, as many plots of land were granted under the  Governor’s 
authority. This resulted in large-scale dispossessions of natives. The Germans 
justified taking possession of territory they classified as herrenloses Land by 
arguing that as nobody had any particular rights to the land concerned, the 
German State was free to seize, distribute and allocate the land in accordance 
with the principles of reasonableness and usefulness: ‘wo keiner ein beson-
deres Recht hat, der Staat nach Billigkeit und Nützlichkeit verteilen kann.’75 
From the perspective of the German government, the natives did not have any 
special rights to the lands they inhabited and they did not succeed in distribut-
ing these lands in accordance with Billigkeit and Nützlichkeit, i.e., cultivation of 
the land for the sake of economic benefits. As a consequence of the Kronland-
gesetz classifying unoccupied lands as Kronland, natives were forced to cede 
their property rights to the German State. The German State eventually and 
effectively acquired ownership of the lands by taking them from the natives.
The German authorities authorized themselves to distribute, allocate and 
use the land, and they instituted a concession system. At the expense of the 
original inhabitants’ rights to the lands, these lands became the property of 
German capitalists, such as planters, bankers, and merchants. In exchange, 
these private actors had to open up the land, to invest in the land, to support 
German initiatives and companies, and to develop agriculture.76 The effects 
of this trade-off were mass expropriations of native lands and granting huge 
numbers of land concessions, mainly to such German associations as the Ge-
sellschaft Süd-Kamerun and the Gesellschaft Nordwest-Kamerun. In 1901, for ex-
ample, Governor Jesco von Puttkamer (1855–1917) transferred full ownership of 
75 Gustav Bansi in Schlimm, Grundstücksrecht in den deutschen Kolonien, 47. See G. Bansi, 
‘Die Gebietshoheit als rein staatsrechtlicher Begriff durchgeführt,’ Hirths Annalen des 
Deutschen Reich (1898), 641–692.
76 Kum’a Ndumbe, Deutsche Kaiserreich in Kamerun, 118–120.
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all unoccupied land to the Gesellschaft Nordwest-Kamerun. Large numbers of 
Cameroonian natives were expelled from their lands and relocated to reserves 
set up by the German administration. Until 1905, the German government sold 
more than two million hectares of native land to German private individuals 
and companies. The profits were used to finance Germany’s colonial venture.
As mentioned before, German rule was not uncontested. For example, 
objections were raised by the Basler Mission in Victoria, which stood up for 
Cameroonian natives by drawing attention to the forced expropriation of land, 
the relocation to reservations and the lack of suitable land to guarantee basic 
subsistence levels. The German Governor at the time, Von Puttkamer, ignored 
the missionaries’ complaints and criticism and defended the interests of the 
plantations, which profited from the concession system.77 The protesters, how-
ever, stood firm and even succeeded catching the attention of the German ad-
ministration on the European mainland. Landraubkrieg was the term used to 
describe the plight of the native population.78
In 1902, the first land commissions, constituted by the 1896 Verordnung, pre-
sented their findings with regard to the German land policy and how it was 
realized in practice. This first report, however, turned out to be highly bureau-
cratic and prejudiced. First, the reference to the exact amount of land allotted 
to native peoples evidences the technocratic nature of the land policy. Second, 
the rapporteurs obviously favoured the German settlers, trading companies 
and plantations on the African territory by insisting that relocating the natives 
to reservations was not objectionable. The commissions’ findings were not 
wholeheartedly accepted by the powerless inhabitants of the Basler mission. 
Although the findings of the land commissions did not contribute to solving 
the problems that accompanied German land policy in Cameroon, they did 
77 Von Puttkamer ‘assured that the natives owned only the land that they cultivated, a view 
opposed by those defending the natives; the latter argued that the land used by the na-
tives for their goats and cattle and for hunting was far more extensive than the land under 
cultivation. In the final vote it was decided by the council that natives should be placed 
in village-reservations without any compulsion; that they should not be forced to work 
on the plantations; that enough land should be given to natives to assure them of an 
adequate living (no fixed amount of land was named because of the differences prevail-
ing between regions in the character of the soil); that natives were to have fishing and 
hunting rights, the right to collect and to process natural products and to get fuel in un-
occupied land so long as it was not sold or leased to third parties.’ Rudin, Germans in the 
Cameroons, 403.
78 A. Rüger, ‘Die Entstehung und Lage der Arbeiterklasse unter dem deutschen Kolonialre-
gime in Kamerun (1895–1905),’ in: H. Stoecker (ed.), Kamerun unter deutscher Kolonial-
herrschaft, vol. i (Berlin: Rütten and Loening, 1960), 184.
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put the land problems in the German overseas territories on the Reichstag’s 
agenda and were occasionally discussed, especially in the context of setting 
and adopting the budget and the ever increasing expenditure in the overseas 
territories.79
Another consequence of the land commissions’ reports was that land regu-
lations were elaborated. On 21 November 1902, a decree was enacted by the 
Chancellor regarding the rights to parcels of land in all German Schutzgebiete. 
The central issues in this decree were the registration of land and the acqui-
sition by Germans of herrenloses Land and land inhabited by natives. This 
decree, as Peter Sack correctly observes, tacitly disregards two fundamental 
legal principles, namely, the freedom of appropriation and the freedom of con-
tract.80 The decree empowered the Emperor to set the conditions for the ap-
propriation of herrenloses Land and land inhabited by natives ‘soweit das im 
öffentlichen Interesse notwendig erscheint.’81 The Chancellor had the right to 
appropriate and allocate land and rights to these lands at will if such a course 
of action were in the public interest. Expropriation of native land was thus 
subjected to the Chancellor’s discretionary power of determining when appro-
priation of land was necessary.
A few months later, on 14 February 1904, restraints to taking unbridled pos-
session of land were put in place through the enactment of the Enteignungsge-
setz by way of a Kaiserliche Verordnung.82 This decree stated in §1 that land 
ownership and the right to occupation of herrenloses Land or Kronland could 
only be effectuated on the basis of the public well-being for undertakings, 
which favoured the execution of the right of expropriation. In exchange, com-
pensation had to be paid.83 Here too, the power to decide whether it was in 
the public interest to appropriate land was granted to the Governor (§4). The 
decree was also applicable to the dispossession of natives, albeit on more 
stringent conditions. There is an essential difference between the Kronland-
gesetz of 15 June 1896 and the Enteignungsverordnung. By constituting Kro-
nland the German State acquired ownership of the land. In contrast, in case of 
79 See, for example, Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons, 401 and 404.
80 Sack, ‘Grundzüge,’ 56.
81 See ibid.
82 Kaiserliche Verordnung über die Enteignung von Grundeigentum in den Schutzgebieten 
Afrikas und der Südsee, vom 14. Februar 1903, Kolonialblatt, p. 121. Reproduced in Kum’a 
Ndumbe, Deutsche Kaiserreich in Kamerun, 176–188.
83 See §1 of the 1903 Verordung. Reproduced in Kum’a Ndumbe, Deutsche Kaiserreich in 
 Kamerun, 176. See also E. Rohde, Grundbesitz und Landkonflikte in Kamerun. Der Bedeu-
tungswandel von Land in der Bamiléké-Region während der europäischen Kolonisation 
(Hamburg: lit, 1996), 73.
chapter 7208
Enteignung the German State was merely a third person granting the right to 
dispossess natives in favour of German settlers. In the light of the Enteignungs-
verordnung, the native’s position had to be taken into account as determined by 
§32: the dispossession ‘die aus der Herrschaft oder dem Besitz Eingeborener an 
Nichteingeborene übergegangen sind, zum Zwecke der Wiedereinsetzung der 
Eingeborenen in den Besitz insoweit zuzulassen, als die Enteignung nach dem 
Ermessen der Behörde notwendig ist, um den Eingeborenen die Möglichkeit 
ihres wirtschaftlichen Bestehens, insbesondere das Recht einer Heimstätte, zu 
sichern.’ The expropriated lands would be classified as Kronland and would 
thus become the property of the German State. This particular provision clear-
ly was not in the best interests of the companies, investors and other German 
settlers that benefited from German land policy, and the strongly objected to 
it. In view of this presumed threat to their rights, the German planters and 
large landowners asserted the absoluteness and inviolability of private land 
ownership: ‘Die Plantagenbesitzer und Konzessionäre, die den Kamerunern 
bedenkenlos den Grund und Boden geraubt hatten, sprachen jetzt als es um 
ihre Interessen ging, von der “Heiligkeit des Privateigentums,” das auch nicht 
mit Worten angetastet werden dürfe.’84 In theory, this decree enabled the Ger-
man government to authorize the colonial authorities to dispossess Germans 
in Cameroon too, and this offended the German landowners. However, the 
provisions on the dispossession of natives it showed that this particular provi-
sion was just a formality which posed no real threat to German landowners in 
the Cameroons.
The German government’s Kronland policy was elaborated extensively by 
the Verordnung of 18 April 1910.85 It stipulated that German settlers were al-
lowed to purchase Kronland from the Government provided that the land was 
used to erect buildings and provided that the requested area did not extend be-
yond three hectares. The Governor had the final say: he assessed the purchase 
request and the purchase price was subject to his approval. If the requested 
land extended beyond three hectares, it could only be held by lease on condi-
tion that they be cultivated. The German government, however, had the right 
to cancel the lease contract and take the land whenever needed.
This Verordnung was issued against the background of the project of 
segregating the Duala area into European and African districts, and the dis-
tinction between urban and countryside law was an important element of 
German modernization of Cameroon. After 1900, the strains caused by urban 
84 Rüger, ‘Entstehung,’ 190.
85 Verordnung, von 18. April 1910, Kolonialblatt, 1910, pp. 43–44. Reproduced in Zimmer-
mann, Deutsche Kolonial-Gesetzgebung, doc. 298.
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development in Duala led to conflicts. As Duala became the main colonial ur-
ban centre of Cameroon, the German administration launched a campaign 
to modernize streets and housing in the main native areas of the city. The na-
tive rulers objected to German interference in their trade monopoly, to the 
fact that they were forced to work for the Germans as wage labourers outside 
the trade sector, and to having to pay taxes to the Germans. The right to levy 
taxes, the native rulers claimed, had not been conferred on the Germans by 
the 1884 treaty.86 Subsequently, the Germans imposed their land expropriation 
schemes, which to the Duala people was the last straw. Duala rulers bombard-
ed the German Governor and Reichstag with telegrams, petitions and letters, 
claiming that the 1884 treaty did not allow expropriation. A typical question 
was the key question in the telegram of 12 March 1912 addressed to the Reich-
stag, in which the Duala rulers literally asked since when the German State had 
been the owner of the land: ‘[S]eit wann ist denn unser ländlicher Grundbe-
sitz Eigentum der Regierung geworden?’87 In response, the government tried 
to appease the rulers and to weaken resistance by privileging the people who 
did surrender their lands and resettled in the appointed reservations. As to 
the argument regarding the violation of the 1884 treaty, the German govern-
ment argued that dispossession was a sovereign right of each and every State.88 
Whether Germany’s argument was valid is a question that will be addressed 
in §5. What is important to bear in mind is that Cameroonians did passively 
accept German rule and that they pointed to inconsistencies in the legal justi-
fication of German presence on their territory. King Manga Bell involved other 
Cameroonian rulers in his resistance against the Germans and asked them for 
support by asserting that the German practices went against the provisions 
of the 1884 treaty. This alliance even appealed to Britain and France to recog-
nize the illegality of the German acts. This last step, however, proved fatal for 
King Manga Bell. As the prospect of war in Europe began to loom large, his ap-
peal to Britain and France was interpreted as an attempt to contact Germany’s 
enemies. Consequently, King Manga Bell was arrested and executed for high 
treason.89
In addition to this peaceful attempt to overthrow German authority, violent 
resistance also erupted. Although the Germans were already actively engaged 
in the exploration and acquisition of the Hinterland of the Adamawa region 
86 Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons, 409. See also Rohde, Grundbesitz und Landkonflikte in 
Kamerun, 77–79.
87 Ibid., 78.
88 Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons, 411.
89 Ibid., 412.
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by concluding treaties with local rulers in the 1880s, the Fulani people con-
tinued to resist German presence. Several military expeditions were sent into 
the Cameroonian interior. On 11 September 1899, a peace treaty between the 
Fulani rulers and the Germans was signed. The Fulani placed their territory 
under German protection and hoisted the German flag, with the Fulani rulers 
promising to respect and to comply with German rules and orders. In return, 
the Germans paid compensation to the Fulani people.90
Despite native resistance and critical questions from the Reichstag, the 
German government continued the expropriation process. German colonial 
rule in Cameroon was characterized by a gradual transition of an agro-rural 
society to a capitalist market economy, a transition that was also reflected in 
colonial land law and policy. By constituting Kronland, the German State ac-
quired ultimate land ownership over Cameroonian land. In other words, the 
German settlers and companies did not acquire ownership of the land; they 
could only obtain concessions from the German government. In the end, all 
land remained under the authority of the German government and it was the 
government that had discretionary power and final control over the territory. 
The German government had the competence to grant or refuse the right to 
property in land at its discretion. Consequently, the Cameroonian inhabitants 
were dispossessed, expelled from their lands, and forcedly placed in reserva-
tions. The Cameroonian people were subjected to the partiality of the German 
Governor and stood defenceless against the German settlers. Later, they would 
be employed on the German plantations to cultivate the lands that had origi-
nally belonged to them. Until the Great War commenced, Cameroon remained 
under German rule.
5 Treaty Interpretation and Execution
Especially after a Schutzgebiet treaty had been signed, the failure to respect 
the distinction between territorial sovereignty and private land ownership be-
came a central issue. From the point of view of German legal scholars, impe-
rium and dominium were distinct concepts. In the words of Von Liszt: ‘Erwerb 
und Verlust der Gebietshoheit, mithin der Staatsgewalt – also des Imperiums, 
nicht des Dominiums; der Herrschaft nicht über das Land, sondern innerhalb 
des Landes über die Leute.’91 The question is whether and to what extent this 
90 See C. Anyangwe, The Cameroonian Judicial System (Yaoundé: ceper, 1987), 26.
91 Von Liszt, Völkerrecht, 1925, 149. See also F. Lentner, Das Internationale Kolonialrecht im 
neunzehnten Jahrhundert (Wien: Manz, 1886) and Schlimm, Grundstücksrecht in den 
deutschen Kolonien.
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distinction was upheld with regard to the acquisition of sovereignty over ter-
ritory and the land ownership of native peoples in the context of Germany’s 
imperial expansion in Africa. From the beginning, German treaties with na-
tives explicitly excluded land ownership from cession. Sovereignty rights were 
the only object of transfer: ‘Der Boden darf bei einer eventuellen Souverän-
itätsübertragung nicht übergeben werden.’92 As has been shown, Germany 
did not acquire African territory by cession and did not establish traditional 
protectorates in Africa. The Germans attempted to constitute colonial pro-
tectorates, or Schutzgebiete, as did Britain and France at the later stage of 
the scramble for Africa. However, transferring external sovereignty rights by 
means of a treaty establishing a colonial protectorate, allowed the Germans to 
acquire internal sovereignty in addition to the external sovereign rights which 
they already possessed. This extension of sovereignty rights over Cameroonian 
territory occurred by way of the unilateral enactment of legislation. By way 
of Verordnungen, the Germans took over the internal administration of the 
protectorate. In contrast to Britain and France, this process of acquiring all-
comprehensive sovereignty over territory was less gradual. Because the Ger-
man colonial venture had started late and little time passed between landing 
on the African continent and taking control over specified territories, the ac-
quisition of territorial sovereignty, including land ownership, was a less subtle 
process. Often, when Schutzgebiet treaties were concluded, the transfer of par-
tial territorial sovereignty rights was presumed to include the appropriation 
of land ownership. Against this background of time pressure caused by the 
scramble, the Germans were less reluctant than the British and French to oc-
cupy herrenloses Land as a means of territorial acquisition and to declare these 
territories Kronland. Having acquired all-comprehensive sovereignty over the 
territory, which it deemed necessary to maintain law and order, the German 
State claimed ultimate land ownership, and this was the point of departure for 
implementing the concession system soon after the treaties had been signed. 
As a consequence, the native people were dispossessed and were placed in 
reservations.
Cameroonian natives, however, resisted the establishment and strengthen-
ing of German rule. In 1911, the resistance of the Duala population against the 
German presence on their land was based on the argument that the act of 
dispossession was contrary to the 1884 treaty. They insisted that only sover-
eignty rights, whether wholly or in part, had been transferred. In so arguing, 
they referred to the treaty’s non-interference clause. The German government 
responded by arguing that dispossession was a right that all sovereign States 
had. The question of course is whether the German State did indeed have the 
92 Kum’a Ndumbe, Deutsche Kaiserreich in Kamerun, 73.
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right to unilaterally overrule these treaty obligations by issuing Verordnungen? 
Did Germany violate protectorate treaties by extending the acquired external 
sovereignty rights to include internal sovereignty rights and by disregarding 
the existing native property rights to the land? In short, was imperium legally 
extended to include dominium? And could the acquisition of partial sovereign-
ty rights over territory result in the acquisition of full sovereignty, including 
proprietary rights to land?
There is another example of the natives opposing German rule. In the light 
of the Kronland policy of Germany, an interesting case emerged in a part of the 
Bamiléké territory, situated at the foot of the Cameroon Mountain and inhabit-
ed by the Bamoun and Bamiléké peoples. During the early 1900s, the Bamiléké 
territory was subjected to and redistributed by the German concession associ-
ations. Objecting to this appropriation, the ruler of the Bamoun people wrote 
a letter on 25 August 1910 to the German authorities in Cameroon regarding 
the rights to land ownership of his people, which implied the rejection of the 
status of Kronland, as declared by the Germans.93 The Bamoun ruler argued 
that the territory could not be deemed herrenlos, despite the fact that the ter-
ritory was neither inhabited nor cultivated. The German authorities’ initial 
response was to argue that it was not the density of population or the num-
ber of buildings that was the standard for Kronland status, but the extent of 
sovereign powers exercised over the involved territory.94 In other words, her-
renloses Land or terra nullius was aligned with the absence of sovereignty and, 
therefore, with the non-existence of a State: the territory lacked Staatlichkeit. 
The Germans later reviewed their argument and admitted that the Kronrechte 
were indeed not very strong. The Bamoun ruler did exercise sovereignty rights 
over the territory and the classification of the territory as Kronland had not 
been justified.95 Subsequently, the German government and local authorities 
promised to respect the sovereignty rights over the territory and the land own-
ership of the Bamiléké people, and considered the holdings of the German 
concession associations invalid.96
Germany’s recognition of the unlawfulness of the acquisition of this partic-
ular African territory by way of occupation and of its subsequent classification 
93 A copy of the letter of 25 August 1910 can be found in the Bundesarchiv Potsdam, Reichs-
kolonialamt nr. 4295, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten des Schutzgebietes Kamerun, Februar-






as Kronland undermines the legality of this mode of acquisition in the context 
of the struggle for African territory. The Germans were well aware of this le-
gally doubtful way of acquiring title to territory and they therefore relied on 
constituting Schutzgebiete by concluding bilateral treaties with native rulers. 
Germany and its European rivals acquiesced on the point that the acquisition 
of African territory by occupation had become untenable and could hence-
forth only be achieved in a derivative manner.
6 Conclusion
The treaties Germany concluded with native rulers to establish a unified 
Schutzgebiet of Cameroon, gave rise to two problems. First, the treaty texts 
clearly indicated that Germany would not acquire all-comprehensive sover-
eignty over the territory: sovereignty rights would be divided between Germa-
ny and the native ruler. Yet soon after signing the treaty, Germany usurped the 
sovereignty rights of the ruler too. Did Germany violate the law by failing to re-
spect the sovereignty of the African ruler? Contemporary legal doctrine point-
ed to the impossibility of two sovereigns ruling one and the same territory and 
asserted that de facto control over the territory was exercised by the German 
authorities.97 Sovereignty was considered indivisible. This premise rests on the 
presumption that Germany possessed and exercised both external and inter-
nal sovereignty over the territory. By asserting this logic, German legal schol-
arship confirmed that once a Schutzgebiet had been constituted, Germany 
could (and did) intervene in the self-government of the native polities, while 
Schutzgebiete were officially not part of the German dominions. From an inter-
national legal perspective and taking the theory of the traditional protectorate 
into account, it is questionable whether the acquisition of external sovereignty 
implied obtaining claims to internal sovereignty. If this presumption were part 
of the international legal order, it would have tremendous consequences for 
the independence and authority of States and the relations between States.
Second, the exercise of internal sovereignty over territory implied the com-
petence to regulate and allocate property rights to land, which the German 
did on the basis of the concept of Kronland, the introduction of concession 
97 Schlimm, Grundstücksrecht in den deutschen Kolonien, 46. See also P. Laband, Das 
Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches (Tübingen, Leipzig: Mohr, 1901), 273; F. Seelbach, 
Grundzüge der Rechtspflege in den deutschen Kolonien (Bonn: Cohen 1904), 5 and K.F. von 
Stengel, Die Rechtsverhältnisse der deutschen Schutzgebiete (Tübingen, Leipzig: Mohr, 
1901), 38.
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systems and the registration of land ownership. German policy left virtually 
no room for native property rights. Did Germany illegally appropriate native 
lands and proprietary rights? As has been shown, the text of the standard pro-
tectorate treaty the Germans used to establish Schutzgebiete unambiguously 
stated the German promise to respect the claim to exclude existing native 
property and proprietary rights from transfer. German interference with the 
self-government of the Cameroonian polities involved the enactment of legis-
lation in which ultimate property rights to the land were granted by and to the 
German State, which implied the expropriation of natives. Subsequently, the 
German authorities constituted the concession system to gain profits, which 
were needed to finance the colonial venture.98 The German government stood 
to benefit from acquiring property rights to the protected territory: the sale of 
the land to German individuals and companies would yield money. In addi-
tion, the land was subjected to exploitative activities, i.e., mining, agriculture 
and construction. The introduction of the notion of individual land ownership 
served the legal security of the German settlers and was the basis for taxa-
tion. Political constructs such as Kronland and Schutzgebiete served the Ger-
man interest overseas. Promises made in treaties with native rulers were no 
obstacle to the German policy of land appropriation and reallocation. Eventu-
ally, the Cameroonian peoples lost their lands, either because their territory 
was considered herrenloses Land or by signing a bilateral treaty establishing a 
Schutzgebiet. This premise turned out to be the key for Germany to interfere 
with the self-government of the Cameroonian political entities, including the 
regulation and allocation of proprietary rights to land.
Were the protectorate treaties concluded between the German State and 
African rulers indeed meaningless formalities? Or did these treaties have le-
gal value after all? The next chapter will address the question whether the 
increased German intervention in the internal affairs of the Cameroonian 
polities constituted a violation of the Schutzgebiet treaty and, more generally, 
of international law. More generally, it will attempt to answer the question 
whether the German, British and French colonization of Africa was legal.
98 See Rüger, ‘Entstehung,’ 182.
chapter 8
Ex facto ius oritur?
The main modes for European States to acquire African territory were 
bilateral treaties effecting cession and establishing protectorates, more spe-
cifically colonial protectorates. Chapter 4 pointed at the diverse forms and 
different interpretations of the protectorate treaties concluded by European 
colonial powers, more specifically Great Britain, France and Germany, took 
different forms and invited a variety of interpretations (Chapter 4). The very 
existence of these treaties suggests that international law was applied to the 
European-African confrontation. Within this broader context of internation-
al law, case studies of British, French and German treaty-making practices 
(in Nigeria, Equatorial Africa and Cameroon respectively) shed light on how – 
and how differently – these treaties were negotiated, worded, concluded and 
implemented (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). The present chapter looks at the theo-
retical implications of the reported treaty-making practices by addressing the 
question whether the cession and protectorate treaties, and by extension in-
ternational law, were violated in their interpretation and execution. Were the 
European States unreservedly obliged to comply with the treaties they had 
entered into or did the civilization argument and the unequal status between 
the contracting parties justify the European States breaching their contrac-
tual obligations? Put another way, on which moral and legal grounds were 
European State powers bound to honour the treaties they had concluded with 
African rulers?
To answer this question, this chapter first compares and assesses the colo-
nizers’ treaty-making practices and subsequent conduct (§1). Second, it ques-
tions the legality of the acquisition and partition of Africa by treaty (§2). 
 Specifically, it discusses whether European States infringed native landown-
ership (§2.1) and whether they respected their treaty obligations and by im-
plication international law (§2.2). Section 3 restates the chapter’s main argu-
ment and concludes with some transitional comments on redressing historical 
wrongs, the topic of Chapter 9.
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1 International Law in Practice: Treaties between European States 
and African Polities
Through their legal advisors1 and judicial institutions2 European governments 
officially recognized that African rulers had the power to transfer sovereignty 
rights over territory, either wholly or in part, i.e., by way of cession or protec-
torate treaties respectively. Such treaties were highly formalistic and became 
standardized during the period when European competition for African ter-
ritory was most intense. Amid this clash of contending interests, cession lost 
currency and establishing protectorates became the main mode for European 
states to acquire title to African territory. Initially, protectorate treaties only 
transferred external sovereignty, but the extent and content of these sovereign-
ty rights remained undetermined, and as competition for territory intensified 
the number of open norms increased. This extensive use of vague provisions 
and concepts – and the resulting widened scope for interpretation – expanded 
the discretionary competences of the European treaty parties. And as the ob-
ject of the protectorate treaties was often obscured by the dust kicked up in the 
scramble for Africa, it was not long before the European treaty parties began 
to appropriate external sovereignty (including its accompanying rights over 
territory) as well as proprietary rights to land. In sum, open treaty terms, object 
indeterminacy and ample discretionary room combined to veil the practical 
implications of the protectorate treaties and effectively erase the distinction 
between sovereignty and property.
What happened was that the European treaty party would acquire full sov-
ereignty step-by-step after the protectorate treaty had been concluded, as ‘[p]
rotectorates ripen into sovereignty.’3 The case studies have shown that the 
reach of the transferred sovereignty differed from protectorate to protector-
ate; the scope of sovereignty rights was indeterminate. As Anghie observes, 
‘colonial jurists self-consciously grasped the usefulness of keeping sovereignty 
undefined in order that it could be extended or withdrawn […].’4 That the pro-
tectorate treaty effected cession of certain sovereignty rights to the European 
1 See, for example, the advice of the British lawyers: Law Officers’ Opinion 21 April 1886 Foreign 
Office No 84/2275.
2 Ol le Njogo and others v The Attorney-General and Others, 1913, k.l.r.70 (Appeal to the Court 
of Appeal for Eastern Africa); Southern Rhodesia, In re, 1919, a.c. 211 (Appeal to the Privy 
Council); and Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary, Southern Provinces of Nigeria, 1921, 2 a.c. 399 or 
3 n.l.r. 21 (Appeal from the Divisional Court of Southern Nigeria to the Privy Council).
3 McCalmont Hill, ‘Growth and Development of International Law,’ 262.
4 Anghie, Imperialism, 89.
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contracting party in itself implied interference with African internal affairs; 
the protectorate treaty was effectively the first step to European control of the 
territory. The Europeans did not distinguish between internal and external sov-
ereignty. Although, in theory, it was the African treaty party that held the rights 
of internal sovereignty, these were hardly, if at all, respected by the Europeans: 
the Europeans allocated these rights to themselves. Alexandrowicz recognizes 
the practice of using protectorates to acquire both external and internal sov-
ereignty rights,5 and he refers to Article 35 of the Final Act of the Berlin Con-
ference and the apparent tension incorporated in the Final Act between the 
requirement of effective occupation and the establishment of protectorates.6 
He argues that, ‘[P]rima facie a Protectorate could not mean anything else but 
transfer of external sovereignty to the Protector leaving the internal sovereign-
ty in the Protected State and linking the latter to the Family of Nations. That 
this interpretation is correct follows from the provision of Article 35 which 
lays down the principle of effective occupation but does not include Protector-
ates in the principle.’7 Alexandrowicz concludes that ‘[i]t could not have been 
otherwise as occupation would have suppressed the internal sovereignty of 
the Protected State.’8 After the external sovereignty rights over territory had 
been transferred from the native ruler to the European State, the European 
colonizing power began to encroach on the internal sovereignty rights of the 
native ruler.
Native transfer of external sovereignty rights by means of a protectorate 
treaty opened up an opportunity for the colonizing powers to acquire full sov-
ereignty, including the power to regulate and administer internal affairs and 
allocate property rights and land ownership. The colonial governments un-
der European rule increasingly claimed authority to dispose of land to which 
5 Alexandrowicz, European-African Confrontation, 111.
6 See Fisch, ‘Africa as Terra Nullius,’ 347–375.
7 Alexandrowicz, European-African Confrontation, 4–5.
8 Ibid. ‘As to the elimination of Protectorates from article 35 of the Berlin Act (which excluded 
their occupation), most of the international lawyers of the positivist school (apparently re-
lying on State practice) took the view that effective occupation of the Protectorate by the 
Protector State was within the law. This was an interpretation contra legem leading to the 
establishment of the colonial Protectorate. The latter was obviously a political device with-
out legal significance vis-à-vis African contracting parties. A Protectorate was bound to be 
governed by the terms of the treaty by which it was brought into existence. Intention of an-
nexation was irrelevant from the point of view of international law. If the Protector State had 
such an intention but if the intention failed (as in the case of Ethiopia) it was meaningless. If 
on the other hand the act of annexation could be carried out, it was a breach of the treaty of 
protection unless the protected entity had agreed to it.’ Ibid., 124.
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African law applied; using their self-enacted legislative instruments they were 
able to strengthen their control over the territories.9 More specifically, using 
these instruments European governments could exert influence on forms 
of land ownership, land use and land distribution on the African continent. 
These instruments included acquisition of the right of disposal, configuration 
of land, expropriation of land, increased control of land use through a sys-
tem of concessions, control of land transfers, land registration for distributive 
purposes, and reassigning juridical competence to colonial authorities.10 The 
Europeans took over the internal administration of the protectorate territory, 
and this would eventually result in mass dispossession of the native popula-
tions and resettling these peoples in reservations established by the European 
authorities.
In the period following the conclusion of the protectorate treaties two dif-
ferent but related difficulties arose. First, it became increasingly hard to dis-
tinguish between a protectorate and a colony: in theory, a protectorate and a 
colony were two different things, but in practice the protectorate turned out to 
be a colony, in which full sovereignty was exercised by the European colonial 
authority.11 Establishing a protectorate rather than a colony gave the European 
colonial power more room for discretion as well as the opportunity to avoid 
responsibilities. As Umozorike asserts correctly, ‘[t]he creation of a status for 
protectorates different from that of colonies was intended to give the Crown 
a free hand in dealing with the people in areas the Crown itself designated as 
“foreign land” under its control. It was a technicality for differential treatment 
that could hardly be justified.’12 Initially, as the British consul Hewett wrote 
to Jaja, the king of Opobo, protection meant that ‘the Queen does not want 
to take your country or your markets, but at the same time is anxious that no 
other nation should take them. She undertakes to extend her gracious favour 
and protection, which will leave your country still under your government.’13 
However, in a memo he wrote to the British foreign secretary Rosebery on 
15 April 1886 Hewett redefined the protectorate concept: ‘[T]he promotion of 
9 See Frohnen, ‘Problem of Power,’ 621.
10 R. Debusmann and S. Arnold (eds.), Land Law and Land Ownership in Africa. Case Stud-
ies from Colonial and Contemporary Cameroon and Tanzania (Bayreuth: Bayreuth African 
Studies, 1996), viii–ix.
11 This blurring line between a protectorate and colony was already acknowledged by con-
temporary scholarship. See, for example, A. Mérignhac, Traité de droit public international 
(Paris: Pinchon and Durand-Auzias, 1905), 181.
12 Umozurike, International Law and Colonialism, 48.
13 f.o. 84/1862, see Hewett to Jaja, 1 July 1884, enclosed in Jaja to Salisbury 5 May 1887. Quot-
ed in Anene, Southern Nigeria in Transition, 66.
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the welfare of the natives of all these territories taken as a whole by ensuring 
the peaceful development of trade and facilitating their intercourse with Eu-
ropeans. It is not to be permitted that any chief, who may happen to occupy a 
territory on the coast should obstruct this policy in order to benefit himself.’14
However, as John Mugambwa correctly notes, there were differences be-
tween the German and French policies, on the one hand, and the British policy 
on the other on jurisdictional rights within protectorates,: ‘In terms of their 
[Germany’s and France’s] interpretation of international law, the assumption 
of a protectorate over “uncivilised” people automatically entitled the protect-
ing state to exercise jurisdiction over all persons in the territory irrespective 
of consent of their government or that of the local ruler.’ British law officers 
wrote two reports (in 1887 and 1891) in which they reminded their government 
that these German and French practices did not comply with the standards 
of international law.15 The reminder did not stop the British government from 
adapting its policy and ‘gradually assimilate[ing] its position with that of the 
other European governments.’16 In other words, while the British initially 
argued for the illegality of the French and German colonial practices on the 
African continent, they eventually adopted the same practices in their African 
protectorates.
In French protectorate treaties, as has been shown, the term protectorate 
was often used in combination with suzerainty,17 a term related to feudalism 
and vassal relations.18 The ensuing ambiguity eventually caused sovereignty 
14 f.o. 84/1749, no. 4, see Memo by Hewett on Rosebery’s letter, 15 April 1886. Quoted in 
Anene, Southern Nigeria in Transition, 74.
15 Salisbury to Count Hatztfeld August 1887 Foreign Office No 412/28, quoted in Mugambwa, 
‘Treaties or Scraps of Paper,’ 86.
16 Ibid. ‘However, by the close of the century, the official view of the legal significance of the 
agreements had changed. The British government allowed itself to be convinced by its le-
gal advisers that the extent of the powers and authority assumed in British protectorates 
was a matter of policy irrespective of express grant in the treaties with the local rulers. 
This view was subsequently adopted by the British judiciary.’ Ibid., 91.
17 The British Lord Chancellor, Lord Selborne, however, did describe the content and com-
petences which a suzerainty in the context of Africa’s colonization entailed: ‘Suzerainty 
means that the Suzerain is lord paramount of the people who are subject to it. The control 
of foreign and Frontier relations essentially distinguishes a paramount Power. No war 
can be made upon adjoining Native tribes, no treaty can be made with (foreign) Powers 
except by the authority of (the suzerain) country,’ leaving the control over internal affairs 
to the subjected political entity. Lord Selbourne quoted in Stubbs, ‘Suzerainty, Medieval 
and Modern,’ 279–280.
18 On suzerainty, see Kelke, ‘Feudal Suzerains and Modern Suzerainty,’ 221–223; M.  McIl-
wraith, ‘The Rights of a Suzerain,’ Law Quarterly Review, 12 (1896), 113–115; M. McIlwraith, 
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rights to be divided and shared between France and the African polities. Most 
treaties concluded between the French and the natives claimed to establish 
a protectorate relationship,19 but the treaties were inconclusive on the scope 
and limitations of the sovereign rights which the native rulers would retain. 
On the one hand, there was no cession: France and the African polities entered 
into traditional protectorate agreements as sovereign entities. On the other 
hand, references to suzerainty reaffirmed a hierarchical relationship between 
the French and the natives.20 This paradox is inherent to the phenomenon of 
colonial protectorates: in theory a protectorate was established, but in prac-
tice the treaty was interpreted in colonial legislation as effecting a cession of 
full sovereignty. The self-contradictory occupation à titre de protectorat is often 
used to characterize the colonial protectorate.21 First, France would claim to 
have established a protectorate on the basis of a treaty with an African native 
ruler. Second, it underlined the hierarchical relationship by referring to suzer-
ainty. Third, vagueness and indeterminacy characterized the object of transfer. 
Fourth, the French exercised sovereignty rights. And, fifth, as this course of 
affairs had to be justified, the construction of the colonial protectorate was 
fashioned and used in both French politics and legal doctrine. The institution 
of the colonial protectorate, however, was not only used to retrospectively jus-
tify Africa’s colonization, its use was first and foremost anticipated.
The difficulties that arose from establishing traditional protectorates 
prompted the ad hoc creation of the colonial protectorate. Legal positivists 
argued for the inapplicability of international law between States within the 
family of civilized nations and other political entities, but as the practice of 
colonial venture necessitated intervention, the political construct of the co-
lonial protectorate22 was introduced to regulate contacts between European 
States and African political entities. Westlake defined the colonial protectorate 
‘Suzerainty: A Reply,’ Law Quarterly Review, 12 (1896), 228–229; Rutherford, ‘Spheres of 
 Influence,’ 300–325; Stubbs, ‘Suzerainty Medieval and Modern,’ 279–318 and C. Sylvest, 
‘“Our Passion for Legality”: International Law and Imperialism in Late Nineteenth- 
Century Britain,’ Review of International Studies, 34 (2008), 403–423.
19 See the Decree of 11 December 1888, published in the Journal official of 13 December 1888, 
which modified the Decree of 26 April 1886.
20 Galtier characterises this inequality: ‘Les formes que l’on emploie pour conclure ces trai-
tés sont de plus, dit-on encore, trop rudimentaires; un simple signe, une croix prouvent 
l’adhésion des indigènes, et en retour des avantages concédés, les nations européennes ne 
donnent rien ou presque rien.’ Galtier, Conditions de l’Occupation, 80.
21 Fisch, ‘Africa as Terra Nullius,’ 366–367.
22 For a detailed explanation of the concept of colonial protectorate, see Alexandrowicz, 
European-African Confrontation, 124. See also Nozari, Unequal Treaties, 260.
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as ‘a region in which there is no state of international law to be protected, but 
which the power that has assumed it does not yet claim to be internationally 
its territory, although that power claims to exclude all other states from any ac-
tion within it.’23 Eventually, the colonial protectorate resolved the issue of ‘how 
sovereignty was to be produced through colonial rule.’24 Westlake’s description 
goes to the heart of the matter: the colonial protectorate was a tool to exclude 
other European competitors for African territory and to colonize the territory 
later. As a result, there were two realities. On the one hand, all European co-
lonial powers shared the expectation that, in time, they would actually rule 
the territories they had undertaken to protect. On the other hand, in conclud-
ing agreements with the native rulers representing their peoples the European 
powers had guaranteed to respect internal sovereignty rights. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, protectorates became the ‘common technique by which 
European states exercised extensive control over non-European states while 
not officially assuming sovereignty over those states.’25 It was the Berlin Con-
ference which marked a turning point: the protectorate as traditionally con-
ceived was transformed into the colonial protectorate.26 In sum, the construct 
of the colonial protectorate served to justify the colonization of Africa both 
before and after the fact.
After the Berlin Conference, hundreds of protectorate treaties were con-
cluded which guaranteed African rulers their internal sovereignty. Moreover, 
all of these protectorates had been promulgated internationally and none of 
them contained any reference to annexation. But in practice and in the course 
of time, the African rulers would lose both external and internal sovereignty 
rights: the Europeans treated the territories and native peoples as they would 
have in traditional colonies. To all intents and purposes, the colonial protector-
ate was a political instrument, not a legal institution. Alexandrowicz too points 
to the political nature of the colonial protectorate and stated that it was ‘an 
arrangement adopted behind the scenes of the Berlin Conference by which 
the signatory powers gave each other carte blanche to absorb protected States, 
which led to a deformation of the Protectorate as such.’27 He argues that ‘such 
an arrangement could not affect the validity of the treaties of protection with 
Rulers, for pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt. The colonial protectorate is the 
23 J. Westlake, International Law. An Introductory Lecture (Cambridge University Press, 1888), 
123–124.
24 Craven, ‘Invention of a Tradition,’ 388.
25 Anghie, Imperialism, 87.
26 See Shaw, ‘Acquisition of Title in Nineteenth Century Africa,’ 1047–1048.
27 Alexandrowicz, European-African Confrontation, 80.
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outcome of a para-legal metamorphosis and has no place in international law 
as a juridical justifiable institution. It was at most a political expedient.’28 As 
early as 1909, the French jurist Jean Perrinjaquet argued that ‘greed and the 
wish for exploitation without administrative and policy costs had led Euro-
pean countries to employ hypocritical techniques of annexation without sov-
ereignty. Colonial protectorates had become a regular feature in the French 
realm (Cambodia, Annam, Tunisia).’29 European politicians used the colonial 
protectorate to conceal and justify the annexation of great parts of the Afri-
can continent. Moreover, international legal scholars, thinking along positiv-
ist lines, adopted the notion of colonial protectorates to legitimize European 
colonial practices and effectively tried to ‘debase’ protectorate treaties.30 This 
of course raises the question whether the political deployment of the colonial 
protectorate could indeed overrule the actual guarantees the European had 
given the natives in the protectorate agreements. Answering this question re-
quires addressing the second difficulty that arose after the protectorate treaties 
had been concluded.
This second difficulty concerns the question whether the step-by-step ac-
quisition of full sovereignty rights by the European contracting party after 
the protectorate treaty had been concluded was permitted under nineteenth- 
century international law. As the previous chapters have shown, most treaties 
contained clauses in which the contracting European power explicitly under-
take to respect the property and the property rights of the native populations. 
Legislation enacted unilaterally by the European authorities often implied 
mass dispossession of natives. Were the European State powers entitled to 
do so or did they have to comply with the treaties they had concluded with 
African rulers? Were European States acting in compliance with nineteenth- 
century international law when they issued decrees that effectively negated 
their treaty obligations? Did European States violate protectorate treaties by 
extending the transferred external sovereignty rights to include the internal 
element of sovereignty, which in turn caused failure to respect native property 
and native property rights? Were imperium and dominium used in accordance 
with the law? In short, were these protectorate treaties, and with them inter-
national law, violated? To answer these questions, the general findings on the 
practices of both cession and protectorate treaties will have to be discussed 
separately.
28 Ibid., 80–81. See Anghie, Imperialism, 89–90. See also Alexandrowicz, ‘Afro-Asian World 
and the Law of Nations,’ 193, 200 and 209–210.
29 Perrinjaquet paraphrased in Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, 151.
30 Fisch, ‘Africa as Terra Nullius,’ 367.
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Cession treaties transferred both external and internal sovereignty over ter-
ritory from African native rulers to European States. Theoretically, no prop-
erty rights were involved in these transfers, a proviso that was often explicitly 
stipulated in the treaties. The central issue here is not whether extending ex-
ternal sovereignty rights to include internal sovereignty rights complied with 
legal; the main question is rather whether the right to dispose of private land 
ownership was transferred along with territorial sovereignty rights. From the 
perspective of international law applying to and between the members of the 
family of civilized nations, Westlake answered this question in the negative. 
He argued that ‘the state which afterwards becomes sovereign will be bound to 
respect such right and give effect to it by its legislation, morally bound if only 
its own subjects are concerned, but if the previous right of property existed in 
a subject of another state, there can be no doubt but that respect to it would 
constitute an international claim as legally valid as any claim between states 
can be.’31 In the broader context of the law of nations, however, Westlake an-
swered the question in the affirmative, pointing to the cultural differences be-
tween Europeans and African natives. He stated that ‘it is possible that a right 
of property may be derived from treaties with natives, and this even before 
any European sovereignty has begun to exist over the spot.’32 Westlake justified 
the appropriation of natives’ land after they had ceded their sovereign rights 
over the territory to the European contracting party, by making a distinction 
between civilized States and non-civilized entities. When all-comprehensive 
sovereignty was ceded from one sovereign State to another, the receiving State 
was both morally and legally bound to respect existing rights to land as much 
as possible. However, when a native ruler ceded sovereignty to a European 
State, the continuity principle did not applicable, or so Westlake argued. The 
crux is of course whether the non-applicability of the continuity principle to 
cession relationships between European States and African native rulers can 
be justifiably based on the civilization argument.
As has been shown, the civilization argument, discriminating as it does 
between the civilized and the non-civilized world, is controversial, especially 
 because it was a political and scholarly expedient for the justification of Af-
rica’s colonization. Cession implied no direct acquisition of property rights 
by the European State: only sovereignty in the sense of regulative powers 
over subjects was transferred. As the continuity principle dictated, there was 
no automatic or necessary extinguishment of native private property rights. 
This principle was generally accepted as a principle of international law in 
31 Ibid.
32 Westlake, Chapters, 145.
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the  context of State succession.33 The acquiring State did, however, have the 
competence to enact legislation to enable it to acquire property rights to land 
and to regulate private land ownership in its territories. The general rule was 
(and still is) that private property must not be taken for public use without 
compensation. The rule of the continuity of existing rights after cession was 
customary and respected in the family of civilized nations, and even in the 
actual European-African confrontation, the continuity principle was initially 
observed. Yet when the struggle for African territory intensified, the principle 
was more honoured in the breach than in the observance.
Although the question on the legal nature of the customary rule of the 
continuity principle and its applicability to cession between Europeans and 
African natives cannot be answered at this stage, it is at stage worth repeat-
ing that the cession treaties between European States and African rulers of-
ten contained provisions on respecting existing property rights to the land 
over which sovereignty was transferred. In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, almost all cession treaties concluded between European powers and 
native rulers contained provisions stipulating that native customs and rights 
33 The general principle that cession does not impair private property rights is especially 
enunciated in the 19th-century case law of the United States. In the landmark case of 
the United States v. Percheman (1833), Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Marshall stated 
the following: ‘It is very unusual even in cases of conquest, for the conqueror to do more 
than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the country. The modern usage 
of nations, which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and of right 
which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if private 
property should be generally confiscated, and private rights annulled. The people change 
their allegiance; their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations 
to each other, and their rights of property, remain undisturbed. If this be the modern 
rule even in cases of conquest, who can doubt its application to the case of an amicable 
cession of territory? […] A cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of the 
property belonging to its inhabitants. […] The cession of a territory is by its name from 
one sovereign to another […] would be necessarily understood to pass the sovereignty 
only, and not to interfere with private property.’ F.B. Sayre, ‘Change of Sovereignty and 
Private Ownership of Land,’ American Journal of International Law, 12 (1918), 480. Francis 
Sayre concluded that the American ‘body of law seems so reasonable and so equitable 
that it is gratifying to note that the principles upon which it is founded are not confined to 
this side of the Atlantic.’ In support of his argument, Sayre refers to case law in Britain, to 
the Argentine historian and statesman Carlos Calvo (1822–1906) who argued that the con-
tinuity principle was a rule of international law, to the work of the French jurist  Gilbert 
Gidel (1880–1958), to the treatise on Staatenpraxis of the Swiss lawyer and diplomat Max 
Huber (1874–1960) and to passages of Droit International of the Italian jurist Pascal Fiore 
(1837–1914). Ibid., 495–497.
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would be respected and that European settlers were under an obligation to pay 
indemnities34 for appropriating the land.35 In practice, however, cession of-
ten brought about dispossession of African natives. Land ownership fell under 
the control of the European authority, which conferred full sovereignty rights 
as well as land ownership on itself. The Europeans did not comply with their 
promise to respect the customs, rights and properties of natives; they failed 
to take into account the personal, collective and inalienable nature of native 
land ownership. Rather, the Europeans imposed their own legal system and 
inherited concepts. It is fair to say then that while the continuity principle was 
deemed applicable to earlier cession relationships between Europeans and Af-
rican natives and was often laid down in the treaties they concluded, the rule 
was not applied and respected. To justify this departure the Europeans invoked 
the cultural differences between themselves and African natives. The legality 
of this practice after cession treaties had been concluded is questionable. Af-
rican natives were dispossessed, expelled from their lands and forced to live in 
areas designated by the European colonizers. Moreover, it was not only the ap-
plicability of the continuity principle to cession of sovereignty by the African 
ruler to the European State that was greatly reduced; cession treaties were used 
less and less. Protectorate treaties became the main instrument for Europeans 
to acquire African territory.
Protectorate treaties, whose meaning changed from a legal institute to the 
political instrument of the colonial protectorate, were deployed as ‘spring-
boards for annexation.’36 This indicates that they were not a goal in themselves 
34 ‘Individual confiscation of property without indemnity undoubtedly falls short of the 
international standard of civilized society, because it violates the sense of equity of the 
civilized world, on which its deepest legal convictions rest, which is at the root of all 
legislation on expropriation, and which has been ratified by a long international custom.’ 
G. Kaeckenbeeck, ‘The Protection of Vested Rights in International Law,’ British Yearbook 
of International Law, 17 (1936), 16.
35 Many of these treaties contain stipulations to the effect that transfer of sovereignty would 
not affect the private legal rights of natives in territory the sovereignty over which was 
transferred to a European power. An example of such a stipulation can be found in the 
Congo treaties concluded between 1889 and 1891. It states that ‘the Chief and his people 
(keeping the property of their lands) will be able to sell them or let them to foreigners, 
whatever their nationality, and to collect rent.’ Alexandrowicz, European-African Confron-
tation, 102. The original treaty used the following words: ‘ils pourront les vendre ou les 
louer à des étrangers de n’importe quelle nationalité et percevoir les redevances …’ Con-
sequently, reference in treaties to the preservation of property rights was made in order 
to ‘strengthen the conviction that transfer of sovereign rights meant a transaction within 
the realm of international law.’ Ibid., 103.
36 Ibid., 111.
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but a means to acquire full control over a specific territory, including rights of 
land ownership.37 Here too, the Europeans explain this instrumental nature 
of protectorate treaties is against the background of cultural differences, as 
Thomas Baty made clear when referring to the ‘denaturalised conception of 
protection’:
The “protected State,” in fact, is not a State at all. And thus, in these cases, 
it is the neologism alone that is used; we speak only of “protectorates,” 
and never of “protected States.” Not only virtually, but actually, European 
Powers have annexed those territories, while shrinking from the con-
sequences of that incorporation, and asserting that they are protecting 
States where there are obviously no States to protect.38
Protectorate treaties thus became the main instrument to acquire first exter-
nal and then internal sovereignty rights over a territory, as was recognized by 
nineteenth-century doctrine.39 It was these treaties that led the Europeans to 
presume that these rulers and their peoples subjected themselves and their 
lands to the superior European State.40 The treaties were mainly used as proof 
of title to territory in relation to other European competitors: a protectorate 
treaty declared the protected territory off limits to rival States, an objective 
that was also expressed in Article 34 of the Final Act of the Berlin Conference. 
Crawford recognizes that in the Final Act of the Berlin Conference colonies 
and protectorates were assimilated, ‘requiring for both effective occupation 
and notification to other powers.’41 He observes that ‘[e]ven though many pro-
tectorate agreements over what came to be regarded as colonial protectorates 
were treaties in international law form made with recognized African States 
37 Alexandrowicz, ‘Juridical Expression of the Sacred Trust of Civilization,’ 155. See Alexand-
rowicz, ‘Afro-Asian World and the Law of Nations,’ 193.
38 Baty, ‘Protectorates,’ 114. See also Alexandrowicz, ‘Role of Treaties,’ 55: ‘This interpreta-
tion of protection just before the Berlin Conference of 1885 contains a clear distinction 
between external and internal sovereignty of the ruler, and provides for limitation of the 
first only so as to enable the protector to introduce the protected entity into the wider 
framework of the universal family of nations. But state practice after the Berlin Confer-
ence revealed a tendency to deform the original classic concept of the protectorate and to 
convert it into an instrument of colonialism. In fact, international lawyers of that period 
called the protectorate “colonial protectorate” with a new connotation.’
39 J. Perrinjaquet, ‘Des annexions déguisées de territoires,’ Revue générale de droit interna-
tional public, 16 (1919), 316–367.
40 See, for example, Bornhak, ‘Anfänge des deutschen Kolonialstaatsrechts,’ 7.
41 Crawford, Creation of States, 301.
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[…], tribes with a certain legal status […], the continuous accretion of pow-
ers by usage and acquiescence to the protecting State was – by virtue of the 
Berlin Act procedure – opposable to the parties to that Act and in practice 
a matter at the protecting State’s discretion.’42 The Final Act did indeed act 
as a catalyst for the tensions between European colonial powers in that they 
were urged to rule overseas territories directly and effectively. However, time 
and resources to realize this effective and direct rule were in short supply. This 
explains why to the Europeans the colonial protectorate proved a welcome so-
lution to and justification of the European territorial expansion in Africa. The 
European States mutually accepted the applicability of the colonial protector-
ate in their struggle for African territory. What remains to be seen is whether in 
European-African relations the partition of Africa complied with international 
legal standards.
2 The Legality of the Treaty-based Acquisition and Partition of Africa
In nineteenth-century international legal doctrine, private property of land 
and territorial sovereignty occupied quite different levels of discourse in the 
context of the territorial State; territorial sovereignty did not interfere with 
private land ownership; imperium could coincide with dominium. This was 
also considered true for the confrontation between civilized nations and 
non-civilized nations, as the Prussian jurist Jean-Louis Klüber (1762–1836) ac-
knowledged by stating that ‘no nation is authorized, whatever its qualities, in-
cluding a higher level of culture, to divest another nation of its property, not 
even savages or nomads.’43 Whether civilized or not, sovereignty did not mean 
property and vice versa. International legal theory, however, did not align with 
the reality of treaty-making on the African continent in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, when dominium and imperium were evidently 
used inaccurately and inconsistently. Although during negotiations and in the 
treaty texts imperium and dominium were clearly recognized as separate in-
stitutions, there does seem to have been a friction between text and intention 
on the one hand and the interpretation and execution of the treaties on the 
other. In other words, a discrepancy appeared between theory and practice: on 
paper, in the form of written treaties, the distinction between dominium and 
imperium was taken as a general rule of law, but the execution of and com-
pliance with treaties belied this separateness. Effectively then, the doctrinally 
42 Ibid.
43 J.L. Klüber, Droit des gens moderne de l’Europe (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1819), 124.
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and contractually separate domains of dominium and imperium were merged 
by the European treaty parties. Evidently, the observed dichotomies – private 
versus public, property versus sovereignty and dominium versus imperium – 
were not as rigid in practice as they were in theory.44 The next sections will 
argue that, in the context of the acquisition and partition of Africa in the late 
nineteenth century, European States acted unlawfully in both the private and 
the public legal spheres.
2.1 Interference with Natives’ Land Ownership
In 1896, Sir Harry Johnston (1858–1927), the British colonial administrator of 
the Oil Rivers Protectorate, stated the following: ‘The white man’s presence in 
these countries was in the highest degree justifiable, since it had resulted in 
no confiscation of the black man’s land, but in his being taught to develop 
its resources and since it had been followed by the steady suppression of the 
slave trade and the diffusion of liberty.’45 This section questions whether Sir 
 Johnston was right in arguing that African natives were justifiably dispos-
sessed. The longer competition for African territory lasted, the more vehement 
and rude it became. Fearful of losing what they could gain, European States 
struggled to obtain paramount title to as much African territory as possible. In 
parallel to this hardening of the struggle, European States increasingly opted 
for protectorate treaties instead of cession treaties. This choice was as essen-
tial as it was deliberate, as is evidenced by the explicit considerations of the 
European colonial powers.46 As has been shown, cession implied the transfer 
of full sovereign rights and consequently the possibility of enacting legislation. 
These sovereign powers could be, and indeed were, exercised mainly by the 
executive of the European State on the foreign territory. As a result, these ex-
ecutive acts were often not open for judicial intervention and assessment; the 
Act of State doctrine prohibited judicial review.47 In the case of protectorates, 
however, these controlling mechanisms between governmental branches did 
not apply, because the protecting power only acquired sovereign rights over 
the foreign relations of the protected entity. Internal affairs, such as enacting 
44 J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace, 5th edn 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), 150.
45 These words reflect the British view on their subjection of African territory and peoples, 
as they were expressed by Sir Johnston, who addressed the Royal Colonial Institute on 
8 December 1896, quoted in Mulligan, ‘Nigeria,’ 299.
46 On the difference between a cession treaty and a protectorate treaty, see Baty, ‘Protector-
ates,’ 109–114.
47 See O’Connell, State Succession, 105, 251–252.
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legislation, remained within the ambit of the protected sovereign’s power.48 
By concluding protectorate treaties with African native rulers, the European 
powers recognized, either implicitly or explicitly, the internal sovereignty of 
the native rulers, as well as the power of these rulers to regulate existing and 
future proprietary within their territories.
What remains to be seen, however, is whether the European State powers 
did in fact respect the sovereign rights of the native rulers and the private prop-
erty rights of the native inhabitants. Although Europeans and non-Europeans 
frequently concluded treaties and, at least before the age of New Imperialism, 
the principles of pacta sunt servanda and bona fides did apply to these treaties, 
the European contracting parties more often than not acted in contravention 
of the rights of the African peoples and their own treaty obligations. It was 
especially in the second half of the nineteenth century, when positivist legal 
thought was at its peak, that the construct and ideal of the sovereign, territorial 
State was held to be the central and sole subject of European-style interna-
tional law and the civilization argument was the dominant political justifica-
tion of European conduct in Africa. This explains why the rights and interests 
of the original inhabitants, in particular their proprietary rights to land, went 
unheeded. The question remains whether European States had a right to act in 
this way. More specifically, were cession and protectorate treaties interpreted 
and executed correctly?
In this context, the distinction between cession and protectorate treaties is 
fundamental: cession was a traditional mode of territorial acquisition, while 
establishing a colonial protectorate was not. When taking the cession of Afri-
can territory by treaty into account, a legal acquisition mode which was aban-
doned during the scramble, the question is whether the transfer of sovereign 
rights over territory also implied the transfer of ownership of the land and 
whether such transfer was effected in keeping with valid legal norms.
As to protectorate treaties, the preliminary questions are whether the 
European colonial power was entitled to extend the external sovereignty it 
had acquired to include full sovereignty by means of legislative, administrative 
and judicial action, and whether such conduct can be considered to have con-
travened treaty obligations. Under the protectorate treaties, the contracting 
European States guaranteed to help and assist the African entity it had under-
taken to protect, and this commitment implied the crucial duty to defend the 
territorial integrity of African natives. Although it now fell to the European 
48 In this context, a difficulty arises, namely, how to interpret the relation between internal 
sovereignty and effective occupation. The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 and the word-
ings of the Final Act will be further analysed on this point.
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protectors to maintain external relationships, it was incumbent on them to re-
spect the internal autonomy African political entities. However, practice shows 
that they showed no such respect. In most cases, the internal autonomy of the 
protected entity was not respected in an absolute sense; the very transfer of 
external sovereignty implied possibilities of extending it to competences that 
were within the scope of the internal autonomy of the protected entity. Lord 
McNair hinted at this expansion: ‘It seems probable that the rule of law to the 
effect that annexation automatically terminates treaties affecting the annexed 
territory, while the establishment of protectorates does not affect them, has 
at times led to the annexation of a protected State as a means of getting rid of 
troublesome treaties.’49 Some legal authors even explain this development as a 
natural consequence of a territory having become a protectorate. The question 
of course is whether the metaphor of the protectorate as the ‘springboard for 
annexation’ is an accurate reflection of nineteenth-century law.
When sovereign rights over territory were transferred from an African ruler 
to a European State, did native proprietary rights to the land, including the 
power to allocate and regulate these rights, devolve on the European contract-
ing party?50 Answering this question requires that the relationship between 
the private right of property and the public right of sovereignty be properly 
articulated. More specifically, the relationship between native African owner-
ship of land and European sovereignty over the territory in which these na-
tives exercised their proprietary rights requires closer scrutiny. Legal scholars 
in the common law tradition recognized and developed five approaches to the 
transfer of sovereign rights from the African ruler to the European State and 
the maintenance of existing rights to land:51 the doctrine of legal vacuum, the 
doctrine of radical discontinuity, the doctrine of continuity, the doctrine of 
common law dispossession, i.e., the doctrine of recognition or the Act of State 
doctrine,52 and the doctrine of aboriginal or native title.53 The question now 
49 McNair, Law of Treaties, 628.
50 In his Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifico (1764), Christian Wolff argued that the transfer of 
sovereignty rights did indeed include property rights: C. Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Sci-
entifico, new edn., transl. by J.H. Drake (Washington: Carnegie Institute, 1934), 140–141, 152 
and 147–148.
51 B. Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title (University 
of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983), 1. With regard to the succession of sovereignty 
rights and the consequences for (existing) treaties, see A.D. McNair, ‘The Effects of Peace 
Treaties upon Private Rights,’ Cambridge Law Journal, 7 (1939–1941), 379–398.
52 For an elaborate definition and explanation of these four approaches, see Slattery, Ances-
tral Lands, 12.
53 More on aboriginal or native title, see R. Bartlett, ‘Native Title: From Pragmatism to Equal-
ity Before the Law,’ Melbourne University Law Review, 20 (1995–1996), 282–310; Gilbert. 
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is which of these doctrines the Europeans used and empowered in the trea-
ties at the time of the acquisition of African territory and the subjection of its 
inhabitants.
The applicability of the doctrine of legal vacuum can be discarded out of 
hand as Africa was not considered to be terra nullius. For the same reason, 
the doctrine of aboriginal title, recognized elsewhere,54 does not apply to 
Africa and its peoples either. The remaining approaches are the doctrine of 
radical discontinuity, the doctrine of continuity and the doctrine of recogni-
tion. These doctrines were all used during the colonization of Africa in the 
second half of the nineteenth century in parallel to the intensity of the 
scramble. Before the race for African land started and at the time of the first 
land acquisitions in the 1870s, the doctrine of continuity was the leading the-
ory in the international legal order. It was very unusual, even in the case of 
conquest, as O’Connell argues, ‘for the conqueror to do more than to displace 
the sovereign and assume dominion over the territory.’55 He continues his ar-
gument in favour of recognition of the principle of continuity by referring to 
custom which became international law: ‘The modern usage of nations, which 
has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and of right which is 
acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if pri-
vate property should be generally confiscated, and private rights annulled.’56 
O’Connell then observes that the ‘people change their allegiance; their rela-
tion to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other, 
and their rights of property, remain undisturbed.’57 He concludes his argument 
by asserting that ‘the State is constituted of two elements, the formal and the 
fictitious element of sovereignty and the real element of society. The former is 
affected by State succession but the latter is not. Hence rights and duties which 
 Indigenous Peoples; P.G. McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law. A History of 
Sovereignty, Status, and Self-Determination (Oxford University Press, 2004); McNeil, Com-
mon Law Aboriginal Title and Reynolds, Aboriginal Sovereignty.
54 As in Australia, for example. See Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2), (1992) 175 clr 1.
55 O’Connell, State Succession, 240. ‘Although the concept of “acquired rights” had not been 
propounded as such, the authors throughout the nineteenth century had taken it for 
granted that private property rights were unaffected by change of sovereignty. Wheaton 
had mentioned that the successor State must pay compensation if, subsequent to the 
change, it confiscates private property.’ Ibid., pp. 242–243. With regard to the dominant 
jurisprudence, O’Connell referred, among others, to the theories of Édouard Deschamps, 




inhere in the people are continuous.’58 As the continuity principle dictates, the 
transfer of sovereignty rights over territory does not affect proprietary rights 
of the people inhabiting the territory. Sovereignty and property were consid-
ered to be separate institutions and the transfer of existing property rights 
was not the natural or necessary concomitant of the transfer of sovereignty 
rights: ‘Change of sovereignty implies nothing more than the substitution of 
one such competence for another. The successor State in no sense “continues” 
the sovereignty of its predecessor; neither is it necessarily responsible for the 
judicial consequences of its predecessor’s acts. The territory, the people, 
the complex of legal relations existing between them, all remain unaffected by 
the change.’59 The continuity principle was recognized in the theory and prac-
tice of early nineteenth-century international law. The French jurist Paul Fau-
chille (1858–1926), for example, explicitly discussed the continuity doctrine, 
observing that while private rights remain untouched in a situation of sover-
eignty transfer, the public rights of sovereignty do not.60 Other nineteenth-
century jurists, such as the Italian Pasquale Fiore (1837–1914),61 the American 
Henry Wheaton (1785–1848)62 and the Belgian Pierre Descamps,63 had argued 
that private individuals who were deprived of their property by the public 
authorities should be compensated. Moreover, as the previous chapters have 
shown, most cession treaties concluded between European States and African 
rulers included the obligation to refrain from encroaching on any private prop-
erty ‘unless the value is agreed upon’ by the African owner and the receiving 
European.
In the final two decades of the nineteenth century, when protectorate trea-
ties became the main method to acquire title to African territory, it was the 
Act of State doctrine or the discontinuity principle that was increasingly used 
58 D.P. O’Connell, ‘State Succession and the Theory of the State,’ in: C.H. Alexandrowicz 
(ed.), Grotian Society Papers 1972. Studies in the History of the Law of Nations (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 22.
59 O’Connell, State Succession, 26. See also on terra nullius: L.B. Ederington, ‘Property as a 
Natural Institution: The Separation of Property from Sovereignty in International Law,’ 
American University International Law Review, 13 (1997–1998), 263–331.
60 P. Fauchille, Traité de droit international public, vol. i (Paris: Rousseau, 1922), 317, cited in 
O’Connell, State Succession, 104.
61 P. Fiore, Trattado di diritto internazionale pubblico, 3rd edn (Turin: Unione, 1887–91), 221.
62 H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 5th edn by C. Phillipson (London, New York: 
Stevens and Sons, Baker, 1916), Section 31.
63 P. Descamps, ‘La définition des droits acquis. Sa portée générale et son application 
en matière de succession d’état a état,’ Revue générale de droit international public, 15 
(1908), 385.
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in the European quest for territorial expansion. British politicians in particu-
lar relied on it to defend and justify the British conduct in the colonies. The 
discontinuity doctrine was formulated explicitly in Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. 
Secretary of State for India in Council (1923), which was brought before the In-
dian Appellate Court.64 In its judgment, the Court argued that the principle 
applied to succession of sovereign powers, regardless of whether the territory 
had been acquired by conquest, occupation or cession. The Court described 
the principle as follows: ‘Any inhabitant of the territory can make good in the 
municipal Courts established by the new sovereign only such rights as that 
sovereign has, through his officers, recognized. Such rights as he had under 
the rule of predecessors avail him nothing. Nay more, even if in a treaty of ces-
sion it is stipulated that certain inhabitants should enjoy certain rights, that 
does not give a title to those inhabitants to enforce these stipulations in the 
municipal courts.’65 The Court added that the ‘right to enforce remains only 
with the high contracting powers.’66 This formulation gave rise to a variety of 
interpretations of the doctrine. Most frequently, the doctrine was understood 
to mean that the rights that before the succession of sovereignty were vested in 
the subjects who fell within the jurisdiction of the preceding sovereign would 
no longer exist at all after the succession.67 In the practice of international law, 
the discontinuity principle stipulated that the change of sovereignty by ces-
sion must not affect private property, but no municipal court or tribunal had 
the authority to enforce such an obligation.68 But what did the discontinuity 
64 Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India, 1923, l.r. 51 i.a. 357. See also Nyali Ltd 
v. Attorney-General, 1955, i All e.l.r., 646 and 652.
65 Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India, 1923, l.r. 51 i.a. 357, p. 360.
66 Ibid.
67 O’Connell, State Succession, 252. He argued that ‘[t]he case that was originally responsible 
for this interpretation was Cook v. Sprigg, which was decided in connexion with the an-
nexation of Great Britain of certain territory in South Africa. It was held that a treaty of 
cession, or annexation, made by the Crown, and its results, are not within the cognizance 
of municipal courts.’ Ibid.
68 This point of view is confirmed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in its suc-
cessive judgments. See Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary of the Southern Provinces of Nigeria, 
1921, 2 a.c. 399 or 3  n.l.r. 21; Sobhuza ii v. Allister M. Miller and others, 1926, Annual 
Digest 1925–1926, No. 28 and Adeyinka Oyekan and others v. Musendiku Adele, Journal of 
African Law, 1 (1957), 186–192. In the context of the French colonization of Africa, this as-
sumption was confirmed by the Cour de Cassation in the John Holt et C° c. Cie Coloniale 
de l’Ogooué, Cour de Cassation (Chambre civile), 30 March 1905, in: P. Dareste (ed.), Re-
cueil de législation, doctrine et jurisprudence coloniales, vol. xiii (Paris: Sirey, 1905), 97–102. 
Although no case law is available in the German situation, the Germans acted according 
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principle imply in the context of the transfer of sovereignty over African terri-
tory and native land ownership?
Although the acquiring State was under a contractual obligation to respect 
private property rights that had been created before the transfer of territorial 
sovereignty, it did have the legal power to enact legislation to regulate property 
rights within its territory,69 namely through an Act of State. These acts were 
not open to judicial review. As the case studies on British Nigeria, French Equa-
torial Africa and German Cameroon have shown, the acquisition and partition 
of Africa was considered to be effectuated by Acts of State, and these acts were 
not open to judicial review. Having concluded cession treaties, the European 
States were effectively at liberty to expand their sovereign powers over African 
territory. In the course of the colonization of Africa, the continuity principle 
was not observed and the discontinuity principle was radicalized. After sover-
eign rights over African territory had been ceded to them, the Europeans ne-
glected existing native rights to land and seized on the opportunity to allocate 
and exercise regulatory control property rights. African natives were dispos-
sessed of their lands and of their rights to these lands.
In the age of New Imperialism the relation between sovereignty and prop-
erty was put to the test in the relationship between the European power and 
the African natives immediately after the transfer of sovereign rights over terri-
tory in which these natives possessed land. As Craven observes, ‘[c]olonialism 
was not just about acquiring things as property, but about turning things into 
property.’70 As will be shown next, this ‘turning things into property’ was done 
illegally.
2.2 Violation of International Law
Now that it has been established that European State powers competing for 
African territory in the late nineteenth century failed to respect native land 
ownership, the next question is whether the Europeans also failed to comply 
with their obligations articulated in the cession and protectorate treaties they 
to this point of view, as the discussion of conflict on the Bamiléké territory in Chapter 7 
showed.
69 ‘That law is not, except in form, derived from sovereign will, but is generated by the needs 
and aspirations of society, and is therefore based on a rational and not a voluntarist prin-
ciple. Removal of the one sovereign and its replacement by another can have no other 
effect upon the existing legal order than to substitute one authority competent to enact 
legislation for another. Hence only those legal institutions which relate fundamentally to 
the constitutional powers of the sovereign can be presumed to lapse.’ O’Connell, ‘State 
Succession and the Theory of the State,’ 22.
70 Craven, ‘Colonialism and Domination,’ 888.
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concluded with African natives. In the case of cession of sovereignty over Af-
rican territory by treaty, the answer to this question can be both ‘yes’ and ‘no,’ 
depending on whether treaty contained an explicit provision on respecting na-
tive property and property rights. In theory, the European State that acquired 
all-comprehensive sovereignty over territory had the capacity to allocate and 
control land and proprietary rights to land. In practice, existing native rights 
to land were ignored and natives were dispossessed. Whether the continuity 
principle had to be respected and whether the increasing use of the disconti-
nuity principle during the scramble for Africa was legal are questions that will 
remain unanswered here, because cession of sovereign rights over African ter-
ritory to European States lost much of its relevance as a mode of acquisition. 
As long as the treaty provisions did not explicitly stipulate that the property 
and property rights of African natives had to be protected or respected, cession 
of sovereignty over African territory must be considered legal. If, however, the 
treaty stipulated such as duty of protection, as most cession treaties did, sub-
sequent appropriation of native property and property rights by the European 
contracting party would contravene its treaty obligations. European colonial 
powers were aware that this situation limited their room for manoeuvre and it 
follows that the decision to use protectorate treaties instead was quickly made.
However, this move, establishing protectorates by treaty, does not preclude 
breach of contract. In fat, since under protectorate treaty only external sover-
eignty rights were transferred from the African rulers to the European States 
and the European contracting parties explicitly undertook not to interfere 
with native property and property rights, it can be concluded that once the 
European States began to extend their sovereign rights to include the author-
ity to govern their relations with the native subjects, they acted in breach of 
their treaty obligations. The European contracting parties failed to respect the 
internal sovereignty of the African rulers and appropriated their role as the 
supreme authority of and over the polity. By doing so – appropriating the sov-
ereign rights controlling the relationship between native rulers and their sub-
jects and dispossessing natives of their land – the Europeans failed to comply 
with the obligations they had undertaken to perform and that were explicitly 
stated in the protectorate treaties. This argument is valid for both the tradition-
al, or international, protectorate and the colonial protectorate, because the ba-
sis of both institutions was a treaty establishing a relationship of protection, 
which implied the transfer of rights of external sovereignty over territory only.
The next question is whether, in breaching the cession and protectorate 
treaties, the European contracting parties acted in violation of nineteenth-
century international law. In other words, were Europeans bound to respect 
their treaties with African native rulers? Were they legally obliged to observe 
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the treaty provisions or were they free to break their promises? In other words, 
were their treaties legally binding instruments?
2.3 Customary International Law Impaired
As has been shown in Chapter 4, before European acquisition of title to Afri-
can territory was at its height the practice of treaties being concluded between 
Europeans and non-Europeans was a common one and considered to accord 
with nineteenth-century international law, in order to establish and maintain 
friendly relations between two nations. The foundational international legal 
principles of pacta sunt servanda and bona fides regulated these treaty relation-
ships, as these were principles shared by both European and African contract-
ing parties. This broad treaty practice and the applicability of the principles of 
pacta sunt servanda and bona fides in the context of the law of and between 
nations are evidenced by the extensive studies of Alexandrowicz.71 At the Con-
ference of Berlin, the American delegate Kasson recognized and emphasized 
this treaty-making between Western and non-Western nations as established 
practice within the scope of international law.72 In this respect, the conclusion 
of and compliance with treaties between Europeans and African natives were 
considered to be governed by customary international law,73 in accordance 
with its constitutive elements of the objective requirement of State practice 
and the subjective condition, introduced in the nineteenth century,74 of opinio 
iuris sive necessitatis.75 In other words, treaties had binding force because they 
met the Western definition and criteria of customary law. Custom as a legal 
71 C.H. Alexandrowicz, ‘Treaty and Diplomatic Relations Between European and South 
Asian Powers in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,’ Recueil des Cours, 100 (1960), 
231–235; Alexandrowicz, Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations, 85–86; Alex-
androwicz, ‘The Afro-Asian World and the Law of Nations,’ 145–148; and Alexandrowicz, 
‘Empirical and Doctrinal Positivism in International Law,’ 288–289. See Onuma, ‘When 
was the Law of International Society Born,’ 56.
72 Minutes of the 8th session of 31 January 1885, in: G.F. von Martens, Nouveau Recueil gé-
néral de traits, vol. x (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1885–1886), 335–336.
73 See B. Stern, ‘Custom at the Heart of International Law,’ Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law, 11 (2001), 89–108.
74 P. Guggenheim, ‘L’Origine de la notion de “l’opinio juris sive necessitatis” comme deux-
ième élément de la coutume dans l’histoire du droit des gens,’ in: J. Basdevant (ed.), Hom-
mage d’une génération de juristes au Président Basdevant (Paris: Pedone, 1960), 259–260.
75 See Lotus (France v. Turkey), Judgment, 1927, pcij (Series A) No. 9, at 18, 28; Asylum 
(Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, 1950, icj Reports 265, at 276–277; Right of Passage (Portugal 
v. India), Judgment, 1960, icj Reports 6, at 42–43 and North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal 
Republic of Germany v. Denmark/Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment, 
1969, icj Reports 3, at 44.
237Ex facto ius oritur?
rule results from a ‘general and consistent practice’ that States adhere to out of 
‘a sense of legal obligation.’76
Since before the age of New Imperialism there had been a sustained prac-
tice of treaty-making between Europeans and African natives, in which the 
principles of pacta sunt servanda and bona fides were duly respected by both 
treaty parties. This practice rested on the will of both European and African 
treaty parties that such treaties establish legal relations; the treaties manifest-
ed a will to give rise to legal relations.77 The opinio iuris was mainly based on 
the security the treaties were intended to offer: the mutual benefits of eco-
nomic transactions and friendly and peaceful relations between Europeans 
and African natives had to be safeguarded. Both parties engaged in concluding 
treaties out of a sense of legal obligation.78 International law was created and 
evolved under the influence of long-established relations between European 
and African private and public entities. Before the nineteenth century, these 
treaty relations were both respected and observed. The treaties between Euro-
peans and non-Europeans were legally binding instruments, not merely politi-
cal expressions of goodwill that were only morally enforceable.79 The scramble 
76 A.E. Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation,’ American Journal of International Law, 95 (2001), 758. This view is made 
explicit in the case of North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, 1969, icj Reports 3, at 44. 
See also M. Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of International Law,’ British Yearbook of Inter-
national Law, 47 (1974–1975), 1–53; M. Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules (Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999); M. Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary International 
Law,’ Recueil des Cours, 272 (1998), 155–410; R. Müllerson, ‘The Interplay of Objective and 
Subjective Elements in Customary Law,’ in: K. Wellens (ed.), International Law: Theory and 
Practice (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998), 161–178; M. Villiger, Customary International 
Law and Treaties: A manual on the Theory and Practice of the Interrelation of Sources (Dor-
drecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) and K. Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law, 2nd 
edn (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993).
77 Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source,’ 53.
78 A.A. D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Ithaca, London: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1971), 89.
79 Compare with J. Mossner, ‘The Barbary Powers in International Law,’ in: C.H. Alexand-
rowicz (ed.), Grotian Society Papers 1972. Studies in the History of the Law of Nations (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 218. That the violation of a (protectorate) treaty implied 
a violation of international law was already emphasized by Vattel: ‘He who violated his 
treaties, violates at the same time the law of nations; for he disregards the faith of trea-
ties, − that faith which the law of nations declares sacred; and, so far as depends on him, 
he renders it vain and ineffectual. Doubly guilty, he does an injury to his ally, he does an 
injury to all nations, and inflicts a wound on the great society of mankind.’ De Vattel, Law 
of Nations, ii.15.221.
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for Africa was a radical break with centuries of legal theory and practice. In this 
light, it can even be argued that the European States violated the principle of 
estoppel,80 in that they were not consistent in their conduct towards African 
polities, and in that this inconsistency which was detrimental to the stability 
and predictability of the international legal order as a whole.81
By not complying with their obligations articulated in the cession and pro-
tectorate treaties concluded with African rulers, the Europeans violated cus-
tomary international law. By interfering with the property rights to land and 
land law of African polities and, by extension, with the sovereign rights of the 
native rulers, the European contracting parties did not observe their obliga-
tions under the treaties. European States that signed such treaties were bound 
to comply with the treaty provisions, as these treaties were based on the cus-
tomary norms of the law of nations regulating the relations between European 
and non-European nations, most prominently the principles of pacta sunt ser-
vanda and bona fides. In this respect, the conclusion must be is that in the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century, when African territory was acquired 
by and divided between European States on the basis of mainly protectorate 
treaties, these European States violated international law. In other words, the 
colonization of Africa by European States in the age of New Imperialism did 
not accord with the then valid legal standards. The scramble for Africa rested 
on illegal grounds.
3 Theory versus Practice: What was International Law in the 
Nineteenth Century?
The international law practice of treaty-making between Europeans and 
African natives in the nineteenth century contradicted theoretical axioms 
and political constructs. In practice, African rulers and their peoples were 
recognized, elements of international law were applied to relations between 
African natives and Europeans, and treaties between contracting parties from 
80 On the doctrine of estoppel, see T. Cottier and J.P. Müller, ‘Estoppel,’ in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007). See 
also C. Brown, ‘A Comparative and Critical Assessment of Estoppel in International Law,’ 
University of Miami Law Review, 50 (1995), 369–412; D’Amato, Concept of Custom, 468–
513; McNair, Law of Treaties, 485; I. Sinclair, ‘Estoppel and Acquiescence,’ in: V. Lowe and 
R. Jennings (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of justice: Essays in Honour of 
Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 104–120; and B. Stern, ‘Custom,’ 
89–108.
81 See A. Cassese, International Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 2005), 156–169.
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different continents created legal relations between them.82 The  dualist world 
view of civilized versus non-civilized nations was disrupted by the interna-
tional legal practice of Europeans and African natives entering into  treaties. 
 Positivists tried to contain the legal difficulties of the European- African 
 confrontation and to justify the tentative conduct of European States on the 
African continent.83 Ultimately, positivist legal scholars failed to align these 
colonial practices with international law. While positivists claimed to look 
at actual practices of international society, in reality they were theorists con-
structing policy-based justifications84 for the conduct of European States on 
the African continent. In response to the problems concerning the legal nature 
of the colonization of Africa, such ad hoc instruments as the colonial protec-
torate (as opposed to the traditional, or international, protectorate) and the 
civilization argument served to buttress the colonial venture. International 
legal theory, however, could not account for the reality of international law, 
which was that international law was effectively violated. The observation that 
there was a discrepancy between international law in theory and in practice, 
between law in the books and law in action, raises the question what valid 
international law was in the nineteenth century.
Nineteenth-century international law consisted of and was applied to trea-
ty relations between two or more foreign nations, and treaty law itself was 
based on customary international law. Custom preceded and determined the 
formation of international law, instead of the recognition by a select group 
of civilized nations determined the creation and application of international 
law in and to the relation between nations, as international legal doctrine pro-
claimed.85 In the nineteenth century, customary international law fractured 
the dichotomy between theory and practice. It offered an alternative solu-
tion to the long-standing dilemma of ex facto ius oritur or ex injuria jus oritur. 
Did the law derive from facts, or did the law arise from unlawfulness? Did facts 
82 See Andrews, ‘Concept of Statehood,’ 130.
83 On the presumption that laws should correspond to reality, see B. Cheng, ‘Custom: 
The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World,’ in: R.S.J. Macdonald and D.M. 
 Johnston (eds.), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, 
Doctrine, and Theory (The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), 513–554.
84 Alexandrowicz argued that positivism became doctrinal and did not adhere to its empiri-
cal roots. Positivists rejected non-European source material which was instrumental to 
building a new European (pseudo-universal) international law. Alexandrowicz character-
ized positivism as being doctrinally Euro-centric and bound to falsify history. Alexandro-
wicz, ‘Empirical and Doctrinal Positivism in International Law,’ 289.
85 See, for example, D. Dörr, ‘Die “Wilden” und das Völkerrecht,’ Verfassung und Recht in 
Übersee, 24 (1991), 391.
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create the law or was it the other way round? This dilemma prompted the ques-
tion whether both treaty parties were bound by the treaty and, more broadly, 
whether there were international legal norms beyond the will of States. What 
made international law binding? This question divided legal scholarship 
roughly along the lines of positivist and natural law thinking. According to the 
natural law approach, there were natural legal principles, such as pacta sunt 
servanda, and there was man-made law, which had to accord with the prin-
ciples of natural law and which was applied in practice. For positivists there 
were only two factors: law posited by mankind and the application of this law 
in the reality of international relations.86 To natural law scholars the binding 
nature of international law derived from norms beyond the general consensus 
of opinion among the subjects of international law, while positivists denied 
this external point of reference. In the nineteenth century, customary interna-
tional law offered a way out of this impasse. The customary law nature of the 
treaty-making practice between Europeans and African natives both integrat-
ed the general consensus of opinion among the subjects of international law 
and implemented such higher norms as the principles of pacta sunt servanda 
and bona fides, in addition to positive international law as laid down in legisla-
tion, case law and doctrine. Customary international law thus simultaneously 
implied bringing international law into practice – by way of contractual rela-
tionships between nations – and realizing higher norms on which this practice 
was based. It showed that international law was not only created by facts, but 
also emerged from unlawfulness and in this sense mediated between factual 
events and theoretical and legal constructs. While customary international law 
reconciled positivist and natural law approaches, it emphasized the primacy 
of the application of law between nations and showed that international legal 
theory was ill-equipped to deal with legal deficits that arose in the field. More-
over, the customary law nature of relations between nations confirms that in-
ternational law did not only have European roots. International law was not 
only created and imposed by European States; it had evolved through confron-
tations between a variety of nations over the course of time. In other words, 
the narrative of a European-style international law which was imposed on the 
rest of the world and claimed to introduce universal standards is a half-truth. 
Nineteenth-century international law did not only have a civilizing mission; 
it also sought to promote toleration between European and non-European 
nations. It joined theory and practice together: custom brought fundamental 
86 On the positivist perspective on customary international law, see Shaw, International Law, 
75–76.
241Ex facto ius oritur?
principles into practice, and this practice in turn created and imposed the law 
of and between nations.
4 Conclusion
Summing up, three points must be considered. First, a close look at the cession 
and protectorate treaties which the European States concluded with African 
rulers has made it clear that there is a fundamental difference between the two 
phenomena in answering the question whether the acquisition and partition 
of Africa was legal or not. Although it remains unclear whether the continu-
ity principle was violated or not, cession of sovereignty over African territory 
occurred legally – provided that the treaty did not stipulate the obligation to 
respect native land ownership. Protectorate treaties, however, turned out to be 
annexation instruments. On the basis of these treaties, European colonizing 
powers extended the external sovereign rights they had acquired by treaty to 
include rights of internal sovereignty. Positivist legal doctrine and politicians 
attempted to justify this gradual appropriation of African territory by introduc-
ing ambiguity into treaties, the civilization argument and the political con-
struct of the colonial protectorate. These ad hoc instruments, however, could 
not alter the illegal nature of Africa’s colonization by means protectorate trea-
ties in the late nineteenth century. Protectorate treaties concluded between 
European and non-European nations required full observance, not just moral 
observance.87 European colonizers did not respect native land ownership, im-
paired the sovereign rights of the native rulers, breached their own treaty obli-
gations and violated international law.
Second, from a theoretical point of view, nineteenth-century international 
society was reduced in size, because of the emergence of positivist thought 
in international legal doctrine.88 The transition from traditional, or inter-
national, to colonial protectorates is a case in point. However, the sustained 
practice, established and developed in previous centuries, of entering into mu-
tual relationships by means of treaties between European and non-European 
 nations89 combined with the belief that these relationships were and created 
87 These treaties fell within valid international law. Jörg Fisch denies this. See Fisch, ‘Africa 
as Terra Nullius,’ 366.
88 See Alexandrowicz, Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations.
89 See Belmessous, ‘Paradox of an Empire by Treaty,’ 262. ‘In the end it is this ambition to 
constitute a society that explains the appeal of the treaty relationship in settler societies 
established by colonization. It reflicts by a desire on all sides to legitimize the sovereignty 
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law supports the conclusion that the scramble for Africa was a radical break 
with what had for centuries been commonly conceived as customary, and 
this break anticipated a violation of international legal norms. Nineteenth-
century  international law was simultaneously exclusive and inclusive. Posi-
tivist legal doctrine, influenced by the political reality of the day,90 built its 
theories on the assumptions of the sovereign territorial State and the family 
of civilized nations. International law only applied to and between the mem-
bers of this exclusive group of European and a handful of non-European States. 
This  development of the exclusive nature of the international society implied 
the  incorporation of political arguments in international legal discourse. The 
entanglement of politics and law thus became, and still is, the fundamental 
weakness of international law.
Third, treaty-making practices between European and non-European 
 nations well before and during the nineteenth century confirm the inclu-
sive nature of international law.91 The widespread practice of interactions 
and transactions between Europeans and nations from Africa, Asia, Canada, 
Oceania and South America created and applied the law that governed in-
ternational relations and is proof that the scope of international law was not 
monopolized by sovereign, territorial States. Twentieth-century legal doctrine 
and politics would recognize this wider scope of international law. Even in the 
hey-day of the territorial sovereign State, the State as the sole subject of inter-
national law turned out to be a construct that did not adequately capture the 
reality of international legal practice. It was this practice, as it unfolded in the 
last two decades of the nineteenth century, which helped restore the notion of 
an international legal order and community in twentieth-century internation-
al legal thought and law – a notion that had first been introduced by natural 
law theory in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and been ousted by 
nineteenth-century positivism. International legal practice was a catalyst for 
the further development of international law, both in theory and in practice. 
Whereas the customary nature of international law testifies to the existence 
and creation of a true law of and between nations, nineteenth-century inter-
national law was constructed and imposed by European legal scholars and 
of these settler societies by reference to the consent, however belated or hypothetical, of 
the Indigenous peoples on whose lands they were established.’ Ibid., 267–268.
90 Many European professors served their country by being involved in national and inter-
national politics. See P. Macalister-Smith and J. Schwietzke, ‘Bibliography of the Text-
books and Comprehensive Treatises on Positive International Law of the 19th Century,’ 
Journal of the History of International Law, 3 (2001), 78.
91 See Keene, ‘Case Study of the Construction of International Hierarchy,’ 334.
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politicians, and Euro-centrism until quite recently persisted as a constitutive 
feature of modern international law.
This chapter has addressed the question whether the cession and protector-
ate treaties and, by implication, international law, were violated in their in-
terpretation and execution. The main issue has been whether the European 
States were obliged to comply with the cession and protectorate treaties they 
entered into, or whether they were free to break their promises, based on the 
civilization argument and the unequal status of the contracting parties. In 
short, why European State powers had to comply with the treaties they con-
cluded with African rulers, not only on moral but also on legal grounds? As 
has been shown in Chapter 4, the European-African confrontation did not take 
place in a legal vacuum: the very existence of treaties between Europeans and 
Africans shows that international law applied to these relationships. The cur-
rent chapter has assessed the compatibility of this international law in practice 
with international legal theory and has determined what nineteenth-century 
international law entailed. More specifically, it has revealed the theoretical as-
sumptions underlying the conclusion of bilateral treaties between Europeans 
and non-Europeans, more specifically European States and African nations.
To determine the connection between the theory and practice of inter-
national law, this chapter has addressed the questions whether the rights of 
African natives were impaired, whether the Europeans breached their treaty 
obligations and, consequently, whether international law was violated. The 
chief question was whether European States were under a duty to observe in-
ternational law in their relations with non-European nations. All these ques-
tions have been answered in the affirmative. Under customary international 
law, which had long been established and which had evolved well into the 
nineteenth century, European States were bound to observe their obligations 
towards and the rights of African nations. European States had a legal duty to 
observe the obligations they had undertaken in cession and protectorate trea-
ties with African rulers. This chapter has shown that the European contracting 
parties failed to meet their obligations and, as a result, violated international 
law in two ways. First, European colonial powers breached specific clauses in 
cession treaties stipulating European observance of native property and prop-
erty rights. Second, international law was violated by the extent to which pro-
tectorate treaties were implemented, and this implementation itself rested on 
an over-extensive interpretation of the treaties. The political construction of 
the colonial protectorate, used to justify the unbridled extension of European 
sovereign rights over African territory, clashed with the formal meaning of the 
treaties establishing a relationship of protection between the European colo-
nial power and the African political entity.
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Having established that Africa’s acquisition and partition by European 
States on the basis of protectorate treaties was illegal, the question that remains 
concerns the responsibility and remedies for these wrongful international 
 actions. If imperium was understood too extensively and, in  consequence, 
 applied illegally by the Europeans at the expense of native African dominium, 
the  European treaty parties acted in breach of their treaty obligations and, by 
implication, in violation of international law. Did the treaties specify conse-
quences of such breaches and, if they did, what remedies were provided for? 
Were there remedies available under general international law outside the 
treaty provisions? And are remedies available under current international law? 
Chapter 9 attempts to answer these questions by addressing the general issue 
of redressing historical wrongs under international law.
chapter 9
A Reflection on the Nature of International Law: 
Redressing the Illegality of Africa’s Colonization
1 Introduction
European colonial powers impaired the sovereignty of native African rulers, 
breached the obligations they had undertaken to perform under the treaties 
they had concluded with native polities, and violated customary international 
law. Under customary international law, European States were bound to ob-
serve their obligations towards African nations and respect native African 
rights. More specifically, European States had a legal duty to observe the obli-
gations they had consented to in cession and protectorate treaties with African 
rulers. But they failed to do so. The extensive interpretation and use of native 
sovereign rights by the European colonial powers after they had concluded 
cession and protectorate treaties disregarded the sovereignty and, subsequent-
ly, property of the original population of Africa. African rights of dominium 
yielded to European rights of imperium.
This study’s finding that the European colonization of Africa in the late 
nineteenth century was illegal because cession and protectorate treaties were 
violated answers the first of the two 2001 Durban Conference issues – whether 
Africa’s colonization was in accordance with international law valid at that 
time. This chapter addresses the second conference issue, and issue that re-
volves around two questions. Can responsibility for a historical wrongful act, 
more specifically Africa’s colonization, be established under international 
law? If so, are there remedies available under the original treaties and under 
nineteenth-century and current international law to redress this historical 
wrong? This chapter attends to the remedies issue from the perspective of cur-
rent international law, because it is an issue that comes up time and again in 
debates on redressing colonial wrongs in the context of international law. As 
the analyses of the text of treaties concluded between European States and 
African natives have shown, these treaties did not provide for remedies in case 
of non-compliance with treaty obligations. If African natives found their way 
to colonial courts to claim their rights, the courts were reluctant to decide on 
the legality of colonialism, because the concluded treaties were Acts of State, 
and such acts were not open to judicial review. And on the international level, 
there were no possibilities for African polities to claim their rights.
© Mieke van der Linden, 2017 | doi 10.1163/9789004321199_010 
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The chapter first addresses the origins of the problematic of establishing 
responsibility for historical wrongs under the doctrine of inter-temporal law 
(§2). It then discusses the two main difficulties in establishing responsibility 
for Africa’s colonization (§3). Next, the chapter advocates an alternative to 
responsibility, namely, recognizing the wrongfulness of Africa’s colonization 
under international law and encouraging reflection on the nature of interna-
tional law (§4). In the final section, the main argument is summarized and 
conclusions are drawn (§5).
2 The Inter-temporal Rule
Time, in particular the lapse of time, raises various problems and is sometimes 
even experienced as an obstacle in establishing the law in its historical context. 
Against this backdrop of a problematic lapse of time and whether past actions 
can be assessed by contemporary standards the question to be answered is 
under which conditions a claim of responsibility for international wrongful 
actions can be lodged. Between committing such acts at the end of the nine-
teenth century and filing a claim for responsibility of former European colo-
nial States lie more than a hundred years and several generations of human 
society. Parties which had been directly affected by international wrongful acts 
had passed away, and that makes it impossible to bring claims for responsibil-
ity and reparations on their behalf. They are succeeded by generations that 
live in their own temporary societies and are usually little aware of the historic 
wrongs done to their ancestors. Lawyers, political philosophers and historians 
argue that it is impossible and undesirable to seek to re-evaluate the remote 
past: they claim that the past cannot be altered and that bygones should be 
bygones.1 The lapse of time coincides with changing circumstances and the su-
persession of historical wrongs, and this has the effect of gradually dissolving 
redress claims of victims and their descendants. Moreover, the maxim interest 
rei publicae ut finis litium sit – it is in the public interest that legal procedures 
should have an end, better known as the principle of finality – is often invoked 
to argue that old sores should be forgotten.2 The innate reflex of legal schol-
ars and practitioners to the issue of responsibility for historical wrongs is, and 
should be, to rely on the inter-temporal rule doctrine.
1 See J. Waldron, ‘Superseding Historic Injustice,’ Ethics, 103 (1992), 4–28. See also De Baets, 
‘Historical Imprescriptibility,’ 142.
2 Ibid. See also Kohen, Possession, 183–200 and R. Higgins, ‘Time and the Law: International 
Perspectives on an Old Problem,’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 46 (1997), 511.
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The next three subsections outline the doctrine of inter-temporal law (§2.1), 
explore how the icj understands and applies the doctrine (§2.2), and asserts 
the importance of correctly interpreting historical facts in the context of inter-
national law (§2.3).
2.1 General Features of the Inter-temporal Rule
In territorial conflicts – often rooted in colonialism – the main issue is how to 
ascertain and evaluate legal rights and obligations existing at a relevant time 
in the past. Here, the inter-temporal rule doctrine offers a balanced instrument 
of appraisal. The formal3 origins of this doctrine trace back to the Island of 
Palmas case (1928),4 in which arbitrator Huber had to decide a rather common 
dispute. The United States, as successor to the rights of Spain over the Philip-
pines, based its claim to sovereignty over the Island of Palmas primarily on its 
discovery of the island. The Netherlands, however, claimed that at the time 
of cession in 1898 it possessed title to the island by way of effective occupa-
tion. In his ruling, Huber articulated the inter-temporal rule in response to the 
problem of changing conditions and circumstances related to international 
law and its principles after a certain period of time has lapsed: ‘[A] juridical 
fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not 
of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be 
settled.’5 Subsequently, he stated the following:
As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at suc-
cessive periods is to be applied in a particular case (the so-called inter-
temporal law), a distinction must be made between the creation of rights 
and the existence of rights. The same principle which subjects the act 
creative of a right to the law in force at the time the right arises, demands 
that the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifesta-
tion, shall follow the conditions required by the evolution of law.6
The doctrine of inter-temporal law thus articulated consists of two com-
ponents. The first one, better known as the non-retroactive application of 
rules, entailed that rights should be understood and assessed in the light 
3 Before the explicit formulation of the inter-temporal rule by Huber in 1928, the rule was al-
ready a recognized principle in international law. See H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in 
the International Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 284.
4 Island of Palmas (Netherlands v. United States of America), 1928, 2 riaa 829.
5 Ibid., 831 and 845.
6 Ibid.
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of contemporary law, i.e. the law valid at the time of their creation.7 The sec-
ond component qualifies the first one by stipulating that the evolution of law 
must be taken into account when assessing the continued existence of a right. 
As Elias explained, ‘rights acquired in a valid manner according to the law con-
temporaneous with that creation may be lost if not maintained in accordance 
with the changes brought about by the development of international law.’8 Or, 
in the words of Khan, ‘acts must be assessed against the law of the time when 
performed but at the same time the claimant must keep up with the law in the 
course of the centuries in order to maintain their title.’9
It was the second element of the inter-temporal rule in particular that elic-
ited criticism, which was voiced prominently by Phillip Jessup. He pointed out 
that in the context of determining the precise title to territory ‘[e]very state 
would constantly be under the necessity of examining its title to each portion 
of its territory in order to determine whether a change in the law had neces-
sitated, as it were, a reacquisition.’10 Jessup concluded his argument by stating 
that chaos would reign. With his argument, arbitrator Huber articulated the 
equilibrium between the acquisition and the maintenance of a title to territo-
ry.11 Paul Tavernier rejects only mentioning one of the two rules, ‘either the first 
rule which evokes the well-known adage tempus regit actum, or the second rule 
which spells out the distinction between creating and maintaining a right. The 
choice to mention one without the other is evidently not neutral.’12 Therefore, 
7 R.Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester University 
Press, 1963), 28. For a detailed reading on the non-retroactive application of international 
law, see J.T. Woodhouse, ‘The Principle of Retroactivity in International Law,’ Transactions 
of the Grotius Society, 41 (1955), 69–89. Woodhouse also shows that the acknowledgement 
of the existence of the principle of non-retroactivity has already a long history. Ibid., 69.
8 T.O. Elias, ‘The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law,’ American Journal of International Law, 74 
(1980), 286.
9 D.-E. Khan, ‘Max Huber as Arbitrator: The Palmas (Miangas) Case and Other Arbitrations,’ 
European Journal of International Law, 18 (2007), 167.
10 P.C. Jessup, ‘The Palmas Island Arbitration,’ American Journal of International Law, 22 
(1928), 740.
11 Huber’s findings were not uncontroversial, as has been mentioned already. However, 
Johnson puts this commentary in perspective by stating that ‘many of these criticisms an-
swer themselves provided it be understood that, whilst every title under international law 
must undergo a continuous process of “maintenance” or “manifestation” required varies 
in accordance with the circumstances. In particular, it depends upon the absence or pres-
ence of competing claims.’ D.H.N. Johnson, ‘Consolidation as a Root of Title,’ Cambridge 
Law Journal, 13 (1955), 224.
12 P. Tavernier, ‘Relevance of the Intertemporal Law,’ in: J. Crawford, A. Pellet and S. Olleson 
(eds.), The Law of International Responsibility. Oxford Commentaries on International Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2010), 397.
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Tavernier claims, when mentioning the inter-temporal rule both counterparts 
deserve equal attention.
The problem of applying and interpreting rules over time is one of the most 
elusive in all legal systems and is not limited to the issue of the acquisition of 
territory. The non-retroactivity13 of norms of international law has been and 
still is a fundamental principle. What must be determined whether new rules 
apply to facts, acts, or situations whose commencement predates these new 
rules. Similarly, applying rules to factual conditions raises the issue whether 
these rules must be interpreted in the light of contemporary standards or 
whether an ‘evolving’ interpretation is permissible. The issue that arises in the 
latter situation could be interpreted as retroactive application of law. In this 
regard, Edward McWhinney states that inter-temporal law presents
both the contemporary conflict between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ in legal 
doctrine – representing, on the one hand, the more traditional forces 
oriented to preservation of the political and economic status quo of 
yesterday, and also the newer political forces oriented to changing law 
in accord with changing society; and also the opportunities and chal-
lenge of judicial policy-making […] in behalf of a new and more nearly 
representative, in ethnic-cultural terms, World public order system, re-
flecting the new and more pluralistic World Community of today.14
13 For an detailed reading on inter-temporal law and retroactivity, see O. Bachelet, ‘Face à 
l’alternative “rétroactivité ou immédiateté”: la Cour européenne ne récidive pas,’ Revue 
trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 18 (2007), 233–245; D. Bindschedler-Robert, ‘De la 
rétroactivité en droit international public,’ in: Recueil d’études de droit international en 
hommage à Paul Guggenheim (University of Genève Press, 1986), 184–200; A. Cassese, ‘Bal-
ancing the Prosecution of Crimes against Humanity and Non-Retroactivity of Criminal 
Law: The Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia Case before the echr,’ Journal of International Crimi-
nal Justice, 4 (2006), 410–418; R. Higgins, ‘Some Observations on the Inter-Temporal Rule 
in International Law,’ in: J. Makaczyk (ed.), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of 
the 21st Century. Essays in Honour of Krysztof Skubiszewski (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1996), 173–181; Higgins, ‘Time and the Law’; E. McWhinney, ‘The Time Dimension in Inter-
national Law, Historical Relativism and Intertemporal Law,’ in: J. Makarczyk (ed.), Essays 
in International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs (The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 179–199; R. Provost, ‘Reciprocity in Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Law,’ The British Yearbook of International Law, 65 (1994), 383–454 and P. Tavernier, 
‘Recherches sur l’application dans le temps des actes et des règles en droit international 
public. Problèmes de droit intertemporel ou de droit transitoire,’ Revue internationale de 
droit comparé, 22 (1970), 9–54.
14 McWhinney, ‘Time Dimension in International Law,’ 180. Shaw also makes the paradox on 
the need for stability and flexibility of international law in relation to the inter-temporal 
law. See Shaw, International Law, 508.
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However, the question remains whether a contemporary or an evolutionary 
interpretation prevails or should prevail. Although these components seem to 
be contradictory – the first component advocates a static and non-retroactive 
application or interpretation of international law, while the second reflects a 
dynamic and evolutionary perspective on international law – they are not. In 
1975, the Institut de Droit International adopted a resolution on the phenom-
enon of inter-temporality in international law,15 which underlines the inter-
play of the non-retroactive and evolutionary application of international law.16 
The non-retroactivity of rules is essential for the existence and application of 
international law,17 but to be able to respond to the needs of current actors of 
and within international law an evolutionary interpretation of international 
law is unavoidable. These two components of legal security and development 
both complement and limit each other.18 They are interdependent and recip-
rocal.19 Although rules should not be applied retrospectively, they are created 
and have to function within ever-changing human societies. The evolutionary 
approach and the retro-active application of rules do not necessarily exclude 
each other.
In sum, resolving a responsibility or reparations claim for historical 
wrongs requires determining the law applicable to acts and acts whose 
commencement or conclusion lies in the past. But what does the inter-temporal 
rule, comprising both the non-retrospective and the evolutionary component, 
signify for the particular question of the legality of the acquisition and  partition 
15 ‘The Inter-Temporal Problem in Public International Law, Resolution adopted by the 
Institut de Droit International at its Wiesbaden Session,’ Annulaire de l’Institut de Droit 
 International, 56 (1975), 537.
16 ‘[T]he legality or illegality of historical events must be judged according to the law in force 
at the time in question, but the continuing effects of these events can be judged by more 
recent standards.’ D. Shelton, ‘Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: The Present Value of 
Past Wrongs,’ in: F. Lenzerini, Reparations for Indigenous Peoples (Oxford University Press, 
2008), 63.
17 The non-retroactive application of international law is a customary rule and codified in, 
for example, Article 4 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). See ibid. 
Not only the law of treaties underwrites the non-retroactive application of law, but also in 
the field of international criminal law and human rights law the rule is fundamental. See, 
for example, K.S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Crimi-
nal Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) and G. Lautenbach, The Concept of the Rule of 
Law and the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2013), 107–108.
18 Elias, ‘Doctrine of Intertemporal Law,’ 291.
19 See ibid., 292.
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of Africa? What, if any, implications does the doctrine of inter-temporal law 
have for the central question of the responsibility claim for the colonization of 
Africa at the end of the nineteenth century? The applicability of the doctrine 
depends on the preliminary question whether the act of colonization was le-
gal. What must be established is whether the conduct of European States could 
be considered wrongful under contemporary international law. Were their acts 
legal or illegal under the law valid at the time when these acts were performed? 
If the illegality of these acts can be established, they do not have to be interpret-
ed and assessed retroactively; in that case, the behaviour of European colonial 
powers was against the law in the international legal context during the colo-
nial era. Moreover, the illegal nature of Africa’s colonization in the late nine-
teenth century would not have been annulled by the evolution of the law: these 
past acts are still in contravention of international law.20 In other words, under 
the straightforward application of the inter-temporal rule Africa’s colonization 
was an act which did not meet the standards of international law.
In the context of Africa’s colonization in the age of New Imperialism, 
applying the inter-temporal rule is not particularly precarious. There are 
legal grounds on which responsibility of former European colonial powers for 
the illegal acquisition and partition of African territory can be based. As the 
previous chapter has shown, the Europeans failed to respect native land 
ownership and sovereignty, breached their treaty obligations and violated inter-
national law. Under nineteenth-century international law, the conduct of Eu-
ropean States could be considered wrongful; their acts were illegal by the legal 
standards in force when they were performed. Retroactive legal evaluation of 
the factual conditions is therefore not required.
20 Nowadays, the unilateral extension of sovereign rights over territory by a State at the 
cost of the sovereignty of another State is a controversial issue and is rejected by most 
international legal actors. See Crawford, Creation of States; Jennings, Acquisition of Ter-
ritory, 37; Shaw, International Law, 197–216 and 492–495 and Starke, ‘Acquisition of Title 
to Territory,’ 413. In addition to that, the principle of non-intervention in the internal 
or external affairs of other States is fundamental for the existence of the international 
(legal) order – which had a determining role in the history of international law – and 
has a prominent place in Article 2 (4) of the un Charter. For a general elaboration on 
the principle, see Cassese, International Law, 53–54 and Shaw, International Law, 211–214. 
See also M. Jamnejad and M. Wood, ‘The Principle of Non-Intervention,’ Leiden Journal 
of International Law, 22 (2009), 345–381 and P. Kunig, ‘Prohibition of Intervention,’ in: 
R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2007).
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However, applying the inter-temporal rule can be problematic in of emerg-
ing fields of international law. The rule has to be employed in cases of, for ex-
ample, human rights violations. For example, the current arsenal of human 
rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948, 
udhr) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966, 
iccpr), cannot be used to assess the colonial activities of the European States 
on the African continent and the subjection of African native peoples and 
lands to European power in the late nineteenth century. In addition, neither 
the International Law Commission’s Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties (1969),21 which partly reflects customary law22 and forms the fundament 
of discussions on the nature, content and procedures of treaties, nor the Ar-
ticles on the Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Actions (2001, 
arsiwa) can be used to assess the legality of treaties between Europeans and 
African natives or the possibility of invoking the responsibility of former Euro-
pean colonial States. Here, international courts play a vital role. In the context 
of international adjudication and the understanding and application of the 
inter-temporal rule, the icj has delivered judgment in cases in which it had to 
assess the validity of treaties or interpret treaty provisions.
2.2 The icj and the Inter-temporal Rule
The icj has had to deal with the problem of inter-temporal law in a number of 
cases, notably Kasikili/Sedudu Island (1999)23 and Cameroon v. Nigeria (2002).24 
It is especially in the latter case, the conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria 
21 See D. Greig, ‘The Time of Conclusion and the Time of Application of Treaties as Points 
of Reference in the Interpretative Process,’ in: M. Craven, M. Fitzmaurice and M. Vogiat-
zi (eds.), Time, History and International Law (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 
163–218.
22 See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opin-
ion, 1971, icj Reports 16, 47 and Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Judg-
ment, 1973, icj Reports 3, 18 and 55. See also Shaw, International Law, 902–955 and Villiger, 
Customary International Law and Treaties.
23 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment, 1999, icj Reports 1045. See J.T. 
Gathii, ‘Geographical Hegelianism in Territorial Disputes Involving Non-European Land 
Relations: An Analysis of the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namib-
ia),’ Leiden Journal of International Law, 15 (2002), 581–622; Greig, ‘Time of Conclusion 
and the Time of Application of Treaties,’ 209–215; and P. Tavernier, ‘Observations sur le 
droit intertemporel dans l’affaire de l’Ile de Kasikili/Sedudu (Botswana/Namibie), Cour 
internationale de Justice, arrêt du 13 décembre 1999,’ Revue Générale de Droit International 
Public, 104 (2000), 429.
24 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equa-
torial Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002, icj Reports 303.
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that the icj has applied the inter-temporal rule and indirectly addressed the 
legality of the acquisition of a specific part of Nigeria by Britain. As will be 
argued, the icj has pronounced and explained its judgment from a legal per-
spective that reflects neither contemporary law, i.e., the law in force at the time 
when the relevant events occurred, nor contemporary practice.
Nigeria and Cameroon came into conflict over the title to a particular piece 
of territory. The source of the conflict was a cession treaty concluded between 
Britain and a native ruler in 1884. One of the main issues the icj had to re-
solve was the precise spatial coordinates of the national boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria.25 In the process of answering that question, the Court 
had to decide whether Britain had been entitled to transfer title to a particular 
piece of territory under Articles xviii–xx of the Anglo-German Agreement of 
March 1913. This issue called for an examination of the colonial history of the 
territory concerned, the Bakassi peninsula. Cameroon and Nigeria disagreed 
on the status and effect of the Anglo-German cession treaty of 1913. Cameroon 
argued that this treaty determined the boundary between Britain and Ger-
many in the area concerned, which implicated that the Bakassi peninsula fell 
under German authority and that upon independence the peninsula became 
Cameroonian territory on the basis of the uti possidetis principle. Nigeria, 
while recognizing that the 1913 treaty intended to hand the area to Germany, 
argued that the treaty could not effectuate such a transfer, because at the time 
of the cession Britain had no sovereign rights over the peninsula and could 
therefore not transfer it. The reason for Britain’s lack of power of disposition, 
so Nigeria argued, was that the protection treaty concluded between Britain 
25 For an analysis of the whole case, see M.D. Evans and J.G. Merrills, ‘Land and Maritime 
Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea In-
tervening), Merits, Judgment of 10 October 2002,’ International and Comparative Law 
 Quarterly, 52 (2003), 788–797. See also J.N. Anyu, ‘The International Court of Justice and 
Border-Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Bakassi Peninsula Conflict,’ Mediterranean 
Quarterly, 18 (2007), 40–55; N.J. Bekong, ‘International Dispute Settlement: Land and 
Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria: Origin of the Dispute and Provi-
sional Measures,’ African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 9 (1997), 287–310; 
D.D.  Caron and P.H.F. Bekker, ‘Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and 
Nigeria,’ American Journal of International Law, 97 (2003), 387–398; B. Kwiatkowska, 
‘The Contribution of the 2002 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and 
Nigeria Judgment,’ Hague Yearbook of International Law, 17 (2005), 95–135; E.M. Mbah, 
Land/Boundary Conflict in Africa. The Case of Former British Colonial Bamenda, Present-
Day North-West Province of the Republic of Cameroon, 1916–1996 (Lewiston: Mellen, 2008), 
24–34; Milano, Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law, 75–77; Shaw, ‘Acquisi-
tion of Title in Nineteenth Century Africa,’ 1045–1047 and N.J. Udombana, ‘The Ghost of 
Berlin still haunts Africa! The icj Judgment on the Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute 
between Cameroon and Nigeria,’ African Yearbook of International Law 10 (2002), 13–61.
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and the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar in September 1884 had only conferred 
limited rights on Britain – it had most certainly not transferred sovereignty 
over the territory. Nigeria concluded that sovereign rights remained vested in 
the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar.
The Court held that the cession of the Bakassi peninsula to Germany in 1913 
was effective even though it appeared to breach the terms of the earlier pro-
tectorate treaty between Britain and the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar. First, 
the Court observed that the 1884 treaty did not specify the territory to which 
Britain was to extend protection, ‘nor did it indicate the territories over which 
the kings and chiefs exercised powers.’26 According to the Court, Britain had 
intended this non-specificity. The icj concluded that in the light of general 
European practice in Sub-Saharan Africa at the time the ‘Treaty of protection’ 
was not an agreement that recognized or maintained the sovereignty of the 
Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar.27 It stated that
many factors point to the 1884 Treaty signed with the Kings and Chiefs 
of Old Calabar as not establishing an international protectorate. It was 
one of a multitude in a region where the local Rulers were not regarded 
as States. Indeed, apart from the parallel declarations of various lesser 
Chiefs agreeing to be bound by the 1884 Treaty, there is not even con-
vincing evidence of a central federal power. There appears in Old Calabar 
rather to have been individual townships, headed by Chiefs, who regard-
ed themselves as owing a general allegiance to more important Kings and 
Chiefs. Further, from the outset Britain regarded itself as administering 
the territories in the 1884 Treaty, and not just protecting them.28
Considering the status and effect of the protection treaty of 1884, the Court 
observed that there were two types of protection treaties. The first of these cre-
ated protected States whose sovereign rights under international law were not 
alienated. The second type, establishing colonial protectorates, was in essence 
a means of acquiring title to territory. Eventually, the icj concluded that there 
was no evidence that the British protection treaty of 1884 could be considered 
to fall in the first category. In support of its conclusion the Court referred to the 
26 P.H.F. Bekker, ‘Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon 
v. Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea Intervening),’ American Journal of International Law, 97 
(2003), 390.
27 Craven, ‘Introduction,’ 19.
28 Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria, Equa-
torial Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002, icj Reports 103.
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Island of Palmas case (1928), in which Arbitrator Huber stated that a treaty of 
protection ‘is not an agreement between equals; it is rather a form of internal 
organisation of a colonial territory, on the basis of the autonomy of the natives 
[…] And thus suzerainty over the native States becomes the basis of territorial 
sovereignty as towards other members of the community of nations.’29 Contin-
uous meetings and debates between Britain as protector and local rulers of the 
protectorate were characteristic of international protectorate relationships. 
Nigeria, however, failed to provide evidence for the existence of these relation-
ships.30 The Court therefore held that the 1884 treaty, transferring sovereignty 
over the Bakassi peninsula to Britain and establishing a colonial protectorate, 
was a legal means to acquire title to territory.
The Court’s conclusion, which asserted Britain’s acquisition of sovereignty 
over the Bakassi peninsula, is predicated on the 1884 treaty between Britain 
and the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar and on the African treaty parties lack-
ing sovereign powers. The Court rejected Nigeria’s arguments that the 1884 
treaty rendered the Anglo-German treaty of 1913 defective31 and concluded 
that under contemporary law Great Britain had been entitled to establish an 
agreement with Germany on the determination of the boundary between Ni-
geria and Cameroon.
Interestingly, Judges Koroma and Ajibola dissented by arguing that the 
Court had wrongly decided that the Bakassi peninsula fell under Cameroonian 
authority, and that the Court should have accepted Nigeria’s arguments regard-
ing the nature and content of the 1884 protection treaty. Judge Koroma criti-
cized the Court for ‘recogniz[ing] and consecrat[ing] political reality’ instead 
of applying the law to the dispute brought before it.32 He supported Nigeria’s 
arguments by elaborating on the nature and implications of the 1884 protec-
tion treaty and on the principle of pacta sunt servanda.33 Koroma argued that 
the transfer of the Bakassi peninsula to Germany violated the internationally 
recognized legal principle of pacta sunt servanda and the rights of the people 
of Old Calabar. Although Judges Rezek and Al-Khasawneh agreed with the 
arguments of the two dissenting Judges, they did not join with them in their 
29 Island of Palmas (Netherlands v. United States of America), 1928, 2 riaa, 858–859.
30 Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria, Equa-
torial Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002, icj Reports, para. 203–209.
31 Ibid., para. 193–199 and 201.
32 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma in Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute Between 
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, 
2002, icj Reports 303, 474, para. 3.
33 See the ibid., 480, para. 15.
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dissent, because they held that the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar had dem-
onstrated their consent to a transfer of sovereignty by their subsequent con-
duct and by the absence of protest against the effectuation of the protection 
treaty after the treaty had been concluded.
Although the icj clearly tried to apply the inter-temporal rule correctly, the 
case between Nigeria and Cameroon, as Craven notes, ‘also exposes the limits 
of this kind of historical enquiry.’34 The Court saw it as its task to interpret the 
treaty between Britain and the rulers of Old Calabar and to assess the status of 
the treaty by standards of treaty interpretation current in the late nineteenth 
century rather than by modern standards. As regards method and approach, 
the icj made a step in its reasoning which can only be understood from the Eu-
rocentric perspective.35 Craven analyses this line of argumentation as follows:
Working from the apparent assumption that international law was large-
ly Eurocentric in outlook, and actively facilitated the process of colonisa-
tion rather than resisted it, the Court seemed to conclude that relevant 
actors at the time would not have recognised the sovereignty and treaty-
making capacity of the King and Chiefs, and hence that the treaty was 
not ‘governed by international law’ and did not affect the capacity of Brit-
ain to subsequently dispose of the territory.36
In other words, the Court regarded the African treaty parties as being non- 
sovereign and interpreted the treaty as being irrelevant in the context of what 
it saw as valid international law at the time when the treaty was concluded. 
That the African rulers with whom Britain concluded a treaty lacked sover-
eignty the Court presumed without any explanation. Eventually, the Court 
held that the 1884 treaty did not establish an international protectorate in the 
traditional sense of the word, but a colonial protectorate, i.e., a relationship 
of protection between a sovereign nation and a non-sovereign political entity.
This conclusion, however, was37 and remains questionable. As has been 
argued, while protectorate treaties primarily served to demonstrate to other 
34 Craven, ‘Introduction,’ 20.
35 See P. Singh, ‘From “Narcissistic” Positive International Law to “Universal” Natural Inter-
national Law: The Dialectics of “Absentee Colonialism,”’ African Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, 16 (2008), 56–82.
36 Ibid.
37 Craven refers to Koskienniemi, who points out that nineteenth-century legal opinion 
was far from undivided on the question of the status of colonial treaties. Whilst 
there were those (such as Westlake and Rolin) who regarded such treaties as irrelevant 
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European powers that a relationship of authority or control had been estab-
lished, the very fact that these treaties were concluded between European 
powers and African native rulers implies that the Europeans recognized, either 
implicitly or explicitly, that the native rulers had internal sovereignty, which 
included the power to regulate existing and future proprietary rights within 
their territories. The Europeans concluded these treaties with the intention of 
acquiring rights of internal sovereignty over the territory too after the conclu-
sion of the treaty of protection with the African rulers. It was the principle of 
nemo dat quod non habet that would have led the Europeans to assume that 
the African rulers did possess sovereign rights over territory, rights which they 
could therefore transfer by treaty.
On this view, the Court took an ahistoric approach: it interpreted the treaty 
and the status of the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar on the basis of the theo-
retical premise of cultural differences, i.e., the dualist world view. The Court 
would probably not have adopted this one-sided or Eurocentric perspective 
if it had conducted, for example, an analysis of the intentions of both treaty 
parties when they were negotiating the treaty. If the icj had considered inter-
national law as it was applied in practice – treaty practice shows that African 
rulers were considered sovereign – it would likely have concluded that the pro-
tectorate treaty only transferred rights of external sovereignty and that Britain 
had not validly acquired all-comprehensive sovereignty over the contested ter-
ritory.38 The Court might then have judged that the later colonization of the 
Bakassi peninsula by the British was illegal by the international legal standards 
valid at the time, because, as has been shown in the previous chapters, the 
colonial protectorate was not a legal means to acquire territorial sovereignty, 
but rather a political construct to justify the European colonization of Africa 
after the fact. If the icj had declared Africa’s colonization illegal on the basis of 
all available facts, acts and laws, the outcome of the case would probably have 
been very different and no difficulties with regard to the inter-temporal rule 
would have arisen.
2.3 International Law in Its Historical Context
History and international law are inextricably and necessarily connected.39 
Lapse of time confronts legal theorists and practitioners with two interre-
lated problems, that of providing evidence of causal relations and that of the 
to international law, there were also those (such as Bonfils and Fauchille) who assigned 
considerable significance to them. Craven, ‘Introduction,’ 20.
38 See Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples, 53–54.
39 See Lesaffer, ‘Grotian Tradition Revisited,’ 103–139.
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legitimacy of counterfactual reasoning in determining what the present might 
have looked like if the original illegal act had not occurred. Both causality and 
counterfactuals40 become increasingly indeterminate and complex in the 
course of time, because circumstances change as a result of internal and exter-
nal intervening factors. Increasing remoteness of historical wrongful acts runs 
parallel to an increasing complexity in establishing a claim for responsibility. 
For lawyers, historical awareness is therefore a preliminary requirement when 
they seek to understand the facts of a case. Especially in the field of interna-
tional law, the necessity of a sound knowledge of historical developments is a 
constitutive condition for understanding and dealing with problems and con-
flicts. Before conflicts erupt, they have often been smouldering for many years, 
sometimes decades, or even centuries. These conflicts have long and complex 
histories and they left their mark on society long before they were character-
ized as legal conflicts and eventually brought before an international court or 
tribunal.41 David Bederman characterizes this interrelatedness of internation-
al law and history as follows:
International law as a discipline appears to be rooted in historical trends 
and realities to a far larger degree than other realms of law and jurispru-
dence, but the relationship between the domains of international law (as 
both an academic study and professional practice) and historiography 
remain cloudy and uncertain.42
As the reasoning of the icj in Cameroons v. Nigeria shows, the inter-temporal 
rule and its application in the context of international law bring home the 
point that assessing the past by current standards and knowledge is a delicate 
matter. Someone like the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin might conceivably 
have pointed out the vital importance of judicial interpretation being based 
on the historical and social characteristics of the contemporary legal order.43 
This is especially true for lawyers operating internationally. Those who use 
historic materials in the pursuit of some legal objective, the icj prominently 
40 See C. Kukathas, ‘Responsibility for Past Injustice: How to Shift the Burden,’ Politics, Phi-
losophy and Economics, 2 (2003), 165–190.
41 See Kohen, Possession, 183–200.
42 D.J. Bederman, ‘Foreign Office International Legal History,’ in: M. Craven, M. Fitzmau-
rice and M. Vogiatzi (eds.), Time, History and International Law (Leiden, Boston: Martinus 
 Nijhoff, 2007), 43.
43 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana, 1986), 245.
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among them, should take into account the three ‘enduring truths’ articulated 
by Bederman:
The first of these is that legal history and legal truth are not always the 
same thing, and they certainly cannot be ascertained by the same means 
and modalities.
The second truth that international lawyers have to understand is that, 
no matter how hard one tries, the historic record is often sparse and in-
complete, at least on the issues that matter for the lawyers or judge.
And that leads to a third enduring truth, and that is that even in cases 
of abundant historical materials, the historic record can still be ambigu-
ous or contradictory.44
Recognizing the significance and seriousness of historical inquiry in interna-
tional legal proceedings is a fundamental issue, especially with regard to the 
questions whether the European acquisition and partition of African territory 
in the late nineteenth century was illegal and whether responsibility for these 
colonial acts can be established. However, lawyers should always be wary of 
the fallacy of presentism:45 the anachronistic application of present-day 
norms and values to interpret and evaluate actions that occurred a long time 
ago. Although anachronism should be avoided, interpretation and determina-
tion of historical facts should not.46 What must be borne in mind is that the 
inter-temporal rule does not apply in the particular case of violations of trea-
ties and property rights by the European colonial powers in the late nineteenth 
century, because these acts were, as has been argued above, illegal under con-
temporary law.
To conclude, as Cameroons v. Nigeria evidences, historical consciousness of 
international lawyers, the judges of the icj included, is a vital but delicate mat-
ter in establishing the illegality of acts that were performed a long time ago and 
the possibility of redressing these historical wrongs. As has been shown, the 
question whether colonization, more specifically the acquisition and partition 
44 Bederman, ‘Foreign Office International Legal History,’ 63.
45 See T. Govier and W. Verwoerd, ‘The Promise and Pitfalls of Apology,’ Journal of Social 
Philosophy, 33 (2002), 7. See also De Baets, ‘Historical Imprescriptibility,’ 145; P. Burke, 
‘Triumphs and Poverties of Anachronism,’ Scientia Poetica, 10 (2006), 291–292 and 298; 
D.H. Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper, 
1970), 132–142 and H. Ritter, ‘Anachronism,’ in: D. Woolf (ed.), A Global Encyclopedia of 
Historical Writing (New York: Garland, 1998), 30–31.
46 See De Baets, ‘Historical Imprescriptibility,’ 146.
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of Africa, was illegal can only be answered if it is established that the colonial 
acts were in contravention of the law as it stood at the time. Now that it has 
been established that the acquisition and partition of Africa violated the legal 
standards in force at the time of colonization, applying the inter-temporal rule 
is relatively uncomplicated. Evaluating the legal nature of colonialism does not 
require retrospective or evolutionary application of international legal norms. 
The factual reconstruction of colonialism, the analysis of nineteenth-century 
international law and the finding that European States acquired African terri-
tory illegally create the grid to answer the question whether the former colo-
nial States can be held responsible for infringing native proprietary rights and 
violating international law.
3 Impossibility of Establishing Responsibility?
Establishment legal responsibility for the historical wrong of colonization 
and identifying viable redress options under current national, regional and 
international law is fraught with difficulties. The lapse of time and the result-
ing remoteness of the wrongful acts make it hard to fulfil the conditions to 
hold a party responsible for what happened in the past. When international 
lawyers try to establish responsibility for Africa’s colonization as a breach of 
law, the two main complications they face are the non-identity problem and 
the supersession of legal norms. The following sections discuss both difficul-
ties and attempt to answer the question whether these hurdles can be over-
come to establish responsibility for what happened in Africa 150 years ago.
3.1 Non-identifiable Parties
The first difficulty is to identify the injured party and the responsible party.47 
Under international law, who can lay the blame for the illegal colonization of 
Africa at whose door? First, the injured party has to be determined. The for-
mer European colonizing powers interfered with the sovereign rights of the 
African rulers, failed to respect native land ownership, did not comply with 
their treaty obligations and violated customary international law. The parties 
47 On this issue, see L.H. Meyer, ‘Einleitung,’ in: L.H. Meyer (ed.), Justice in Time. Responding 
to Historical Injustice (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), 12. See C. Kukathas, ‘Who? Whom? 
Reparations and the Problem of Agency,’ Journal of Social Philosophy, 37 (2006), 330–341 
and P. Patton, ‘Colonization and Historical Injustice – The Australian Experience,’ in: 
L.H. Meyer (ed.), Justice in Time. Responding to Historical Injustice (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2004), 159–172.
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thus prejudiced were the native rulers, the African political entity as a whole 
and the members of the polity. As many of these African polities no longer 
exist (or have materially changed) and the persons involved have passed away, 
a host of questions arise regarding the legitimate representation of these enti-
ties. On what grounds can persons or entities today file claims on behalf of 
parties that were disadvantaged in the distant past? What forms of relation-
ship can be attributed to descendants of natives who suffered colonial wrongs? 
To what extent can a direct relationship be presumed between those wronged 
and subsequent generations? Can native, indigenous, or minority groups be 
considered to have standing to represent their ancestors in legal proceedings? 
As to the specific issue of the illegal colonization of Africa, are potential claim-
ants sufficiently continuous with the parties that were directly impacted by 
the colonization? Can successive generations of injured African natives hold 
former colonial States to account for not complying with international law? 
Can present-day African States be identified as the successors to the former 
political entities that concluded cession and protectorate treaties with Euro-
pean States? Up till now, unambiguous and uniform responses turned out to 
be particularly complicated if not impossible. The indeterminateness of the 
injured party makes establishing responsibility for colonization as a wrong-
ful act unattainable. The core issue cannot be resolved: can current entities – 
whether nations, States or other organized groups of people – be identified as 
legitimate representatives of the African rulers and peoples who suffered at 
the hands of the European colonizers in the late nineteenth century?
In addition, identifying a current African State with rulers and natives who 
were wronged in the colonial past is barred by the argument that the injured 
party was and is considered to be a non-State actor. This argument follows 
from the icj’s reasoning observes in Cameroons v. Nigeria:48 according to the 
Court, the African entities with which the European powers concluded trea-
ties could not be considered States. This observation precludes a present-day 
African State from claiming to be the legitimate successor to an injured Afri-
can treaty party in the new imperialist era. In other words, a present-day State 
cannot be considered a legitimate substitute for a historical non-State entity. 
As a result, present-day States cannot be considered to succeed the rulers who 
concluded the cession and protection treaties.49
48 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Judg-
ment, 2002, icj Reports 303. The view of the icj was, however, criticized. See, for example, 
Craven, ‘Introduction,’ 19–20.
49 Although it is a formal given that a current State cannot be considered as a substitute 
of a political entity in the past, this does not mean that current States claim to be 
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Yet another problem is that the lapse of time only adds to the complexity 
of the non-identification problem. So much time has passed since the colonial 
wrongful acts were committed that today it is virtually impossible to identify 
legitimate successors to native rulers and peoples that suffered these acts. Be-
ing a legitimate claimant, or being recognized as such, is heavily dependent 
on the amount of time that has passed and on the extent to which the world 
has changed in the meanwhile. While the existence and identity of future 
generations can be argued to depend on the decisions and actions of current 
generations,50 the consensus among legal scholars is that a continuous and un-
disruptive chain of generations is likely to be the exception rather than the rule 
and is extremely difficult to prove. This is especially so if a wrongful act came 
to a clear end in the past, because this implies that the only claim succeeding 
generations may pursue is that they suffered the wrongful act indirectly.51
successors of historical polities, as the debate at the World Conference Against Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban (2001) evidenced, 
for example.
50 ‘A political community is constituted not only by the actions of those in the present, but 
also by those in the past, through the construction and maintenance of its identity over 
time. The anchors of legitimacy in a democracy are thus not exclusively present-centered, 
but also tied to the past – not only through legal practices such as precedent, but through 
ideals and norms associated with constitutional “foundings.”’ D. Ivison, ‘Historical Injus-
tice,’ in: J. Dryzek, B. Honnig and A. Philipps (eds.), Oxford Handbook to Political Theory 
(Oxford University Press, 2006), 18.
51 The Durban debate, however, made clear that the question whether colonization as a 
wrongful act has indeed ended in the past is answered differently depending whether 
you are in the block of, on the one hand, European States and the United States or, on the 
other hand, the African States, supported by Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. The 
main question is whether and to what extent there is a (in)direct link between histori-
cal dispossession and present violations of international law. Africa’s current dispositive 
status, as is put forward, is a consequence of the European dominance and suppression at 
the end of the nineteenth century. It is, however, the question to what extent colonialism 
is a continuous injury and which disadvantaged features can really be ascribed to as be-
ing consequences of colonialism? Put differently, did colonization have an end, and if so, 
what and when demarcates this finishing point?
    Causal relations become increasingly indeterminate in the course of time, caused by 
internal and external intervening factors. Increasing remoteness of historical wrongful 
acts runs parallel with an increasing complexness of determining the direct relation be-
tween acts and consequences, wrongs and injury. In this respect Dinah Shelton observes 
the following: ‘Causation is a complex issue in every legal system, where the extent of 
liability for remote events and the consequences of intervening causes may vary con-
siderably from one area of the law to another.’ D. Shelton, ‘Remedies and Reparation,’ in: 
M. Langford, W. Vandenhole, M. Scheinin and W. van Genugten (eds.), Global Justice, State 
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Identifying the responsible party is also problematic and controversial. How 
can present-day persons or States be held responsible for the past wrongs of 
others, in particular when these present-day parties were not themselves 
directly involved in committing these historical injustices? Several politi-
cal philosophers52 advocate the intergenerational justice approach to this 
Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 385.
    Africa of the twentieth century pictures a continent of colonization and decoloniza-
tion, war and peace, suppression and freedom, dictatorship and democracy, etc. To blame 
colonization for Africa’s economic, political, legal and social disposition on the whole, can-
not be substantiated. In other words, direct causal relations between Africa’s subjection to 
European powers and its present underdeveloped position cannot be proved. The lasting 
disadvantaged position of Africa as a developing part of the world may not be ascribed to its 
European subjection solely; it has other intervening causes too. Again, elapse of time and 
the concomitant difficulty of establishing causal relations make it complex to point out the 
cause of Africa’s status quo and to hold people responsible for its disadvantaged position.
    However, some consequences of the European ‘civilizing mission’ during the Age of 
New Imperialism are undeniably definite. In the vast majority of cases the amount and 
extent of native peoples were dramatically reduced when Europeans went into Africa’s 
Hinterland, caused by exploitative labour conditions, diseases, appropriation of tradition-
al lands, and conflicts with settlers. Alongside reduction of natives, they were relegated 
to socially minor positions. The consequences of dispossession, displacement, systematic 
discrimination and policies to enforce assimilation had a determining, if not devastat-
ing effect on the African continent and its populations. See P. Patton, ‘Colonization and 
Historical Injustice – The Australian Experience,’ in: L.H. Meyer (ed.), Justice in Time. Re-
sponding to Historical Injustice (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), 159. Especially, the taking 
of property (rights) to land had a crucial impact on the living standards of Africans, in 
particular if one considers property of land as the most basic right to fulfil primary needs 
of life. See Van Banning, Human Right to Property; Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples Land Rights 
and D. Lea, Property Rights, Indigenous People and the Developing World (Leyden: Brill, 
2008). And, up till today, Africans continue to suffer higher rates of disease, mortality, 
low living standards, unemployment and criminalization, while remaining neglected or 
under-represented in political and legal institutions on the international level.
52 See E. Barkan, The Guilt of Nations. Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (New 
York: Norton, 2000); D. Butt, Rectifying International Injustice. Principles of Compensa-
tion and Restitution Between Nations (Oxford University Press, 2009); M. Freeman, ‘Past 
Wrongs and Liberal Justice,’ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 5 (2002), 201–220; R.A. Hill, 
‘Compensatory Justice: Over Time and Between Groups,’ Journal of Political Philosophy, 
10 (2002), 392–415; D. Ivision, ‘Political Community and Historical Injustice,’ Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, 78 (2000), 360–373; Ivison, ‘Historical Injustice,’ 1–26; C. Kukathas, 
‘Responsibility for Past Injustice: How to Shift the Burden,’ Politics, Philosophy and Eco-
nomics, 2 (2003), 165–190; D. Miller, ‘Holding Nations Responsible,’ Ethics, 114 (2004), 
240–268; G. Sher, ‘Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10 
(1981), 3–17; R. Sparrow, ‘History and Collective Responsibility,’ Australasian Journal of 
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issue.53 This approach starts from the assumption that a ‘polity is a political 
society that persists through time and across generations: an organized entity 
capable of acting as an agent and taking responsibility for its actions.’54 Nations, 
States, tribes and other political entities are, therefore, continuous projects 
which go beyond generations: ‘[S]ome people may have to bear responsibility 
for past injustice of lines of responsibility can clearly be drawn. This is most 
likely when certain kinds of corporate agents persist over generations, even 
 after original members of such corporations have ceased to exist.’55 Since a 
political entity is intergenerational, it has ‘an identity that persists through the 
generations: a historical past and continuing future. As an agent it is assumed to 
have responsibilities in respect to both its past and future.’56 As a matter of jus-
tice, polity members have ‘duties to and in respect to past generations,’ which 
consequently implies that ‘each generation has a duty to ensure, so far as it can, 
that the burdens their successors must bear to maintain institutions of justice 
Philosophy, 78 (2000), 346–359; J. Thompson, ‘Historical Obligations,’ Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy, 78 (2000), 334–345; J. Thompson, ‘Historical Injustice and Reparation: Jus-
tifying Claims of Descendants,’ Ethics, 112 (2001), 114–135; J. Thompson, Intergenerational 
Justice. Rights and Responsibilities in an Intergenerational Polity (New York/London, 2009) 
and R. Tinnevelt, ‘Collective Responsibility, National Peoples, and the International Or-
der,’ Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie, 38 (2009), 147–158. See also M. Osiel, Mass Atrocity, 
Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick, London: Transaction, 1997) and J. Sarkin, 
Colonial Genocide and Reparations Claims in the 21st Century (Westport: Praeger Security 
International, 2009).
53 Irrespective whether the concerned generations succeed or overlap each other. See 
D. Butt, ‘Nations, Overlapping Generations, and Historic Injustice,’ American Philosophy 
Quarterly, 43 (2006), 357–367.
54 Thompson, Intergenerational Justice, 1. It has to be noted that also the intergenerational 
approach also cannot escape the non-identity problem. In the end, the plea for inter-
generational responsibility comes down to the rejection of the exclusion principle – 
 individuals or collectives are entitled to reparation only if they were the ones to whom 
the injustice was done – and the introduction of the idea of making entitlement depen-
dent on inheritance rather than causation of harm: descendants of the injured African 
natives at the end of the nineteenth century should ground their claim on the assertion of 
being deprived of their inheritance. See Thompson, ‘Historical Injustice and Reparation,’ 
114–135.
55 Kukathas, ‘Responsibility for Past Injustice,’ 165. See Miller, ‘Holding Nations Responsible,’ 
243.
56 Thompson, Intergenerational Justice, 5. ‘Associations that endure over time confer upon 
present members benefits that are the product of earlier expropriation.’ Kukathas, ‘Re-
sponsibility for Past Injustice,’ 183.
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[…] will not be greater than its own.’57 The core idea behind the argument for 
intergenerational responsibility is that political entities commit to obligations 
that are continuous and transcend generations. In trying to circumvent the su-
persession thesis (see below),58 supporters of intergenerational justice argue 
that membership of an intergenerational political entity, such as a nation, im-
plies civic responsibility for society fulfilling its duties, regardless of whether 
these duties are past, present or future ones. Supporters of the intergenera-
tional approach argue that many political entities, States included, can be held 
responsible for past injustices because as intergenerational continuators they 
were themselves involved directly in committing these wrongs.59 However, the 
intergenerational perspective on past injustices is not undisputed.60 One of the 
strongest objections to the intergenerational justice approach, − as expressed 
in Jeremy Waldron’s supersession thesis – is that political entities such as States 
or nations change in the course of time and in most cases radically. This makes 
determining the addressees of a responsibility claim a matter of immense intri-
cacy. The intergenerational approach to identifying responsible parties might 
be less problematic than it would be in Waldron’s view. As will be shown in the 
next section, Waldron would argue that pinpointing the responsible party is in 
some cases impossible and undesirable.
Considering that so much has happened and changed over the past 
150 years, linking members of the current generation to a remote generation 
of injured and responsible parties severely limits the feasibility of establishing 
responsibility for Africa’s colonization. Indeed, such identification may well 
be too complicated, but does this indeterminacy also vitiate the rights and ob-
ligations involved? Is the passing of time an insurmountable hurdle?
57 Thompson, Intergenerational Justice, 12. See ibid., 79. See also Ivison, ‘Historical Injustice,’ 
19; L.H. Meyer, ‘Einleitung,’ in: L.H. Meyer (ed.), Justice in Time. Responding to Historical 
Injustice (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), 24 and J. Thompson, ‘Collective Responsibility for 
Historical Injustices,’ in: L.H. Meyer (ed.), Justice in Time. Responding to Historical Injustice 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), 101–115.
58 See Sher, ‘Ancient Wrongs,’ 16.
59 See Ivison, ‘Historical Injustice,’ 17–22. Daniel Butt goes one step further in arguing that 
not to fulfil one’s compensatory or restitutive duties to wrongs in the past constitutes 
itself an act of injustice. D. Butt, Rectifying International Injustice. Principles of Compen-
sation and Restitution Between Nations (Oxford University Press, 2009) and D. Butt, ‘Na-
tions, Overlapping Generations, and Historic Injustice,’ American Philosophy Quarterly, 
43 (2006), 357–367.
60 J. Waldron, ‘Redressing Historic Injustice,’ in: L.H. Meyer (ed.), Justice in Time. Responding 




Since the European colonial powers violated international law and failed to 
respect the property rights of African natives, the populations involved and 
contextual conditions have changed drastically. As a consequence, old titles 
and rights expired and new ones were created. It was not only the parties that 
changed, so did their rights and obligations. It is in this context that Waldron 
uses the example of property rights to land.61 He argues that titles and rights to 
property of land are particularly sensitive to the passage of time and changes of 
circumstances. The entitlement of the original owners of land will decrease in 
strength over time if their title is separated from that land. Claims to land may 
fade over time as circumstances change; property rights are not imprescripti-
ble. Kukathas confirms the transitional or temporary validity of property rights 
by stating that ‘it is at best unclear how far the claims present people have to 
properly stem from the original rights of their ancestors. Property rights re-
gimes change over time. The law changes. And if this is so, it is not clear that a 
plausible claim can be made now on the basis of rights or entitlements which 
were in existence 100 years ago.’62 If this is true, the supersession thesis creates 
a moral hazard in that it generates an incentive to hold on to stolen land and 
to benefit the person who illegally acquired property rights to land. Waldron 
counters by stating that ‘the argument is that claims about justice and injustice 
must be responsive to changes in circumstances.’63 He agrees that the rule of 
restitution64 is a fundamental rule and that it applies in the sense that appro-
priators must return that which they have taken illegally. There are, however, 
certain time limits by which claims for restitution are bound. Waldron there-
fore argues that the illegal nature of historical acts cannot and should not be 
addressed after a certain period of time has passed.
What does this imply for the dispossession of African natives in the late 
nineteenth century? Claims to restitution of arrogated property rights over 
land should be treated very carefully, should be limited, and should in some 
61 Ibid., 68–71. David Lyons also asserts that property rights are not necessarily stable rights. 
D. Lyons, ‘The New Claims and Original Rights to Land,’ Social Theory and Practice, 
4 (1977), 249–272.
62 C. Kukathas, ‘Responsibility for Past Injustice: How to Shift the Burden,’ Politics, Philoso-
phy and Economics, 2 (2003), 171–172.
63 Waldron, ‘Redressing Historic Injustice,’ 70.
64 Restitution within the context of international law can be effectuated in two ways, name-
ly by (1) restitution integrum, implying the restoration of the former legal situation; or by 
(2) restitution in natura, which means the returning of the object wrongfully taken to its 
original owner.
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instances be rejected.65 The supersession thesis must be taken seriously and 
can indeed, as Waldron indicates, have the effect that claims arising from an 
illegal act lose their validity because of changed circumstances. The scope and 
substance of property rights are highly dependent on the context in which 
they were created and were meant to have the intended effect(s). Over time, 
arrogated land has often been transferred repeatedly. And there would be little 
justice in landing the current owner, who has acquired and possesses his prop-
erty in good faith, with the responsibility for illegal acts that were committed 
more than a century ago. On balance, it seems reasonable that restitution for 
historical acts of dispossession should not be effectuated if such restitution 
interferes with the property rights of current land owners. Wrongs should 
not be redressed by committing further wrongs. The principle of legal secu-
rity requires that the supersession thesis applies. Rights and obligations have 
a contingent nature, which necessarily limits the scope for exercising them. 
Paradoxically, supersession of rights and obligations is essential to legal cer-
tainty. This makes prescription a fundamental mode of acquisition under both 
private law and public law, and both nationally and internationally. It should 
be noted, however, that the supersession thesis must not be applied in general, 
but should be used on a case-by-case basis.
As a consequence of the supersession of people and their rights and obliga-
tions, responsibility for the historical wrong of Africa’s colonization by Euro-
pean States as a unified and general event cannot be established. Yet, this does 
not mean that in particular cases and circumstances responsibility of former 
colonial powers can be claimed successfully. The indeterminacy of the parties, 
rights and obligations involved cannot be resolved and this makes awarding 
claims for responsibility impossible. Nor is offering apologies a viable option, 
because apologies presume responsibility. Apologies differ from explanations 
and justifications in that apologies imply responsibility as well as blamewor-
thiness.66 While under international law apologies are recognized as a formal 
65 See G.S. Alexander, ‘The Limits of Property Reparations,’ Cornell Law Faculty Publications 
(2003), Paper 24. Available at: < http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lsrp_papers/24 > [ac-
cessed on 16 May 2014], 1–18. Alexander brings two reasons why reparations in the form 
of specific restitution for unjustly property should be awarded only in exceptional cases. 
He asserts that ‘[s]pecific restitution is a unique form of reparations. It is neither the only 
nor the best means of recognizing the legitimacy of claims brought by the many victims 
of atrocities committed in the past half-century.’ Ibid., 18.
66 E.A. O’Hara and D. Yarn, ‘On Apology and Consilience,’ Washington Law Review, 77 
(2002), 1132.
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remedy for violations of the law,67 in the political arena formal and public 
apologies are rare.68
Does the narrative end on the rather sobering note that the illegal coloniza-
tion of Africa cannot be redressed? Are there alternatives to establishing re-
sponsibility for such a major event? These questions are particularly pressing 
in view of the impact of colonization and the notion of cultural differences 
on the evolution of international law.69 The colonization of Africa in the late 
nineteenth century, and more specifically its illegality, was constitutive of the 
creation and development of the international legal order and its law. Recog-
nition of the illegal nature of the European acquisition and partition of Africa 
and its impact on the evolution of international law may contribute to recti-
fying the wrongfulness of this historical event and inspire reflection on the 
nature of international law.
4 Recognition
The virtual impossibility of identifying injured and responsible parties and the 
supersession of rights and obligations over time are unavoidable and insupera-
ble obstacles to establishing responsibility for the illegal European acquisition 
67 R.B. Bilder, ‘The Role of Apology in International Law,’ in: M. Gibney, R.E. Howard- 
Hassmann, J.-M. Coicaud and N. Steiner, The Age of Apology. Facing Up to the Past (Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 17. Richard Bilder enumerates several reasons why 
States might choose to apologize. Ibid, 24–26. See also E. Latif, ‘Apologetic Justice: Evalu-
ating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal Solutions,’ Boston University Law Review, 81 (2001), 
289–320.
68 The main reason for this reluctance of States is that these statements under certain cir-
cumstances may ‘constitute evidence of state practice and therefore (1) contribute to the 
formation of customary international law; (2) constitute a source of interpretation for the 
purpose of determining the content of obligations arising from treaty law; and (3) serve 
as a unilateral declaration that is at least binding on the state that issued the apology.’ 
M. Gibney and E. Roxstrom, ‘The Status of State Apologies,’ Human Rights Quarterly, 23 
(2001), 915. Examples of public apologies for past wrongs made by State representatives 
are, for example, to be found in R.R. Weyeneth, ‘The Power of Apology and the Process of 
Historical Reconciliation,’ Public Historian, 23 (2001), 9–38.
69 Anghie, Imperialism, 3 and A. Anghie, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of 
International Law,’ in: E. Darian-Smith and P. Fitzpatrick (eds.), Laws of the Postcolonial 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 89–107. See also Crawford, Creation of 
States; Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, 98–178 and M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law in 
the World of Ideas,’ in: J. Crawford and M. Koskenniemi (eds.), The Cambridge Companion 
to International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 54.
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and partition of Africa. Yet this fait accompli does not preclude recognizing 
the illegal nature of Africa’s colonization. The wrongfulness of this historical 
event has to be recognized under international law and by its agents, because 
the scramble for Africa had a decisive impact on the creation and evolution 
of international law. As has been argued, nineteenth-century international 
law not only had a civilizing mission but also one of furthering toleration 
between European and non-European nations. In the course of Africa’s 
colonization doctrine and day-to-day practice simultaneously imposed and 
created international law. As has been argued in the context of the inter- 
temporal rule, international law and its agents ought to be aware of the 
embeddedness of international law in the illegal colonization of Africa. 
Recognizing this entrenchment, i.e., formally acknowledging it,70 may 
contribute towards a reflection on the nature of international law. Such con-
templation ideally consists of three components. First, the Eurocentric per-
spective in international law should be abandoned, or at least avoided as 
much as possible. Second, international lawyers should generate knowledge 
on the history of international law to be able to understand the origins of dis-
putes and developments in current international law. And third, international 
lawyers seeking to evaluate historical international law for present-day pur-
poses should adopt an objective or critical position and consciously set aside 
particular interests or politics. As will be argued, reflecting on the nature of 
international law first and foremost serves (and requires) independence and 
impartiality.
The next question that arises is how international law recognition of the 
illegality of Africa’s colonization in the late nineteenth century can be effectu-
ated. Two complementary elements can be proposed. First, the United Nations 
General Assembly might request the icj to issue an Advisory Opinion71 on the 
question whether European States violated international law when they ac-
quired and partitioned Africa in the late nineteenth century. Second, the find-
ing the European acquisition and partition of Africa was illegal could be used 
in disputes brought before national, regional and international courts. Both 
elements will now be discussed in more detail.
70 Jennings, Acquisition of Territory, 36.
71 On the advisory jurisdiction of the icj, see K.J. Keith, The Extent of the Advisory Jurisdic-
tion of the International Court of Justice (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1971); D. Pratap, The Advisory 
Jurisdiction of the International Court (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) and F.B. Sloan, ‘Ad-
visory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice,’ California Law Review, 38 (1950), 
830–859.
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The first element is that the un General Assembly requests the icj to issue 
an Advisory Opinion72 on the question whether the European colonizers failed 
to respect African natives’ property rights, interfered illegally with the sover-
eign rights of the native rulers, breached their treaty obligations and violated 
customary international law. The fragility of this solution is that it relies on the 
endorsement of the individual Member States of the General Assembly, a fully 
fledge political body whose members make political choices and act in their 
own interests.73 Yet, even though considering a request for an Advisory Opin-
ion might be resisted by former colonial States, such a course of action could 
also be considered an opportunity for these States to acknowledge that the 
acquisition and partition of Africa was wrong and that this had repercussions 
in international law. Indeed, such a request for an Advisory Opinion may74 be 
an opportunity for modern States to draw a line under Europe’s colonial past 
in Africa.75
For a request to be considered by the Court, it must present a ‘legal or justi-
ciable’ question.76 This requirement, however, is not an obstacle. As has been 
shown, New Imperialism did indeed involve legal questions and was not only 
about politics and economics. The previous chapters have revealed the legal 
dimensions of the partition and subjection of Africa and have argued that giv-
en the treaties concluded between European States and native African rules 
the European colonization of Africa was illegal. In view of these findings, the 
icj might (if so requested) address the following two questions in an Advisory 
Opinion on the legality of Africa’s colonization. First, were the cession and pro-
tectorate treaties between European States and African polities in the second 
72 Article 96 of the United Nations Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of the Court serve 
for the legal basis for the request of an Advisory Opinion.
73 See R. Higgins, ‘Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process,’ Internation-
al and Comparative Law Quarterly, 17 (1968), 58–84. See also M. Pomerance, ‘The icj and 
South West Africa (Namibia): A Retrospective Legal/Political Assessment,’ Leiden Journal 
of International Law, 12 (1999), 425–436.
74 Before a request for an Advisory Opinion can be brought before the icj, an extensive 
debate has to take place in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the exact ques-
tions and on the question whether the icj is the right (judicial) institution to answer the 
questions. If agreement can be reached, an Advisory Opinion can contribute to ending 
the debate on the illegality of Africa’s colonization. There is, however, a danger that the 
icj will become part of the political conflict, which will enhance the conflict instead of 
weakening or solving it.
75 See J. Elster, Closing the Books. Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004).
76 Pratap, Advisory Jurisdiction, 121. See also article 96 un Charter and article 65 icj Statute.
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half of the nineteenth century valid and observed? Second, was the colonial 
protectorate a legally valid mode to acquire territory? The effect of recognition 
by way of such an Advisory Opinion should not be underestimated. Although 
icj Advisory Opinions, unlike icj judgments, are not binding,77 the respect 
their contents command is similar to that of the Court’s judgments.78
Here the second, complementary element of achieving international law 
recognition manifests itself. An icj Advisory Opinion recognizing the illegal-
ity of the acquisition and partition of Africa under international law needs to 
be concretized. Although responsibility cannot be established, the argument 
that Africa’s colonization was illegal can be used in cases brought before in-
ternational, regional and national courts. The colonization of Africa and, in 
particular, the treaties concluded between European States and African rulers 
underlie many current disputes over territory and borders79 as well as lawsuits 
in which native people claim their original and fundamental rights.
Recognizing the illegality of Africa’s colonization may have a notable impact 
on territorial and border disputes.80 Many conflicts81 on demarcating bound-
aries and the geographical parameters of territory on the African continent 
can be traced to the treaties concluded between European States and African 
rulers in the second half of the nineteenth century. Relevant examples include 
the Arbitral award cases of Bulama Island (1870) and Delagoa Bay (1875).82 In 
addition, the findings that native property rights were not respected, that the 
sovereignty of native rulers was ignored, that protectorate treaties were not ob-
served and that customary law was violated can have significant consequences 
77 This non-binding character of advisory opinions is confirmed by the Court itself in Inter-
pretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, Advisory Opinion, 1950, 
icj Reports, at 71 and South West Africa (Liberia/Ethiopia v South Africa), Preliminary Ob-
jections, 1962, icj Reports, 337.
78 On the nature of the Court’s advisory opinions, see Sloan, ‘Advisory Jurisdiction,’ 850–855.
79 See I. Brownlie, African Boundaries, 14–21.
80 See A.L.W. Munkman, ‘Adjudication and Adjustment,’ 1–116; B.T. Sumner, ‘Territorial Dis-
putes at the International Court of Justice,’ Duke Law Journal, 53 (2004), 1779–1812 and C.G. 
Widstrand (ed.), African Boundary Problems (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute for African 
Studies, 1969).
81 It has to be emphasized that not all boundary and territorial conflicts are rooted in Af-
rica’s colonial past. See Mbah, Land/Boundary Conflict in Africa, 2.
82 Bulama Island (Great Britain v. Portugal), Arbitration, 1870, 139 C.T.S. 21 and Delagoa Bay 
(Great Britain v. Portugal), Arbitration, 1875, 149 C.T.S. 363. For more recent cases, see Ka-
sikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment, 1999, icj Reports 1045 and Land 
and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002, icj Reports 303.
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for the outcome of present and future disputes on territory and boundaries.83 
This is (and has been) particularly true for cases that involve the consolidation 
of historical titles to territory, the application of the principle of the indisputa-
bility of borders (i.e., the principle of uti possidetis juris),84 the consequences 
of decolonization and the principle of self-determination.85 While the com-
patibility of the uti possidetis principle and the self-determination principle86 
is heavily debated,87 recognizing the illegal nature of Africa’s colonization 
cannot and should not affect existing rules of international law such as the uti 
83 Continuous conflicts exist, for example, between Chad and Libya, Ethiopia and Somalia, 
Ghana and Togo, Malawi and Tanzania, Namibia and South Africa, Niger and Benin, West-
ern Sahara. For a detailed address of these disputes, see A.J. Day, Border and Territorial Dis-
putes (Essex: Longman, 1982), 95–177 and D. Downing, An Atlas of Territorial and Border 
Disputes (London: New English Library, 1980), 58–83. See also N. Hill, Claims to Territory 
in International Law and Relations (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 7–53.
84 Frontier Dispute (Burkina-Faso v. Republic of Mali), Judgment, 1986, icj Reports 554 and 
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equa-
torial Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002, icj Reports 303. On the uti possidetis principle, 
see M.N. Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries,’ European Journal of International 
Law, 8 (1997), 478–507 and M.N. Shaw, ‘Introduction,’ in: M.N. Shaw (ed.), Title to Territory 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Dartmouth, 2005), xxii ff.
85 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 
1971, icj Reports 16 and Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975, icj Reports 4.
86 It has to be noted that there is no general right to self-determination. There is a principle 
supported by some concrete rights. Only if the minority population within the borders 
of a State is suppressed by the majority, this can legitimate a secession by the minority. 
There is, thus, no real tension between the principles of uti possidetis and self-determi-
nation. See A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 190–193.
87 See S.K.N. Blay, ‘Self-Determination Versus Territorial Integrity in Decolonization,’ New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 18 (1985–1986), 441–472; A. Casse-
se, ‘The International Court and the Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination,’ in: V. Lowe 
and M. Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice. Essays in Hon-
our of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 361–362; J. Crawford, ‘The 
General Assembly, the International Court and Self-Determination,’ in: V. Lowe and 
M.  Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice. Essays in Honour 
of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 603; K.H. Kaikobad, ‘Some Ob-
servations on the Doctrine of Continuity and Finality of Boundaries,’ in: M.N. Shaw (ed.), 
Title to Territory (Aldershot: Ashgate Dartmouth, 2005), 299–321; S.R. Ratner, ‘Drawing a 
Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States,’ American Journal of Interna-
tional Law, 90 (1996), 590–624 and Udombana, ‘Ghost of Berlin,’ 1–71.
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possidetis principle, because the problem of non-identification and the super-
session thesis make this impossible and objectionable.88
Within and outside Africa there is case law on how to reconcile the colonial 
past and on how to deal with entitlement to land created as a result of coloniza-
tion. The South-African Richtersveld case,89 the Australian Mabo v. Queensland 
case90 and the Canadian cases of R v. Van der Peet91 and Delgamuuwk have set 
a precedent.92 In these cases, the common-law doctrine of aboriginal or native 
88 Conflicts and legal insecurity are and will be the result of questioning and disregard-
ing existing rules on the allocation and division of (State) territory. Exemplary are the 
current situations of Kosovo and South Sudan in which independence was proclaimed 
unilaterally.
89 Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another, Judgment, 2001, 4 All sa 
563; Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Limited, Judgment, 2003, 6 sa 104 and Richters-
veld Community v Alexkor Ltd and Others, 2003, 12 bclr 1301. On aboriginal title in South 
Africa, see, for example, T.W. Bennett and C.H. Powell, ‘Restoring Land: The Claims of 
Aboriginal Title, Customary Law and the Right to Culture,’ Stellenbosch Law Review, 16 
(2005), 431–445; Bennett, Customary Law in South Africa; L.A. Hoq, ‘Land Restitution and 
the Doctrine of Aboriginal Title: Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd and Another,’ South 
African Journal on Human Rights, 18 (2002), 421–443 and H. Mostert and P. Fitzpatrick, 
‘Law against Law: Indigenous Rights and the Richtersveld Cases,’ Law, Social Justice and 
Global Development Journal, 2 (2004), 1–17.
90 Mabo v Queensland (No. 2), Judgment, 1992, 175 clr 1. On aboriginal title in Australia, see, 
for example, I. Hunter, ‘Natural Law, Historiography, and Aboriginal Sovereignty,’ Legal 
History, 11 (2011), 137–168; S. Motha and C. Perrin, ‘Deposing Sovereignty after Mabo,’ Law 
and Critique, 13 (2002), 231–238; H. Reynolds, The Law of the Land (Melbourne: Penguin, 
1987); H. Reynolds, Aboriginal Sovereignty (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996) and G. Simp-
son, ‘Mabo, International Law, Terra Nullius and the Stories of Settlement and Unresolved 
Jurisprudence,’ Melbourne University Law Review, 19 (1993–1994), 203–210.
91 R v Van der Peet, Judgment, 1996, 2 scr 507. On aboriginal title in Canada, see, for exam-
ple, M. Asch and P. Macklem, ‘Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on 
R. v. Sparrow,’ Alberta Law Review, 29 (1991), 498–517; K. McNeil, ‘The Meaning of Aborigi-
nal Title,’ in: M. Asch (ed.), Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equal-
ity and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), 
135–154; B. Slattery, ‘Understanding Aboriginal Rights,’ Canadian Bar Review, 66 (1987), 
727–783 and B. Slattery, ‘Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims,’ Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal, 29 (1991), 681–703.
92 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, Judgment, 1997, 3 scr 1010. See J. Borrows, ‘Sovereignty’s 
Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,’ Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 37 
(1999), 537–596 and K. McNeil, ‘Aboriginal Title as a Constitutionally Protected Property 
Right,’ in: O. Lippert (ed.) Beyond the Nass Valley: National Implications of the Supreme 
Court’s Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2000), 55–75.
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title is introduced and developed.93 Although these cases do not recognize the 
illegal nature of the colonization by the European State concerned (Britain), 
they do answer the question how to deal with the consequences of coloniza-
tion in this day and age.94 Using and refining the doctrine of native title and 
even extending it to civil law95 jurisdictions may well be a way to address the 
 illegal dispossession of African natives. Although the doctrine is still in its in-
fancy and has its limitations,96 it opens the door to redressing the historical 
wrong of colonization. In addition to cases that have been decided, an inter-
esting  development is that of precedent being created by, for instance, New 
Zealand in dealing with its colonial past of British domination, the Treaty of 
Waitangi and native entitlement to land.97 The future evolution of the doc-
trine of aboriginal title may well be influenced by the finding that the coloni-
zation of Africa was illegal. More generally, this finding may inspire research 
into the legality of European colonization of territories in other parts of the 
world. In addition, the finding that Africa’s colonization was illegal because the 
 European colonial powers violated their treaty obligations aligns with the con-
cerns of the United Nations Special Rapporteur Miguel Alfonso Martínez over 
the validity and legality of treaties between States and indigenous peoples.98 
93 Gilbert. Indigenous Peoples; McHugh, Aboriginal Societies; McHugh, Aboriginal Title and 
McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title.
94 See Kukathas, ‘Responsibility for Past Injustice,’ 186.
95 See Bennett and Powell, ‘Restoring Land,’ 431–445.
96 See J. Gilbert, ‘Historical Indigenous Peoples’ Land Claims: A Comparative and Interna-
tional Approach to the Common Law Doctrine on Indigenous Title,’ International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 56 (2007), 597–598.
97 See M.S.R. Palmer, The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution (Welling-
ton: Victoria University Press, 2008). See also, T. Bennion, ‘Treaty-Making in the Pacific in 
the Nineteenth Century and the Treaty of Waitangi,’ Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review (2004), 1–35 and A. Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of 
Maori Claims in New Zealand since the 1970s, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 1997).
98 Findings of the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Treaties with Indigenous 
Peoples, 22 June 1999, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20. Martínez completed his work after the for-
mer United Nations Special Rapporteur, José R, Martínez Cobo, made recommendations 
on this topic in his Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Peoples, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/0, §§ 388–392. In 1987, these recommendations led the United Na-
tions Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to 
decide to commission a ‘Study on treaties concluded between indigenous peoples and 
States’ (2 September 1987, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/17). In 1988, the Human Rights Commission 
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By making explicit the relationship between the treaties and the consequences 
for the rights of natives he bridges the gap between past events and present 
implications. He notes that these treaties have played ‘a negative role with re-
spect to indigenous rights. On many occasions they have been intended – by 
the non-indigenous side – to be used as tools to acquire “legitimate title” to the 
indigenous lands by making the indigenous side formally “extinguish” those 
and other rights as well.’99 Extending the Special Rapporteur’s concerns, the 
concerned finding may be used to support the implementation of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007, undrip).100 
These are, however, speculative prospects whose achievement depends on a 
wide range of human choices and circumstantial uncertainties.
Effectuating the recognition of the illegal nature of the European coloniza-
tion of Africa has two purposes, one pragmatic or realistic, the other theoreti-
cal or ideological. First, specific disputes and cases that originate in a failure to 
respect native land ownership and sovereignty, non-compliance with protec-
torate treaties, or violation of customary international law must be addressed 
and settled. Second, given its historical roots the nature of international law re-
quires reflection. Agents of international law – courts, scholars, States or other 
entities making and applying international law – must be (made) aware of the 
emergence and development of international law in the wake of the confron-
tation between Europeans and African natives in the late nineteenth century.
99 Martínez, Study on Treaties, §282.
100 See the Committee on Rights of Indigenous Peoples of the International Law Association 
presented its Interim Report at the 2010 biennial ila meeting in The Hague and its Final 
Report at the 2012 biennial ila meeting in Sofia. Both reports can be found at the ila 
website: www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024 [accessed on 28 May 2014]. 
For the declaration itself, see www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf 
[accessed on 28 May 2014]. See also W.J.M. van Genugten, ‘Protection of Indigenous 
Peoples on the African Continent: Concepts, Position Seeking, and the Interaction of Le-
gal Systems,’ American Journal of International Law, 104 (2010), 29–65. It has to be noted 
that Article 37 of the undrip, which addresses the issue of treaties between indigenous 
populations and States, reflects customary law. This Article provides in its first Section 
that ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement 
of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States of 
their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and 
other constructive arrangements.’ The second Section adds that ‘[n]othing in this Decla-
ration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples 
contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.’ See the Interim 
Report of the Committee on Rights of Indigenous Peoples of the International Law As-
sociation, 2010, 51.
chapter 9276
As a result of the scramble for Africa, the presumption of cultural differ-
ences has introduced three deficits into international law. The proposed re-
flection on international law aims to encourage agents of international law to 
recognize these deficits and to remedy them. Only renunciation of Eurocen-
trism, heightened historical awareness and a critical mindset can contribute 
towards the nature of international law being reflected on in any meaningful 
way. And it is only the recognition of the illegal nature of colonization and 
its determinative influence on the nature of international law that can help 
provide closure.
The illegal act of colonization and its consequences should be recognized 
globally, especially when considering that in an ever globalizing world inher-
ently encourages a more integrative approach to international law and human 
rights law. This approach is particularly nourished and strengthened by the 
broadening scope of international legal subjects. The distinction between pub-
lic international law and human rights, never an easy or perspicuous one, is 
rapidly becoming fictitious and outdated. Collective rights, which go beyond 
State borders and negate the State-centric world view, are coming to the fore. 
Developmental rights of minorities and indigenous peoples as well as environ-
mental rights and duties claim a place on the world stage. Public international 
law and human rights law will need to forge ties to ensure that global actors 
exercise their rights and perform their duties. Creating a level playing field for 
all, instead of a hierarchical world as colonialism did, is the way forward. And 
this objective can be achieved by the legal subjects of the global community 
as a whole working together, ranging from States to international organiza-
tions, from ngos to individuals, and from multinational corporations to small 
businesses.
Anghie underlines that ‘colonialism was central to the constitution of in-
ternational law – including, most importantly, sovereignty doctrine – were 
forged out of the attempt to create a legal system that could account for re-
lations between the European and non-European worlds in the colonial 
confrontation.’101 The civilizing mission based on cultural differences created 
and justified a superior versus inferior hierarchy within international law. This 
idea of fundamental cultural differences separating the European and non-
European worlds dominated the colonial era. The resulting inequality was to 
define the evolutionary course of international law.
The violations of the cession and protectorate treaties by the European 
contracting parties constituted wrongful acts, and this implies that the con-
tinued evolution of international law was founded on illegitimate actions and 
101 Anghie, Imperialism, 3.
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introduced inequality: In the artificially created hierarchy of the international 
legal order, Africa and its inhabitants were wrongfully relegated to an inferior 
position.102 It is for the sake and future of international law that its subjects 
must come to terms with its foundations. A lesson to be learned from the age 
of New Imperialism and the European treatment of African natives is that in-
ternational law should be based on the inclusion of subjects, not on exclusion, 
as exemplified by the ‘standard of civilization’ and its degrading concepts of 
‘barbarian’ and ‘savage.’103 The emphasis should be on equal rights for all sub-
jects of international law in order to erase the premise of inequality underly-
ing twentieth century international law. African legal subjects (in the broadest 
sense; not only African States), should be recognized and acknowledged as 
equal players on the global level by and for the international community as a 
whole. The global human rights regime must truly include nations and peoples 
that have as a consequence of colonialism been marginalized in the current 
world order.
Moreover, the international community has to be understood as compris-
ing not only States, but also international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, multinational corporations and private individuals. Since 
the partition of Africa in the late nineteenth century went beyond the level 
and boundaries of the State and was carried out by a multiplicity of play-
ers, it is a  multiplicity of actors that must now try to ameliorate some of the 
 consequences. As  colonialism involved so many private and public persons, 
organizations and societies, it would be undesirable and impossible to hold 
particular individuals, organizations, or societies accountable. This would re-
sult in arbitrariness.
It could even be argued that the violation of the cession and protection 
treaties by the Europeans were violations of all members of the international 
community. This is what Karl Strupp concedes in his Das völkerrechtliche Delikt 
(1920). He argues that it is possible, in theory, to consider the violation of any 
treaty a violation of the fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda, which 
102 In this sense, Butt was right when he argued that if the response to the injustice was mor-
ally inadequate, then a second act of injustice was committed. D. Butt, Rectifying Interna-
tional Injustice. Principles of Compensation and Restitution Between Nations, Oxford, 2009, 
p. 6. The failure to fulfil restitutive and/or compensatory obligations with regard to the 
violation of African natives’ property rights and extensive amounts of treaty violations 
could itself be seen as a wrongful act, which is inherent and constitutive to the nature and 
further development of international law.
103 See Koskenniemi on ‘The myth of civilization: a logic of exclusion-inclusion’ in Kosken-
niemi, Gentle Civilizer, 127–132.
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implied ‘a violation of all members of the community of states.’104 When ap-
plied in the context of Africa’s colonization, Strupp’s argument implies that 
the violation of cession and protectorate treaties concluded between Europe-
ans and Africans can be considered violations of obligations erga omnes. This 
would be a compelling reason to argue for the moral responsibility of the in-
ternational community as a whole105 for the sake of international law and the 
common good.106 Recognizing the illegality of Africa’s colonization can and 
should be considered an erga omnes obligation107 on the international, or more 
correctly, the global level. Such recognition would in fact be in the interest of 
the entire international community, as the icj confirmed in a 1970 decision: ‘In 
view if the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a 
legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.’108 However, 
obligations erga omnes do not only affect States, but also all current and future 
subjects of international law; the dualist world view should be abandoned in 
favour of serving the collective interests of the international community.109 
104 K. Strupp, Das völkerrechtliche Delikt (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1920), 9–11.
105 ‘[T]he term “international community as a whole” is now a well-accepted phrase. States 
remain central to the process of international law-making and law-applying, and it is axi-
omatic that every state is as such a member of the international community. But the in-
ternational community includes entities in addition to states, and their role can be legally 
significant. […] Thus our conception of “international community as a whole” needs to 
be an inclusive and open-ended one. But this only underlines the point we cannot con-
ceive of these obligations as owed “to” a wide and disparate group, as it were singularly 
or separately.’ J. Crawford, ‘Responsibility to the International Community as a Whole,’ in: 
J. Crawford, International Law as an Open System. Selected Essays (London: Cameron May, 
2002), 351–352. See also A.-L. Vaurs-Chaumette, ‘Other Entities: Peoples and Minorities,’ 
in: J. Crawford, A. Pellet, and S. Olleson, The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 1000–1002.
106 M. Craven, ‘For the “Common Good”: Rights and Interests in the Law of State Responsibil-
ity,’ in: M. Fitzmaurice and D. Sarooshi (eds.), Issues of State Responsibility before Interna-
tional Judicial Institutions (Oxford, Portland: Hart, 2004), 105–128.
107 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, icj Reports 1970, 
p.3, p. 32, at para. 33 and 34.
108 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, icj Reports 1970, 
p.3, p. 32, at para. 34.
109 In the context of erga omnes obligations, the question arises whether the scope and 
invocability of responsibility should be broadened: The bilateralism inherited in the cur-
rent system of State responsibility seems to be unable to meet nowadays conditions and 
challenges. See, for example, P.-M. Dupuy, ‘A General Stocktaking of the Connections be-
tween the Multilateral Dimension of Obligations and Codification of the Law of Respon-
sibility,’ 13 European Journal of International Law 5 (2002), pp. 1053–1081; and I.  Scobbie, 
‘The Invocation of Responsibility for the Breach of “Obligations under Peremptory 
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Bruno Simma characterizes the rise of community interests ‘permeating’ the 
body of international law: ‘International law is finally overcoming a legal, as 
well as moral deficiencies of bilateralism and maturing into a much more so-
cially conscious legal order. Thus, a rising awareness of the common interests 
of the international community, a community that comprises not only States, 
but in the last instance all human beings, has begun to change the nature of 
international law profoundly.’110
In sum, the constitution and evolution of international law and the legal or-
der in which it is used is based on illegal actions by European colonial powers 
directed against Africans and the international community as a whole. How-
ever, New Imperialism did mark the end of the absoluteness of the traditional 
perspective on the international legal order as consisting of the bilateral rela-
tions between territorial States. On this view, the international community as 
a whole is under a moral duty to settle a historical debt, because several of its 
members benefited from subordinating a whole continent and its peoples. This 
global obligation involves recognizing and improving Africa’s disadvantaged 
territories and peoples on the basis of equality, and this includes  realizing 
 Africa’s full participation on the international legal forum as well as developing 
and protecting a wide range of rights: civil and political rights, social and eco-
nomic rights, minority and indigenous rights, collective rights, development 
rights, etc. The global rehabilitation of Africa and its subjects benefits both 
Africa and international law, because it is through this process of reflection, 
recognition and rehabilitation that the subjects of international law can (and 
must) come to terms with its historical legal roots origins in order to move 
forward. That is the responsibility the international community has to bear.
5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined whether responsibility can be established for the 
unlawful acquisition and partition of Africa and whether remedies are avail-
able to redress this historical wrong. First, the responsibility issue was prob-
lematized by analysing and showing the consequences of the passing of time 
and the application of the inter-temporal rule in international law. The in-
terpretation and application of the inter-temporal rule – the non-retroactive 
Norms of General International Law,”’ 13 European Journal of International Law (2002), 
pp. 1201–1220.
110 B. Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law,’ 250 Hague 
Recueil des cours (1994), p. 234.
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application of law, but at the same time an evolutionary interpretation of 
law – is not obvious, though crucial, as is shown by the reasoning of the icj in 
Cameroons v. Nigeria. If the Court had used an objective and historic interpre-
tation of the inter-temporal rule, it might not have concluded that a colonial 
protectorate was a legal means for European States to acquire title to African 
territory. Instead, the Court might have argued that the colonial protectorate 
was a political instrument to justify Africa’s colonization after the fact, that 
Britain had breached its treaty obligations and that the transfer of territorial 
sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula from the rulers of Old Calabar to Brit-
ain did not accord with nineteenth-century international law. The doctrine of 
inter-temporal law therefore underlines the close and necessary relationship 
between international law and a proper understanding and awareness of the 
history of international law in general and of legal disputes in particular.
Second, it has been shown that establishing responsibility for the illegal-
ity of Africa’s colonization faces two difficulties: the identification of the in-
jured and responsible parties and the supersession of rights and obligations. 
The passage of time has been shown to be an insurmountable hurdle; estab-
lishing responsibility, in general, for the historical wrong of colonialism is too 
complex. Establishment such responsibility would also impair legal certainty, 
create injustice and violate the law. The inevitable conclusions are that respon-
sibility cannot be established, that no remedies are available and that formal 
apologies need not be offered.
In addition, a case has been made for an alternative to responsibility in or-
der to enable international law to be reconciled with its colonial origins, name-
ly, recognition of the illegal nature of the European acquisition and partition 
of Africa. Until recently, as has been shown in the first chapter of this book, the 
determinative impact of the acquisition and partition of Africa by European 
colonial powers on the nature, creation and evolution of international law has 
not been not acknowledged by its agents. This is unfortunate, because it has 
meant that the civilization or cultural differences argument has continued to 
underlie and justify international law. Legal scholars and professionals should 
recognize that the dualist world view has affected the evolution of interna-
tional law. Such reflection may encourage international law agents to reflect on 
and abandon the biased and ahistoric nature of international law.
Finally, two complementary ways have been proposed to effectuate this rec-
ognition. First, the United Nations General Assembly should request the icj to 
issue an Advisory Opinion on the question whether the European treaty-based 
acquisition and partition of Africa was legal by nineteenth-century interna-
tional standards. Second, international, regional and national courts ought to 
consider the illegality argument in deciding cases that trace back to Africa’s 
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colonization. Here too, the aim of recognizing the illegal nature of Africa’s col-
onization is to encourage reflection on the biased character of international 
law. Both legal practitioners and legal scholars have a role to play in reshaping 
international law as an inclusive body of law. The Eurocentric approach in in-
ternational law should be abandoned; international lawyers should be (made) 
aware of the historical roots and evolution of international law, and they 
should be critical in assessing and applying international law. By recognizing 
the illegality of Africa’s colonization, members of the current international le-
gal order can draw a line under cultural differences between nations as the 
basis of international law and develop a non-hierarchical international law, 
both in theory and in practice. Although responsibility for the illegal acquisi-
tion and partition of Africa by European States in the late nineteenth century 
cannot be established, this does not mean that the international law legacy of 
this historical wrong cannot somehow be rectified.
chapter 10
Evaluative Summary and Conclusion
The stand first of a newspaper article in the British newspaper The Telegraph 
of 9 July 2009 catches the eye: ‘Barack Obama tells Africa to stop blaming co-
lonialism for problems’ In the article President Obama is quoted as saying ‘Ul-
timately, I’m a big believer that Africans are responsible for Africa. I think part 
of what’s hampered advancement in Africa is that for many years we’ve made 
excuses about corruption or poor governance, that this was somehow the con-
sequence of neo-colonialism, or the West has been oppressive, or racism […] 
I’m not a believer in excuses.’ Although President Obama is right in pointing 
to the flawed logic of causally linking the colonization of Africa to its current 
social, political and economic problems, Western imperialism – not only as 
a social, political and economic phenomenon, but also as a legal one, as the 
Durban debate shows – did have a constitutive impact on the creation and 
development of international law and order.
The legacy of the age of New Imperialism for international law is that it was 
in that era that international law was founded on the premise of the world 
being divided into civilized and non-civilized nations, a notion introduced by 
European legal doctrine and politics to justify the acquisition and partition 
of Africa. Euro-centrism in international law and the at best modest histori-
cal contextualization and critical evaluation of international law by its agents 
combined to ensure that the nature of international law was determined by 
cultural differences. New Imperialism, and more specifically the acquisition 
and partition of African territory in the late nineteenth century, was consti-
tutive of the creation and development of international law. Europeans did 
impose international legal norms, but international law was also shaped by 
the European-African confrontation. In this sense, international law evolved 
as the product of a process of mutual influence in the confrontation between 
political entities. Recognizing that the European colonization of Africa had a 
major impact on the evolution of international law may add a dimension to 
the biography of international law and initiate a process of reflection on the 
nature of international law as an impartial body of law.
The biased nature of international law can be considered one of New Im-
perialism’s main offshoots. But what else have New Imperialism and the colo-
nization of Africa bequeathed to international law? Their impact has made 
itself felt in at least six ways. First, the process of acquiring and partitioning 
Africa demonstrates that theoretical categorizations in nineteenth-century 
© Mieke van der Linden, 2017 | doi 10.1163/9789004321199_011 
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 international legal doctrine are flawed. Traditionally, New Imperialism, both 
the age and the phenomenon, is characterized by dichotomies, oppositions 
and divisions – civilized versus non-civilized, European versus non-European, 
sovereign versus non-sovereign, public versus private, sovereignty versus prop-
erty, centre versus periphery, theory versus practice, law versus politics, formal 
versus informal, advanced versus backward, domination versus sub-ordina-
tion, positivism versus naturalism, we versus them, and, in missionary terms, 
toleration versus civilization. The scramble for Africa, however, evidences how 
these dualities were exploited arbitrarily and how they became unworkable, 
invalid and out of touch with reality. In fact, the European acquisition and 
partition of African territory can be, and should be, understood as an eman-
cipatory force in international law that upset this view of the world as being 
composed of binary opposites. Although international law retained its biased 
character, the scramble for Africa was a catalyst for the diversification and uni-
versalization of international law in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
Second, New Imperialism shows that Africa’s colonization did not occur in 
a legal vacuum and that the law of nations was a living body of law. In nine-
teenth-century international legal doctrine, these dualities were used to ex-
plain and justify international relations. Moreover, until quite recently it was 
this dualistic world view that informed mainstream European international 
legal doctrine. This established canon prioritized the theoretical explanation 
and justification of colonialism over the empirical evidence, i.e., what hap-
pened on the ground. The premise on which legal doctrine based its views and 
arguments was that international law only applied to and between the mem-
bers of the family of civilized nations, i.e., a select group of nations in Europe, 
America, the Ottoman Empire, Japan, China, Siam and Persia. Admission to 
membership of this family depended on being recognized as a sovereign State 
by the other family members. Although it is true that norms of international 
law only applied to and between the members of the family of civilized na-
tions, it was the more general law of nations that regulated the relations be-
tween nations beyond the family of civilized nations and between members 
and non-members of the family. The practice of concluding cession and pro-
tectorate treaties beyond the realm of the family of civilized nations strongly 
suggests that the law of nations was a functioning body of law before and dur-
ing the European scramble for Africa.
Third, New Imperialism belies the presumption that the private and the 
public spheres were disconnected environments. New Imperialism demar-
cates a period in the common history of Africa and Europe in which the politi-
cal and economic forces of society became entangled: the boundaries between 
public and private spheres blurred, as did those between the legal concepts 
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of sovereignty and property. This intermingling is an outgrowth of the liberal 
approach of defining and organizing society in a persistent longing for prog-
ress. This liberalism introduced a strain of cosmopolitism that was inherently 
paradoxical: its goal of a tolerant – Kantian – cosmopolitan world rested on the 
assumption that there was a non-civilized part of the world to waiting be con-
verted. This cosmopolitanism neither respected nor tolerated other nations, 
but imposed itself on them. It was this brand of liberalism that contributed to 
making the world a smaller place, underlay the civilized-non-civilized divide 
and was the basis of positivism. As the privileged status of being a civilized 
nation depended on being recognized as such by the members of the family of 
civilized nations, this coveted and exclusive position was open only to a select 
group of States.
Fourth, New Imperialism challenges the plausibility of the State-centric 
model as the foundation of international law. In nineteenth-century interna-
tional legal doctrine, the colonial encounter was a confrontation between Eu-
ropean States and African political entities. Assuming that the non-European 
world lacked sovereignty, enabled positivists to construe this encounter as an 
arena in which the sovereign – by definition a European State – made, inter-
preted and enforced the law. In other words, the colonial encounter enabled 
positivists to construct a system of international law that imposed European 
norms and values on non-European lands and peoples. Although positiv-
ist theory envisioned a harmonious world defined by international society, 
sovereignty, and civilization, the reality of the scramble for African territory 
turned was one of conflict and disorder, reinforcing the dualistic world view. 
Nineteenth-century international legal doctrine created two worlds: one of 
sovereign States, whose relations were governed by international law, and one 
of non-civilized nations, where international law had no place. Imperium as 
the unifying notion of territory and sovereignty became the realm of the State, 
the civilized European State to be precise. It was only at the end of the nine-
teenth century, as a result of doctrinal attempts to legitimize the colonization 
of  Africa, that territory coincided with sovereignty and became a constitutive 
condition for statehood. In practice, however, African political entities were 
perfectly capable of transferring sovereignty, whether wholly or in part, over 
their territory by treaty. Although they did not possess statehood – i.e., they were 
not recognized as States by the members of the family of civilized nations – 
they were considered sovereign. This reality confirms the fictitious nature of 
the dualist and State-centric legal order, a reality which helped shape inter-
national law in the Post Modern Age (1914-present), an era characterized by 
the pluriformity of international legal entities and the gradual, globalization-
induced detachment of sovereignty and territory.
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Fifth, New Imperialism confirms the central role of sovereignty and prop-
erty in instituting legal order and maintaining it. The concepts of sovereignty 
and property, more specifically territorial sovereignty (imperium) and private 
ownership of land (dominium), are the most fundamental regulatory principles 
of human society. This universality notwithstanding, their application is rela-
tive to their interpretation and realization in the given historical, geographical, 
cultural and socio-political context. What did the right to property of land and 
territorial sovereignty mean in Europe and Africa in the age of New Imperial-
ism? One of the main findings of this study is that dominium, imperium and 
the differences between these two legal concepts were recognized by both the 
European colonizing powers and the African native polities. More fundamen-
tally, the core legal issue of the European acquisition and partition of Africa 
was the compatibility of the right to control objects and the right to control 
subjects, and it is clear that the European construct of the modern State is 
one of a number of ways to express and apply the concepts of sovereignty and 
property. Unlike these two universal concepts, however, the State is a product 
of its time. The European-African confrontation in the late nineteenth-century 
shows the limits of the State, both as a concept and as an instrument of geo-
political organization.
Sixth and more fundamentally, New Imperialism raises the question what 
the nature of international law was in the nineteenth century. How must inter-
national law be conceived: as a man-made construct deductively imposed or 
as a product of encounters between nations inductively applied? In attempt-
ing to reinterpret the acquisition and partition of Africa by European pow-
ers in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, this book has not taken 
the modern State as its starting point, but rather the concepts of property and 
sovereignty, which go beyond the State. And in abandoning the State-centric 
model, it has also discarded the erroneous presumption of a divided world, a 
presumption that has had a lasting impact on international law. Instead of the 
theoretical premises of international law, it was international law in practice 
that has formed the point of departure for this book. This approach has made 
it possible to assess the colonial venture from a perspective that is not, or at 
least to a lesser extent, informed by preconceived notions. What happened in 
practice is that Europeans came into contact with African native communi-
ties. As these contacts endured, they needed regulating, but the conceptual 
framework of the modern State was ill-suited to account for the reality of the 
scramble for Africa.
These general claims about the impact of New Imperialism on interna-
tional law are founded on the answers to the three central questions of this 
book. Did the European colonial powers acquire private property rights to 
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land along with territorial sovereignty by concluding cession and protectorate 
treaties with African rulers in the age of New Imperialism (1870–1914)? Did 
the European colonial powers comply with their treaty obligations and their 
international legal obligations? If treaties and international law were violated, 
which consequences and remedies were and are available under these trea-
ties and under international law respectively? Three case studies – on Brit-
ish Nigeria, French Equatorial Africa and German Cameroon – have clarified 
the historical context in which these treaties were negotiated, concluded and 
implemented. Put differently, the case studies address the question whether 
the objectives, the text and the interpretation of these treaties aligned. They 
show that it is essential to reconstruct international law as it stood at the time 
of the scramble for Africa on the basis of a contextual analysis. The three case 
studies also bring home the reality of the acquisition and partition of Africa 
by means of cession and protectorate treaties between European powers and 
African rulers.
As has been argued, the scramble for Africa constitutes a radical break with 
a centuries-long tradition of international law. In the relatively short period of 
half a century, international relations and colonialism underwent several fun-
damental transitions: from economic to political relationships, from indirect 
to direct rule, from original to derivative modes of acquisition, from cession to 
protectorate treaty and, eventually, from traditional to colonial protectorates. 
These far-reaching transitions occurred in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, a period when positivist legal thinking was at its apogee, the sovereign 
State was the creator, subject and enforcer of international law – as it applied 
to and between the members of the family of civilized nations – and territory 
became the prime objective in the European drive towards expansion.
Effectively, New Imperialism on the African continent was a European 
struggle for title to territory within a period of less than twenty years at the 
end of the 1800s. The premise underlying the appropriation by European 
States of foreign territories was that legal acquisition of territory confirmed 
the legality of the subsequent title to that territory. The legal instruments most 
commonly used to create European titles to African territory were bilateral 
cession and protectorate treaties between European States on the one hand 
and African rulers representing their peoples on the other hand. The fact that 
these treaties were concluded implies that the European confrontation with 
nations in the non-civilized part of the world did not occur in a legal vacuum. 
In this  European-African confrontation, concepts from European interna-
tional law, which in principle only applied to and between members of the 
family of civilized nations, were used to regulate contacts with foreign nations 
and the acquisition of overseas territories. The reality of nineteenth-century 
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 international law is that bilateral treaties were concluded between European 
States and African political entities, and this reality shows that African rulers 
had the capacity, or competence, to conclude treaties and possessed sovereign 
powers. Cession and protectorate treaties were considered to be treaties be-
tween two sovereign contracting parties. This also implies that the capacity to 
conclude treaties did not require European-style statehood. In sum, interna-
tional legal practice does not support the strict dualist perspective and con-
firms the existence and applicability of the law of nations.
The legality of the cession and protectorate treaties hinges on the meaning 
and role of territory in the context of the European treaty-based acquisition 
and partition of Africa as well as on the status of these treaties in nineteenth-
century international law. Were cession and protectorate treaties concluded 
between European States and African rulers in the late nineteenth century 
merely pieces of paper without any legal value, a status constructed by nine-
teenth-century legal positivists and upheld by twentieth-century international 
legal scholarship? Or did these documents have legal value? In other words, 
were these cession and protectorate treaties sources of law? This book presents 
three in-depth comparative case studies of treaty compliance to clarify what 
happened after the treaties had been signed.
The case studies address two central questions. First, what role did prop-
erty and sovereignty play in treaties and agreements transferring sovereign 
rights over territory that Europeans and Africans concluded in the second half 
of the nineteenth century? Second, how were existing sovereignty and prop-
erty rights affected after these treaties had been signed? Although the three 
case studies report substantial differences in terms of how African territories 
were acquired and ruled, two general conclusions can be drawn. First, the 
European colonizing power manifestly failed to observe provisions in the ces-
sion treaties on the observance of natives’ proprietary rights to land. In theory, 
the European State which acquired all-comprehensive sovereignty over terri-
tory had the capacity to allocate and control land and proprietary rights to 
this land. In practice, existing rights to land were neglected and natives were 
dispossessed – a strategy that accorded neither with the letter nor with the 
spirit of the cession treaties. Second, the European protectors denaturalized 
protectorate treaties and used them as springboard for annexation. Protector-
ate treaties became the most important instrument for European powers to 
acquire, first, external and, later, internal sovereignty rights over territories, 
a procedure recognized by nineteenth-century doctrine and politics. The 
European protectors not only had jurisdiction over external relations and de-
fence, but also over internal affairs. As a result, European politicians could 
use colonial protectorates as they saw fit – Acts of State not being subject to 
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judicial review – and such use was at odds with both the essence and purpose 
of the traditional protectorate.
This practice raises the intriguing question whether European contracting 
powers, acting as they did, breached their treaty obligations. Since by treaty 
only external sovereignty rights were transferred from the African ruler to the 
European State and the European contracting party explicitly committed itself 
not to interfere with natives’ property and related rights, it can be concluded 
that the European State concerned, by extending its external sovereign rights 
to include the authority to rule the native population, breached its obligations 
under the protectorate treaty. The European contracting party failed to respect 
the internal sovereignty of the African ruler and arrogated the latter’s role as 
supreme authority of and over the native polity. By appropriating the sover-
eign rights controlling the relationship between native ruler and native sub-
jects and by dispossessing natives of their land, the Europeans failed to comply 
with the obligations they had undertaken to perform and that had been ex-
plicitly stated in the protectorate treaties. On this view, the acquisition of all-
comprehensive sovereignty after signing a protectorate treaty was not a logical 
consequence or natural process, but an illegal act.
In sum, these treaties were indeed sources of law and, more importantly, 
the objectives, texts, interpretations and implementation of these treaties 
were unaligned: imperium and dominium were not used in accordance with 
the law of nations. These findings give rise to the question whether in breach-
ing cession and protectorate treaties the European contracting parties violated 
nineteenth- century international law. In other words, were Europeans bound 
to respect their treaties with African rulers? Were they legally obliged to ob-
serve the treaty provisions or were they free to break their promises? Were 
their treaties with African rulers legally binding instruments? All of these 
fundamental questions must be answered in the affirmative. European States 
were obliged to comply with the cession and protectorate treaties and had to 
keep their promises, despite the civilization argument and despite the unequal 
status of the contracting parties. In short, European State powers were legally 
obliged to honour the treaties they concluded with African rulers.
By not complying with their obligations as articulated in the cession and 
protectorate treaties concluded with African rulers, the Europeans violated 
customary international law. By interfering with the property rights to land 
and land law of African polities and, by extension, with the sovereign rights 
of the native rulers, the European contracting parties failed to observe their 
obligations under the treaties they had concluded. By signing a treaty, the Eu-
ropean State concerned was bound to execute the treaty as agreed based on 
the customary norms of the law of nations regulating the relations between 
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European and non-European nations, the most prominent of which were the 
principles of pacta sunt servanda and bona fides. In the final analysis then the 
European treaty-based acquisition of African territory in the final two decades 
of the nineteenth century was in contravention of international law. In other 
words, the colonization of Africa by European States in the age of New Impe-
rialism did not accordance with legal standards that were considered valid at 
the time: the scramble for Africa lacked legality.
As has been argued, the perceived divide between the civilized and the non-
civilized word part was disproved by the international legal practice of Euro-
pean and Africans concluding treaties. International legal theory was unable 
to account for this reality of international law. This clear discrepancy between 
international law in theory and in practice – law in the books versus law in 
action, so to speak – raises the question what constituted valid and therefore 
binding international law in the nineteenth century? This question revealed 
a division amongst legal scholars along the positivist-naturalist fault line, but 
customary international law offered a way out of this gridlock. The custom-
ary law nature of the treaty-making practices between Europeans and Africans 
both integrated the consensus of the subjects of international law and put into 
effect such norms of the law of nations as the principles of pacta sunt servanda 
and bona fides alongside positive international law as laid down in legislation, 
case law and doctrine. In other words, customary international law simultane-
ously brought international law into practice and realized norms of the law 
of nations on which this practice was based. It showed that international law 
was not only created by facts, but also emerged from unlawfulness; it mediated 
between, on the one hand, factual events and, on the other hand, theoretical 
and legal constructs. While it reconciled positivist and natural law approaches, 
customary international law emphasized the primacy of the application of 
law between nations and showed that international legal theory was not up to 
the task of dealing with legal deficits created in the field. The customary law 
nature of international relations also showed that international law was not 
just ‘European’: international law was not only imposed by European States, 
it also evolved through the confrontations between nations. In other words, 
the narrative of ‘European’ international law imposing itself the rest of the 
world and introducing universal standards is a half-truth. Nineteenth-century 
international law not only had a one-directional civilizing mission but also one 
of mutual toleration between European and non-European nations. Custom 
brought fundamental principles into practice which in turn both imposed and 
created the law of and between nations.
Furthermore, the practice of European and non-European nations conclud-
ing treaties well before the nineteenth-century testifies to the inclusive nature 
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of the law of nations. The widespread practice of interactions and transac-
tions between Europeans and nations from Africa, Asia, Oceania and South 
America was instrumental in creating the law that applied the law between 
these nations, and it evinces that the scope of international law was not lim-
ited to sovereign, territorial States. The customary nature of international law 
is testament to the creation and existence of a true law of and between na-
tions. Even so, in the nineteenth century European legal scholars and politi-
cians constructed and imposed a distinctly European brand of international 
law, and until quite recently Euro-centrism persisted as a constitutive feature 
of international law.
The finding that the European acquisition and partition of Africa was illegal 
raises the issues of responsibility and reparations. Can responsibility be estab-
lished for a past wrongful act, more specifically the colonization of Africa? If it 
can, what remedies were available under the cession and protectorate treaties 
and under nineteenth-century law, and what remedies are available under cur-
rent international?? Given the temporal aspect of these questions, the inter-
temporal rule comes into play. How does the inter-temporal rule, involving 
components of both the non-retrospective and the evolutionary application 
of rules, impact on the issue of the legality of the acquisition and partition of 
Africa? What implications does the doctrine of inter-temporal law have for the 
central issue of European responsibility for the late nineteenth-century coloni-
zation of Africa? The applicability of the doctrine depends on the preliminary 
question whether the act of colonization was legal, and that question must be 
answered on the basis of contemporary international law: did the European 
States act in contravention of the law that was in force when they colonized 
Africa? If they did, if their conduct is found to be illegal, retroactive interpreta-
tion and assessment is redundant, because the conduct of the European colo-
nial powers was contrary to international law in force at the time. Moreover, 
the illegal nature of Africa’s colonization in the late nineteenth century has not 
been reversed by the evolutionary path international law has since taken: the 
colonial conduct of the European powers in Africa in the late nineteenth cen-
tury remains contrary to international law. In conclusion, the inter-temporal 
rule offers a compelling argument that the colonization of Africa was an act 
which did not, and does not, meet the standards of international law.
In sum, in the context of the colonization of Africa in the age of New Impe-
rialism, the application of the inter-temporal rule is relatively straightforward. 
Responsibility of former European colonial powers for the illegal acquisition 
and partition of African territory can be based on legal grounds. The Europe-
ans failed to respect native ownership of land and sovereignty, breached trea-
ty obligations and violated international law. On a proper understanding of 
291Evaluative Summary And Conclusion
nineteenth-century international law, the colonial conduct of European States 
can be qualified as wrongful; the European States’ acts contravened the law in 
force when these acts were performed, and retroactive legal evaluation of the 
factual circumstances is therefore unnecessary.
However, problems regarding the application of the inter-temporal rule 
may arise in emerging fields of international law. Here, courts play a vital role. 
In the context of international adjudication and the understanding and ap-
plication of the inter-temporal rule, the icj has delivered judgment in cases in 
which it had to assess the validity of treaties or interpret their provisions.
There is no clear-cut answer to the question whether responsibility for past 
colonial wrongs can be established, and whether reparations can be awarded, 
under current national, regional and international law. The passing of time 
and the ensuing remoteness of the wrongful acts make it hard to fulfil the con-
ditions for assigning responsibility for past events. Establishing responsibility 
for the illegality of Africa’s colonization faces two difficulties: the identifica-
tion of the injured and responsible parties and the supersession of rights and 
obligations. This study shows that the passage of time is an insurmountable 
obstacle: it renders the pursuit of establishing responsibility too complex to be 
feasible. Establishing such responsibility would itself impair legal security, cre-
ate injustice and violate the law. As responsibility cannot be assigned, there is 
no case to be made for awarding reparations or offering formal apologies. The 
same is true if obligations are superseded.
Does the story end here: the colonization of Africa, while illegal, cannot be 
redressed? Is there an alternative to establishing responsibility for an event 
that had such an impact on the history of both Africa and international law? 
No, and yes. There is a way to assign Africa’s colonization its proper place in 
the history of international. This alternative route, which bypasses estab-
lishing responsibility and awarding reparations, is recognizing that Africa’s 
 colonization was illegal. The pervasive impact the European acquisition and 
partition of  Africa has had on the evolution of international law has largely 
gone  unnoticed. This is an unfortunate oversight, because it has meant that 
the civilization or cultural differences argument has continued as a mainstay 
of international law. What should be acknowledged is that the dualistic world 
view not only helped clear the way for the colonization of Africa, but has also 
shaped the evolution of international law. Such recognition may encourage 
agents of international law to interpret international law in its historical con-
text and to reflect on the biased nature of international law.
To facilitate this recognition, this study has proposed two complementary 
courses of action. The first of these is that the icj issue an Advisory Opinion on 
the legality or illegality of the treaty-based European acquisition and partition 
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of African territory by nineteenth-century international law standards. Second, 
international, regional and national courts, as well as individual judges, ought 
to take into account the illegality of Africa’s colonization in deciding cases that 
trace back to the time when European States acquired and partitioned Africa.
Times have changed and societies have progressed since the Europeans 
colonized Africa, but international law still rests on a historically biased foot-
ing. Both legal practitioners and legal scholars can contribute towards making 
international law an inclusive body of law. International law should lose its 
Euro-centric outlook, and international lawyers, once aware of the historical 
roots and evolution of international law, ought to critically assess and apply 
international law in their day-to-day work. Ultimately, international law can 
only achieve the status of an impartial, unbiased and universal body of law if 
it disposes of its fundamental – and fundamentally flawed – presumption of 
cultural differences. Past events cannot be undone, but their legacies can.
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